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This thesis reviews the political work of Sir Robert Filmer in terms of its coherence 
and justificatory framework. Here, I also examine Locke’s response to Filmer, in 
Locke’s Two Treatises of Government. I propose to revise the arguments of Filmer 
and Locke, in their relation to each other. 
Filmer’s system, on my proposal, is coherent in its justification of political 
power. I observe in Filmer’s system a justification of political power isolated within 
the political. A moral and a legal justification is supplementary to the political. 
The objective of this thesis, accordingly, is to establish a political 
justification of political power. This project is limited to Filmer’s system. I propose 
to extract from Filmer’s system a justification of the state limited to political 
reasons. This, I contend, is the strength of Filmer’s system. 
Further, I offer a revision of Filmer’s political doctrine, in particular the 
critical part of his work. Within Filmer’s critique of consent theory, a positive 
notion of freedom and consent may, I observe, be developed. The strength of 
Filmer’s system also lies in a positive notion of natural freedom. This I conceive in 
terms of a revisionist account of Filmer’s system, on the substance of his argument. 
In my approach to Locke, I limit the project to his Two Treatises of 
Government, where Locke is engaged in his attack on Filmer. 
I discuss the limits of a political voluntarist interpretation of Locke’s 
political doctrine. Locke’s account of the original contract, I find, does not establish 
individual consent as a grounding of political legitimacy. A political naturalist 
interpretation, I contend, is available for Locke’s doctrine, serving it better in its 
justification of political power. 
Now, as I observe, Locke, in his critique of Filmer, commits to a Filmerian 
paradigm. In his First Treatise, Locke engages Filmer’s scriptural arguments. But 
Locke, also, relies on scripture in his own political philosophy. As I argue, Locke 
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not only relies on scripture but constructs his contract theory within a Filmerian 
paradigm. This, I find, explains Locke’s allowances for political absolutism, in his 
Second Treatise, as well as non-intentional (tacit) consent. 
Further, Locke’s anthropological patriarchalism coheres with his contract 
theory, on a political naturalist interpretation, whereas a voluntarist interpretation 
does not fully incorporate this part of Locke’s doctrine. On the former, Locke 
constructs an evolutionary framework for Filmer’s patriarchal theory, in terms of 
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Abbreviations and References. 
 
References are noted parenthetically within the text, using an author-date reference 
system. Abbreviations, noted parenthetically, are applied for several primary 
sources. These are listed and demonstrated below, with some remarks of 
clarification. 
 
1. Works of John Locke. 
 
I            First Treatise of Government (1690). 
 
II           Second Treatise of Government (1690). 
 
For Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, a numeral is cited for the relevant 
section. Also, the lines of sections may be cited, indicated with an “l.” 
 
Laslett’s edition of Two Treatises (1970) is applied throughout. 
 
E           Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1894). 
 
2. Works of Sir Robert Filmer. 
 
A           The Anarchy of a Limited and Mixed Monarchy (1648). 
 
D           The Directions for Obedience to Government in Dangerous or Doubtful 
              Times (1652). 
 




F           Observations upon Aristotles Politiques Touching Forms of Government 
              (1652). 
 
O           Observations Concerning the Originall of Government (1652). 
 
P            Patriarcha (1680). 
 
Laslett’s edition of Filmer’s works, Patriarcha and Other Political Works of Sir 
Robert Filmer (1949), is applied throughout. Sommerville’s edition, Patriarcha 
and Other Writings (1991), is noted for comparison, on occasion. 
 
3. Works of Thomas Hobbes. 
 
C           De Cive (1983). 
 
EL        The Elements of Law [Human Nature and De Corpore Politico] (1840). 
 
Note. Chapters of De Corpore Politico follow numerically from Human Nature. 
 
L           Leviathan (1994). 
 
4. Works of Immanuel Kant. 
 
G          Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1981). 
 







The chronology presented is for purposes of clarification, in view of the relation of 
major thinkers and their critics. 
 
1570. Elizabeth I excommunicated by Pope Pius V. 
 
1632-42. Filmer engaged in (completes) the writing of his Patriarcha. 
 
1635. John Selden’s Mare Clausum published. 
 
May, 1640. Hobbes completes a manuscript of The Elements of Law, to be 
published (without permission) ten years later. 
 
April, 1642. De Cive published in Paris, in Latin. 
 
1647. De Cive (in Latin) published in two editions in Amsterdam. The first edition, 
entitled Elementa Philosophica, De Cive, published early in 1647. A second 
Amsterdam edition of the same title published towards the end of the year. 
 
1648. Rump parliament. Filmer’s Freeholders Grand Inquest published. 
 
1649. England declared a commonwealth, 19 May. 
 
1650. The Engagement controversy. Humane Nature and De Corpore Politico 




1651. In the spring, the English translation of De Cive, entitled Philosophicall 
Rudiments concerning Government and Society, is published in London. 
 
1651. Leviathan published late that year, in London. 
 
1652. Filmer’s Directions published alongside his Forms, under the 
Commonwealth of England. Nedham’s translation of Selden’s Mare Clausum 
published. 
 
1653. Oliver Cromwell made Lord Protector. Death of Filmer. 
 
1668. The Latin version of Leviathan published. 
 
1679-80. Filmer’s works republished in bulk. First publication of Filmer’s 
Patriarcha. Locke writes large portions of Two Treatises of Government, during 
the Exclusion Crisis, when Filmer has become the focal point of Whig attack on 
the royalist cause. 
 
1680. Tyrrell’s Patriarcha non Monarcha published (late that year). 
 
1681. Charles II dissolves the Oxford Parliament. Shaftesbury is arrested for 
treason. Locke acquires (in June) a copy of Tyrrell’s Patriarcha non Monarcha. 
 
1683. The Rye House Plot. Algernon Sidney executed for treason. Locke leaves 
London, 14 June. 
 
1685. Edmund Bohun publishes the second edition to Filmer’s Patriarcha, 




1685-6. Locke is occupied with the writing of A Letter concerning Toleration. 
 
1689. Locke returns to England from exile in the Netherlands. Convention 
Parliament. Locke’s Epistola de Tolerantia published in the Netherlands. A Letter 


























This is a study of political naturalism in the works of Sir Robert Filmer and, 
relatedly, John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government. 
Here, naturalism denotes a patriarchal account of the development of human 
society and a genetic justification of political power. A concept of the political 
supports a patriarchal account, in Filmer’s political writings. This, I observe, is also 
the case in Locke’s reply to Filmer, in his Two Treatises.  
A concept of the political, for both thinkers, relates to the beginning of 
political society. A beginning is marked by a form of possessory right. Political 
power, ultimately, is justifiable in virtue of who or what possesses the right to use 
it. 
The question posed, Was Filmer right? is prompted by a concern for Filmer’s 
status in political philosophy. My aim is to do justice to Filmer’s standing and the 
substance of his argument. Filmer is a diamond in the rough. The project is to carve 
out the diamond. 
The strength of Filmer’s system lies in its conception of the political. This 
conception I extract from Filmer’s scriptural account of political authority as well 
as his critical account of consent theory. 
In contribution to recent Filmer scholarship,1 I emphasize an argumentative 
approach to Filmer’s political works, in addition to the historical. The thesis revises 
Filmer’s argument, in particular the critical part of his work. 
 
1 See esp. Leiter (2018); Cuttica (2012); Ian Parker (2004); Waldron (2002); Sommerville (1999). 
Leiter (2018), Ian Parker (2004), and Waldron (2002) argue in favor of Locke’s reliance on scripture 
and the Adamite paradigm. But these authors still position Locke within an antithetical paradigm to 
Filmer. Cuttica (2012) and Sommerville (1999) apply the contextualist (autobiographical) method 
to Filmer’s body of work. This thesis proposes, analyzing Filmer’s system, that Filmer and Locke 
proceed within the same paradigm in political philosophy. 
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Now, as Cuttica (2012:6) stresses, Filmer has been denied the status of an 
independent thinker within the history of English political thought. This is largely 
due to the influence of John Locke, in whose shadow Filmer remains. In his Two 
Treatises of Government, Locke attacks Filmer’s system wholesale. Locke, 
notably, has long been deemed successful in his dismantling of Filmer’s system.2 
In the words of Robert Paul Wolff, in his In Defense of Anarchism (1970), 
 
John Locke may have found it worthwhile to devote an entire treatise 
to Sir Robert Filmer’s defense of the hereditary rights of kings, but 
today the belief in all forms of traditional authority is as weak as the 
arguments which can be given for it (21). 
 
But, suffice it to say, in our time of political crises, Wolff’s judgement falls flat. 
Illiberal politics rival the liberal paradigm on a global scale, most notably in the 
extended use of emergency laws. This project, accordingly, is to examine Filmer’s 
justification of authoritarian government. 
Filmer’s most notable work, Patriarcha (1680), is to be interpreted in the 
context of political crisis (Cuttica 2012:219). This is not to say that the specter of 
crisis provides a justification for political action. Rather, the powers of the ruler, 
unleashed in crises, require a justification, because in crisis those are most at 
controversy. 
My desire, like Cuttica’s (2012), is to demonstrate Filmer’s deserved 
independent standing in the history of political thought. In my view, Filmerism still 
presents a novel position in political philosophy. Also, I believe, Locke’s critique 
of Filmer has yet to be scrutinized on equal terms with Filmer. As it happens, this 
is the motivation of the present study, in developing the philosophy of Filmerism. 
 
2 See e.g., Marshall (1994); Green (1986); Wolff (1970); Laski (1949). 
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My investigation of Filmer is historical, though not primarily biographical. 
Rather, the approach given is revisionist in terms of Filmer’s argument. Also, I 
examine Locke’s political doctrine, in view of a political naturalist interpretation of 
Filmerism. As I contend, Locke, in his attack on Filmer, retains the philosophical 
basis upon which Filmer’s system rests, namely, political naturalism. 
In this way, the project at hand deviates from Cuttica’s (2012) investigation 
of Filmer, in which Filmer’s biography is extensively discussed in examination of 
his political doctrine. Here, Cuttica is indebted to Peter Laslett, following Quentin 
Skinner’s contextualist method. While I value the contextualist method, I offer a 
more argumentative approach to Filmerism as well as a comparative study of 
Locke. 
Now, presenting the contextualist method, Sommerville (1991:xv) stresses 
reading Filmer in the context of his own time, as opposed to the orthodox reading 
of Filmer through Locke’s critique of his works. Locke was engaged in the writing 
of his Two Treatises during the Exclusion Crisis (1679-81), when Filmer’s 
Patriarcha was posthumously published, and his other works republished. The 
English Civil War, however, is most relevant to Filmer’s own time. 
The contextualist method provides the background to our project’s re-
evaluation of the quality of Filmer’s argument. In examining the argumentative 
structure of Filmer’s political writings, I suggest taking seriously their 
philosophical basis. Admittedly, my re-evaluation of Filmer’s contribution to 
political philosophy is challenged by Locke’s shadow. My priority, however, is not 
to engage in analysis of Filmer through Locke’s critique. To the contrary, the aim 
is to read Locke through Filmer, in retrospect. This, I gather, is the next phase in 
Filmer scholarship. 
I certainly concur that Filmer’s Patriarcha is not to be “seen as an unalterable 
and timeless discursive performance expounding uniform cultural patterns or social 
typologies” (Cuttica 2012:12). Following the contextualist method, Cuttica (2012) 
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considers Patriarcha “as a character acting on a stage of ongoing exchanges of texts 
and opinions” (12). While I agree, I also emphasize the significance of an 
evaluation of Filmer’s argument. A revision of Filmer’s argument is in order as 
well as Locke’s. 
Now, Filmer’s system provides a political justification of political power. A 
political justification, as I understand, is based on political reasons alone. In Filmer, 
a justification of the state is observed within a framework of political naturalism, 
in critical analysis of consent theory and political voluntarism. 
In this light, the foregoing question may be rephrased. How is a political 
justification of political power possible? Filmer’s system, I find, provides an 
answer to this question. In Filmer’s system, a political justification of political 
power may be isolated and evaluated on its own terms. 
Further, I examine Locke’s consent theory, as formulated in his Two 
Treatises, in its reply to Filmer. Locke’s political doctrine, though averse to Filmer, 
is shown to rest comparably on a political naturalist foundation. Filmer, I gather, 
was right not only to the degree that he presented a coherent system of political 
thought but also seeing that Locke, his great critic, proceeded in his own doctrine 
within a Filmerian paradigm.3 
This thesis, accordingly, is divided into Part 1 and 2. In Part 1, I set forth 
Filmer’s argument within a coherent system. Filmer’s argument offers a 
justification of the absolute power of the ruler. I revise and develop Filmer’s 
argument, in advancing the logic of the system. Also, I defend Filmer’s system 
against its critics. In Part 2, I discuss the limits of a voluntarist interpretation of 
Locke’s political doctrine. Locke’s account of the original contract, I find, does not 
 
3 Cf. Faulkner (2005). As Faulkner (2005:456) notes, Locke addressed not only Filmer’s 
“principles” but the “foundation” of his system, as expressed in the subtitle of Two Treatises. 
However, I contend, Locke does not abandon the “foundation” of Filmer’s system. This relates 
particularly to the Adamite paradigm. Rather, Locke would address Filmer’s opposition to original 
communism within his own presentation of the Adamite paradigm. 
5 
  
establish individual consent as a grounding of political legitimacy. A political 
naturalist interpretation, I contend, is available for Locke’s doctrine. Further, it 
serves better Locke’s doctrine in the justification of political power. 
Here, my objective is to isolate a political justification of political power, viz. 
prior to a moral and a legal justification. Filmerism, I observe, provides a political 
grounding for his otherwise moral and legal reasoning. To be sure, I do not attribute 
to Filmerism the proposition that “Might makes right.” Political power, for Filmer, 
is not a matter of ability but one’s position within a natural hierarchy. 
The thesis, on this caveat, presents a case for political naturalism.4 The case 
is established in developing the logic of Filmer’s system. We read Locke, likewise, 
through the lens of political naturalism. The task is twofold: (1) To locate in Filmer 
a political justification of political power; and (2) to present an interpretation of 
Locke’s consent theory consistent with political naturalism, as a viable alternative 
to a political voluntarist reading, in demonstration of a similitude between Filmer 
and Locke. 
Now, Locke’s political-theological doctrine is crucial to the understanding of 
early modern political thought and, by extension, the basis for contemporary liberal 
democracy (Ian Parker 2004:151). But Locke’s political doctrine, and its grounding 
in theology, is only properly understood as a reply to Filmer. 
In his attack on Filmer in Two Treatises, Locke crafted Filmer’s legacy. Yet 
both thinkers, I contend, apply a political justification of political power. By 
 
4 I shall, for the purposes of this thesis, use the term “political naturalism.” This term might be 
identified, or said to overlap, with “political realism.” The term “political realism,” however, I 
reserve for a discussion of the political and the moral, in the context of Bernard Williams’ (2005) 
deliberations of the political. In the context of Filmer’s system, we shall apply “political naturalism.” 
The concept of the political, in Williams (2005), relates to security and stability. This understanding 
of the political is also relevant, for our purposes. Yet this, I observe, is a utilitarian case for the 
justification of political power. A utilitarian case, I gather, is still tied to the moral in such a way as 
to render the moral prior to the political. In our usage, the political is prior to the moral on a de facto 
theory of political power. That is, I define the political in terms of possessory right, where the right 
has been appropriated (by means of acquiring property). 
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“political,” I refer to a right that is possessed because it has been appropriated. It is 
not possessed prior to the act of appropriation. A right of possession, in this sense, 
is applied as a fundamental premise of justification within a de facto theory of 
political power. 
Political naturalism, as I apply the term, is defined by the primacy of 
possessory right. A political entity, then, obtains in virtue of a right of possession. 
Now, Locke’s Two Treatises is in large part a polemic against Filmer. The 
First Treatise is a refutation of the political writings of Filmer, his Patriarcha in 
particular (Zuckert 2002:129). Locke’s Second Treatise provides a more abstract 
account to that given in the First. In the Second, Locke further develops his consent 
theory and labor theory of property. Our enterprise, incidentally, is meant to 
alleviate “the great neglect of the First Treatise” (Zuckert 2002:129) in Locke 
scholarship. 
I object to Ian Harris’s (1994:239) view that Locke eschewed political 
naturalism. According to Harris (1994:240), Locke’s commonwealth could not 
arise from the processes of nature. A formation of government, for Harris’s Locke, 
is a rational act. Government, thus, is an artifice; the formation of government is a 
deliberate act of artifice, for rational ends (240). 
I do not doubt that government, for Locke, is a rational construction. This, 
however, does not render government non-natural. Locke’s commonwealth, in fact, 
is built on the structure of patriarchal monarchy. 
As I observe, Locke, in his Two Treatises, does not set out to destroy Filmer’s 
system but to construct his own political doctrine within a Filmerian paradigm. 
Though Locke’s attack on Filmer’s system is unmerciful, Locke ultimately 
maintains its most fundamental naturalist premises. 
Filmer’s system, I maintain, is coherent. Here, my reading is unorthodox. 
Faulkner (2005) maintains Locke in fact demonstrated Filmer’s “hopeless 
incoherence” (465). Filmer’s political thought, Ian Parker (2004:83) claims, was 
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not so much a coherent philosophical account as a polemic. Dunn (1969:58-79) 
expresses a similar opinion. This, further, confirms Laslett’s judgement. The corpus 
of Filmer’s political writings, Laslett (1949:11) maintains, does not present a 
coherent theory of politics. In contrast, Greenleaf (1964:87) proposes Filmer does 
have a coherent theory of politics. Though Greenleaf reaches his conclusion on an 
inaccurate interpretation of Filmer’s system,5 I do concur with his view of the 
coherence of Filmer’s system. 
On this view, I reconsider the substance of Filmer’s argument. My primary 
objective, to be sure, is not to evaluate the historical influence of absolutism in 
seventeenth century English politics, in the fashion of Sommerville (1999). Rather, 
I aim to extract a coherent argumentative structure in Filmer’s political doctrine of 
divine right absolutism. At the same time, absolutism is found persistent in Locke’s 
account of the original compact, within a political naturalist framework. 
Further, Filmer’s system has heretofore been evaluated in terms of his denial 
of freedom. The strength of Filmer’s system, however, lies in a positive notion of 
natural freedom. This I conceive in terms of a revisionist account of the substance 
of Filmer’s argument. A positive account of freedom is not explicit in Filmer’s 
works. 
A revisionist account of Filmer’s system offers us an interpretation, in turn, 
of Locke’s political doctrine, within a political naturalist framework. Locke’s 
engagement with Filmer, I observe, reveals the foundations of Locke’s political 
doctrine. 
As I maintain, in his refutation of Filmer’s system, Locke is not reliant on 
political voluntarism. In Locke’s attack on Filmer, individual consent is non-
essential to a justification of political power on contractual grounds. Locke’s 
 
5 Greenleaf (1964) considers Filmer’s patriarchalism analogical in its argumentative structure. 




commonwealth begins not in the form of a transfer of the natural rights of 
individuals but, rather, an immediate political union established in protection of 
property, in effect in taking possession of a territory. 
The nature of the political, for both thinkers, is possessory right. Locke’s 
political doctrine, so to say, presents evolutionary Filmerism. This is demonstrated 
in Locke’s historical framework of the development of human societies from a 
patriarchal order. 
The difference between Filmer and Locke does not amount to an antithesis. 
In fact, Filmer and Locke fundamentally agree on the natural order of things and 
political authority. But while Filmer presents a static view of natural and political 
order, Locke reconstructs the Filmerian paradigm within an evolutionary account 
of human societies. 
In his critique of Filmer, Locke maintains a form of patriarchalism as well as 
a commitment to a scriptural account of political legitimacy. In this context, the 
static Filmerian view is put in evolutionary terms. Locke does not deny the 
patriarchal origins of human societies. But the evolution of patriarchal societies is 
understood within the framework of contract theory. Also, Locke follows Filmer in 
the use of Adam as a model of political society (Ian Parker 2004:146, 150). Yet 
Locke’s Adam represents the whole of humanity and its development, whereas for 
Filmer, Adam is an individual appointed universal monarch by divine decree. 
As Joshua Mitchell (1993:81) remarks, Locke and Filmer are allies of a sort, 
as well as antagonists. In his attack on Filmer, Locke at the same time defends the 
notion of the political significance of Adam (81). But, given Adam’s representation, 
the idea of original common ownership of the earth is established, in Locke’s 
political doctrine. For Filmer, private ownership is primitive, in the person of 
Adam. 
Ultimately, I reject a political voluntarist reading of Locke. On such a 
reading, political power is legitimated in virtue of individual consent (see Simmons 
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1993:208). Locke’s consent theory, however, is not one “of self-assumed 
commitment according to which actual individual consent itself justifies holding 
citizens to be under a certain duty” (Green 1988:162). For Green (1988), political 
power is justifiable by individual consent in the undertaking of an obligation (162). 
The consequence of consent is the acquisition of obligation on part of the consenter 
(162). But Lockean consent, I observe, is not consistent with political voluntarism, 
so described. Rather, in the formation of Locke’s commonwealth, unanimous 
consent is expressed in a political union, where all members are required to obey 
the determination of the body politic, as it is constituted. An obligation to obey, in 
this sense, is a consequence of a political requirement. 
On my interpretation, Lockean consent is binding upon political 
requirements. Individuals, on political naturalism, are naturally subject to political 
authority (Simmons 1993:36). This, I propose, is a Filmerian as well as a Lockean 
position. 
A political voluntarist reading of Locke’s consent theory proposes to 
comprehend his state-of-nature model in apolitical terms. Political relationships, 
then, are considered morally legitimate as an outcome of voluntary acts by assigned 
parties, viz. in the form of individual consent (Simmons 1993:36). Now, Lockean 
consent, granted, manifests in individual consent. But, I claim, this is expressed 
apropos of original unanimous consent, in the formation of a political union. A 
political requirement of unanimity grounds Locke’s consent theory. 
On this basis, I offer a political naturalist reading of Locke’s consent theory. 
Here, I challenge A. John Simmons’s (2001) political voluntarist reading of Locke. 
For Simmons (2001), individual consent remains the legitimating standard of 
Locke’s consent theory. 
Political naturalism, Simmons (1993:37) notes, tends to commit the 
“communitarian fallacy,” viz. inferring the truth of political naturalism from 
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truisms of human societies.6 Such truisms, granted, are meant to support claims of 
political naturalism. However, Filmer’s patriarchal theory, I contend, relies on no 
such truisms. It presents a coherent system of political naturalism. 
Political naturalism, Simmons (1993:37) remarks, must defend the claim that 
persons are necessarily political and thus subject to political authority. In Filmer’s 
system, the very structure of human society is inherently political. Persons are 
subject to political authority from birth. These claims are rendered normative in 
terms of a natural hierarchy and divine right. 
Political naturalism maintains the invariability of the political in the natural 
condition of human beings (Simmons 1993:36). On this notion, individuals are 
political beings, invariably located in a political condition, whether societal or 
anarchical. A political condition is prior to the moral and social. The latter are 
extensions of the political. 
Now, patriarchalism is a form of political naturalism. As Cuttica (2012:4) 
notes, patriarchalism does not exclusively refer to the origins of political authority. 
It sets forth a comprehensive account of sovereignty. 
I shall, in this light, re-litigate Locke’s reply to Filmer. The controversy 
involves Filmer’s patriarchal and sovereignty theory, that is, of the state and its 
origin. This will be re-litigated on an interpretative basis, in evaluation of Locke’s 
purported dismantling of Filmer’s political naturalist doctrine, in Locke’s Two 
Treatises. 
I propose, then, to develop Filmer’s system in a renewed defense of 
Filmerism. Filmer, in my view, sets forth a coherent system of political naturalism. 
Pursuant to a political justification of political power, the Filmerist view remains 
consistent. 
 
6 E.g., “We are all born into families,” “We all grow up in communities” (see Simmons 1993:37-8). 
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Also, Filmer’s system can withstand the onslaught of attack from Locke and 
its numerous critics.7 A defense of Filmer’s system is available, suggesting, in turn, 
vulnerabilities in opposing systems of thought. 
The political naturalism of Filmer’s system is one I propose to revisit and 
develop, in setting forth a mode of justification pertaining to the political in and for 
itself. This follows a critique of Lockean consent theory. On my Filmerist view, 
Lockean consent invariably relies on political authority. The political is presumed 
in the giving of consent. I attribute, accordingly, a form of Filmerism to Locke’s 
consent theory. 
Now, for Locke (II, 191), each person is born free in the state of nature. That 
is, persons are not born into political communities, though they be born within the 
territory of a community or a state. They are not natural citizens but become citizens 
by a voluntary act or choice (Simmons 1993:36-7). 
As Locke (II, 118) states, a child is born a subject to no country or 
government. Yet, even so, children are under parental authority tied to membership 
of the state. Their choice at maturity to enter or depart from the state affirms the 
conditions of the original compact. 
Now, Simmons (1993:36) remarks, a theory presenting a state-of-nature 
model is fundamentally opposed to a thesis of political naturalism. Our thesis does 
not proceed from such a characterization of a state-of-nature theory. On the 
contrary, Locke’s consent theory, in its reliance on a state-of-nature model, is set 
forth within a political naturalist framework. 
 
7 Filmer’s notable critics, in chronological order of the time of writing (not published critique), are: 
Edward Gee, in his critique of Filmer’s Anarchy, in Divine Right (1658); Algernon Sidney, whose 
fate was sealed with the writing of his Discourses Concerning Government (1698), in a 
comprehensive critique of Filmer’s system; James Tyrrell, in his Patriarcha non Monarcha (1681), 
as well as John Locke (1690), in his Two Treatises. Locke, as Laslett (1970) discusses, commences 
the writing of Two Treatises at a similar time as did Tyrrell (1679-80). Notable defenders of Filmer’s 
system are: Edmund Bohun, in his Defence, against Sidney’s Discourses, and “Preface,” against 
Tyrrell’s Patriarcha non Monarcha; and (less vocally) the non-juror Charles Leslie, e.g. in his The 
Finishing Stroke (1711). See also “Chronology.” 
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I do not concur with Simmons (1993:36) that a state-of-nature theory is 
individualist, voluntarist, and anti-naturalist, where sociability is understood in 
apolitical terms. Neither do I accept Locke’s consent theory presents such a state-
of-nature model. In fact, a Lockean state of nature is described in the form of early 
human patriarchal societies. These precede an original compact to form a 
government, which, I understand, is not instituted by apolitical individuals but a 
political union. 
Also, contra Simmons (1993:34), Locke’s state-of-nature theory does not 
essentially describe a moral condition but rather a political one. In his state-of-
nature theory, Locke lays out the precursors within patriarchal societies to the 
original compact. Simmons’s voluntarist interpretative framework does not 
accommodate Lockean patriarchalism. 
My reading of Locke is put forth in opposition to a political voluntarist 
interpretation as presented in Simmons (1993; 1992; 1979) and Plamenatz (1963; 
1968). On my reading, Lockean political voluntarism is limited in its justification 
of state power, given Locke’s commitment to state coercion. 
On my interpretation, Locke’s consent theory does not depart from 
fundamental premises in Filmer’s theory of sovereignty and patriarchal order. For 
both thinkers, in fact, the patriarchal theory is carried by the concept of sovereignty. 
In Locke, the patriarchal theory is limited to an historical framework, whereas in 
Filmer, the theory is a legal construct based upon the political. But in Locke’s 
original contract, a natural right of inheritance, also, is rendered a legal right. 
Admittedly, in Locke, naturally free individuals, entering a political society 
proper, are social moral beings, acting in accordance with natural law. These are, 
ostensibly, not mere political beings. However, in Locke’s original contract, a 
justification of authority, I suggest, proceeds not from sociability and the moral but 
political requirements imbedded in the contract. The priority of the political is fixed 







In Part I, I examine Filmer’s political doctrine in the aim of isolating a justification 
of political power limited to the political. Filmer’s system is shown to be coherent, 
on this notion. 
Part 1 combines five chapters. 
In Chapter 1, I discuss Filmer’s historical background. Also, I review the 
major tenets of his system, where I propose a revision of the critical part of Filmer’s 
works. Further, I discuss a similitude in Locke’s doctrine and Filmer’s system. As 
I contend, Locke maintains a Filmerian paradigm, in his political philosophy. 
In Chapter 2, I proceed to develop Filmer’s system. The objective is to isolate 
a political justification of political power, limited to Filmer’s system. The 
patriarchal theory, also, is shown to rest on a de facto theory of political power. 
Further, I set forth a positive account of Filmer’s critique of consent theory. 
In Chapter 3, I evaluate Locke’s reply to Filmer, within the context of natural 
and civil freedom. Locke rejects Filmerian freedom, in meeting Filmer’s challenge 
to consent theory. But the extent of disagreement, between Locke and Filmer, is 
not antithetical. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to Filmer’s patriarchal theory. In demonstrating its 
coherence, I defend the theory against its most notable critics, Locke, Tyrrell, and 
Sidney. The defense accentuates Filmer’s concept of a natural hierarchy, 
overlooked by his critics. 
I explore, in Chapter 5, a novel conquest theory, based upon Filmer’s de facto 
theory of political power. This discussion is related to Filmer’s sympathetic 





The Politics of Filmerism. 
 
Locke attacks Filmer’s doctrine on, as is written in the subtitle of Two Treatises, 
the true original, extent, and end of civil government, with the purpose of 
overthrowing Filmer’s false principles and foundation of royal absolutism and the 
patriarchal theory. For Filmer, a doctrine of absolute monarchy is supported by 
scriptural evidence. 
Locke does admit Filmer brings a persuasive case set to “blind the People,” 
(I, 1) although “there was never so much glib Nonsence put together in well 
sounding English” (“The Preface”). Persuasion, in fact, is indicated by Locke and 
Filmer’s notable critics (e.g., Sidney, Tyrrell) as a rationale for their enterprise of 
the dismantling of Filmer’s system. 
Algernon Sidney, in his Discourses Concerning Government (1698), while 
presenting the rationale for his critique of Filmer, expresses concern that the people, 
despite their love of liberty, are now set to be persuaded in conscience to give up 
their liberty, as they are made to believe they ought so to do (1.1, 7). 
James Tyrrell, like Sidney, complains, in his Patriarcha non Monarcha 
(1681), Filmer’s gentile style “could onely serve to ensnare the Understandings of 
some unthinking Country-Gentleman or Windblown-Theologue […] and enslave 
the Reasons of all his unwary Readers” (“The Preface”). Thus, “since the Poyson 
hath spread so far among the men of Letters, and in the Country among divers of 
the Gentry and Clergie, I thought it not amiss to do my weak endeavour to 
undeceive them.” 
At the risk of taking the poison, my aim here, contrarily, is to give due 
respect to the logical structure of Filmer’s system, which, I claim, is coherent, in its 
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justification of the state. In this chapter, also, we shall observe Filmer’s historical 
background and his relevancy in English seventeenth century politics. As I shall 
discuss, Filmer’s political writings are relevant to political crises and civil war. In 
that regard, Filmerism presents a justification of authoritarian politics. The task is 
to extract a justificatory framework from Filmer’s system and examine its viability. 
 
1.1.  Background. 
 
Filmer occupies a unique position in political philosophy. He was a reactionary 
thinker, yet novel in his justification of political power for its own sake. The myth 
of Filmer presents him as a stringent royalist thinker of a rather modest caliber, 
dependent upon scripture in his political argument. This is the myth of the Whigs, 
the historical victors of the political debate, following the revolution of 1688. 
As Laslett (1948) observes, 
 
[T]he man himself has been forgotten: his thinking has been 
misunderstood and misinterpreted: his name has been a laughing stock 
for a dozen generations (523-4). 
 
Filmer writes in a polemical style, indicative of pamphlet literature. It may be 
tempting to localize him in time and place. Yet his political writings amount to a 
coherent system of thought, which, despite its reactionary quality, introduces a 
persistent challenge to liberalism. 
Although published posthumously, Patriarcha (1680) remains Filmer’s most 
notable work. Patriarcha is written in the monarchist tradition, in refutation of the 
Jesuit doctrine of tyrannicide (Cuttica 2012:191-2). It would seem Filmer wrote 
Patriarcha as a blueprint for his other works. The text and themes of Patriarcha 
appear in his later published works. 
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As Laslett (1948:523) notes, Filmer’s political thought is reminiscent of the 
late Elizabethan era. But Filmer puts forth his views in writing during the conflict 
of the English Civil War and Commonwealth (523). Filmer’s Patriarcha, further, 
became notorious in the context of the Exclusion Crises of 1679-81, towards the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 (523). 
Patriarcha, as noted prior, is a work of political crisis (Cuttica 2012:219). 
Filmer wrote the manuscript of his Patriarcha in the Caroline era, as he was 
confronted by the clash between royalists and parliamentarians over the 
constitutional basis of Charles I. Patriarcha, however, was not published until 
1680, in the midst of the Exclusion Crisis. 
At the time of its publication, Patriarcha served the cause of royalists in 
defense of Charles II, in opposition to parliamentarians disputing the legitimacy of 
the Stuart king (Cuttica 2012:189; Scott 1991:76). For the royalists, Patriarcha 
provided a defense of indefeasible hereditary monarchy, based upon Filmer’s 
interpretation of Genesis (Cuttica 2012:190). 
In his account of Genesis, Filmer designates Adam as a king appointed by 
God. Here, Adam is granted universal monarchy. From Adam’s universal 
monarchy, all secular monarchs would then derive their power. On this scheme, 
Filmer attempts a final justification of kingly power. 
Following Richard Tuck’s “A New Date for Filmer’s Patriarcha” (1986), we 
can approximate the earliest manuscript of Patriarcha was written in or around 
1630, or as early as 1628.8 Sommerville (1996:172; 11n) estimates Filmer 
completed his Patriarcha by 1632. 
 
8 See also Sommerville (1999:29; 39n). Filmer’s Patriarcha, according to Laslett (1970:57), was 
written in 1637-8, while Daly (1979:4) estimates Filmer wrote his Patriarcha between 1635 and 
1642. Wootton (1993:13) asserts Filmer wrote Patriarcha by 1631. Cuttica (2012:2) mentions the 
late 1620s as the time of writing. For overall approximation, Patriarcha was written as early as 
1628, as late as 1642 (Scott 1991:208). 
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Filmer was the eldest child of a prosperous gentry family at East Sutton in 
Kent (Sommerville 1991:x). He married Anne Heton, a bishop’s daughter, 
inheriting the estate at East Sutton upon his father’s death in 1629 (x). Notably, he 
befriended Peter Heylin, a clergyman, historian, and polemicist (x). Heylin 
encouraged Filmer to publish Patriarcha but failed to persuade him (xiii). 
A similitude is observed in Filmer’s political thinking and opinion of higher 
clergy prior to the English Civil War, in its support of the Stuart monarch 
(Sommerville 1991:x). Also, Filmer’s brother, Edward, was an esquire of the king’s 
body (x). 
Filmer took no active part in the Civil War (Sommerville 1991:xi). Still, he 
was arrested after Kent fell into parliamentarian hands (xi). By the spring of 1647, 
Filmer had been released (xi). 
In 1647, the publication of Filmer’s works commenced, until his death in 
1653. His essay Of the blasphemie against the Holy Ghost was published in 1647. 
In February 1648, The Freeholders Grand Inquest was published, though it may 
have been written in 1644. The Inquest compiles evidence for a royalist 
interpretation of English constitutional history. For the Inquest, Filmer’s authorship 
has been questioned.9 But, as Sommerville (1991:xi) affirms, there is good evidence 
to suggest the work is Filmer’s. In April 1648, Filmer’s The Anarchy of a Mixed or 
Limited Monarchy was anonymously published. This is Filmer’s reply to Thomas 
Hunton’s Treatise of Monarchie (1643), a parliamentarian work of political theory. 
Also anonymously published, Filmer’s The Necessity of the Absolute Power of All 
Kings was published in the summer of 1648, where Filmer presents extracts from 
the works of Jean Bodin, to accentuate their absolutist elements. 
In January 1649, Charles I was executed. In the years following, Filmer was 
silent. Then, in February 1652, his commentaries on Hobbes, Milton, and Grotius 
 
9 See J.W. Allen’s “Sir Robert Filmer” (1928). 
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were published under the title Observations Concerning the Originall of 
Government. His last political treatise presented an analysis of Aristotle’s Politics. 
It was published in May 1652, entitled Observations upon Aristotles Politiques 
touching Forms of Government. To this work was appended his Directions for 
Obedience to Government in Dangerous or Doubtful Times. This last pamphlet is 
most significant in discussing Filmer’s justification of the usurpation of kingly 
power. 
There is an indication Filmer’s works had some influence among political 
writers in the 1650s (Sommerville 1991:xiv). Most notably, Edward Gee presented 
a critique of Filmer’s Anarchy, in his The Divine Right and Originall of the Civill 
Magistrate (1658). But at the time of the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-81, Filmer’s 
works were republished, to be applied in support of the Tory cause. The Whigs 
attempted to exclude a Catholic heir to the throne. James, Duke of York, was set to 
succeed Charles II, his brother, to the throne. 
At the time of the Exclusion Crisis, the works of Filmer became a centerpiece 
of political debate. In 1679, Filmer’s political treatises were reprinted save for 
Patriarcha and the Necessity. Then, in January 1680, Filmer’s Patriarcha was 
published, and the Necessity republished. 
In his Patriarcha non Monarcha (1681), James Tyrrell put forth a 
comprehensive critique of Filmer. Algernon Sidney undertook the same project in 
his Discourses Concerning Government (1698). Meanwhile, Locke was engaged in 
the writing of his Two Treatises. 
Now, Filmer’s writings would seem to demonstrate a support of the monarch 
(Sommerville 1991:x). Richard Royston, the publisher of Filmer’s works, also did 
specialize in royalist propaganda (x). Yet even here we present a caveat. For Filmer 
(P, 106), it essentially matters who holds power at present, irrespective of means 
by which one comes to power. The claim of a rightful heir, accordingly, is 
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overridden by an usurper, during the latter’s hold on power. So, although his works 
were applied for royalist propaganda, Filmer’s doctrine exceeded the royalist creed. 
Filmer’s system is one of divine right absolutism, wherein, it is argued, power 
political and paternal are identical, such that princes and magistrates are owed 
obedience equivalent to filial obedience to fathers (Schochet 1975:1). On this basis, 
Filmer, in his Patriarcha and other works, employs a critique of consent, in his 
undermining of the idea of an original contract in the foundation of government for 
the legitimation of political authority. 
The power of the monarch, for Filmer, is not derived from papal authority or 
the people. Also, his power is not limited by the law. 
Filmer’s political doctrine is averse to Catholicism and Puritanism in their 
aim of restricting the authority of the king (Greenleaf 1964:80). In Jesuit doctrine, 
a justification for deposing of the king by the pope or the people, is observed, in 
case of his espousing heresy or his oppressing of the subjects, respectively (see 
Cuttica 2012:92). Here, Filmer attacks Bellarmine and Suarez on the supreme 
power of the pope. 
The Bishop of Rome, for Filmer, possesses no power to delimit the power of 
the monarch, in punishing or removing his person. Neither do the people. For 
Filmer, authority is bestowed on kingly power by neither the pope nor the king’s 
own people (Greenleaf 1964:80). Thus, the legitimacy of monarchical power is 
untouched, though his power be challenged by either. 
Filmer also rejects the representative power of parliament to impose any 
restriction on the power of the king. For Filmer, parliament has no independent 
legislative authority (Greenleaf 1964:81). In this context, the common law tradition 
is dismissed by Filmer as mere “common usage or custom” (A, 297). 
In his Freeholder’s Grand Inquest, Filmer argues from historical records that 
the king alone has supreme legislative power and final determination as the 
supreme judge in parliament (157-8). The power of the king, then, is not subject to 
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limits imposed by the ancient constitution, that is, the House of Commons as the 
interpreter of the common law tradition (157-8). The common law, on the contrary, 
originates in the commands of a superior power, that is, in the primeval laws and 
commands of kings (P, 106). 
Ancient constitutionalism is antithetical to Filmerism (Cuttica 2012:238). For 
the ancient constitutionalist, the common law tradition is preserved in the system 
of politics, while for Filmer the absolute monarch embodies the realm. On the latter 
proposition, the power of the people to elect their kings through Parliament is 
denied (238). 
Still, as noted, significant caveats are in order, in ascribing royalism to 
Filmer’s doctrine. Contrary to the royalist creed, Filmer goes to some lengths in 
justifying the usurpation of the power of the monarch (Daly 1979:111). Also, for 
Filmer, the identification of political and paternal power is not analogical, whereas 
for royalists the relation between these powers is a matter of analogy (Daly 
1979:70-1). 
The original contribution of Filmer’s system, I observe, includes two 
fundamental propositions. These are: (1) Monarchy is the only natural form of 
government. (2) Any form of government is bound to operate as a monarchy. On 
these grounds, also, anthropological patriarchalism may be understood in terms of 
the political. That is, any human society inevitably evolves in the form of a 
patriarchal monarchy. 
This is the novelty of Filmerism. Still, Filmer’s system is comparable to, most 
notably, the political thought of James I. Also, Filmer relies heavily on Bodin’s 
sovereignty theory. There are yet sufficient differences between Filmer and these 
thinkers to ascribe novelty to Filmer’s system. 
 In the words of Pocock (1987), Filmer and James I were “the twin dragons of 
theoretical absolutism” (149). Still, in his patriarchalist argument, James I presents 
a more figurative sense to the identification of king and father. In James I’s The 
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Trew Law of Free Monarchies (1994:65), the king is said to be pater patriae. He is 
depicted as a loving father and careful watchman, providing nourishment, 
education, and virtue to his people (65). But here, the fatherly image of the monarch 
is rather applied as a metaphor (see Cuttica 2012:108). In Filmer, the identification 
of king and father is complete. 
 Also, although James I opposes the common law tradition, in favor of 
absolutist principles of government, his rhetoric at times seeks to appease 
Parliament, in taking account of the common law tradition (Cuttica 2012:109). 
Filmer, on the other hand, wholly rejects parliamentary claims based on the ancient 
constitution (109). While James I remains an absolutist, his discourse does not fully 
correspond to Filmer’s patriarchal theory (109). 
 Neither is Filmer’s position identical to Bodin’s. Bodin does not deduce 
sovereign power from Adam’s dominion (Daly 1979:22-3). For Bodin, also, the 
power of the sovereign is limited, whereas in Filmer it is absolute sans phrase. For 
instance, the Bodinian sovereign has a duty to respect property rights; and he has 
no right to tax subjects without their consent (22-3). 
 
1.2. The relevancy of Filmer. 
 
Filmer, though not much of a household name, owes his legacy, such as it is, to 
Locke’s refutation of his system, in Locke’s Two Treatises. We may grant Laski 
(1949) that Filmer’s name would be largely unknown “had not Locke […] 
honoured him by retort” (29-30). This, however, speaks to legacy, rather than 
controversy following the publication of Filmer’s works in his own time and in the 
Exclusion Crisis. 
Locke was not a victor of the exclusionist debate of 1679-81, at a time Filmer 
was most in vogue. In fact, Two Treatises was not published until 1690, after the 
Glorious Revolution. Following the republication of Filmer’s works in 1679, as 
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well as the publication of his Patriarcha in 1680, the debate ensued in Filmer’s 
favor. This is most exemplified by the trial and execution of Algernon Sidney. In 
December 1683, Sidney was executed. His critique of Filmer contributed to his fate. 
Sidney commenced the writing of his Discourses Concerning Government 
(1698) in the second half of 1681 (Scott 1991:201). This work presented a 
comprehensive dismantling of Filmer’s Patriarcha. Sidney was still occupied in 
the writing of Discourses upon his arrest in May 1683, when the piece was 
confiscated by the authorities (201). His claims in the Discourses, to the effect that 
the people may change or take away negligent or malicious, deceitful kings,10 were 
stressed against him at his trial (264). But Sidney had been driven to this conclusion 
in his critique of Filmer (214). 
Sir Roger L’Estrange,11 Edmund Bohun, John Nalson,12 and John 
Northleigh13 were among those supporting a Filmerian political doctrine, coming 
to the defense of Filmer against Sidney (Cuttica 2012:193). Edmund Bohun, most 
notably, was a Tory defender of Filmer’s doctrine and a publisher of a 1685 edition 
of Filmer’s Patriarcha, which Bohun prefaced in refutation of James Tyrrell’s 
Patriarcha non Monarcha (1681).14 In 1684, Bohun produced A Defence of Sir 
Robert Filmer against Sidney’s scaffold speech. However, in his Filmerian 
apologetics, Bohun adopted a more orthodox monarchist view of the origins of 
 
10 See Sidney (1698:2.32). 
11 Sir Roger L’Estrange was a Tory propagandist and pamphleteer, adhering to a Filmerian doctrine 
and patriarchalism. He produced The Observator, a newspaper written in dialogue, applied for Tory 
propaganda. The first issue of The Observator appeared on 13 April 1681, remaining in print until 
9 March 1687. According to L’Estrange, Sidney misrepresented the principles of Filmer’s system 
(Observator, “Monday, December 24, 1683; Issue 461,” 1). 
12 John Nalson, a clergyman and Tory pamphleteer, was a non-juror and Filmerian apologist. In his 
Reflections upon Coll. Sidney’s Arcadia (1684), Nalson attacked Sidney’s republicanism, in its 
critique of Filmer. (See also Cuttica 2012:199-200.) 
13 John Northleigh was a patriarchalist and a Tory pamphleteer. In his The Triumph of Our Monarchy 
(1685), Northleigh defended Filmer against Sidney. According to Northleigh (1685:655), Sidney 
had distorted Filmer’s doctrine of political obligation. (See also Cuttica 2012:200-1.) 
14 In his Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell had put forth a comprehensive attack on Filmer’s system. 
Locke and Sidney also proceed in this manner. 
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government and political obligation (Cuttica 2012:215). For Bohun (1685), the 
antithesis of monarchical government is despotism and tyranny, whereas in Filmer, 
there is no such distinction to be made. 
On due revision of Locke’s and Filmer’s political doctrine, I do concur with 
Allen (1928), in that Filmer is a thinker of “uncommon power [and] originality,” 
even “far more profound [and] original than was Locke” (45). Sommerville (1982), 
skeptical of Filmer’s novelty,15 does acknowledge Filmer is “unquestionably 
original” in proposing monarchy as the only form of government and the 
legitimation of monarchy by hereditary succession from Adam (540).16 
Now, in Locke’s Two Treatises, Filmer is positioned as the primary opponent. 
Two Treatises is written in direct response to Filmer (Ian Parker 2004:98), as is 
apparent in the logic and structure of Two Treatises (Schochet 1975:244; 1969:82). 
This is most evident, as Marshall (1994:206) notes, in Locke’s distinction of 
paternal and political power. As Locke rebuts Filmer, while individuals are born 
into families and depend on their parents as children, mature individuals become 
free and juristically equal (Marshall 1994:206). 
Filmer, as it happens, is, on an historical standard, vastly overshadowed by 
Hobbes. Still, for Locke, Hobbes deserves but a few remarks, ironic at that, in Two 
Treatises. Locke devotes his critique to Filmer, for reasons paradigmatic (see 
Zuckert 2002:130). In fact, the Filmerian paradigm is preserved in Locke. 
 
15 Sommerville (1996) makes the case against Conrad Russell that absolutism was, in fact, prevalent 
in seventeenth-century England. If so, Filmer’s originality and isolation may be overstated. See also 
Sommerville (1991:xvi). 
16 Forerunners of Filmerism, or thinkers whose doctrine may be said to be most akin to Filmer’s 
system, are, most notably, John Overall, John Selden, and James I. Overall, in his Convocation Book 
(1690), construes Adam as first universal monarch, but the idea is not applied in a systematic way 
in the form of a theory of government (see Daly 1979:59-60; Schochet 1975:139). Filmer (P) makes 
use of Selden’s account of Adam’s “private dominion,” in Selden’s Mare Clausum (1635), but 
Filmer objects to Selden’s understanding of the position of Noah and his sons. Also, James I’s 
“majestical discourse,” The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, is quoted in Filmer (P, 93-4, 96, 119), 
as an authoritative source. See: James VI and I, King of England, The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, 
in King James VI and I. Political Writings (1994). 
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To suppose, Laslett (1970) remarks, Locke wrote Two Treatises in refutation 
of Hobbes’s Leviathan, “is almost as mistaken […] as to believe that he wrote to 
rationalize the [Glorious] Revolution” (67). For Two Treatises, Filmer’s system sets 
the terms of the argument, where Locke posits universal freedom and equality, 
given Filmer’s rejection of this principle (68). 
As Dunn (1969:79) observes, Locke’s refutation of Filmer’s system is set 
within a framework beyond the Hobbesian. In Two Treatises, Hobbesian 
arguments, accordingly, are ignored (83). For Locke, Hobbes is at most a “ghostly 
adversary” (82). Whereas in Hobbes, political society is constructed from an ethical 
vacuum, a central premise of Locke’s Two Treatises, as in Filmer, is “the absence 
of any such vacuum” (Dunn 1969:79). 
Filmer, not Hobbes, “was the most characteristic and influential defender of 
royal authority in England during the mid-seventeenth century” (Greenleaf 
1964:80). Filmerism, according to Laslett (1949), was “the ipsissima verba of the 
established order” (34).17 Likewise, Schochet (1975:139, 193) claims Filmerism 
served as a “bed-rock” of royal absolutism, which represented the official state 
ideology. Though this may be overstated,18 Filmerism came to the fore as a 
wholesale political system during the Exclusion Crisis, following a republication 
 
17 Daly (1979:xii; 4n; 124), sceptical of Filmer’s place as a leading representative of royalist thought 
in seventeenth-century England, takes issue with Laslett’s claim of Filmer’s standing in the 
established order. Filmer, according to Daly (1979:xii, 124), does not fully belong to, and Filmerism 
is quite distinct from the body of, royalist thought. It is not so much, Daly (1979) suggests, that 
Filmer was a formidable royalist force as Filmer presented an opportunity to the Whigs of turning 
the political narrative in their favor, in applying Filmer as a “ready-made caricature of royalism” 
(56). 
 This, however, does not exclude Filmer’s standing on the royalist side, within the context of 
the times. At best, Daly (1979) demonstrates misguided royalist support of Filmerism. Though 
Filmer presented a convenient royalist adversary, the mere volume of meticulous critical work from 
Locke, Tyrrell, and Sidney in (or following) the Exclusion Crisis would suggest Filmerism posed a 
grave threat to the political ideology of the Whigs, even if an opportunity to impel their narrative 
presented itself at the same time. 
18 See Daly (1979:xii, 56, 124). 
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of Filmer’s works in 1679-80, including the initial publication of his Patriarcha in 
1680. 
Given this political landscape, Locke attacks Filmer rather than Hobbes, as 
does James Tyrrell, in his Patriarcha non Monarcha (1681), as well as Algernon 
Sidney, in his Discourses Concerning Government (1698). 
As established in Laslett, Locke’s Two Treatises relates to the Exclusion 
Crisis. Locke, in Two Treatises, is concerned with Filmer’s patriarchal theory based 
upon Filmer’s proposition of Adam’s universal monarchy, given its application in 
opposition to exclusion. The works of Filmer were “most powerful” as applied in 
support of Charles II in his pursuit of absolutism, against the case for Parliamentary 
rights of exclusion (Marshall 1994:205). 
Further, the dating of Two Treatises indicates it was composed as a refutation 
of Filmer’s doctrine and as propaganda for Whig exclusionists (Ian Parker 
2004:119). By estimation, Locke was engaged in the composition of Two Treatises 
as early as 1679 and onwards in 1683, prior to his exile to the Netherlands that year. 
In the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-81, Filmer had become a focal point of Whig attack 
on the royalist cause, following a republication of Filmer’s works. 
According to Laslett (1970:51, 55-6), Two Treatises is written largely prior 
to 1683. Locke, on this account, was occupied in the writing of Two Treatises 
mainly during the autumn and winter of 1679-80 (61). 
Locke, according to Laslett (1970:59), wrote the Second Treatise prior to his 
writing the First. He took upon writing the Second Treatise during the winter of 
1679-80, partially or as a (near) completed work (65). The Second Treatise may 
even have been largely completed prior to January 1680, when Filmer’s Patriarcha 
first appeared in print (59). Locke, then, commences the writing of the First 
Treatise in early 1680, upon the publication of Filmer’s Patriarcha (65). The 
Second Treatise was revised onwards, though largely completed before Locke fled 
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to the Netherlands in 1683. Eventual revisions were made in 1689 towards 
publication, Locke having returned home (65). (See also Ian Parker 2004:98.) 
As Laslett (1970:61) claims, Two Treatises is accordingly to be deemed an 
Exclusion tract. It was not intended to justify the revolution of 1688. We might still 
regard Two Treatises as “a theoretical proclamation of the ultimate right of 
revolution” (Dunn 1969:48). But, as Laslett (1970:47) remarks, rather than to 
justify a revolution, Locke demands one. A demand for revolution eventually 
served to justify it. 
Laslett’s (1970:58-9, 61) view is supported, inter alia, by the fact that 
references to Filmer in Two Treatises are made from the 1680 collected edition of 
Filmer’s works, except section 22 of the Second Treatise references a 1679 edition 
of Filmer’s works. Incidentally, Filmer’s Patriarcha was included in the 1680 
edition but not the 1679 edition. It would seem, Laslett (1970:59) conjectures, that 
Locke had been initially engaged in the writing of the Second Treatise up to section 
22, without having read Filmer’s Patriarcha. Also, cross-references are made from 
the First to the Second but not vice versa.19 
Ashcraft (1987:286-7) challenges Laslett’s dating of Locke’s Two Treatises, 
finding Laslett’s exact dating of the time of writing implausible. On Ashcraft’s 
(1987:286) estimation, the Second Treatise was not written before the First. Also, 
it has not been established that Locke was engaged in the writing of Two Treatises 
as early as 1679 (295). 
On Ashcraft’s (1987) estimation, the Second Treatise was written in 1681-3. 
Locke was to begin composition on the Second Treatise in 1681, upon Charles II’s 
dissolving of the Exclusion Parliament. The First Treatise was written as an 
Exclusionist tract, but Aschraft (1987:289) adjusts the time of writing to 1680-1. 
Tyrrell wrote his Patriarcha non Monarcha, during this same period (289). 
 
19 See also Ian Parker (2004:98-9); Wootton (1993:50); Ashcraft (1987:286). 
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Locke’s and Tyrrell’s works were part of the Whig campaign to discredit 
Filmer’s political doctrine, against the Tories in their justification of kingly power 
over and above the power of Parliament (Ashcraft 1987:289). But, proceeding from 
Ashcraft’s (1987) account, the First Treatise belongs to the political debate of 
1680-1, as part of Earl of Shaftesbury’s electoral and parliamentary campaign to 
win support for the Exclusion Bill, during the elections and sessions of Parliament 
in 1680-1 (291). The Second Treatise was written in 1681-2 after Locke had 
essentially completed the First Treatise (294). Popular armed resistance only 
started to gain support among radical Whigs in 1680-1 (292). When Charles II 
dissolved Parliament, the political strategy shifted towards a policy of armed 
resistance (292). 
“The Parliament of England,” Shaftesbury (1689) maintains, “is that 
Supreme and absolute Power, which gives Life and Motion to the English 
Government” (5). Filmer’s Patriarcha contravened Shaftesbury’s opinion (Cuttica 
2012:221). But, as Ashcraft (1987) argues, the Whigs did not, during the Exclusion 
Crisis, require as blatant a statement of resistance as that of Locke’s Second 
Treatise. The issue of resistance is more apparent in 1683, in the context of the Rye 
House Plot (Ian Parker 2004:99).20 
 
20 Given proximity to the time of Locke’s writing of the Two Treatises, we might speculate, 
following Ashcraft (1986), on Locke’s justification of, and involvement in, the Rye House Plot of 
1683, given Locke’s concurrent radical political activist and conspiratorial connections, his 
correspondence, and political exile soon after. 
At issue is the supposed botched plot to assassinate the king, Charles II, and his brother 
James, Duke of York, at the Rye House, on their return to London from horse races at Newmarket, 
as had been expected on 1 April 1683. A fire broke out in Newmarket about ten days prior, so the 
king and James made an early return, and the assassination was called off. 
Ashcraft (1986:384-90) makes the case that Locke, in his correspondence, wrote in a 
canting language to, among others, Edward Clarke, in preparation of an insurrection. Cf. Goldie 
(1992:559, 562-4); Marshall (1994:251; 64n); Wootton (1993:89-94). 
Locke, notably, made immediate preparations to leave the country upon discovery of the 
plot by the government (Ashcraft 1986:383). Fearing for his security in the aftermath of the plot, 
Locke fled into exile to the Netherlands. 
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Laslett’s case for his dating of the Two Treatises in 1679-80 is built on 
Locke’s relationship with Tyrrell and Shaftesbury. Locke, on Laslett’s (1970:59-
61) judgement, followed Tyrrell, in setting out to write the First Treatise. Locke, 
according to Laslett (1970:60), purchased Tyrrell’s Patriarcha non Monarcha on 2 
June 1680. At this time, Locke was to recognize the significance of a critique of 
Filmer’s doctrine, at which point Locke added the First Treatise to his manuscript 
of the Two Treatises.21 
Ashcraft (1987) faults Laslett here over “a compound of error and 
supposition” (288).22 Locke, according to Laslett (1970:16), wrote Two Treatises 
for Shaftesbury’s political purposes. Shaftesbury, however, had not adopted a 
policy of armed resistance in 1679-80, when Locke, on Laslett’s analysis, was 
supposed to have been engaged in the writing of the Second Treatise, pursuant to 
armed resistance (Aschraft 1987:289-90). There is no evidence that Shaftesbury 
had formulated a political strategy of armed resistance against Charles II in 1679-
80 (290). The political strategy, rather, involved petitioning the king for Parliament 
to be called into session, in the aim of passing the Exclusion Bill (290). Shaftesbury 
did not adopt a policy of armed resistance until 1681-2 (290). 
There is no reason, Ashcraft (1987:289) argues, to assume Locke or Tyrrell 
recognized the political significance of Filmer until after the publication of Filmer’s 
Patriarcha. Prior to 1680, the debate surrounding the Exclusion Crisis centered on 
legal and historical precedents of the powers of Parliament and king (289). Filmer’s 
Inquest was relevant at this juncture of the debate, but it did not require a discussion 
of the patriarchal origins of government (289). 
 
21 Cf. Ashcraft (1987:288). 
22 Laslett, Ashcraft (1987:289) notes, misdates the publication of Tyrrell’s Patriarcha non 
Monarcha and Locke’s purchase of Tyrrell’s work. Tyrrell’s work was not published before June 
1680. The manuscript was completed and ready for publication in the spring of 1681. Also, Locke 
did not purchase a copy of the work on 2 June 1681 (289). He did purchase Filmer’s Patriarcha on 
22 January 1680 (289). Compare Laslett (1970:57-61, 65). 
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Filmer’s system, on this interpretation, provides a bulwark against an 
argument for resistance. Locke’s project, as Tyrrell’s, was to dismantle Filmer’s 
system in view of a case for a right of resistance against absolute, arbitrary power. 
The issue of resistance, in respect to Filmer’s relevancy, is also emphasized 
in Marshall (1994). Marshall (1994:205) observes the “most powerful” role of 
Filmer’s works in the years following the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament, in 
1681. As Marshall (1994:260) notes, an attack on Filmer would have been useful 
for the purposes of resistance. 
On Marshall’s (1994:223; 25n) view, it is reasonable to suppose the Second 
Treatise was written before 1689, but not before 1682-3. Marshall (1994:223-4; 
25n) rejects Laslett’s estimation that Locke largely wrote Two Treatises in 1679-
80. Also, on Marshall’s (1994) judgement, Laslett has not sufficiently shown that 
Locke wrote the Second Treatise before the First (223-4; 25n). 
Marshall (1994:234) argues that the First Treatise was largely composed by 
August 1681. The Second Treatise was not written before December 1681 
(Marshall 1994:237). Locke, according to Marshall, commenced the writing of the 
Second Treatise in 1682, when plans of armed resistance had reached a level of 
urgency. (See also Ian Parker 2004:175; 5n.) 
On Marshall’s (1994:238-9) view, Locke had not reached the point of 
desperation prior to this time to have a rationale for the writing of a treatise 
advocating armed resistance, thereby endangering his life. By early-to-mid 1682, 
with Parliament dissolved, absolutism takes a hold on English society, while armed 
resistance is actively planned (238-9). 
As Marshall (1994:242) estimates, Locke wrote the First Treatise against 
Filmer to defend Exclusionists in Parliament by mid-or-late 1681. In early 1682, 
Locke’s opposition to Filmer along with a plan for imminent resistance provided 
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Locke with sufficient motivation to commence the writing of the Second Treatise 
(242).23 
Laslett (1970), I believe, undervalues the justification of resistance as an 
objective of Locke’s Two Treatises. In any event, Filmer remains the target, in or 
around the Exclusion Crisis towards a call for resistance against Charles II. Filmer’s 
historical relevancy, in relation to Locke, pertains to the Exclusion Crisis as well as 
a political justification of armed resistance against the king. 
 
1.3. The tenets of Filmerism. 
 
Filmer’s political doctrine proposes absolute rule as the only natural form of rule 
(Ian Parker 2004:123). I ascribe three essential categories to Filmer’s doctrine. 
These are: (1) his theory of sovereignty based upon a possessory right to rule; (2) 
the patriarchal theory formulated in his account of Genesis; and (3) his consequent 
denial of the natural liberty of the people. 
Now, Filmer’s theory of sovereignty and his patriarchal theory may be thus 
separated, for purposes of analysis. In Filmer, the patriarchal theory, however, 
assumes a theory of sovereignty. A genetic argument is submitted by the patriarchal 
theory for the legitimation of political power (Cuttica 2012:5; Schochet 1975:8). 
Yet in the absence of a genetic justification, political power remains legitimate by 
mere possessory right. 
Patriarchalism presents an account of the origin of government and a 
description of the nature of political power (Sommerville 1999:32). On the 
 
23 Marshall (1994:243) also entertains the possibility that Locke may have started the composition 
of the Second Treatise in mid-or-late 1682, after becoming involved in active planning for armed 
resistance. Further, in Marshall (1994:260), some credence is lent to the view that Locke wrote Two 
Treatises for Shaftesbury in the planning of resistance, earlier than late 1682. Though, on Marshall’s 
(1994:260) estimation, it is likelier that Locke intended Two Treatises for publication to gain support 
for resistance or to defend it, after the fact. 
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patriarchal theory, human beings are not originally free. They are born into civil 
subjection (32). In Filmer, the patriarchal theory is not a mere description of 
political power but a theory of political obligation. 
The hallmark of Filmerism is the Adamite paradigm. Here, in his account of 
Genesis, Filmer presents Adam as the first father and monarch. 
The figure of Adam is fixed as a model of political society. For Filmer, the 
power of Adam denotes the authority of kingship, where king and state are 
identified as one household. The Adamite paradigm combines absolute and 
arbitrary power, in identification of paternal and political power. The arbitrariness 
of Adam’s power provides a justification of the sovereign will of the monarch. 
Filmerian justification surpasses a patriarchal account of government as 
applied by James I (see Cuttica 2012:109). For James I (1994:183), kings governed 
arbitrarily in original kingdoms, but in the ascent of civil society, they began to rule 
in conjunction with the law. Filmer, however, introduces the Adamite model of the 
origins of political society in his use of a genetic justification of political power 
(Cuttica 2012:111; Schochet 1975). 
James I does make a distinction between absolute and arbitrary power, in his 
maintaining the legitimacy of absolute power, as opposed to the arbitrariness of 
power (Cuttica 2012:110). In Filmer, the distinction between absolute and arbitrary 
power is dissolved (110-11). “Absolute” and “arbitrary” are interchangeably 
applied in complete identification of these powers. In effect, the question of 
tyranny, for Filmer, does not arise. It does not, by reason of arbitrariness, diverge 
from a natural form of government. In fact, it is natural for this very reason. As 
Filmer (F, 204) remarks, though people may unjustly suffer under the rule of a 
tyrant, they still benefit in being subjected to his government. 
God had conferred on Adam universal superiority, unlimited in extent (Harris 
1994:212). Adam had no superior but God, and so he was sovereign. The power of 
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Adam, then, passed by descent to subsequent monarchs, who enjoyed absolute 
authority over person and property (Harris 1994:212). 
The first father, Filmer (A, 289) states, possesses not mere personal power 
but power monarchical, as he is a father immediately from God. Adam is appointed 
monarch of the world in his very creation (289). He is granted private dominion of 
the worldly domain. Adam’s children have dominion by descent from him, given 
his universal dominion. They inherit Adam’s right to rule in succession from him 
(F, 187-8). 
Adam is king, father, and lord over his family. As Filmer states in his Forms, 
a son, thus, is also a subject and a servant (188). 
God, for Filmer (P, 57-8), bestows legitimacy on monarchical rule. The 
patriarchal monarch rules by divine right. Absolute monarchy is found legitimate, 
where the person of the monarch inherits the right to rule from Adam. The power 
of the monarch is paternal in origin. Justification of political power proceeds from 
original monarchical rule and proprietorship. Political power is absolute in 
derivation from the universal monarchical rule of Adam. 
Filmer’s patriarchal theory exceeds an anthropological account of the 
progression of human societies. Political society is thought to commence in the 
family; and states to form in the amalgamation and enlargements of households 
(Ian Parker 2004:68). This development, for Filmer, is preordained. The ordering 
of human beings into political societies is disclosed in God’s directives to Adam at 
creation (Ian Parker 2004:84). 
Political society is modeled after Adam’s dominion (Ian Parker 2004:85). In 
Filmer, we observe a descriptive account of how political power is bound to 
manifest in every form of government, viz. as monarchical. But Adam’s dominion 
operates as a normative account of how political power must invariably be 
represented (Ian Parker 2004:84). 
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The power of government, Filmer (A, 289) maintains, is fixed in the Fifth 
Commandment of “Honor thy father.” Filmer conceives it as enjoining obedience 
to kings as well as to natural fathers (Sommerville 1999:31). 
As noted, Filmer (P, 63) proposes the identification of political and paternal 
power, though these may differ in degree.24 I shall refer to this identification as 
“patri-political power.” 
As Filmer (P, 62) posits, the right and natural authority of a supreme father 
obtains in any design of government. Patriarchalism maintains either the 
identification or similitude of political and paternal power (Sommerville 1999:31-
2). Filmer’s patriarchal theory is of the former kind. It is not analogical. For Filmer, 
political and paternal power are in fact the same. 
Filmer scholars, to note Schochet (1975) and Daly (1979), largely agree on 
this point. The exception is Greenleaf (1964). Filmer’s doctrine of political 
obligation, on Greenleaf’s (1964:86-7) reading, does not propose legitimate 
kingship from veritable heirs of Adam’s power as the literal natural fathers of their 
people but those in a position of power like that of a father. Filmer’s Adam thus 
involves a use of a metaphor or an analogy, as opposed to an historical argument 
(86-7). 
On this point, Greenleaf (1964) is mistaken. The identification of paternal 
and political power, for Filmer, is not a matter of similitude (see Sommerville 
1999:53). Political and paternal power are identified in the power of Adam. This 
power is exercised by kings and fathers, in their own domains. Filmer’s argument 
is historical in part. But it is primarily a normative one on the issue of political 
obligation. 
 
24 Filmer was not the first theorist to propose the equation of paternal and political power. Hadrian 
à Saravia is a predecessor of Filmer, in this respect (Sommerville 1999:34). James I appointed 
Saravia to produce the King James Version of the Bible. 
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I call this type of patriarchalism (i.e., Filmerism) “political patriarchalism,”25 
as distinguished from the analogical or anthropological. Here, the only difference 
between a kingdom and a family is one of size (Sommerville 1999:34). Further, if 
kingly and fatherly power are identical, it follows that a father may punish his 
children with death (32). Also, if paternal power is political, then the doctrine of 
original democracy and contractual origin of regal authority, is false (33). 
Proceeding from said identification, Filmerism denies contractualism and 
ancient constitutionalism. On a theory of political voluntarism, contractual origins 
of political society involve the granting of a right from individuals to a governing 
entity to rule. This proposition presents an antithesis to Filmer’s patriarchal theory. 
However, I question the political voluntarism of Locke’s consent theory, in his 
attack upon Filmer. In my reading of Locke’s consent theory, it is grounded in 
political naturalism. 
 
1.4. A political justification of political power. 
 
Filmerism employs a political justification of political power, in terms of a de facto 
theory of political power. A genetic justification of political power is also applied, 
in the context of Filmer’s patriarchal theory. But Filmer’s patriarchal theory, I 
maintain, rests on a de facto theory. The Adamite paradigm, as observed in Filmer, 
involves the patriarchal theory on a de facto basis. 
Filmer uses Genesis as a model for a genetic justification (Ian Parker 
2004:70). Here, God’s grant to Adam lays the foundation of a genetic theory of 
political obligation (84). A de facto basis refers to a right of possession. A genetic 
argument, I understand, extends possessory right in terms of a royal bloodline, 
which maintains the right. Still, power is possessed by whomever comes into 
 
25 The same term is applied (e.g.) in Schochet (1975) and Cuttica (2012). 
35 
  
possession of it. A genetic argument for possession stands, in that inheritance is one 
form of possession. Conflicting claims to the same thing, however, may arise, when 
it has been appropriated from its rightful owner.26 
Filmerian justification consists in a genetic justification based upon 
possessory right. The latter, in Filmer, does not render a genetic justification 
superfluous. On the contrary, a genetic justification is carried by a political 
justification based upon possessory right. 
Filmer applies two modes of justification. These are inter-related, though a 
de facto basis serves as the basis of the genetic justification. Now, as Filmer states 
in his Forms, none of Adam’s posterity had a right to possess anything but by 
Adam’s grant or permission, or by succession from Adam (187-8). But I observe 
two said modes of justification within this statement. 
Patriarchs, Filmer (P, 58) confirms, hold sovereignty in their possession of a 
power of life and death and the power of war and peace. These are the marks of 
sovereignty.27 Here, sovereigns are recognized not by paternity but their power 
(Scott 2000:549). Filmer defines sovereignty in terms of the possession of power 
or certain powers (see Scott 2000:549). Though, again, paternity is a way of 
maintaining power. Whether kings come to power by election, donation, or 
succession, is not essential to the legitimacy of their power but the very fact that 
they possess supreme power as the sovereign (P, 106). Sovereign power is 
ultimately justified by mere possession. 
As Filmer argues in his Anarchy, sovereign power cannot be limited by law. 
For in that case the law would govern the sovereign, who would be rendered a mere 
 
26 This is the essence of a de facto right by possession, as we further discuss in Chapter 2, esp. 2.9. 
In 2.9.1, the concept of robbery is at issue, in respect to possessory right. As it turns out, the right 
of the robber obtains by his possession of the thing, while the rightful owner still has a claim to it. 
In my view, Filmerism admits conflicting claims, in this context. But this accords with a de facto 
theory. 




executive (282). Instead, the sovereign governs the law. Accordingly, the power of 
the sovereign is absolute and arbitrary (A, 303). A supreme limited power is a 
contradiction-in-terms (A, 284). (See also Greenleaf 1964:91-2.) 
Here, Filmer constructs his sovereignty theory on Bodin’s theory of 
government. Sovereignty, for Bodin, is absolute and indivisible. Filmer adopts this 
notion of sovereignty. There are yet significant differences between Filmer and 
Bodin. Bodin, notably, marks tyranny as a condition of ignoring natural law, in 
treating subjects as slaves (Harris 1994:198). In Filmer, tyranny has no special 
status. It conforms to a natural form of government. 
In conclusion, Filmerian authority is not fundamentally relational but 
hierarchical. The family, first, is conceived in terms of a hierarchy, where it is 
understood, via Bodin, as all those persons under the obedience of one and the same 
head (P, 75). In this context, Filmer (P, 77) refers to the laws of the Romans, where 
parents are given the power of life and death over their children, and to sell their 
children two or three times over. 
Kingly power is by divine law and has no inferior law to limit it (P, 96). 
Likewise, a father governs by the law of his mere will, not by the laws of his sons 
or servants (P, 96). Though, Filmer (P, 96) grants, a father is bound by natural law 
to preserve his own family; and, by the same token, the king is bound to protect his 
kingdom. But a natural hierarchy, in Filmer, rests on divine authority, which 
ultimately binds the patriarchal monarch. A king, then, is not bound by the positive 
law of any nation (P, 102). He is naturally bound to maintain the safety of the 
commonwealth, that is, by the natural law of a father, not by the law of the land 
(103). 
 




In discussing Filmer’s critical doctrine, we examine his argument for the denial of 
natural freedom and his critique of consent theory. The critical part of Filmer’s 
work concerns his challenge to consent theory, in its proposing of an original 
contract in the beginning of political society. Filmer’s challenge to consent theory 
interrogates the consensual origin of the state or government. Political obligation, 
on the Filmerist argument, cannot be maintained on the presumption of individual 
natural rights, granted to government. The granting of a right to rule can as easily 
be revoked. 
Here, Filmer denies a state of nature prior to government.28 In this respect, 
Filmer’s system differs fundamentally from Hobbes’s, in which a state of nature is 
a precondition of political society. A body politic, on Hobbes’s contract theory, is 
formed by an original assembly, which establishes a commonwealth. In the making 
of a body politic, contractors oblige themselves to one man or a council to obey the 
command of, and to perform no action forbidden by, said man or council (EL 19.6-
7). Accordingly, the consequent acts of the sovereign are representative of the will 
of the commonwealth (EL 21.3). 
For Filmer, however, the sovereign is presupposed in the body politic. He 
does not act for the state. He embodies it.29 The people in themselves lack power. 
Political obligation, then, does not obtain by an undertaking of it. The people are 
obliged to obey their sovereign in view of his mere bodily existence. 
Note, a fundamental difference in Hobbes and Filmer is explained not so 
much by Hobbes’s stipulation of an original assembly as the very formation of it. 
In contract theory, an original assembly may be formulated in terms of the consent 
 
28 Cf. Cuttica (2012:5). 
29 See Cuttica’s (2012:5) similar phrasing. Though Cuttica (2012:127-8), elsewhere, describes 
Filmer’s Adamite sovereign as preceding political society and the creation of law. But here, also, it 
would be proper to understand the Adamite sovereign to embody the political society, in terms of 
generation as well as the order of society. 
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of the whole of society or its majority. On an anthropological account, it may be 
conceived as patriarchal. This, however, is not the case in Hobbes. 
Sovereign power, for Hobbes (EL 21.2), is derived from individual consent. 
In the formation of government (through assembly), no contract is made between 
the multitude and a prospective sovereign. It is not the case, Hobbes (EL 21.2) 
stresses, that the multitude grants itself a right, which prior it did not possess. The 
multitude possesses no sovereignty. So, it cannot grant itself such power. Rather, 
each participant to the assembly, from his own interest, consents to obey the 
command of the majority. A naturally free individual is sovereign. Sovereignty, 
then, is conferred by each consenter to the majority of contractors, or those who 
assemble at a certain time and place. Given this, a transfer of sovereignty proceeds 
unrequited from sovereign individuals to prospective members of the 
commonwealth (i.e., the people) and thereon from the people to one man or a 
council (EL 21.3, 21.7). 
As Gauthier (1969:vi) depicts the Hobbesian position, unlimited political 
authority is based upon unlimited individualism. But, as Gauthier (1969:vi) asserts, 
unlimited individualism leads only to anarchy. This, in fact, is Filmer’s position. 
That is, proceeding from the principle of the consent of sovereign individuals, the 
right granted by those to government is fully revocable, unless an obligation to obey 
is imposed on them by force. For private judgement, alas, is ineliminable (Hoekstra 
2001:438). 
Now, Hobbes does resort to the use of force to bind supposedly sovereign 
consenters. They are not presumed on their own judging to maintain consent. 
Instead, a common fear and compulsion, as Hobbes (EL 19.4; 19.6) states, are 
required. Fear amalgamates the union of contractors, such that they remain in 
concord (EL 19.4). But to establish such rule by fear, the political must obtain, to 
begin with. The body politic, formed by an original assembly, compels its members 
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from the outset to remain pliant. To make this consistent, individual consent is 
abandoned as the grounding of a political union. 
 
1.5.1. Denial of natural freedom. 
 
Filmer’s argument for the legitimacy of absolute rule requires a denial of natural 
freedom. In Filmer’s system, individuals have a determined position within a 
natural hierarchy (Ian Parker 2004:93). Consequently, they lack freedom to act 
according to their own will. They depend on the will of their sovereign. 
Freedom of the people is unnatural, whereas the power of kings is natural.30 
The people are naturally subservient to kings. 
In his aim to remove a justification of deposing a king,31 Filmer (P, 53) rejects 
the proposition that individuals are naturally free and equal, owing obedience 
through their own consent. Men are not born free. They are not naturally endowed 
with freedom from subjection and so at liberty to choose a form of government in 
a natural condition (P, 53). Thus, political power is not bestowed by consent of the 
multitude. 
As Filmer (P, 54) maintains, the doctrine that kings may be deposed by their 
subjects — whereby kings are made subject to their own subjects — is understood 
by its proponents as a “necessary consequence” of the premise of natural freedom 
and equality and a liberty to choose a government. But the people do not bestow 
power on the prince in the sense of granting him a power that he did not possess 
prior. Rather, people testify to a power he already possesses. In fact, the power of 
the prince is affirmed as “free from all laws” (P, 74). Here, Filmer (P, 74) gives an 
 
30 These words may be gathered from the subtitle of Filmer’s Patriarcha, following Laslett’s edition, 
which is applied throughout. 
31 Filmer (P, 53-4) names Robert Parsons (Dolman) and George Buchanan as authors of a liberty of 




example of Roman Law, in respect to testifying to power. The people of Rome 
bestow power upon Augustus, by their own consent, in affirmation of his power, 
which Augustus already possesses “free from all laws” (P, 74). 
Here, a fundamental difference in Filmer and Hobbes is observed in terms of 
natural freedom and equality. The doctrines of each radically differ in their usage 
of these concepts. In Filmer, natural equality in fact applies not at all. This is due 
to Filmer’s Genesis account of the origin of the state and his corresponding 
rejection of consent theory on a contract-model of the state of nature. Filmer and 
Hobbes proceed from antithetical models of the origin of political society. In 
Filmer, a state of war does not precede political society. Rather, the political is fixed 
in universal monarchy, whereas a state of war indicates a collapse of the political, 
namely, a state of anarchy. 
Contra Hobbes, Filmerian justification of monarchical government renders 
null and void the legitimation of political power by the original consent of 
individuals. 
In the preface to his Originall (1652), Filmer mentions his reading of 
Hobbes’s Leviathan and De Cive32, proceeding to engage in a critical review of 
these works. But Filmer does not put forth his critique in the interest of “stating and 
attempting to meet Hobbes’s position” (Warrender 1983:19). Rather, the 
fundamentals of Hobbes’s doctrine are attacked. Most notably, Filmer rejects 
Hobbes’s contract theory, i.e., the proposition of a natural condition devoid of 
government (Cuttica 2012:5). 




32 Filmer, in his Originall, cites passages from the Latin edition of De Cive (Warrender 1983:19). 
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I consent with him about the rights of exercising government, but I 
cannot agree to his means of acquiring it (239). 
 
On the notion of absolute sovereignty, Filmer concurs with Hobbes. Yet in Hobbes, 
sovereignty is instituted by covenant, whereas in Filmer, sovereignty originates in 
divine grant as manifested in the institution of family (cf. Zuckert 2002:131). 
This asymmetry may be explained in virtue of Filmerian as distinguished 
from Hobbesian freedom. While for Hobbes freedom is natural, Filmerian freedom 
(of the populace) is unnatural. For Filmer, it is impossible a government, built upon 
a natural hierarchy, may be instituted by individuals naturally subservient to their 
rulers. 
Further, Hobbes proceeds on the assumption of natural equality. Hobbesian 
individuals are naturally equal. However, inequality in the distribution of power is 
introduced by the establishment of a commonwealth (EL 20.19). Whereas in 
Filmer, individuals are naturally unequal, the Hobbesian state of nature is grounded 
in equality. For Filmer, inequality is present in the original human condition, 
definitive of the order of things. Equality would only obtain in an unnatural 
condition, namely, in anarchy. At most, individuals enter a state of equality due to 
a collapse of the state, against the order of things. 
As it happens, sovereigns, in relation to one another, exist in a state of 
equality. But this is relevant to Hobbes, not Filmer. Filmer’s Genesis model does 
not admit a state of equality between sovereigns. The power of Filmer’s sovereign 
is determined relative to his dominion in a natural hierarchy. A sovereign, then, 
may subsist within the dominion of another. 
Further, in his account of human nature, Hobbes (EL 14.1) stipulates human 
natural powers. These are bodily strength, experience, reason, and passion. Now, 
since the weaker may yet physically destroy the stronger, human beings, in respect 
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to their natural powers, are equal (EL 14.2). The ability of one to kill another, for 
Hobbes, is the measure of human equality (Gauthier 1969:15). 
Natural powers, for Filmer, are already employed from a position of 
authority. Given Adam holds universal monarchical power by reason of a divine 
grant, his natural powers are irrelevant to his kingdom thus formed. By virtue of 
dominion, the weaker may indeed destroy the stronger. But Filmer’s doctrine, in 
this respect, is not “Might makes right.” The ability of the sovereign to wield power, 
is irrelevant. The fact that he possesses power is at issue. 
Now, on Ian Parker’s (2004:103) observation, seeing that Filmer fails to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate authority, Filmerism may be 
reduced to “Might makes right.” However, if this is a failure on Filmer’s part, it is 
a deliberate one. For Filmer, there is no such thing as an illegitimate authority. 
But Filmer’s system, on my reading, is not reduced to “Might makes right.” 
Rather, a right is determined de facto, that is, in possessing a thing. An individual, 
in possessing a thing, has a claim right to that thing. The right is fixed by mere 
possession, not the ability to claim it. 
 
1.5.2. The anarchical principle. 
 
Natural freedom, Filmer (O, 273) observes, presents a conundrum for consent 
theory. Given the voluntary joining of naturally free individuals into a political 
society, their departure is ever imminent on the same principle. For naturally free 
individuals would be likewise free to leave a state of subjection they have once 
chosen. 
For Filmer, the relevant problem for consent theory concerns how individuals 
supposedly born free and equal come to be subject to government (Marshall 
1994:206-7). Also, if individuals join society by their own consent, the stability of 
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political society remains in doubt. For those who join the society remain free to 
revoke consent (206-7). 
Consent, for Filmer, is expressed from a position of anarchy. Here, we would 
otherwise use the term “state of nature,” but in Filmer a state of nature is not 
positively stated. Government, as Filmer would have it, is not absent from a natural 
condition. But Filmer attacks consent theory on its notion of a state of nature, 
wherein prospective members of a political society are to authorize a government 
to rule. Such a condition, for Filmer, could only be construed as anarchy. 
A proper understanding of consent, Filmer observes, is the granting of a right. 
This is to be performed by individuals in a natural condition, in the absence of 
political authority. On these grounds, Filmer (O, 273-4) objects, members of 
political society would remain in perpetual anarchy; for revocation of consent is 
likewise in their power. 
The consent of anarchic individuals underpins Filmer’s critique of social 
contract doctrine. I shall refer to Filmer’s proposition of perpetual anarchy on 
presumption of individual consent as “the anarchical principle.” It fixes consent in 
a state of anarchy, viz. a condition wherein the consenter is understood as a judge 
in his own case.33 
The issue is one of revocation. In possession of natural rights, individuals are 
free to alter their wills, as they have given consent to subject themselves to the 
power of another. Voluntary subjection, on the assumption of natural freedom, 
requires the revocation of consent at the prerogative of the consenter. 
Now, within a moral framework, Filmer’s argument is evidently false. Given 
a moral obligation is demonstrated by the giving of consent, revocation of consent 
is morally unjustified. However, Filmer’s argument from supposed individual 
natural rights, lies not within a moral but a political justificatory framework. That 
 
33 See esp. Filmer‘s discussion in his Forms (223-4). 
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is, supposing the consenter possesses a right to be granted to a body politic to 
govern over him, the right may likewise be revoked. If the consenter once holds the 
authority to apply his natural right, he retains the right. To negate his right of 
revocation, the authority of the body politic must be invoked. But this renders his 
voluntary subjection void. Political power, thus, is deemed unwittingly illegitimate, 
on the standard of consent theory. 
As Filmer (F, 211) argues, for the resolution of the problem of political 
legitimacy, exclusion of non-consenters is not optional. Consenters and non-
consenters alike are included in consent theory’s standard of legitimacy. Non-
consenters, on the standard of consent theory, are not to be excluded; or else their 
liberty by consent is violated. Consent would otherwise be invalidated; and political 
power, justifiable on basis of consent, be deemed unjust. 
Majority-rule, also, does not present a solution for consent theory in the face 
of Filmer’s critique. As Filmer (F, 218) stresses, an assumption of natural freedom 
of the people by their own consent and the rule of the majority over the whole, is a 
plain contradiction. 
Now, in his critique of consent theory, Filmer proceeds from the consent of 
anarchic individuals. These are posited for the sake of argument. If individuals are 
by nature born free and not to be governed absent their own consent, “it is not lawful 
for any government but self-government to be in the world” (F, 225). 
On these grounds, political voluntarism necessitates a state of anarchy, where 
everyone is his own monarch acting at will (F, 224). In the application of natural 
right, consent is given or revoked at the prerogative of the consenter. A right is 
granted to another to rule from a natural right to act at will. But a state of anarchy 
remains. A natural right to act at will persists. 
As his own monarch acting at will, an anarchic consenter has not nullified his 
freedom to act at will, in granting another a right to rule. A right granted to another 
can thus be revoked at the prerogative of the consenter. 
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This conception I term “the anarchical principle” of freedom and consent. 
Here, consent is given at the prerogative of the consenter. It is likewise revoked at 
will. Consent, in this sense, is non-binding. 
Anarchic consent, in the Filmerist sense, is non-relational, non-binding 
authorization. It is proposed on presumption of individual natural rights, in the 
context of Filmer’s critique. While Filmer does not endorse it, Filmer (A, 285; O, 
273-4) applies anarchic consent from a critical standpoint, in a challenge to consent 
theory to maintain political obligation derived from natural rights. 
The consenter is presumed to grant permission. Authority lies in the natural 
rights of anarchic consenters. The right accorded to another is liable to revocation, 
at the prerogative of the consenter. While this result, for Filmer, is undesirable, it 
is unavoidable for political voluntarism based upon consent theory, given 
individual natural rights. 
The consenter is a judge in his own case. In legitimation of authority, he is a 
judge. But consent, thusly, is non-binding, unless, say, the consenter agrees to 
transfer authority. But the consenter, in position of a judge, is held to account by 
authority none other than his own. Thus, a transfer of authority is impermanent, at 
his own prerogative. In this sense, consent is only binding relative to the judgement 
of the consenter (A, 286). It is merely self-binding. 
On these terms, consent is neither a promise nor a contract, save in 
supplemented form. Anarchic consent, appropriately, is distinguished from a 
promise and a contract. A moral argument is only afforded once consent is 
supplemented by a promise or a contract. Till then, we operate on basis of a political 
justification.34 
 
1.5.3. A comparison to “free gift” in Hobbes. 
 




Anarchic consent is not quite the same as “free gift,” as distinguished from contract, 
in Hobbes (EL 15.7-8). Free gift, as Hobbes (EL 15.7-8) expounds, is a successful 
transfer of a right without consideration of reciprocal benefit. Contract, on the other 
hand, is described as mutual donation, on which is established future commitment 
of both trusting parties. But free gift “carrieth with it no obligation greater than that 
which is enforced by the words” (EL 15.7) spoken at present. In this mode, consent 
is but binding at present. 
Now, a successful transfer of right indicates alienation of that right, 
generating an obligation for the consenter. However, in its Filmerian sense, a right 
granted may be revoked, by the same token. The granting of a right (i.e. mere 
authorization) implies no such transfer of a right which is not yet retained. A right, 
in fact, is retained based upon the authority of the consenter, whose prerogative is 
presumed in his granting. Apparently, the consentee holds the right. But the right 
may be revoked at the prerogative of the consenter. If the right is irrevocable, the 
prerogative of the consenter is negated. But the consenter does not surrender his 
prerogative in the form of authorization. On the contrary, authorization is an 
exercise of prerogative. 
In Hobbes (EL), free gift is said to be obligation-generating at the time of 
utterance. Free gift is already considered a form of promise, given by one “that 
promiseth to give, without any other consideration but his own affection” (15.7). In 
Hobbes, authorization is still infused with promise. Anarchic consent, however, is 
contrasted with promise, qua mere authorization.35 
 
35 Gough (1973), notably, conceives a notion of anarchic consent akin to that of Hobbes’s “free 
gift.” Here, Gough (1973:64) suggests, consent only binds at present. But this, likewise, does not 
capture anarchic consent in the Filmerian sense. Consent, on the anarchical principle, does not bind 
at all. Still, Gough (1973) explains, presently binding consent conflicts with “the commonly 
accepted idea that it is generally a moral duty to keep one’s promises” (Gough 1973:64). The conflict 
may be overstated, however, if consent is understood as obligation-generating, in the first place. 




1.6. Filmerism revised. 
 
Our revision of Filmer’s system concerns the substance of his argument. This 
applies not least to Filmer’s critical doctrine. In developing Filmer’s system, we 
examine a positive perspective of Filmer’s critical doctrine. 
Now, Filmer’s critical doctrine is relevant to his putting forth a political 
justification of political power, given the dichotomy between political authority and 
a state of anarchy. The challenge to consent theory is to avoid a state of anarchy. 
On basis of consent simpliciter, anarchy is unavoidable. 
But I conceive Filmer’s critique, at this place, as positive on basis of the 
anarchical principle. Anarchic consent, as an affirmation of will, is here taken as an 
authoritative utterance of the consenter, in granting permission. 
However, personal consent, so conceived, negates any distinct political 
authority. This, in fact, is a veritable expression of anarchy, wherein each is his own 
judge, such that “we shall run into a liberty of having as many Kings as there be 
men in the world, which upon the matter, is to have no King at all, but to leave men 
to their natural liberty” (A, 286). 
Anarchic consent is a challenge to consent theory, given the ever-present 
possibility of the revocation of consent, as natural rights are retained. The challenge 
is put forth to a political voluntarist account of consent. On our positive rendering, 
it presents, at the same time, a political naturalist account of consent. Here, anarchic 
consent is understood in terms of the prerogative of the consenter, in his holding a 
right to grant permission. 
Filmerism is non-voluntarist, in that it opposes political voluntarism on the 
claim of political obligation on grounds of consent. But I propose a non-voluntarist 
consent theory, on Filmerist premises. A consent theory of this type, incidentally, 
is found in Locke’s construct of the original compact. 
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Now, Filmerism presents the choice between monarchy and anarchy, 
“between the only natural form of government and no government at all” 
(Greenleaf 1964:88). This characterization of Filmer’s system is consistent with his 
argument. Yet I do observe the potential in Filmer’s system to identify monarchy 
and anarchy, where in the latter monarchs are as many as individuals. This is given 
a positive meaning, in that the consenter presents his own political right on his own 
judgement. A governmental authority negates his judgement, but absent 
government, his judgement stands. 
Presupposing natural freedom, as Filmer (A) states, “every man is at liberty 
to be of what kingdom he please […] and every particular man [has] a liberty to 
choose himself to be his own King if he please; and he were a madman that being 
by nature free, would choose any man but himself to be his own governor” (286). 
Yet, in Filmer, natural freedom on these premises applies to the sovereign and the 
patriarch, within their own domains. The denial of natural freedom relates to that 
of the people, under government. Absent government, a state of anarchy is as much 
a monarchy as any government, viz. where individuals are as many as monarchs. 
Thus, Filmer’s critical doctrine may be turned positive towards a concept of 
freedom and consent. This is the way in which I propose to revise Filmer’s political 
doctrine and its justificatory framework. 
Our objective here is twofold. It is (1) to lend Filmer’s system an intellectual 
weapon against a Lockean critique, in the form of natural freedom and consent; and 
(2) to demonstrate political naturalism in Locke’s consent theory, on basis of the 
anarchical principle. A positive rendering of Filmer unravels Filmerist premises in 
Locke’s consent theory. Filmer and Locke, I observe, proceed on political 
naturalism, viz. on the same principle of consent. Locke does not rely on individual 
consent. In Locke, political consent is given by a union of contractors. 
The sense of “political,” here, is anarchical, in proceeding from the 
prerogative of the consenting party. The political is understood in terms of the mere 
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possession of a right, which may be granted to another or removed from the same 
on the sole judgement of the initial holder of the right. In this sense, the consenter 
is a judge in his own case. 
Filmer ostensibly denies natural freedom of anarchic consenters. A positive 
notion of freedom, however, may be extracted from Filmer’s system. Anarchic 
consent exemplifies this notion. 
Anarchic consent is authorization simpliciter. Mere authorization, however, 
is not an immediate undertaking of an obligation. The undertaking of an obligation, 
via consent, is given by supplementation of consent by a promise or a contract. If 
any is undertaken, an “obligation” may be cancelled at the will or judgement of the 
consenter. Here, authorization presumes the consenter’s prerogative, synonymous 
with a political right, prior to the moral and social. 
The revocation of a right, on this principle, is left to the discretion of the 
consenter. In that case, the consenter holds a political right. “Political” implies the 
anarchic position of the consenter as a judge in his own case. Till now, there is no 
implication of a body politic or practice.36 A political right, so understood, obtains 
in virtue of its possession.37 That is, an individual possesses a political right, as a 
judge unto himself. 
Anarchic individual consent is futile for any government. However, if 
anarchic consent is rendered collective, it forms a basis for a political justification 
of political power. This, I suggest, is the case in Locke’s original contract. 
 
1.7. Locke’s reply to Filmer. 
 
 
36 Though this may also be the case, if the consenting party is a union of individuals, e.g., Locke’s 
original compact. 
37 A political right, I conceive, may also be deemed legitimate by a higher authority, e.g., divine 




In Two Treatises of Government, Locke puts forth his reply to Filmer.38 The 
principal target is Filmer’s proposition of the absolute monarchical power of Adam 
and the hereditary power of secular monarchs from Adam (Cuttica 2012:190). Here, 
Locke’s aim is to dismantle Filmer’s system, though maintaining the Adamite 
paradigm. 
Locke (I, 3) sets out to argue against Filmer’s proposition that all government 
is absolute monarchy under which no one is born free. In his dismantling of 
Filmer’s system, Locke (II, 2) distinguishes political power from power paternal 
and conjugal. (See also Ian Parker 2004:124.) As Locke maintains, Filmer conflates 
these powers and, in that, fails to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate 
power (Ian Parker 2004:123-4). Subjects of the state, effectively, are treated as 
children. 
Human beings, Locke (I, 67) posits, possess natural freedom. In confrontation 
with Filmer’s doctrine of subjection by divine right, Locke argues for a natural jural 
equality and defends a right of resistance (Marshall 1994:263-4). To counter 
Filmer’s position, Locke proposes his own interpretation of Genesis, in support of 
his consent theory (Ian Parker 2004:150). 
Locke proceeds from a reinterpretation of Genesis, integral to his liberal 
doctrine of natural freedom and equality (Ian Parker 2004:123). Yet, in so doing, 
Locke maintains the Adamite paradigm, in that God’s grant to Adam is retained as 
a paradigm for political order (150). On the use of Adam as a model for politics, 
Locke is no different than Filmer (146). But Locke’s Adam has rights common to 
all, whereas Filmer’s Adam has rights exclusive of the rest (146). 
Locke seeks a justification of representative government based on the 
fundamental unity of all in Adam, refuting Filmer’s claim of superior political 
authority (Mitchell 1993:74). However, I stress, a superior political authority, for 
 
38 Locke purchased a copy of Filmer’s Patriarcha on 22 January 1680 (see Cuttica 2012:193). 
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Locke, is not absolute rule per se but the arbitrary will of the natural person of the 
monarch. Locke, in fact, does allow absolutist features of government, as I shall 
discuss.39 
Locke’s proposition that all are one in Adam grounds his rejection of absolute 
monarchy (Mitchell 1993:90). But, more precisely, Locke rejects the rule of a 
monarch whose will is arbitrary towards members of the commonwealth. Absolute 
monarchy need not signify arbitrary rule, in this sense. For Locke, there is a form 
of absolute rule that may be considered benign, within a commonwealth formed by 
an original compact. 
In Locke, Adam represents human equality and original common ownership. 
In the beginning, there was an original community of all things, established in 
Adam (I, 37, 39, 40; II, 25). 
Adam’s dominion forms the basis of Locke’s doctrine of property. The 
project of the Second Treatise is to provide a justification of private property from 
human equality founded in Adam (Mitchell 1993:82). This, essentially, means 
original communism. Things were originally owned and used in common. But 
private property evolved from a state of original communism. 
Locke puts forth his labor theory of property against Filmer’s thesis of 
original natural inequality, viz. of human difference in the natural order of things 
(Ian Parker 2004:133). For Locke, human beings are all one in Adam (146). God’s 
grant to Adam represents the model of political order (146). The task of 
government, in effect, is to protect all who are one in Adam (Mitchell 1993:90). 
Government, also, protects private property, as it was set up to do. 
So, Locke, in setting out to distinguish political power from power paternal 
and conjugal, all the while maintains the singularity of Adam, as a representative 
of human freedom and equality (Ian Parker 2004:124). But the challenge for Locke 
 
39 This reading follows, inter alia, section 132 in Locke’s Second Treatise. The issue is discussed in 
Part 2, Section D, Chapter 15 (15.5-6). 
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is to demonstrate how undifferentiated human beings came to acquire exclusive 
property rights, protected by government, over things originally given in common 
(133). 
Filmer’s patriarchal theory controverts natural freedom of the people and 
proposes natural inequality, in that God had introduced a distinction between 
monarchs and those subservient to them (Harris 1994:220-1). Political authority, 
Filmer asserts, cannot be derived from the power of the people (Harris 1994:203). 
The people, in fact, are devoid of political power and the right to exercise it. 
Locke opposes Filmer’s proposition on basis of natural freedom and equality. 
Natural individuals are in a state of perfect freedom and equality (II, 4, 7). Their 
status does not differ in terms of their position in the order of things. In Locke, there 
are no grounds for differentiation between naturally free individuals. One person is 
not naturally subordinated to another, barring divine revelation (Harris 1994:220).40 
Now, Filmer (O, 273) had challenged consent theory in its reliance upon 
original communism, since obtaining private property would require universal 
consent of commoners. If property is premised on consent, then a development 
from common ownership to private property would need to be agreed upon by all 
commoners. A non-consenter to the obtaining of private property or its 
appropriation by the state could at any time justly complain and nullify it (O, 273). 
(Marshall 1994:206.) Locke’s reply, accordingly, is intended to resolve Filmer’s 
challenge as to how private property originated from God’s grant of common 
ownership of the world, that is, if not through the simultaneous universal consent 
of all commoners (Marshall 1994:206). 
Locke’s project, in his Two Treatises, is to ground political authority on the 
formation of government in an original compact within an evolutionary account 
fixed in Adam as a model of political society. But this, I claim, does not imply the 
 
40 Note the caveat here, as stated by Locke (II, 4). See further: Part 2, Section D, Chapter 15 (15.7). 
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derivation of political authority from the natural rights of individuals. The grant of 
a right to rule is delivered from a political union formed in Locke’s compact. 
Locke’s reply to Filmer, I find, is not properly understood within the context 
of political voluntarism, anti-absolutism, and non-naturalism.41 Ian Harris (1994) 
presents a political voluntarist interpretation of Locke’s consent theory. It 
exemplifies an interpretation of Locke’s political doctrine to which I fundamentally 
object. 
Locke’s objective, granted, is to distinguish what Filmer combines: king, 
father, and lord (see Harris 1994:217). For Filmer, a son, subject, and servant are 
one and the same thing. Here, Filmerism is properly understood in terms of multiple 
superiority. A father, while lord of his family, is yet a servant to his king. Locke’s 
argument, in contrast, requires the absence of a political superior. For Locke, people 
by nature have no political superior (Harris 1994:217). 
However, contra Harris (1994:217), Locke’s distinction of political and 
paternal power does not relate to a non-absolutist form of polity. On my reading of 
Locke, a political superior obtains in a political union formed by an original 
contract, manifested in the people. Locke’s sovereign is not the natural person of 
the monarch but a political union formed in the beginning of society. Locke’s 
commonwealth, on this formulation, may adopt a form of absolute monarchy.42 
On a political voluntarist account, Locke, in his Two Treatises, sets out to 
demonstrate that political authority is derivative of the freedom and power of the 
people (see Harris 1994:203). Locke’s commonwealth, then, is founded on terms 
compatible with natural freedom, where a political arrangement is established by 
free and rational agents (Harris 1994:232). In this context, Harris (1994:232-3) 
supposes each agent, for Locke, consents to the formation of a political society in 
his own person, acting on behalf of himself. 
 
41 Compare Olsthoorn & Apeldoorn (2020). 
42 See esp. II, 132, 151. We discuss this reading of Locke in Part 2, Section D, Chapter 15. 
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Filmer, accordingly, is thought to present the opportune opponent. His system 
challenges the very premises on which Locke’s argument is to proceed (Harris 
1994:203). Still, the power of the people, in Locke, is reduced to the original 
compact, not individual natural rights. I doubt the premise of individual consent 
and own action, as posited in Harris (1994). Political authority, ultimately, is 
grounded in a union of original contractors. Filmer is positioned as Locke’s 
opponent by reason of Filmer’s denial of an original contract. To refute Filmer’s 
political doctrine, Locke does not require freedom and power of individuals in a 
natural condition as the grounding of a political society. The original compact, 
rather, grounds political authority. Freedom and power of individuals are limited to 
the citizenry, given the formation of a political society. 
According to Harris (1994), Locke’s aim, in his Two Treatises, is to refute 
Filmer’s argument for the legitimacy of absolutist power of the state and 
government. Absolutism, Harris (1994:192) states, was “[t]he object of Locke’s 
distaste.” This, however, relates primarily to the absolute, arbitrary power of the 
natural person of the monarch, whereas absolutism in Locke’s commonwealth, as I 
understand, is impersonal. 
Locke’s Second Treatise, Harris (1994:202) claims, provides an explanation 
of political authority incompatible with absolutism. For Locke, rulers can be 
legitimately resisted. On Harris’s (1994:208) reading, Locke meant to show the 
illegitimacy of absolute government on basis of natural law. But Locke (II, 151-2) 
makes significant absolutist allowances. Locke, rather, aims to establish the 
potential of a legitimate government in the absence of arbitrary rule. Non-arbitrary 
rule, however, may display absolutist features, even hereditary rule (II, 132). 
Now, for Locke, living under an absolute monarch is being in a state of war, 
confronted by a predator (II, 13, 137). (See also Ian Parker 2004:131.) The absolute 
monarch restricts freedom necessary for the preservation of the individual (II, 17), 
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who, in that case, is enslaved under his rule. But, as I understand, absolute rule 
denotes arbitrariness, where Locke refers to it as a state of war.43 
Ian Parker (2004:182; 17n) understands absolute monarchy, for Locke, to 
consist in a political situation where the executive and legislative powers are in the 
same hands. Locke (II, 132, 151), however, makes allowances for this. But once an 
absolute monarch acts arbitrarily towards the people, he has entered a state of war 
with them, rendering him susceptible to legitimate resistance. 
In sum, on his formulation of the establishment of a civil society, Locke 
operates on a political naturalist framework. Political power is found legitimate on 
basis of the consent of original contractors. An establishment of a commonwealth, 
on this basis, involves absolutist allowances, where sovereignty is understood in 
terms of the original compact. 
 
1.8. Lockean political naturalism. 
 
At issue is the grounding of Locke’s consent theory, in the context of his 
formulation of the establishment of a civil society from an original compact. I reject 
a political voluntarist account, where the legitimation of Locke’s commonwealth is 
said to derive from the granting of a right to rule from individuals departing a 
natural condition. Instead, Locke’s commonwealth, I claim, is legitimated on basis 
of a political union, as formed in the original compact. In that case, the political, 
rather than the moral, grounds Locke’s commonwealth. 
The state-of-nature argument, as applied by Locke (II, 4), is meant to derive 
political power from its origin. But the origin of political power, I argue, is not 
individual consent, as the granting of a right to rule. It is, rather, a political 
foundation in a natural condition and a compact to form a civil society. 
 
43 See the discussion on Locke’s usage of these terms in Part 2, Section D, Chapter 15.6. 
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A political voluntarist account of Locke’s consent theory is developed in 
Simmons (2001) and Plamenatz (1963). Locke’s political doctrine, within a 
political voluntarist framework, presents an antithesis to Filmerism. 
On Simmons’s (1993:60) reading, Locke proceeds from individual consent. 
Here, Locke is to posit the natural freedom of individuals, in granting their rights 
to government, against Filmer’s doctrine of universal government and inevitable 
subjection to it. 
As I read Locke, civil government is not legitimated by the delegation of 
individual natural rights but an original compact on the foundation of which those 
rights are politically relevant. I suggest Locke’s objections to Filmer, though 
significant, are not put forth within an antithetical framework. In his Two Treatises, 
Locke, like Filmer, proceeds from a political naturalist framework, within the 
Adamite paradigm. 
To a degree, this aspect of my thesis follows Martin Seliger, in his study of 
Locke’s political doctrine. In his The Liberal Politics of John Locke (1968), Seliger 
demonstrates a naturalist reading of Locke’s political doctrine. Our thesis deviates 
from Seliger’s project in his emphasis upon the anthropological aspect of Locke’s 
naturalism. Our emphasis is greater upon the political aspect, in affirmation of a 
Filmerian view of a political society. 
Filmer and Locke, as Mitchell (1993:81) remarks, are allies as well as 
antagonists. Both thinkers apply political reasons to the justification of the state, 
grounded in Adam as a model of political society. 
Further, in his construction of the original compact, Locke does not proceed 
from individual consent. Lockean consent, I contend, is anarchic, as contractors to 
the original compact place themselves under an obligation to their own union. They 
are not obliged to obey a separate political entity. 
Here, the meaning of “anarchic” follows that in Filmer. In Locke, the anarchic 
form of consent is one of a collective, whereas in Filmer, it is of an individual. The 
57 
  
collective of original contractors takes possession of a commonwealth, by the mere 
power of mutual consent. The contractors are bound only to themselves. 
Now, the legitimacy of Locke’s commonwealth rests on its origin in consent. 
This, however, is not individual consent but the consent of prospective members 
unified in joining a civil society. A body politic, on this notion, is ultimately 
governed by unanimous rule, viz. referential to unanimous consent of prospective 
members in their setting up a governing society. 
In Locke (II, 95-9, 132), the establishment of a legislature is the beginning of 
a political society proper, from an original compact of those entering a society of 
their own accord. This implies unanimity of original contractors. Each mutually 
agrees to enter a political society proper, whereupon original contractors place 
themselves under an obligation to obey the law. Once they have become full 
members of a political society,44 they are not at liberty to revoke consent. Here, 
non-revocation is based upon agreement, not an immediate moral obligation. 
As Locke (II, 95-9) expounds, in unanimous rule of an established 
commonwealth, contractors must be understood to consent to the rule of 
government. Otherwise, a body politic cannot subsist and operate from conditions 
of compact. But note, government is not a separate political entity. Rather, it 
extends the political union of original contractors. 
Now, Locke’s original compact may be construed within a juridical and an 
historical framework (Sagar 2018:110-12; Dunn 1969:97, 103, 106-7; Ashcraft 
1968:898). The latter is to provide an explanation and a rationale of natural 
individuals’ entering a political society proper, whereas the former, proceeding 
from Locke’s state of nature as a juridical condition of natural law (Dunn 
1969:106), is to establish a grounding in the original compact upon which the ruler 
 
44 In Locke, one becomes a full member of society by express consent (II, 119). Tacit consent, by 
contrast, is revocable (II, 199, 122). 
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or the government may be judged, on potential invocation of a right of resistance 
(see II, 168). 
Locke’s state of nature, on the juridical account, is a relational concept 
(Simmons 1993:16). An individual may subsist in a natural condition towards one 
person while out of a natural condition towards another (16). This differs from 
Hobbes, where the state of nature is a static condition, viz. of which persons are 
either in or out, simpliciter (Simmons 1993:16). In Hobbes (L 28.2), the sovereign 
remains in a state of nature towards his subjects whose relations to one another are 
invariably civil (see Simmons 1993:16; 12n). 
Locke’s state of nature is a condition of social moral beings under the law of 
nature alone. In applying the state-of-nature model, Locke describes a moral 
condition independent of statehood, viz. a moral relationship of non-citizens 
(Simmons 1993:34). In the state of nature, natural rights and duties apply and none 
other, in the form of a right and a duty of self-preservation and a natural executive 
right for the securing of preservation (II, 135). (See also Simmons 1992:59-67; 
1993:24.) 
Lockean contractors depart from a state of nature, in joining civil society. The 
state of nature, as Dunn (1969:97, 103, 106) notes, is a condition indicative both of 
sociability and morality. But, in terms of the juridical, a natural condition is 
apolitical and ahistorical (97, 103, 106). Still, though the state of nature may be 
construed as ahistorical, I object to any such construal in general.45 The juridical 
framework does not exclude the historical and the political. Also, in the joining of 
 
45 I object to a characterization of Locke’s model of the state of nature as apolitical. But I do agree 
the state of nature, for Locke, is that of social moral beings, as may be construed within a juridical 
framework. This would still not exclude an historical framework, wherein we can observe the 
political in terms of Locke’s anthropological patriarchalism. Also, the moral state-of-nature 
framework does not negate a political justification applied in Locke’s construct of the original 
compact, where prospective members leave the state of nature. (See Sagar 2018:110-12; Ashcraft 
1968:898, 901, 908.) 
59 
  
civil society, the political remains the proper way to justify the imposition of an 
obligation to obey the government of the established commonwealth. 
The political is defined by a principle of unanimity in Locke’s original 
compact. As Wolff (1970:26-7)46 suggests, unanimity establishes a de jure state, or, 
minimally, the strongest case, within consent theory, for state legitimacy and an 
obligation to obey the law.47 This, I contend, is the principle Locke sets forth in his 
formulation of the establishment of civil society. The legitimacy of political power 
obtains in unanimous rule. 
Political legitimacy is grounded in a principle of unanimity, in Locke’s 
consent theory. On this principle, a naturalist justificatory framework of political 
power is established. The anarchic consent of original contractors fixes their 
prerogative as progenitors of political society proper. Political legitimacy is derived 
from its origin in the natural political rights of contractors. 
Original contractors, in effect, take possession of an established 
commonwealth, in their joining of it by unanimous consent. Members, then, are 
required to consent, to maintain their membership of the society. Individual 




46 Robert Paul Wolff’s In Defense of Anarchism (1970) is to a degree comparable, I find, to Filmer’s 
critique of consent theory. Here, I refer to Wolff’s (1970) central thesis of the incompatibility of 
moral autonomy and political authority. See further: Part 2, Section A, Chapter 8. 
47 Wolff (1970), to be sure, discusses “unanimous direct democracy,” to locate the compatibility of 
autonomy and a social order governed by a vote of each member. But any such social order would 
be founded on a principle, if not an historical event of the formation of, unanimous rule. Hence, a 
vote held in unanimous direct democracy presumes the political legitimacy of unanimous rule, in 
which case voting is a form of obedience to that rule. For this reason, I gather, Wolff, in his “Reply 
to Reiman” (1976), concedes the incompatibility of autonomy and unanimous rule. 
There is, on Lockean political naturalism, a resolution on this point, in substituting individual 
autonomy for the autonomy of unified original contractors. True, unanimous rule is incompatible 
with individual autonomy. But unanimous rule respects the autonomy of members of society, in 




I emphasize a similitude in Filmer and Locke within a political naturalist 
interpretative framework. Locke maintains the Adamite paradigm. Also, on my 
reading, a political justification of political power is set forth in Locke’s consent 
theory. A revision of Filmer’s critical doctrine illuminates a political justification 
in Locke’s original compact, allowing us to view Filmer’s critique of consent theory 


























The Denial of Natural Liberty and the Free Monarch. 
 
In this chapter, I set out to develop Filmer’s doctrine in its justification of political 
power. The aim is to present a case for the coherence of Filmer’s system in terms 
of a political justification of political power, as well as his critique of political 
voluntarism. 
Filmer’s doctrine is novel, in that it introduces a political justification of 
political power, prior to a moral and a legal justification, in the context of a 
patriarchal theory. I aim to extract from Filmer’s system a political justification. 
This, I contend, demonstrates the coherence of Filmer’s system. For that, we revisit 
the central categories of Filmer’s system: the concept of sovereignty, the Adamite 
paradigm, and his denial of natural liberty. 
 Now, concerning Filmer’s novelty, we may consider the case of Anthony 
Ascham. In his Of the Confusions and Revolutions of Governments (1649), Ascham 
sets forth a de facto theory of political power. A de facto theory submits a political 
justification of possessory right. However, Ascham’s political justification relies 
ultimately on a moral utilitarian foundation, in its consideration of self-interest on 
the issue of political obligation. 
 Filmer’s system differs from that of Ascham’s in terms of a political 
justification. Ascham (1649), in his de facto theory of political power, relies on a 
moral utilitarian foundation, whereas in Filmer, a moral justification rests on the 
political. For Ascham (1649), possession has the potential of making a true right. 
But this is a moral condition. As Ascham (1649:34) states, in order to evaluate 
justifiable obedience to an usurper or a conqueror, it suffices to ask whether he 
possesses the means of our subsistence. Submission may be deemed just to the 
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orders of an unjust ruler, who yet affords protection to the citizenry. This concerns 
the misery of those who have done no wrong (34). 
 The weakness of Ascham’s political justification lies in its emphasis on 
protection. As soon as the ruler is no longer understood to afford protection to 
members of the commonwealth, his rule is deemed unviable. In Filmer, the premise 
of protection is absent. Possessory right is given in the mere act of possession. The 
possessor is in the right, provided he holds onto power. 
 A presumption of possessory right, in Filmer, supports a political 
justification, viz. where it does not amount to, or rest on, a moral justification. This 
is rendered coherent in Filmer’s system, in the context of his patriarchal theory. 
Filmer’s denial of natural freedom and his critique of contract theory is most 
relevant, in this regard. As I contend, the critical part of Filmer’s work, once 
positively construed, serves to strengthen the de facto basis of his political doctrine. 
 In my revision of Filmer’s system, I propose a positive notion of Filmerian 
freedom and consent, pursuant to a political justification. While Filmer denies 
natural freedom, I understand his denial as relating to the natural freedom of the 
people. Filmer does not deny the natural freedom of the monarch. Neither does he 
deny the natural freedom of the head of a family. A free monarch or patriarch, then, 
may be understood to possess power, in virtue of his freedom. He is free to possess 
whatever he in fact possesses. 
 Also, I observe a positive account of consent in Filmer’s allowance of a 
patriarchal assembly, in case an heir to the throne is missing. The power of the king 
is to devolve to the assembly, which then nominates their new sovereign. The 
patriarchs, in this context, exert a freedom to nominate their sovereign, by mutual 
consent to his rule. 
 A positive account of Filmerian freedom explains a right of possession and 





2.1. Political legitimacy and ancestral contract. 
 
Pursuant to his doctrine of royal absolutism, Filmer rejects in his Patriarcha the 
proposition of “the Schoolmen and other Divines”48 that human beings are born in, 
and naturally endowed with, freedom from all subjection and at liberty to choose a 
form of government (53). The reference is here to contract theory on presumption 
of natural freedom. Political power, on a contract theory of natural freedom, is 
bestowed by popular consent in the beginning of human society, in the form of an 
original ancestral contract. Rights and liberties, Filmer (P) objects, derive not from 
a law of natural liberty but “the grace and bounty of Princes” (55). 
Filmer (P, 54-5, 57) denies natural freedom and equality on basis of his 
theory of a patriarchal political order. Given the natural subjection of children to 
their parents, there is no such thing as natural freedom (A, 287). (See also Schochet 
1975:262; 70n.) The subordination of children, further, is the origin of political 
power (P, 57). 
On presumption of natural freedom, Filmer (A, 287) continues, political 
power inevitably is rendered illegitimate. Political legitimacy is impossible on 
grounds of natural freedom and equality, whereas no form of government may then 
be legitimately established “without apparent wrong to a multitude of people” (A, 
287). That is, a wrong is committed towards non-consenters, by the moral standard 
of contract theory. 
Ancestral contract, Filmer (A, 287) argues, is inconsistent with natural 
freedom and equality. (See also Schochet 1975:261.) If the acts of parents 
 
48 These, as mentioned (in P, 53-5), would include Robert Parsons (R. Doleman), George Buchanan, 
Sir John Heywood, Adam Blackwood, William Barclay as well as Bellarmine and Calvin. 
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contractually bind the children (as well as wives, servants, etc.) in the foundation 
of government, then natural freedom is nullified (A, 287). 
In rebuttal to Filmer, a reference to minority (nonage), binding minors to 
their parents’ vote, will not suffice. As Filmer writes in his Anarchy, 
 
[I]n nature there is no nonage; if a man be not born free, she doth not 
assign him any other time when he shall attain his freedom: or if she 
did, then children attaining that age, should be discharged of their 
parents’ contract (287).49 
 
Now, it is impossible, Locke (II, 74, 189) grants, to legitimately give away natural 
rights of others (children) in an original contract. (See also Schochet 1975:262.) 
This is the gist of Filmer’s argument in the Anarchy, in respect to nonage and the 
origin of government. In response, Locke emphasizes individual consent in lieu of 
ancestral consent (Schochet 1975:262). 
However, Locke’s emphasis on individual consent does not amount to 
political voluntarism. Lockean consent, qua obligation-generating act, is not 
fundamentally personal. Rather, individual consent, expressed explicitly or 
implicitly, is introduced after the fact, viz. referential to an original compact within 
an historical or a juridical framework. Lockean consent, capable of generating an 
obligation, refers to original unanimous consent, expressed in the compact. 
Locke, in response to Filmer’s critique of ancestral contract, does not deny 
an obligation from an ancestral contract.50 But ancestral contract is understood in 
 
49 See also Schochet (1975:262; 70n). 
50 See Elrington (1798:62n) for Locke’s supposed denial of ancestral consent and contract. Ancestral 
contract is replaced by the original compact, which may be understood both in historical terms and 
juridical. This is also discussed in Part 2, Section C, Chapter 14.1. 
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historical and juridical terms, such that an obligation from individual consent, 
referential to the contract, may obtain. 
 
2.2. A genetic justification of political power. 
 
Political obligation, in Filmer, derives from the origin of political power within a 
patriarchal order (Schochet 1975:8). The institution of family manifests the power 
of the state, whereas the position of the father is that of a king of the household. 
The state is one household. 
In Filmer (P, 63), political and paternal power are identified in the form of 
a genarchy,51 viz. a political society governed by patriarchal rule. Political authority 
is invested in patriarchal rule, or the fatherly power of a household. Monarchical 
government is a natural order of society, in extension of paternal power (see 
Schochet 1975:7). 
The power of the prince, for Filmer, originates in the natural constitution of 
society (Figgis 1914:149). The first kings were heads of families.52 
This is not an analogical relation. As Filmer (P) stipulates, the natural duties 
(or rights53) of a father and those of a prince are “all one” with no difference in kind 
“but only in the latitude or extent of them” (63), within a continuous natural 
hierarchy of the family and monarchical government. 
 
51 I borrow the term “genarchy” from Edward Gee’s Divine Right (1658). 
52 I borrow this wording from a 1680 edition of Patriarcha, which is divided into three chapters, 
entitled: “I. That the first Kings were Fathers of Families. II. It is unnatural for the People to Govern, 
or Choose Governours. III. Positive Laws do not infringe the Natural and Fatherly Power of Kings.” 
53 In Laslett’s edition (1949) of Patriarcha, the text reads (natural) “duties,” in the passage cited. 
The text of printed versions, however, reads (natural) “rights.” Sommerville’s edition (1991) of 
Patriarcha also uses “duties” in said passage (see p. 12). 
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Filmer introduces political patriarchalism54, as distinguished from 
anthropological55 and analogical56, on basis of patri-political power. Political 
patriarchalism is neither an historical account of patriarchal power nor the use of 
analogy, respectively, but a naturalist account of social order and political 
obligation (cf. Schochet 1975:11-5). 
Filmerian patriarchalism employs a genetic justification of political power 
(Schochet 1975:8). Political power is justified by reason of patrilineage. Now, 
anthropological patriarchalism, in isolation, provides no basis for political 
obligation. Filial obedience is not justification-apt. A genetic argument is thus 
presented to provide a theory of political obligation (11). 
In constructing his genetic argument, Filmer uses the model of Adam. 
Adam, on the genetic argument, instantiates a universal monarch, as the original 
progenitor (P, 63-4). Heirs of Adam are legitimate rulers, by patrilineal descent 
from Adam. Rulers otherwise partake in Adam’s sovereignty by usurpation or 
conquest. 
 
54 The terminology applied deviates both from Daly (1979) and Schochet (1975), in their variant 
naming of the form of patriarchalism relevant to Filmerism. For “political patriarchalism,” Daly 
(1979:71; 49n) applies “legal” patriarchalism (distinguished from “anthropological” and 
“analogical”), whereas Schochet (1975:11-5) applies “ideological” (distinguished from 
“anthropological” and “moral”). Though, I note, Schochet (1975:2) does apply “political” for 
Filmerian patriarchalism, within his discussion of Filmer’s historical relevancy. Further, Cuttica 
(2012) applies the term “political patriarchalism,” but this is not understood fundamentally in terms 
of possessory right. 
55 Anthropological patriarchalism describes the origins of political society proper from patriarchal 
societies or familial association (Schochet 1975:11). Schochet (1975:11) speaks of these origins as 
“pre-political.” But this is misleading. A patriarchal society is political in structure; yet it lacks a 
legal structure. Accordingly, we might rather apply “quasi-political” or “pre-legal.” These nuances 
are further addressed in Part 2, Section C, Chapter 14, in relation to Lockean anthropological 
patriarchalism, or Locke’s notion of patriarchal elective monarchy. 
Anthropological patriarchalism is an Aristotelian view of the evolution of human societies. 
This view is espoused by Locke in Two Treatises and (e.g.) Richard Hooker, as quoted by Locke. 
56 Here, I adopt Daly’s (1979) usage, accentuating the use of an analogy or a metaphor. On this 
notion, power political and paternal are identified, though in the context of a metaphor (Schochet 
1975:13). This form of patriarchalism, in 17th century English politics, is applied by royalists (Daly 
1979:70-1), whose doctrine is separate from Filmer’s, most notably, in regard to the usurpation of 
power, as in Filmer may be rendered justifiable. (Cf. Greenleaf 1964.) 
67 
  
Now, contra Ian Parker (2004:46, 91), I do not take Filmer’s use of Adam 
to be allegorical or figurative.57 Rather, as Figgis (1914:154) expounds, Filmer’s 
system is a rational absolutist doctrine of political thought. Thus understood, Adam 
is applied, rather, as a paradigm of sovereign power and a justificatory framework 
of political power, based upon a literal interpretation of Genesis. As I observe, a 
genetic justification of political power, in Filmer, constitutes an overlay of a 
political justification, which proceeds from a possession of power (i.e., a de facto 
theory). For this reason, rulers may partake in the power of Adam through 
usurpation or conquest. 
Further, in application of a genetic justification of political power, Filmer 
defends the doctrine of the divine right of kings.58 However, the patriarchal theory, 
in its identification of power political and paternal, is not essential to the doctrine 
of the divine right of kings, where a naturalist account of the patriarch-monarch 
may be applied (e.g., by James I)59 qua analogy or metaphor (Figgis 1914:8, 149-
50). The analogy is transfigured in Filmer into an absolutist system of political 
thought, in legitimation of political power on basis of said identification (149-50). 
In Filmer, a naturalist system of absolutist politics is thus erected from a theological 
source (154). It is, notably, overstated in Cuttica (2012:5) that divine right theory 
 
57 In other places, Ian Parker (2004:175) does in fact speak of Filmer’s literal interpretation of 
scripture. 
58 The doctrine of the divine right of kings assumes the concept of sovereignty (Figgis 1914:13), or, 
the right of secular government to be free from clerical interference (160). 
On Figgis’s (1914:5-6) account, the doctrine states, 
(1) Kingly power is by divine right, or the ordinance of God, so that the king, within his 
dominion, commands all persons and their estates. 
(2) Hereditary right is indefeasible. The succession to the throne is regulated by the law of 
primogeniture. Birthright cannot be negated by usurpation of kingly powers. 
(3) Kings are accountable to God alone. The law expresses the king’s unlimited will. Law 
cannot exist independently of a law-giver; thus, the law-making power exceeds positive law. A 
mixed or limited monarchy is a contradiction-in-terms. 
(4) Non-resistance and passive obedience are enjoined by God. Resistance to a king is a sin. 
If a king shall issue a command contrary to God’s law, passive obedience is in order.  
59 See: James VI and I, King of England, The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, in King James VI and 
I. Political Writings (1994), 76. 
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is incongruous with Filmerism, seeing that it may be applied to republics as well. 
In Filmer, divine right theory is fixed within the patriarchal theory, in extension of 
divine right. 
Now, Locke (II, 71) objects to Filmer’s identification of political power and 
paternal, in that each carries a claim to sovereignty. This would render the powers 
irreconcilable (see also Laslett 1949:18). But Filmer treats political power and 
paternal as a single power. Filmer’s identification of these powers is conclusive and 
non-figurative. There is no distinction between the terms. 
Patri-political power is fixed in a natural hierarchy (see Laslett 1949:18), 
wherein nominal kings and fathers are positioned at different latitudes (P, 63). The 
scope of kingly power is greater than that of fatherly power. But this relates to the 
mere extent to which the same power is exercised, within variable domains of a 
natural hierarchy. 
The notion of a continuous natural hierarchy, I claim, is not given proper 
credence in Locke’s critique of Filmer. In defense of Filmer, as we observe in 
Bohun and Leslie, the concept of a natural hierarchy is recurrently invoked. 
Likewise, I shall invoke the concept in my defense of Filmer, in demonstrating the 
de facto basis of Filmer’s genetic argument. 
 
2.3. Sovereignty and patrilineage. 
 
A genetic justification, I contend, is dependent upon Filmer’s de facto theory of 
political legitimacy. A de facto basis of the genetic argument manifests in Filmer’s 
sovereignty theory, adapted from Bodin. This is evident in Filmer’s definition of 
monarchy as a government of a single person, combined with his justification of 
the usurpation of kingly power. Patrilineage, in Filmer, presents the maintaining of 
power over generations, but a final justification of political power is in fact reduced 
to possession of power. The patriarchal theory depicts a mode of possession, the 
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justification of which lies in possession simpliciter. Accordingly, I object to Allen’s 
(1928:30) rendering of Filmer’s axiom of government as an exercise of a moral 
power. The state or government, in Filmer, denotes sheer patri-political power 
based upon possessory right, only to be supplemented in the form of a moral 
justification. 
 
2.3.1. The original state and hereditary monarchy. 
 
The state, for Filmer, is original, in the person of Adam. Sovereign power is vested 
in Adam, whose dominion is universal. 
 Filmerism presents a static view of political power. Anthropological 
patriarchalism is distinguished from Filmer’s political patriarchalism, in presenting 
a temporal view of political power. The state, on political patriarchalism, is the 
absolute order of things, while the aim of anthropological patriarchalism is to 
describe the evolution of human societies towards statehood. 
 In the creation of Adam, as Filmer (P, 57; A, 289) lays down, God grants 
Adam authority over his posterity, whereas from the moment of Adam’s creation, 
all are subject to the power of fathers, partaking in Adam’s supreme authority, on 
the law of primogeniture or otherwise60. On Filmer’s scriptural account,61 God 
appoints Adam a universal monarch, in granting him qua first progenitor authority 
to rule, with complete ownership of the world (A, 289). (See also Daly 1979:13.) 
By divine grant, Adam is sovereign. The head of a family or a state, then, derives 
his power from Adam (P, 60-1). (See also Laslett 1949:14.) 
 
60 In Filmer (P, 60-2), usurpation is justifiable, despite a standing claim of a rightful heir. 
61 Filmer (A, 283) builds his scriptural account, inter alia, on Genesis 3:16 (“he shall rule over thee”), 
where God asserts Adam’s rule over Eve, after the Fall. This, Filmer (A, 283) maintains, is the 
original grant of government, or God’s special grant to Adam. 
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Adam’s monarchical power is inherited by Cain, on the law of 
primogeniture, and succeeding patriarchs to Noah, where the line of succession 
starts anew (P, 61, 63-4). (See also Laslett 1949:13-14.) Noah relegates distinct 
territories of the world to his sons and their descendants (P, 58, 63-6). Patriarchal 
societies (nations) are then dispersed, following the confusion of tongues at Babel 
(P, 58-9). The state, as presently known, is rooted in these developments, from 
Adam’s sovereignty (Laslett 1949:14), in which the doctrine of the divine right of 
kings is based. 
Now, Locke (I, 11) complains Filmer takes Adam’s sovereignty without 
proof. But Adam’s sovereignty is applied as a model of an original condition. 
Locke’s original compact is so applied as well.62 Filmer, enjoining the patriarchal 
theory and Bodinian sovereignty, maintains a natural hierarchical order founded on 
Adam’s sovereignty (Laslett 1949:18).63 Filmer’s sovereign rules by absolute, 
arbitrary power, derived from Adam’s sovereignty by divine right (A, 303). Here, 
“absolute” and “arbitrary” are used interchangeably.64 Adam’s supreme rule, in this 
regard, obtains by a “right of nature” (A, 289).65 The heir of Adam has a natural 
right to supreme rule of absolute, arbitrary power. 
 Political power, on this account, is hereditary, in derivation of Adam’s 
sovereignty. Any subsequent claim to kingly authority, for Filmer, is determined in 
 
62 In that case, Locke takes scripture as proof as much as does Filmer. Locke puts his challenge to 
Filmer’s interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis, proceeding at the same time within the 
Adamite paradigm. 
63 This relates to a central claim of our thesis: The patriarchal theory is grounded in sovereignty 
theory, adapted from Bodin. Sovereignty theory is applied in Filmer as well as in Locke, in 
combination with a patriarchal theory. 
64 See Filmer (A, 291, 303 306, 308). Compare Daly (1979:52). By contrast, “absolute” and 
“arbitrary” are separated in Locke (I, 9; II, 23-4, 90, 127, 132, 135-9, 171-2, 174, 210, 212, 214, 
221-2). 
65 Since, Locke (I, 16) objects, it was due to Adam, by a right of nature, to be governor of his 
posterity, God’s special grant to appoint Adam monarch of the world is rendered superfluous. See 
also I, 17. 
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virtue of hereditary succession (Ashcraft 1987:70). Legal authority, further, is 
grounded in the divinely ordained fatherly power of Adam (Schochet 1975:1). 
 For Filmer, hereditary monarchy is a natural form of government,66 governed 
by absolute, arbitrary power (A, 283, 303). 
 Now, Filmer (P, 61) recognizes the inevitable indeterminacy of Adam’s heir. 
But Filmer puts the blame on the people, in this respect. Filmer (P) does grant the 
fact that the line of succession from Adam can no longer be traced. However, 
people have themselves to blame, if the heir is lost to their memory, “for an heir 
there always is” (61). Political power does not devolve to the multitude by reason 
of its “negligence or ignorance” (61). Legitimate political power thus remains in 
hereditary succession. 
 
2.3.2. The sovereign will and a government of one. 
 
Filmerism involves a genetic justification of political power. This defines 
Filmerism, inter alia, as political naturalism. The genetic argument, however, is not 
comprehensive. It demonstrates, rather, a form of possession of political power. 
 In his Anarchy (1648), Filmer defines monarchy as the government of a single 
person (281). Here, Filmer relies on Bodinian sovereignty, rather than the 
patriarchal theory, which, in principle, is non-essential to the definition, so 
stipulated. The patriarchal theory portrays the possession of power over 
 
66 Filmer does not, in fact, state hereditary monarchy is the only natural form of government, as 
suggested e.g., in Arneil (1996:36). Rather, Filmer (A, 283) states, political obligation is limited to 
one kind of government, namely, monarchy (the government of one alone) “and the determination 
of it to the individual person and line of Adam” (283). As we may interpret this passage, Filmer 
proposes two options: the government of one alone may be occupied by an individual and a rightful 
heir. Here, Filmer does not isolate an individual person in the line of Adam. Political obligation is 
limited to one kind of government, namely, the government of one alone. But a political obligation 




generations, based upon a theory of sovereignty. However, power may be 
possessed, on the same concept of sovereignty, by an usurper or a conqueror. 
Filmer puts forth his definition of monarchy in reply to Philip Hunton, who, 
in his Treatise of Monarchie (1643), advocates a mixed monarchy. In Hunton 
(1643), a proper rule of government involves a limited monarch, who is met with 
“a will beside his own will for the measure of his power” (12). The supreme power 
of the state, for Hunton, “must be restrained by some Law, according to which this 
power was given, and by direction of which this power must act” (12). Yet, Hunton 
(1643) insists, monarchical power “must not be limited by any power above his” 
(12). The monarch is otherwise but a subordinate magistrate.67 
Monarchy, Filmer maintains, is neither limited nor mixed. Monarchical 
power, for Filmer (A, 303), is absolute/arbitrary,68 untouched by positive law. 
As Filmer (A, 282) retorts, if the monarch be supreme, his command must 
transcend the bounds of the law, so that he may rule and govern the law, not the 
law the monarch. If a supposed monarch be restrained by the law, then the law-
making power is superior to his power “so that which is but the instrument, or 
servant to the monarch, becomes the master” (A, 282). 
 A supreme limited power, Filmer (A, 277) states, is a contradiction-in-terms. 
The making of law presumes its power above the law. The limiting power must 
stand above the power limited. The former is, by definition, a power supreme and 
unlimited, thus capable of making the law. In a monarchy, the supreme power is 
the will of the sovereign, on basis of which the law, “the command of a Superior 
Power” (P, 106), is made and promulgated (105). 
 
67 Filmer, in his Anarchy, is engaged in a reply to Philip Hunton, on the question of a mixed 
monarchy, as developed in Hunton’s Treatise of Monarchie (1643) and Vindication of the Treatise 
of Monarchie (1644). Filmer rejects Hunton’s account of a mixed monarchy as well as Henry 
Ferne’s alternative version of a limited monarchy, as laid out in Ferne’s Conscience Satisfied (1643) 
and A Reply (1643). See Daly (1979:40-1, 52). 
68 In Filmer, these terms are interchangeable. See Filmer (A, 291, 303 306, 308). 
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 The monarch exercises his power in isolation; and it is unlimited (A, 282), 
“for if there should be granted two sorts of power without any subordination of one 
to the other, they would be in perpetual strife which should be supreme, for two 
supremes cannot agree” (D, 233). Monarchy, accordingly, is the government of one 
(A, 281). 
 Monarchy, for Filmer (A, 281-3), is the only natural form of government. The 
order of civil society is proper in the form of a monarchy (see Greenleaf 1964:88). 
In a supposed democratic arrangement, a unitary will is conclusively exercised, 
whereby “the people becometh a monarch” (F, 205)69. Aristocracy, likewise, 
inexorably acts from a unitary will. A nominal democracy or aristocracy constitutes 
“a monarchy of many wills in one” (F, 205). A form of government ostensibly non-
monarchical is but a feigned monarchy (F, 205). In any design of government, there 
is a right and the natural authority of a father (P, 62), even in his absence. In a 
nominal democracy or an aristocracy, rulers also hold fatherly power (see 
Sommerville 1999:34). 
 The multitude, Filmer (F, 205-6) stresses, does not govern through the rule 
of an assembly, governed by majority-rule. The will of the multitude does not 
constitute the governing rule of an assembly. The majority, in fact, rules against the 
will of the multitude or ignores it. To overcome the divergence of private interests, 
the wills of many unite in the equivalent of one-man rule, for any government 
proper. Effectively a monarch, an assembly thus governs as a single entity. Any 
sort of assembly, democratic or aristocratic, rules by a majority, which is ultimately 
monolithic in its unitary determination (see Greenleaf 1964:88). 
 
69 This is borrowed from Aristotle in bk. 4, ch. 4 of the Politics. See Barker’s translation of 
Aristotle’s Politics (1995): “The people then becomes a monarchy – a single composite monarch 
made up of many members, with the many playing the sovereign, not as individuals, but 
collectively” (1292a7). Compare Jowett’s translation of the Politics (1885): “For the people becomes 




 A collective ultimately unified in its determination proceeds in the form of 
one-man rule. An assembly, in fact, feigns one-man rule (F, 206). The purported 
rule of the populace operates in the same vein as a monarchy, where the people 
become “Lords, not separately, but altogether as one” (F, 205). Accordingly, a 
mixed polity, for Filmer, is impossible (Greenleaf 1964:88). 
 Now, it is not the case, as suggested (e.g.) in Arneil (1996:36),70 that 
hereditary monarchy, for Filmer, is the only natural form of government, unless this 
is to include the rule of an usurper. In his Anarchy, Filmer states, political obligation 
is due to (1) one form of government, namely, monarchy, (2) the individual 
sovereign, and (3) the descent from Adam (283). These are “all three ordinances of 
God” (283). If an individual sovereign prevails, in usurping the power of a rightful 
heir, his current reign satisfies the condition of a natural government. 
 Though not explicitly stated in Filmer, descent from Adam appears not to 
apply as a necessary condition for political legitimacy. Legitimate political power, 
rather, is maintained by descent from Adam. This, however, is but one form of 
possession. An obligation to obey is also applicable to a government of one, in the 
absence of a rightful heir. 
 Political power, in Filmer, is the law-making power, which is essentially pre-
legal.71 A hierarchy manifested in any polity, further, is such that a pre-legal force 
must be supreme. 
 
70 Locke, however, assumes this in his attack on Filmer. 
71 This, I gather, presents the major difference between Filmer and Locke. For Locke, the law-
making power may be located within the state or its apparatus (government), whereas for Filmer, 
the very notion of a law-making power implies a sovereign will, above the law. Yet, as I shall argue 
(in Part 2, Section D, Chapter 15), there is a case to be made for a concept of sovereignty, in Locke’s 
political doctrine, as formulated in his Two Treatises. In effect, the state entire is Locke’s sovereign, 
while in Filmer, the sovereign is an individual in possession of supreme power. Though on Filmer’s 
definition of monarchy as the government of one, the Lockean concept of sovereignty may also be 
explicated. As noted above, democracy and aristocracy, in Filmer, form a unitary will, in the absence 




 Positive law, accordingly, has no superiority over monarchical power, which, 
as it obtains “by the Law of God,” is altogether superior to human law; “it hath no 
inferiour Law to limit it” (P, 96). As a father governs by no law but his own will, 
not that of his sons or servants (96), a king is not bound by the positive laws of any 
nation (102). The prince, a judge in all cases, is the author, interpreter, and 
corrector of positive law (106), which is enacted, amended, or abrogated by the 
prince. The law thus exercises a single indivisible will (Laslett 1949:19).72 
 Yet, Filmer (P) clarifies, as a father is naturally bound to preserve his 
progeny, the prince, under divine law, has a duty to protect the commonwealth and 
the subjects’ goods, liberties, lands, and lives, “so far forth as the general law of 
the safety of the commonweal doth naturally bind him” (P, 103). Human laws bind 
the prince “not by being positive but as they are naturally the best or only means 
for the preservation of the commonwealth” (103). 
As Filmer (P) writes, 
 
 
72 The Bodinian notion of indivisible sovereign power, implied here, need not, in Filmer, exclude 
distinct high powers performed by separate agents in the apparatus of the state, though these powers 
ultimately lie in the sovereign will. It suffices to be asserted, high powers are exercised by the 
sovereign or at the command of the sovereign will. Relevant to this issue, is Filmer’s Inquest. 
Although Filmer relies on Bodin, Filmer does not adopt wholesale Bodin’s sovereignty 
theory. In Bodin, monarchical power is not deduced from Adam. Also, sovereign power, in Bodin, 
is in some areas restricted, e.g., in respect to property rights and tax (see Daly 1979:22-3). As Harris 
(1994:198) mentions, Filmer, in his use of Bodin, omits Bodin’s qualifications of the authority of 
the king. The power of the monarch, for Filmer, is unrestricted. 
As Filmer discusses, in his Inquest (1647), the Lords are counsellors to the king, with 
deliberative power, whereas the Commons are to perform and consent to what is ordained (152-3). 
Counsellors, Filmer (Inq.) stresses, have no power to command their consultation to be executed 
“for that were to take away the sovereignty from their Prince, who by his wisdom is to weigh the 
advice of his council, and at liberty to resolve according to the judgment of the wiser part of his 
council, and not always of the greater” (152-3). The judicial power exercised by the Lords, is 
derivate of, and subservient to, the supreme power of the king (156). The supreme court of the land 
is not Parliament but the king (157-8). The power of making laws, thus, rests ultimately in the king 
(157-8), who is the vicegerent of God (174). 
In short, judicial powers are performed by the Lords and Commons, yet at the service of the 
king, who remains indivisibly sovereign, in that judicial powers are derivative of, and subservient 
to, his will. 
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[T]he Prerogative of a King is to be above all Laws, for the good only 
of them that are under the Laws, and to defend the Peoples Liberties 
[…] (105). 
 
However, the sovereign shall judge of the uprightness of the law (P, 104). While a 
prince, by oath, has sworn to keep upright laws, princely oaths may be nullified and 
the king relieved where the law on his judgement is unjust (104). Further, 
disobedience is by no means justified, even where a prince commands contrary to 
the law. For the subject has “no commission to judge of the titles of kingdoms or 
causes of war” (105), that is, to judge of the uprightness of its prince’s command. 
 
2.4. Filmer’s critique of consent theory. 
 
We proceed now onto Filmer’s critique of consent theory. A consensual origin of 
the state, in the form of ancestral contract, typifies the antithesis of Filmer’s 
political doctrine. Filmer’s strategy is to refute consent theory on its own terms. 
 Recall, a positive account of anarchic consent presents a case for political 
naturalism, on our interpretation of Filmer’s system. The discussion of anarchic 
consent, in Filmer, is however limited to the critical part of his work. The 
employing of anarchic consent is tactical, in his putting forth a challenge to consent 
theory. 
 First, let us demonstrate Filmer’s account of anarchic consent from natural 
political rights. In his challenge to consent theory, Filmer conceives anarchic 
consenters as natural-right holders. In this sense, we say that they hold political 
rights. 
 Filmer’s argument from natural political rights is not to be taken as a moral 
construct. Rather, in fixing a natural political right, moral considerations follow in 
the application of the right. In fact, anarchic consent is non-binding. Put otherwise, 
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it is merely self-binding, in that the consenter binds himself on his own prerogative 
(A, 286). 
 Here, Filmer’s understanding of consent coheres with the granting of a 
right.73 For consent theory, Filmer (A, 285; O, 273) argues, the consenter must be 
naturally free to judge as to whether he shall belong to the commonwealth (in the 
formation and establishment of a political society), to be governed by a body politic, 
for him to veritably grant a right to rule and the making of law to this body. 
 This is presented as a challenge to consent theory. Filmer does not espouse 
consent theory, on the anarchical principle. Yet, I claim, Filmer’s system is more 
formidable on a positive account of anarchic consent. For that we render Filmerian 
freedom positive, below. 
 On the standard of anarchic consent, Filmer (A, 285) sets the requirement of 
unanimous consent.74 As Filmer (O, 273-4) argues, if government is set up, and 
legitimated, by consent, it takes only one to revoke his consent to render the 
government illegitimate. If one is permitted to withdraw his consent, so it must be 
permitted for everyone. 
 Filmer’s argument may depicted as follows. 
 If S is naturally free to consent to P’s rule, in granting P a right to rule over S 
(q), then S is also naturally free to revoke S’s consent, thus nullifying P’s right to 
q. If S, however, is required by P to maintain consent, then either: 
 (1) S is not naturally free to consent to P’s q-ing; or, 
 
73 Other forms of consent are not discussed, in Filmer, save in the case of testifying to political 
authority in the context of Roman law or custom, where “the people of Rome very bountifully, by 
a Royal Law, bestowed that power upon Augustus which he before had taken upon him” (P, 74). 
Thus, effectively, popular consent affirms prior political authority. Here, Filmer shows the Romans 
did not operate under consent proper. Roman Law, Filmer (P) explains, allows popular consent “not 
to prove the right of all people to give power to Princes, but produceth it against the people to show 
them that, by their own act, the Prince was free from all laws” (74). 
74 As I shall discuss in Chapter 3, Locke avoids Filmer’s challenge, in proceeding from another kind 
of freedom, viz. that of social moral beings (in lieu of bona fide individuals), any number of whom 
may establish a political society proper, on a right of emigration. Thus, the requirement of universal 
consent is avoided, given unanimous consent of original contractors. 
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 (2) P requires S to judge and act in opposition to the natural freedom of S, in 
which case P’s q-ing is unjust, thus illegitimate. 
 As Filmer argues in his Originall, if individuals in a natural condition are 
assumed to be free to place themselves under subjection, they must be free — with 
even stronger reason — to renew their natural freedom (273). 
 Given a natural liberty to alter his will, the consenter is therein free to alter 
his will anew, revoking prior determination. That is, where he restores his natural 
liberty to “take what he please and do what he list,” (O, 274) the consenter applies 
his natural right in the same vein as in altering his will to join political society, such 
that “it will be lawful for every man, when he please, to dissolve all government, 
and destroy all property” (O, 274). 
 The terminology applied (“take what he please and do what he list”) is 
indicative of Filmer’s notion of freedom. An individual, in consenting to 
government, enjoys unlimited freedom, viz. to act at will. Here, consent is put at 
the prerogative of the consenter, in his acting at will, on presumption of his natural 
right. 
 To avoid this predicament, a freedom to act at will cannot be restricted. Any 
restriction on natural liberty violates the standard set by consent theory for an 
individual to consent to government. As Filmer (F) argues, by the moral standard 
of consent theory, a government would be deemed unjust, if it set out “to exclude 
any one man from his right in government” (211). 
 On terms set by consent theory, political legitimacy is established by consent 
of the prospective members of society. But for the body politic to operate on this 
ground, unanimous consent is required throughout. This, however, is an impossible 
task. The very idea of non-consent renders consent theory practically impossible. 
 




I do not take Filmer’s argument from anarchic consent to proceed essentially from 
moral premises. Rather, Filmer presents a critique of consent theory, in questioning 
its basis of political authority. 
 Consent, in other words, is not treated as a promise or a contract. The 
anarchical principle, as we find in Filmer, presents consent as an act of granting 
from which an obligation cannot be generated. 
 So: If S once acts at will in giving away S’s natural freedom to act such that 
P may q, then S has the same authority to restore S’s freedom to act at will, such 
that P no longer may q. 
 Consent, here, is revoked at will. 
 Note, because consent is here understood neither as a promise nor a contract, 
time-constraints on S’s obedience to P and P’s rule over S, given S’s consent for a 
set period, are irrelevant. At any time, S may revoke consent, even within an 
interval indicated by S to obey P. The same principle of revocation applies. 
 In granting P a right to rule, S does not commit to maintain consent, so that P 
continues to enjoy a right to rule. Even if S morally commits to maintain consent, 
such that revoking consent is deemed morally unacceptable, S is permitted to 
revoke consent on grounds of S’s natural political right. After all, the granting of 
permission lies in the authority of S, whereby S retains the prerogative to revoke a 
right accorded to P. 
 To impose an obligation on S to maintain consent, S’s consenting needs to be 
supplemented by a promise or a contract, in which S commits to maintaining 
consent. Yet again, this is a moral commitment. It can be negated by S, invoking 
the prerogative of S on grounds of S’s natural political right. This may surely invite 
a moral objection. But the objection does not remove the right. 
 As Filmer observes, a natural political right is fundamental. It is given prior 
to moral considerations. A transfer of a natural political right, though it grants 
permission to rule, does not guarantee a right to rule. 
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 Now, we distinguish anarchic consent from the voluntary alienation of a right. 
The latter is proposed on a thesis of political voluntarism. Consent, on this 
proposition, is akin to promising in generating an obligation to obey, or not to 
interfere with, the action of the grantee. Anarchic consent is not akin to promising, 
in this regard. It does not entail the undertaking of an obligation. 
 Here, I observe political voluntarism as developed in Plamenatz (1968) and 
Simmons (2001). While Simmons (1979:76) admits consent differs from promise 
in authorizing the actions of others, consent and promise are both understood as 
obligation-generating acts, affording special rights to the grantee. Consent is given 
to, and in consideration of, the actions of another, in authorizing those actions by 
virtue of a special right granted (Simmons 1976:275-6; Plamenatz 1968:3). 
Promises, in contrast, are but rarely made in consideration of the actions of others. 
They are, rather, made in consideration of the action of the promisor, generating an 
obligation to act as promised (Simmons 1979:76). However, consent, like promise, 
generates an obligation in authorizing an action by the grantee. 
 Simmons (1979) does not deny entailment in authorization. So, while in the 
very act of promising, one undertakes an obligation to fulfill another’s immediate 
claim to action, the consenter, in granting a right to another to act, authorizes her to 
act. Though relegating a secondary role to the undertaking of an obligation, 
Simmons affirms consent as an obligation-generating act. 
 This I deny, however, if consent is genuinely anarchic. An act of promising, 
I grant, is obligation-generating by virtue of a deliberate undertaking on part of the 
promisor and a correlative right accorded to the promisee. The promisor undertakes 
an obligation to perform a certain act, according thus a right to another. He is 
obligated to act accordingly on another’s immediate claim to action. So, given an 
81 
  
obligation to keep the promise obtains, the promisor ought, other things being 
equal,75 to keep the promise. 
 This account of promissory obligation is one adapted from Searle (1964).76 
Promising, Searle (1964:45) states, is, by definition, an act of undertaking an 
obligation. Or: The essential feature of a promise is the undertaking of an obligation 
to perform a certain act (Searle 1969:60). 
 An obligation is undertaken in the very act of promising, in communication 
of an intention to act in a certain way. Promising, in this regard, entails the 
undertaking of an obligation. 
 Consent, qua voluntary alienation, is also understood to impose an obligation, 
though consensual obligation would follow through authorization. 
 So: S, in granting P a special right to q, authorizes P to q. In so doing, S 
undertakes an obligation to abide by P’s q-ing. Given an obligation to abide by P’s 
q-ing obtains, S ought, other things being equal, to abide by P’s q-ing. P, in effect, 
has a claim to S’s q-ing. 
 On this account, consent as akin to promising, given an obligation obtains 
through authorization. However, on the anarchical principle, a moral commitment 
is not presumed in the granting of a right. S, in granting a right to P to q, does not 
renounce a right to act at will. Thus, S is not obliged to maintain consent, in granting 
a right to P to q. 
 Here, we proceed from the mere possession of a right. In granting a right to 
another, a right is yet retained. Moral commitment, in form of a voluntary alienation 
 
75 The clause “other things being equal” (ceteris paribus) assumes no drastic changes in 
circumstances, such that P would be morally justified (or excused) in breaking the promise. Things 
remaining equal, P would be justified in not keeping the promise, where R releases P from the 
promise, in effect canceling it. 
76 My objective is not to render a definition of promising proper but to contradistinguish promising 
from consenting. For that purpose, I grant Searle’s (1964; 1969) understanding of promising as an 
undertaking of an obligation. But consent, I claim, does not entail an obligation. 
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or a promise, supplements anarchic consent. Otherwise, S nowhere commits S to 
maintain consent, such that P continues to enjoy a right to q. 
 An ought, then, cannot be derived from anarchic consent in isolation. For an 
ought to be derived from consent, it needs to be supplemented by a voluntary 
alienation of the right possessed. 
 In this way, we proceed on a Filmerian critique of consent theory. Anarchic 
consent, in Filmerian terms, is understood as primitive. Consent of anarchic 
individuals only presumes the possession of a right. An individual is thus a judge 
in his own case. His right to act is political, in that sense. 
 A presumption of a moral commitment removes the authority of the anarchic 
individual. Morality, at that point, introduces sociability, where authority is 
understood as relational. Authority, for Filmer, obtains in possession of a right to 
act at will, namely, in freedom of the individual. 
 
2.4.2. A promise to obey. 
 
Anarchic consent does not entail a promise to obey. On the anarchical principle, 
consent alone does not bind. For consent to bind, it needs to be supplemented by a 
promise or a contract. Political obligation cannot be imposed in derivation of 
anarchic consent. To impose political obligation, a moral construct is introduced. 
This may obtain in the form of a promise to obey, as we find in Hobbes’s contract 
theory. 
A Hobbesian state of nature, governed purely by self-preservation, is one of 
war of all against all. Here, everyone has a right to all things. Unlimited right (i.e., 
a right to all things) engenders a war of all against all, inimical to preservation. A 
right of all to all things tends to destruction. Insecurity persists, in its application. 
The giving up of unlimited right, on the principle of preservation, follows (L xiv 
4). (See also Gauthier 1969:51.) 
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As Hobbes (EL 15.3) stipulates, in the joining of political society, a right to 
all things is either relinquished or transferred, in declaring sufficiently by signs a 
ceasing to act on this right or a non-resistance to another entity’s acting, 
respectively. Further, Hobbes (EL 15.14) argues, the consenter does not retain the 
right. But this, I gather, is stipulated by a political requirement. One does in fact 
retain a right of revocation, unless required otherwise. In this case, contract takes 
precedence over individual consent. 
On this construal, Hobbes (EL 15.9) portrays consent as a promise to obey, 
namely, a “covenant.” A covenant is a promise made in the form of a contract (EL 
15.9). To covenant is to lay down a right to all things, thus, to assume an obligation 
by a mutual transfer of right, where each party to the covenant agrees not to oppose 
another, in his laying down a corresponding right (Gauthier 1969:41). A transfer of 
right in consideration of reciprocal benefit is not a “free gift” but a mutual donation, 
i.e., a contract (EL 15.8). A covenant thus obtains in the form of promising in 
consideration of mutual benefit (Warrender 1957:30). 
A covenant, so understood, implies promissory obligation (EL 15.9). (See 
also Gauthier 1969:42; Skinner 2008:45.) There is no prior independent obligation 
to perform. One undertakes an obligation, where there was none prior (Gauthier 
1969:42). 
But consent is here understood as a promise to obey in virtue of its mutuality, 
in consolidation of a power political. Also, force is to be exerted to this end. The 
power of coercion, Hobbes (EL 20.7) claims, consists in the transfer of the right of 
resistance. No member of the commonwealth is consequently allowed to resist the 
power established. Covenant is binding on the law of nature, which dictates the 
keeping of covenant (EL 16.1). Yet bindingness, also, assumes the use of force, 
since contracts are invalid in a natural condition. In the absence of sanction, it 
cannot be expected that anyone shall keep his commitments. So, for a contract to 
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bind, it needs to be enforced (EL 15.10). As Hobbes puts it in Leviathan (ch. xvii), 
covenants without the sword are but words. 
Here, the individual is not presumed on his own prerogative to maintain 
consent. Fear, rather, constitutes the motivation by which consent is maintained. In 
the case of lone individuals, “the fear of not otherwise preserving himself” (EL 
19.11) fixes the motivation for political union. Yet fear of non-preservation keeps 
none in check. Once individuals have adopted membership, a fear by use of force 
is introduced “to keep them all in awe” (EL 19.4). 
Contra Sagar (2018:104-5), power and consent are inseparable in Hobbes’s 
account of covenant. Covenant is not indicative of a de facto authority legitimated 
by individual consent. Rather, the body politic is formed by mutual consent and the 
compulsion of unreliable individual consenters, forced to keep their word by the 
power of union. 
As Hobbes (EL 15.18) explains, covenant binds as far as it may be carried 
out. That is, one is bound by a contract, where there is assurance of its being kept, 
beyond a mere word. An obligation to keep a covenant rests on the law of nature 
and sanctions applied by the body politic, which is founded upon that very 
covenant. 
Rule by fear situates authority prior to individual consent. Now, as Hobbes 
(EL 20.3) does clarify, prospective members of a political society expressly 
consent, at the outset, to a coalition towards that end, whereupon the will of their 
majority or that of one man or council is taken as the will of each member of society. 
But here an act of consent is conceived in terms of mutual consent upon a 
contractual requirement. Prior to an act of consent, an individual is not given a 
reason to obey, save in context of a political union. Express consent, accordingly, 
is mutual, given a political structure. 
In the case of anarchic consent, a right is granted to another in the form of 
permission simpliciter. This is not equivalent to relinquishing or transferring, in the 
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Hobbesian sense, as would make consent binding. Anarchic consent consists in the 
granting of a right, which is retained, in that authorization is fully revocable. 
Hobbes presumes that a right, once waived or granted, has been relinquished or 
transferred, respectively, such that it may at no time be reclaimed. This is due to 
Hobbes’s account of consent in the form of a promise to obey, enforced by a 
political entity. 
Now, in his critique of Hobbes, Filmer (O, 243) remarks upon Hobbes’s 
discussion of transfer in virtue of relinquishing a right of resistance, such that in 
abdicating said right, no new right is given to another. In a covenant, another 
possesses the same right. But in mutual consent, the right is conferred onto a body 
of one man or assembly in which the multitude is united. Such conference, Filmer 
(O, 243-4) stresses, requires unanimous consent at the formation of the body, the 
disintegration of which would ensue at the utterance of one dissenting opinion. 
To extrapolate, in entering into contract, an act of consent is performed, 
whereby a right of resistance is abdicated. However, the right established by a 
contract is not due to an abdication of that right. A contract, on the abdication of a 
right of resistance, is valid only while consent is maintained. Hobbes, to render a 
right to govern permanent, invokes contractual requirements, referential to natural 
law and enforcement. In unanimity, contractors establish for themselves, qua 
communion, a new right. The creation of a new right, however, is analogous to 
taking that right. Conversely, if the right of individuals remains the standard, no 
right to govern, as would satisfy contractual requirements, has been granted. 
In Hobbes, a right is reserved against all non-consenters.77 However, on 
Filmer’s anarchical principle, one reserves a right against those with whom one 
makes a contract. There is no obstruction of the principle, in breaking a contract. 
 
77 See Filmer’s (O, 243) comment on this feature in Hobbes. 
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The granting or waiving of a right, on individual prerogative, does not imply a 
morally committed transfer of authority. 
In Hobbes, a transfer of right is performed by contractors, who give up their 
right to a prospective governing body, enforcing the contract. Hobbesian 
contractors reserve a right against anarchic individuals. Yet this is not so much a 
“transfer” of right as an extension of a power political. For the body, absent any 
contribution from individuals, is already present, in the form of a contract. 
Hobbes and Filmer assert divergent forms of consent. While in Hobbes, 
contractual requirements impose an obligation to obey, Filmer’s anarchical 
principle negates it. In Filmer, a form of consent is understood in terms anarchic, 
while Hobbes applies a moral construct to consent qua covenanting. Political 
obligation, in Hobbes, is derived from covenant. However, insofar as we proceed 
from anarchic consent, political obligation does not obtain. 
A Filmerist critique of Hobbes accentuates the unreliability of individual 
consent, in formation of a political union. This necessitates Hobbes’s eventual 
appeal to a rule by force, given mutual consent. Hobbes’s project, however, relies 
on individual consent as the grounding of a political society. A rule by force, as 
here outlined, is inconsistent with that project. 
 
2.5. Contra original communism. 
 
Filmer’s critique of consent theory is relevant to his argument against original 
communism. In his Originall, Filmer rejects Grotius’s thesis of original 
communism (273). As in his critique of consent theory, Filmer puts a challenge to 
the thesis of original communism on its own premises. 
 Grotius maintains original common ownership with a shift towards private 
property by human action (O, 266). For Filmer, private ownership is original, 
vested in Adam’s monarchical power and his dominion. This is a major point of 
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contention between Locke and Filmer, whereas Locke in Two Treatises is 
committed to the doctrine of original communism, in his interpretation of 
Genesis.78 
 First, Filmer (O, 262) objects to Grotius’s thesis of original communism, in 
that Grotius makes the law of nature subject to change, once private property is 
initiated in human affairs. If all things were originally owned in common, on 
presumption of equality, a natural law of common ownership and equality is 
rendered contrary to the law by which things are now rightfully owned in private 
(262). 
 Further, original communism, as Filmer argues in his Originall, cannot 
explain the development of private property through consent. To establish the 
principle of private property from a state of original communism, an agreement 
must obtain on that very principle. Political legitimacy, let us say, is established by 
consent. However, to legitimately transform the natural order of original 
communism to a political society of private ownership, universal unanimous 
consent is required. In its absence, society could not be altered towards private 
property, “for if but one man in the world had dissented, the alteration [towards 
private ownership] had been unjust, because that man by the law of nature had a 
right to the common use of all things in the world; so that to have given a propriety 
of any one thing to any other, had been to have robbed him of his right to the 
common use of all things” (O, 273). 
 Recall, Filmer demands unanimous consent for the legitimacy of government, 
formed by an original contract. Now, in the context of original communism, 
universal unanimous consent is required, to establish the very principle of private 
ownership from original communism. That is, it must be presumed, on a thesis of 
 
78 For his case of original communism based in scripture, Locke (I, 19-20) cites I Tim. 6.17 (“God, 
who giveth us richly all things to enjoy”). However, as Laslett (1970:187n) notes, Locke provides 
no bona fide scriptural evidence of original communism. 
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original communism, that individuals have a right to common use of the earth, until 
they unanimously give up that right. Yet even if everyone has given up the right, 
anyone can without notice choose to alter the social order anew, in revoking his 
consent, thus restoring his natural liberty and ownership. Private ownership from 
common use is thus made to be unjust. 
 For Locke, Filmer’s critique of original communism challenges the main 
tenets of his own political doctrine. Locke’s labor theory of property provides a 
reply to Filmer’s critique, introducing an evolutionary framework to the 
appropriation of property from a state of original communism. In Locke (II, 27), 
the product of labor is one’s own, given ownership of one’s person and body, 
applied in the making of the product. Property, thus, is appropriated in virtue of 
self-ownership. Political society, eventually, is established for the securing of 
private property (II, 135, 171). 
 Here, Locke explains the change from common use to private property, 
within the context of the law of nature. Filmer’s challenge of universal unanimous 
consent is ostensibly met. But Locke circumvents Filmer’s challenge in denying his 
concept of anarchic individuals. As Filmer would have it, these are presupposed in 
consent theory. His challenge is put to consent theory, on this ground. Locke, 
however, introduces a new framework for a natural condition, applicable to his 
labor theory of property. 
 For Locke (II, 28), the appropriation of property is not dependent upon the 
consent of those subsisting in common ownership. Labor suffices to claim 
ownership of what is otherwise owned in common. However, once property is 
brought into the jurisdiction of civil society in the formation of government, private 
ownership is newly founded on the original compact (II, 120-2). 
Lockean consent is not expressed by anarchic individuals but original 
contractors. It takes the form of unanimous consent of those contractors. The 
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requirement of universal consent, in Filmer’s challenge, is then avoided, in limiting 
unanimous consent to a political union of original contractors. 
 
2.6. The multitude. 
 
To further our grasp of Filmer’s notion of freedom and consent, let us examine 
Filmer’s understanding of “the people” or “the multitude.” Here, Filmer refers to 
individuals under the rule of a monarch or the head of a family. 
 The “natural” freedom of the people, for Filmer, obtains only in an unnatural 
state of anarchy. In Filmer, anarchy is not properly understood as a precursor to 
political society but a consequence of a collapse of government. Israel of the Judges 
exemplifies such a condition. 
 Consent, for Filmer, is immaterial to political legitimacy. But in his challenge 
to consent theory, Filmer presents individual consent as a granting of a right. This 
is conceived within a natural condition of anarchic consenters. These are naturally 
free individuals. Yet, as Filmer (F, 206) argues, if authority is bestowed on political 
power by individual consent, then anarchy persists. Consent may at any time be 
revoked; thus, anarchy is reintroduced. 
 It is not the case, Filmer (P, 53) affirms, that authority is bestowed upon 
political power, by consent of the people at liberty to choose a form of government. 
There is no such right, conferred by consent of the people, to establish a political 
society. 
Though note, Filmer (A, 288) is not so much concerned whether people in 
fact choose their kings as with the right of the people so to do. For Filmer, the 
people have no such power or right; or if they had any such power or right, the 
people would have no grounds to lawfully exercise it. 
Here, Filmer (F) controverts the historical existence of an independent 
multitude “who at first had a natural right to a community,” (188) giving consent 
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to government. In his objection to Bellarmine’s contention in De laicis (1586-9), 
that power is given by a multitude to the king and government, in accordance with 
the law of nature, Filmer (P, 56-7, 189) denies a natural right to form a political 
society by consent. 
As Bellarmine contends in his De laicis (1586-9), God had given power to 
no person but — as all are by nature equal — to the multitude; thus, by divine law, 
power rested immediately in the multitude entire (see P, 56-7; Zuckert 2002:136-
7). “The people were never the Lords anointed,” (189), Filmer (F) objects. Supreme 
power, “being an indivisible beam of majesty,” (189) cannot be divided among a 
multitude; thus, it is not the case that a power supreme is ever exercised by the 
multitude (189). It is, and must be, indivisible in one person (189). 
Now, the signification of “the people” or “the multitude,” Filmer (A, 285-
6) insists, does not change the implications of the foregoing argument. Despite the 
obtaining of joint consent, the individual is, or may at any time be, wronged, 
provoking revocation of his consent. Natural freedom of the individual implies a 
permanent right of secession (Dunn 1969:69), in his revoking consent. 
If by “the people” we mean (1) the entire multitude, in accepting natural 
freedom of all and accordingly common ownership (original communism), then 
“without a joint consent of the whole people of the world, no one thing can be made 
proper to any one man, but it will be an injury, and a usurpation upon the common 
right of all others” (A, 285). Given natural freedom of the individual, no one can 
be chosen a king without the simultaneous continuous consent of the entire 
multitude (285). 
But suppose, rather, (2) the people belong to different territories (countries), 
where they have the power to ordain a king, on supposition of their natural freedom. 
It follows (as it is not by nature alone that kingdoms form but the power of a people 
to ordain a king) that “every man is at liberty to be of what kingdom he please, and 
so every petty company hath a right to make a kingdom by itself; and not only every 
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city, but every village, and every family, nay, and every particular man, a liberty to 
choose himself to be his own King if he please” (A, 286). That being so, kings count 
as many as individuals. Yet a kingdom of one is no kingdom at all for the rest. 
There is but a state of anarchy, in which individuals are left to their natural freedom 
(286). 
Now, we may however refer not to the population of a particular territory 
but (3) a majority thereof. Non-consenters, Filmer (A, 286) argues, remain unbound 
by laws decreed by the majority, any decisions made by it or its actions. Majority 
consent, unavoidably, excludes non-consenters. But if but one may be excluded, all 
can be excluded for the same reason. If all are by nature free to choose a 
government, it is, however, unjust to exclude anyone from political society or 
discount his right to government (F, 211). 
In any case, “the people” denotes individuals, including those “normally 
excluded from political life” (Daly 1979:92), namely, women, children, and 
servants. In fact, the implicit emphasis in Filmer’s understanding of “the people” is 
on those on the bottom rung, though the term is comprehensive. Daly (1979:92) 
takes the term to signify “mathematical equality of units,” viz. individuals each with 
an equal claim to government. On this polemical construal of a multitude naturally 
free to consent to government, Filmer’s challenge to consent theory is presented: 
everyone must be included. 
So, it is deemed futile, on basis of natural liberty and individual consent, 
ever to establish political legitimacy, as “it will prove a mere impossibility ever 
lawfully to introduce any kind of government whatsoever, without apparent wrong 
to a multitude of people” (A, 287). The state or government, Filmer (A, 287) argues, 
cannot meet the standard given by individual consent, whereas the right given by 
individuals to governors to rule over them may at any time be revoked. This renders 




2.7. Freedom to act at will. 
 
Filmer denies the natural freedom of the people. Yet in his rejection, Filmer asserts 
the freedom of the sovereign. 
Freedom under monarchy, for Filmer (P, 55), is the greatest liberty in the 
world. As Filmer (P) writes, 
 
It is the Magna Charta of this kingdom; all other shows or pretexts of 
liberty are but several degrees of slavery, and a liberty only to destroy 
liberty (55). 
 
Freedom under monarchy here denotes “rights and liberties” qua “ample 
privileges,” granted by the grace and bounty of princes (55). Otherwise, the natural 
freedom of the people is rejected, on the proposition that the natural form of 
government is absolute monarchy.79 No one is born free under the original state, 
that is, the sovereignty of Adam. 
The sovereign, however, may grant rights and liberties, in virtue of his own 
freedom. But, as James I, in his Trew Law of Free Monarchies (1994), warns, there 
is no right, in the case of a wicked king, to revoke privileges (80). Though in 
revoking consent, one renounces permanently all privileges (69). 
James I insisted he was not bound by the laws of the land (Harris 1994:198). 
The emphasis in James I differs from that in Filmer. While James I admits that 
subjects owe no obedience to the sovereign in case his commands contradict God’s, 
Filmer persists in his assertion that the sovereign justifiably commands contrary to 
 
79 Cf. I, 2, ll. 14-6. Locke (I, 2) stipulates Filmer’s primary proposition as: All government is absolute 
monarchy. This proposition is to be grounded in Filmer’s rejection of natural freedom: No one is 
born free. Yet, on my understanding, the reverse is the case in Filmer’s system. It is not the case 
that all government is absolute monarchy, because no one is born free. Rather, no one is born free 
under absolute monarchy, from the beginning, viz. because political power is invariably absolute. 
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human as well as divine law (Cuttica 2012:110). Subjects remain obliged to obey 
the commands of their sovereign. 
James I confessed the king was bound by his oath, whereas Filmer admits to 
the monarch’s complete freedom of action (Cuttica 2012:111). In Filmer, though a 
king may not have the right towards God to revoke privileges, the king yet has such 
a right towards his people. The people, further, are not in any position to revoke 
their privileges. 
 
2.7.1. Original freedom. 
 
In Filmer (P, 53), the doctrine of natural freedom is rejected, in its assertion that 
individuals are born free from subjection and to choose a form of government. At 
birth, a child is a subject to his father “under which subjection he is always to live, 
unless by immediate appointment from God, or by the grant or death of his Father, 
he become possessed of that power to which he was subject” (D, 232). A natural 
hierarchy obtains in Adam’s sovereignty, by divine grant (see Laslett 1949:18). 
Political society develops from original monarchy, vested in Adam. It is formed on 
the principle of fatherly power under which one is born. 
Now, as I observe, Filmer, in his rejection of natural freedom, denies being 
born free, rather than natural freedom simpliciter. Note, Adam is not born but 
created (cf. I, 50, ll. 15-6). 
Accordingly, I propose, Filmer’s Adam is created a free man. Adam, in his 
creation, is placed under subjection to God. But Adam is created a free man towards 
all other men, positioned in a natural hierarchy. 
It is, to be sure, nowhere explicitly stated in Filmer that Adam is created a 
free man. Now, Filmer, in the preface to his Forms, does maintain “natural freedom 
of mankind cannot be supposed without the denial of the creation of Adam” (188). 
On the face of it, Filmer is asserting that natural freedom obtains nowhere in 
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creation; and if posited, it contradicts the creation of Adam; for Adam in his 
creation, is subject to God. However, preceding the sentence in question, we are led 
to believe the freedom of the people leads to atheism. Popular freedom is in 
opposition to a natural hierarchy, based in Adam’s sovereignty. So, I propose an 
alternative interpretation: The freedom of the people contradicts the universal 
monarchy of Adam, in subjection to which the multitude subsists. Here, Filmer 
denies not the freedom of Adam but the freedom of the people (cf. Zuckert 
2002:131). 
Further, Filmer (P) states, 
 
[T]he desire of liberty was the cause of the fall of Adam (53). 
 
Supposedly, since no natural freedom obtains in creation, Adam’s sin is to desire 
freedom in opposition to God’s command. Or: Adam’s sin is to desire greater 
freedom than he possesses, or freedom different in kind, in desiring the wrong 
thing, or that thing at the wrong time.80 Here, Filmer does not deny the freedom of 
Adam. Rather, as it is a sin for Adam to desire greater freedom, so it is a sin for his 
progeny to desire any freedom at all. 
In this context, Filmer (P) lambasts the “Divines of the Reformed Churches” 
for the attribution of liberty to “the meanest of the multitude, who magnify liberty 
as if the height of human felicity were only to be found in it […]” (53). The 
emphasis is here laid on the supposed freedom of the people. This is all that Filmer 
explicitly denies. 
 
80 This argumentation accords with Anselm’s description of the Fall of Satan, in his De Casu Diaboli 
(2000). In chapter 7, Anselm describes the reasons for the Fall, in that Satan inordinately 
(excessively) willed more happiness than he had received from God, as he had “an excessive need 
of good for no reason except because of an immoderate desire.” 
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 In any case, Adam’s desire for freedom violates God’s command. In his 
Discourses Concerning Government (1698), Sidney, in his objecting against 
Filmer’s portrayal of Adam’s sin, notes “that the liberty asserted is not a 
licentiousness of doing what is pleasing to everyone against the command of God; 
but an exemption from all human laws [...]” (I.2, 8-9). Freedom, properly 
understood, is in conformity with God’s law, Sidney (1698:1.2, 9) observes. Adam, 
in trespassing a law from a desire of freedom, would trespass human law, not God’s. 
 However, as I observe, Filmerian freedom is part of the order of things. For 
the multitude, though, it remains unnatural. Filmerian freedom relates to the action 
of the sovereign, in the making of positive law. Now, Adam desires more freedom 
than he possesses, in violation of divine law. In degree, Adam’s freedom does not 
cohere with God’s law. Yet Adam does possess freedom, on God’s law. His 
freedom, then, may be employed by the concurrent monarch. 
 
2.7.2. Unlimited freedom. 
 
I observe a positive element in Filmer’s definition of freedom in his reference to 
desire. Minimally, Filmer does grant a desire for liberty. The desire is sinful, 
apropos of the multitude. But Filmer also defines freedom positively as 
unrestrained desire. As Filmer (F) writes, 
 
True liberty is for every man to do what he list, or to live as he please, 
and not to be tied to any laws (224).81 
 
81 This sentence, following Sommerville’s edition (1991:275), is written in inverted commas. In 
Laslett’s edition (1949:224), however, the sentence runs without quotes. In any case, Filmer (F, 224) 
here apparently resorts to common usage, in describing natural (as distinguished from civil) 
freedom. For this idea of freedom (liberty), I apply “the freedom to act at will.” 
 Few lines below, Filmer (F, 224) refers to Aristotle’s Politics (bk. 6, ch. 4-5), in further 





From this definition, I shall speak of natural liberty, for Filmer, as the freedom to 
act at will. Freedom, put otherwise, is acting by unrestrained desire, on one’s own 
judgement. 
I also refer to this notion of freedom as the anarchical principle, in 
combination with anarchic consent as the granting of a right, at the prerogative of 
the consenter.82 
Note, the terms “desire,” “will,” “list,” or “please” need not be understood to 
denote acts of will or the capacity to act. The primary sense of true liberty, on my 
reading of Filmer, is the prerogative of individual judgement, viz. being a judge in 
one’s own case and right. 
This sense of freedom is unraveled in Filmer’s discussion of anarchy, namely, 
in his references to Israel of the Judges. Here, Filmer relies on Gen. 21.25, where 
every man is said to have done what was right in his own eyes, when there was no 
king in Israel. Here, we observe a phraseology, relevant to individual judgement, 
rather than willing or ability. 
 
translation of Aristotle’s Politics. In Book 6 (ch. 2, 340), Aristotle discusses one of the “tokens” of 
liberty being “to live as men list.” 
Filmer, though, may in fact adopt the phraseology from Hobbes, in De Cive (9.9) (see Skinner 
2008:108; 95n). Hobbes, notably, used the 1598 translation of Aristotle’s Politics, where, in book 
6, the phraseology occurs (Skinner 2008:37). This translation was available to Hobbes, in the 
Hardwick library (37). 
On Skinner’s (2008:108; 95n) estimation, Filmer, in his definition of natural liberty, makes 
use of Hobbes’s rendering of Florentinus’s dictum, at the beginning of the Digest (1.5.4). Here, 
Florentinus states: “Liberty is the natural faculty of doing whatever one likes” (libertas est naturalis 
facultas eius quod cuique facere libet). (See also Skinner 2008:108; 95n.) This is noted in Hobbes’s 
Latin version of De Cive (9.9): Vulgo omnia nostro arbitratu facere, atque id impunè, libertas. The 
Latin version of De Cive is the one read and cited by Filmer (Warrender 1983:19). 
Filmer, lastly, borrows like phraseology from scripture (KJV), esp. the last verse of Judges, 
21:25 [In those days there was no king in Israel: every man did that which was right in his own 
eyes]. Here, the phrasing turns to judgement, rather than desire. Filmer is wont to describe the 
anarchic individual as a judge in his own case or in his own right. 
82 Filmer does not espouse this principle for consent. But, as I contend, the anarchical principle may 
be positively extracted from Filmer’s system, in terms of consent. 
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In comparison, Hobbes, in The Elements, portrays liberty in positive terms83 
with similar phraseology. But in Hobbes (EL 14.6, 15.13), the wording connotes 
the liberty of using a natural power and ability. (See also Skinner 2008:35.) 
As Hobbes (EL) writes, 
 
Every man by nature hath right to all things, that is to say, to do 
whatsoever he listeth to whom he listeth, to possess, use, and enjoy all 
things he will and can (14.10).84 
 
83 On Pettit’s (2005:137) reading, natural freedom, as characterized by Hobbes in The Elements, is 
properly defined as non-obligation. Skinner (2008:35, 44) rejects this reading of The Elements. As 
Skinner (2008:35) notes, Hobbes, in The Elements, does not put forth a veritable definition of liberty. 
Also, Hobbes does not discuss liberty in negative terms, as he is otherwise wont to do in De Cive 
and Leviathan. 
84 Hobbesian freedom, thus formulated in The Elements, is most akin to Filmerian freedom. But in 
De Cive and Leviathan, Hobbes departs from this understanding of freedom. 
In De Cive (9.9), Hobbes rejects the Florintinian notion of liberty, viz. “to doe all things 
according to our own phancies, and that without punishment” (C 9.9). Here, Hobbes acknowledges 
an agent cannot on this standard of liberty be considered free under a civil government and peaceful 
arrangement, “because there is no City without a Command, and a restraining Right” (“Vulgo omnia 
nostro arbitratu facere, atque id impunè, libertas; id non posse, seruitus iudicatur; quod in ciuitate, 
& cum pace humani generis fieri non potest; quia ciuitas sine imperio & iure coërcendi nulla est”). 
Freedom to act at will is incompatible with civil life (civitas) (C 9.9), whereas civitas must involve 
sovereignty and a corresponding right to restrain the liberty of subjects. (See also Skinner 2008:109.) 
Further, Hobbes (C 9.9) argues, this standard of liberty fails to accommodate the idea of 
natural freedom of movement. Liberty is then reformulated as “nothing else but an absence of the 
lets, and hindrances of motion” (“LIBERTAS, ut eam definiamus, nihil aliud est quam absentia 
impedimentorum motus”). 
On this idea of civil liberty (libertas civilis), a form of liberty is enjoyed after submitting to 
government. Submission to government, as Hobbes now proceeds to argue, does not negate a certain 
form of liberty, namely, civil liberty. Liberty may be possessed “more or less,” that is, relative to 
the space within which one moves, “as he hath more liberty, who is in a large, then he that is kept 
in a close prison” (C 9.9). 
Civil law is not to regulate bodily movement in its entirety; thus, subjects retain a degree of 
liberty (C 13.15-16). Natural liberty, however, is not enjoyed in a commonwealth, where one no 
longer acts at will, being restrained according to penalty of law (C 9.9) (cohibetur poenis propositis, 
ne omnia quae vult faciat). The exercise of natural liberty, that is, acting at will, results in a war of 
all against all (see Skinner 2008:121-2). 
In Leviathan, Hobbes refines his idea of freedom. Whereas in De Cive, Hobbes defines 
liberty as the absence of impediments to motion, Hobbes, in Leviathan (xxi), defines freedom as the 
absence of external impediments. Liberty proper is now merely corporal, that is, the liberty of 





In the Hobbesian state of nature, liberty is possessed in its entirety (Skinner 
2008:42-3). But in Hobbes, natural liberty consists in the right to act at will, relative 
only to ability. In that case, natural liberty may be forsaken, where one loses the 
capacity to act, in being physically subdued or enslaved. A slave is one who lacks 
natural liberty in being chained or otherwise restrained by natural impediments (EL 
22.3). But, as Skinner (2008:44) stresses, Hobbes’s slave forfeits his natural liberty 
due to his inability to act otherwise, being physically chained or bound, as opposed 
to his entering into an obligation to act in a certain way.85 The slave is not capable 
of undertaking an obligation, by covenanting.86 For he remains in a state of war 
with his master (44).87 
Now, on our positive version of Filmerism, a consenting slave would in fact 
turn out to be the judge of his own veritable enslavement, by albeit revocable 
 
Given the circumscription of “external impediments,” Skinner (2008:129) argues in favor of 
a significant evolution in Hobbes’s thinking of liberty, in opposition to Pettit’s (2005:150) claim to 
the contrary. In De Cive, Hobbes argues freedom may be taken away by absolute or arbitrary 
impediments. In Leviathan, however, Hobbes abandons the notion of arbitrary impediments (e.g., 
fear) (Skinner 2008:128). 
For Hobbes, in De Cive (9.9, 13.16), fear is an arbitrary impediment, acting as a hindrance 
per accidens. Fear acts as a force impeding a would-be agent from willing to perform an action 
otherwise within his power. The would-be agent is impeded from behaving or willing in a particular 
way, or willing to act in a particular way (C 9.9, 13.16). Now, such formulation runs counter to 
Hobbes’s rendering of freedom in Leviathan (xxi 3), where fear and liberty are said to be consistent. 
An action performed from fear of the law, is voluntary; an agent is at liberty to omit the act. 
Obedience to the law is due to fear (L xiv), which is not an external impediment. Liberty, 
however, is taken away by external impediments. Thus, despite fear, one is free at any time to 
disobey the law. It is accordingly viable to live as a free-man in subjection to government or absolute 
sovereignty (L xxi). As one is not physically prevented from disobeying the law, one is entirely at 
liberty to disobey the law (Skinner 2008:160-1). 
In conclusion, we encounter a major difference in the mature Hobbes and Filmer, related to 
dependence on government. In Filmer, fear and liberty are (and ought to be) inconsistent. 
Dependence on government is actual and desirable. 
85 Compare Locke, II, 23, 172. 
86 I note here, though, a distinction in Hobbes (EL 22.2-3) between a servant (servi) and a slave 
(ergastuli). A person loses her freedom by enslavement as a servant or a slave. A servant (servi), 
however, has covenanted to avoid death, whereas a slave (ergastuli) has not covenanted. In fact, the 
latter is not understood to be able to consent to his enslavement. (See also Skinner 2008:103-5.) 
87 Cf. EL 22.2-3. 
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consent. Contra Hobbes, impediments to his motion are irrelevant. His capacity is 
not at issue. Given consent is required, authority lies with the consenter. If ever a 
slave is presumed to give consent, he is the master. 
Further, in Hobbes, a covenant (of those able) limits natural liberty, in 
prohibiting the full exercise of a natural right to act. The covenanter is restricted by 
his promise to act in accordance with the covenant (Skinner 2008:44-5). Promises 
are covenants, signaling the will of covenanters, viz. last acts of deliberation (EL 
15.9). In undertaking the covenant, the will to relinquish a right of resistance is 
signaled (EL 19.10). A natural right to resist is relinquished, whereby one 
experiences a “loss of liberty” (EL 24.2; L xiv).88 By covenant, the liberty of nature 
is thus abridged (EL 29.10).89 But remaining “out of all covenants obligatory to 
others,” one shall be “free to do, and undo, and deliberate as long as he listeth” (EL 
20.18). 
In Filmer, the judgement of anarchic individuals is not limited by promissory 
obligation. Their actions are indeed judged by a divine will. Still, relative to human 
judgement, anarchic individuals are self-appointed judges. Filmerian freedom, 
then, is not a matter of degree. It is unlimited. A sovereign individual cannot but 
 
88 In The Elements, Hobbes claims liberty is taken away as soon as one acquires the will to covenant. 
In the Leviathan (xiv), Hobbes, however, claims obligation arises only when right is transferred by 
the undertaking of a covenant (Skinner 2008:45). 
89 In Hobbes, liberty is limited rather than forsaken, in civil society. Now, Hobbes (EL 23.9) does 
maintain liberty is the state of a person who is not subject. But under government, one is obliged to 
live under “absolute subjection” to a sovereign power (EL 23.9). The idea of a free-man under 
government is a contradiction-in-terms. However, subjects, as opposed to slaves, retain two 
elements of natural liberty, following the establishment of a commonwealth, namely (1) the right to 
freedom of movement (EL 28.4; see also Skinner 2008:53); and (2) liberties necessary for obtaining 
peace and the benefits of peace. So, although a right to all things is relinquished, a right to some 
things (e.g., a right to self-defense) is retained (EL 17.2). Divine and natural law, Hobbes (EL 29.5) 
explains, allow greater liberty than civil law, which binds to restrict natural freedom. But these 
liberties are retained, such “that there be no restraint of natural liberty, but what is necessary for the 
good of the commonwealth” (EL 28.4). 
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act freely, even in giving up his freedom. If freedom is renounced, it may yet at any 
time be reclaimed.90 
So: If S gives away S’s right to act at will for P to q, then S, likewise, may 
restore S’s freedom and reclaim S’s freedom. But if so, S, in effect, is inexorably 
free to act at will. In giving up S’s freedom, S acts freely. But S, in restoring S’s 
freedom, gains no freedom. The act of restoration presupposes S’s freedom. Thus, 
S remains free to act at will. P’s claim to q is wholly dependent upon S’s continuous 
permission. 
Now, given natural inequality, subjects under the rule of a sovereign are 
naturally unfree. Sovereigns alone possess freedom. They are anarchic. To posit the 
freedom of prospective subjects, demands their interminable sovereignty. But this 
renders them wholly unreliable for government to operate and remain legitimate. 
Filmer maintains, if freedom to act at will is posited for the populace, then a 
proposed right to rule granted by it is revocable. If the right is deemed non-
revocable, then this is presumed on basis of prior political or moral authority. But 
given a prior authority, freedom to act at will does not obtain. 
While Hobbes, in The Elements, posits freedom to act at will, Hobbes, unlike 
Filmer, envisions a degree of freedom under government, where even a right of 
self-defense is retained (EL 17.2). This, Filmer (O) objects, is destructive to all 
government for “hereby any rogue or villain may murder his sovereign, if the 
sovereign but offer by force to whip or lay him in the stocks” (248). In fact, such 
condition is equivalent to a state of war (248). As Filmer (O, 243) stresses, if one 
has not given up the right to defend one’s life, one has effectively relinquished 
nothing. 
 
90 Self-enslavement is conceivable on the anarchical principle. But, in that case, consent to being 
enslaved by another may be revoked at any time. In Locke (II, 23), slavery by compact is impossible 
by the law of nature. (See also Olsthoorn & Apeldoorn 2020:3.) 
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Here, Hobbes is vulnerable to Filmerian critique. Proceeding from Filmer’s 
argument, given the state’s exclusive right to punish, the right of self-defense 
cannot be maintained. It would otherwise apply as well to the criminal, as Hobbes 
(L xxi 13) acknowledges. But the right of the criminal is not recognized by state 
power. While Hobbes, in this respect, still struggles to contain the moral, this fact 
of the political is captured entirely by Filmer’s system, in denial of the right of self-
defense. 
Civil freedom, for Filmer (P, 55), is but a privilege, in the form of certain 
liberties granted to the people by the king. That is, only under government is 
freedom meaningful, but no one is born free. Natural freedom, for Filmer, is 
reserved for anarchic individuals, i.e., sovereigns. 
 
2.7.3. The denial of natural popular freedom. 
 
Natural liberty, if extant, must be unlimited. This proposition forms Filmer’s 
challenge to consent theory. Filmer’s anarchical principle combines unlimited 
freedom and anarchic consent, in formulating the challenge. Here, consent theory 
is challenged in its supposed derivation of political legitimacy from consent of 
anarchic individuals. 
Freedom, for Filmer, is unnatural. It does not obtain in political society 
(commonweal), where there is proper rule of government (F, 224). As Filmer (P) 
writes, 
 
[T]he nature of all people is to desire liberty without restraint which 
cannot be but where the wicked bear rule (89). 
 
The law is made to nullify liberty. “[G]overnment […] was invented to take away 
liberty, and not to give it to every man; such liberty cannot be; if it should, there 
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would be no government at all” (F, 224); for “where every man does what he 
pleaseth, it may be truly said, there is no government” (F, 189). 
The end of government, then, is the absence of freedom, such “that every 
man should not do what he pleaseth, or be his own judge in his own case” (F, 189). 
Government proper negates the enjoyment of natural liberty. 
Now, it may be conceived, the government is inefficient in promulgating 
and enforcing the law91; or, the government has collapsed into a state of anarchy 
(F, 224). In such a state, freedom will fester. A government proper, however, 
amounts to general unfreedom. 
Yet in the absence of government, freedom assumedly obtains. Filmer (F, 
188, 229) rejects natural freedom in the sense of being born free. But in Filmer’s 
denial of natural freedom, an affirmation of freedom is veiled. Minimally, a desire 
for freedom is extant, given it is to be nullified. It persists in the absence or lack of 
government. Filmer (A, 288) does, however, deny the right to freedom, as we have 
seen. 
Now, a positive notion of Filmerian freedom may appear ill reconciled with 
the idea of an original state, in Adam’s sovereignty. In the institution of fatherly 
power, government has always existed. Freedom, therefore, is nullified, from the 
outset. But in Filmer’s reasoning of the end of government, freedom is presumed 
to exist. 
The argument is rendered coherent in Filmer’s (F, 224) discussion of a 
“broken” monarchy, that is, a collapse of the state. Here, individuals are said to 
subsist in a state of unnatural freedom, as judges in their own case. There is, for 
Filmer, such an unnatural condition wherein freedom obtains. In a natural 
condition, the state operates by government proper, in negation of liberty. 
 
91 Filmer, to be sure, does not discuss inefficiencies of government but rather total collapse (see F, 
224). However, we might infer, in that case, inefficiency leaves room for a degree of freedom. 
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Since individuals are born unfree under a natural hierarchy, they are not 
meant to — it ought not to be the case that they — be free. The denial of natural 
freedom is expressed in this normative sense, I take it. Freedom is extant, but the 
right to freedom is denied. 
Filmerian freedom, it may be said, is a privation of the good, existing in 
anarchy, “where the wicked bear rule.” The good is achieved in obedience to the 
sovereign will, where the apparatus of the state prevails. 
But we need to qualify Filmer’s denial of natural liberty as of the people.92 
Here, natural liberty is not denied but the natural liberty of “the people” or “the 
multitude,” that is, “a universal natural right belonging to individuals as such” 
(Daly 1979:85). 
Further, as I propose, Filmer’s Adam is created a free man, as the first 
progenitor and universal monarch. Accordingly, the sovereign and patriarchs 
qualify for the enjoyment of freedom, by partaking in the freedom of Adam. The 
freedom of those in subjection to monarchical power, however, is denied. 
It is not the case that there is no natural liberty in creation. The subjects are 
those unfree. Freedom remains for patriarchal and anarchic monarchs. 
The denial of natural freedom (“No one is born free”) does not relate to 
Adam, since Adam is not born but created.93 Given Adam is created a free man, the 
heir of Adam may partake in the freedom of Adam, in possession of patri-political 
power, within his own dominion or domain of the family. 
The heir of Adam, in position of supreme power, partakes in Adam’s 
sovereignty and freedom. Independent of the law, the sovereign enjoys freedom to 
act at will, within his private dominion. The head of a family, under the monarch, 
is free within his own domain of the family, while unfree towards the monarch. 
 
92 See 2.10 for a discussion of anarchy, where I distinguish between individuals and the people 
(multitude). 
93 Cf. I, 50, ll. 15-6. 
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For the multitude, freedom is sin. But given the identification of power 
political and paternal, the patriarch enjoys freedom on the same ground as the 
sovereign, the patriarch paramount. Freedom obtains in subjection to power 
supreme, in the domain of the family under a natural hierarchy. 
In a natural hierarchical order, Adam is free towards his progeny (the 
species), yet unfree towards God. In the same vein, sovereigns enjoy freedom 
towards their subjects, while unfree towards Adam, the universal monarch. 
Patriarchs and fathers, while unfree towards the prince, are free towards members 
of their own family and servants. 
This, lastly, may be put in terms of political obligation. The sovereign acts 
at will, in that his actions are not to be judged by his subjects, who shall obey their 
sovereign. If their sovereign acts against them, they await providence (A, 289). In 
the domain of the family, fatherly power, likewise, is unchecked by the judgement 
of the wife, children, and servants. Still, the actions of the father are liable to 
punishment, on judgement referential to sovereign will. 
A positive notion of Filmerian freedom, then, is observed, implicit in the 
denial of natural liberty. This, I grant, relies on an interpretation of Adam’s 
sovereignty and freedom. The foregoing interpretation, however, is not only 
admissible but supported by Filmer’s (P, 62) allowance of patriarchal assembly, in 
the devolution of monarchical power, in the case of a want of issue. 
 
2.8. Patriarchal consent and assembly. 
 
Filmer, in his denial of natural liberty, yet allows patriarchal consent within an 
assembly of independent heads of families, in case required to determine an heir, 
for want of an issue upon the death of the king. Sovereign power, in this case, 
devolves to a patriarchal assembly. 
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A patriarchal assembly is in formation at the death of a king without issue, 
whereupon it is incumbent upon patriarchs to elect or nominate an heir, “not as they 
are the people, but quatenus they are Fathers of people, over whom they have a 
supreme power devolved unto them after the death of their sovereign ancestor: and 
if any can have a right to choose a King, it must be these Fathers, by conferring 
their distinct fatherly powers upon one man alone” (A, 288). 
At the devolution of sovereign power to a patriarchal assembly, the members 
constitute the monarchy anew in conferring sovereign power upon one man alone, 
the patriarch paramount. As Filmer (P) writes, 
 
All […] prime heads and Fathers have power to consent in the uniting 
or conferring of their fatherly right of sovereign authority on whom they 
please. And he that is so elected claims not his power as a donative 
from the people, but as being substituted properly by God, from whom 
he receives his royal charter of an universal Father, though testified[94] 
by the ministry of the heads of the people (62; italics added). 
 
Now, in the conferring of their fatherly right of sovereign authority on whom they 
please, patriarchs, assumedly, are free. The conferring of sovereign power is by 
election or a nominating process; it is not a mere testifying to the sovereign’s power 
— indeed, he is absent. The nomination of an heir is at the pleasure of the members. 
Transitorily, sovereign power lies wholly in the patriarchal assembly, wherein 
members are free to choose whom they please as heir. 
Natural liberty, then, is admissible for Filmer in the case of assembled 
patriarchs, who, as it happens, convey a right to rule over their subjects, while 
sovereign power is exerted in their union. Filmer’s assembled patriarchs, I suggest, 
 
94 Filmer’s use of “testify” echoes the understanding of consent, in the context of Roman law and 
custom, where the people are understood to confirm the power of the emperor (P, 74). 
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operate freely, in the exercise of sovereign power. Yet it is not the case that supreme 
power is absent, in its devolution to the patriarchal assembly, for members to 
nominate an heir. The position of the monarch is vacant; yet the government of one 
remains. Assembled patriarchs thus coalesce in a unitary will, on the principle of a 
government of one. 
 It is conceivable, Daly (1979:85) notes, assembled patriarchs subsist in a state 
of nature. However, a natural condition, for Filmer, is that of the state, which 
persists in the form of a patriarchal assembly. The death of the natural person of the 
monarch does not render the state extinct. Rather, sovereign power devolves to 
assembled patriarchs, who proceed on the principle of a government of one. The 
structure of the state remains in a patriarchal assembly. 
 Now, within his critique of consent theory, Filmer (P) does state that “no one 
man, nor a multitude, can give away the natural right of another” (82). But this way 
of arguing, for Filmer, is polemical. In Filmer, there is no such thing as a natural 
popular right. Also, the renouncing of one’s own right is not excluded, on this 
statement (see Daly 1979:85). Still, in Filmer, the waiving of a right instantiates the 
anarchical principle, in the exercise of a natural political right, which, if renounced, 
constitutes non-binding consent (or, if binding, self-binding at the prerogative of 
the consenter). 
 Further, since the multitude has no right in the first place, a right to rule over 
the people may be conveyed by members of a patriarchal assembly (Daly 1979:85). 
For Filmer, there is no right of the multitude to be transferred, to begin with. The 
multitude cannot renounce a right it does not possess; nor can its right be transferred 
by another. Yet assembled patriarchs do have a right of transfer, e.g., Noah in 
granting his sons distinct territories of the world (P, 63-4). Since they possess a 
right of transfer, patriarchs validly agree to enter into subjection. Given their 
subjects possess no right of transfer, it is incumbent on assembled patriarchs to 
convey a right to rule over their subjects (see Daly 1979:85). 
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Assembled patriarchs, I observe, are transitorily sovereign and free, 
partaking in Adam’s sovereignty and freedom, in exercising sovereign power by 
patriarchal consent. The institution of patriarchal assembly, notably, is inconsistent 
with Filmer’s supposed contention that there is no natural liberty in creation.95 This 
lends further support to our proposition of the freedom of Filmer’s Adam. Further, 
if patriarchs, in the advent of a formation of a patriarchal assembly, are transitorily 
sovereign and free by virtue of a right of transfer, then, it may be inferred, the prince 
is permanently free. 
The prince, then, enjoys freedom in virtue of his supremacy over positive 
law, whereas patriarchs remain free within their private domain. But in the advent 
of a patriarchal assembly, the domain of patriarchs is made public, given sovereign 
power devolves now to them. Yet assembled patriarchs, in the exercise of sovereign 
power, remain subject to the supreme power of sovereign will, in filling the position 
of the monarch. They are not superior to the nominating procedure. In any case, 
they feign a monarchy (see F, 205), in formation of a unitary will of the sovereign.96 
There is but a transitory change of masters in the hierarchy of the state. 
 
2.8.1. Tyrrell’s remarks on patriarchal assembly. 
 
James Tyrrell, in his Patriarcha non Monarcha (1681), lambasts Filmer for 
admitting patriarchal consent and assembly. As Tyrrell (1681:89-91, 100-1) judges 
the matter, a patriarchal assembly implies the natural liberty of patriarchs, 
contradicting Filmer’s denial of natural liberty. 
 Filmer (P, 62) denies the derivation of the prince’s title from the people. 
Given this, Tyrrell (1681) remarks, the prince ought not to derive absolute power 
 
95 See 2.7.1. 
96 I rely here on Filmer’s account in his Forms, of democratic procedures (205).  
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over the persons and estates of patriarchs from their election or nomination of him; 
yet “this Right commences from their own Act or Election, and not from the 
Fatherly power supposed to be at first conferred on Adam” (90). 
 Now, Tyrrell (1681) argues, if patriarchs confer a right upon the prince, the 
prince, assumedly, owes his power to the patriarchs; and in that capacity, patriarchs 
are representatives of the people (90). Hence, as in any democracy, the prince 
receives his power as a donation from the people (90). 
But, Tyrrell (1681:90-1) continues, if the prince receives his charter from 
God, testified by the assembly of patriarchs, then the election or nomination by an 
assembly of patriarchs serves no purpose. Since patriarchs, also, must obey an 
usurper, any election or nomination is futile (91).97 
As Tyrrell (1681:89) observes, the inconveniences of democratic rule, 
enumerated by Filmer, translate onto Filmer’s own system, in regard to patriarchal 
consent, since a government is to be constituted anew and a monarch elected or 
nominated by an assembly of patriarchs, which may even include a minority view 
of those. But a minority view renders the patriarch paramount elected or nominated 
by the assembly illegitimate (89). 
Tyrrell (1681) writes, 
 
For all Cities, Towns, and Families consisting of so many independent 
Heads of Families, if the major part of an Assembly cannot conclude 
the minor […] then though all the Fathers of Families in a Nation should 
agree in the choice of a King, and but those of one Town or Family 
dissent, these Dissenters, if they do not like the Prince the rest have 
elected, may certainly (if they are able) divide from them, and set up a 
distinct Government of their own; since all these Fathers of Families 
 
97 Here, Tyrrell (1681:91) refers to Filmer’s justification of the usurpation of princely power. 
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being alike free and independent, can in the state of Nature claim no 
Superiority over each other (89). 
 
Now, devastating a critique as Tyrrell’s may seem, it misses the mark. Filmer does 
not deny natural liberty simpliciter but natural popular freedom (see Daly 1979:85). 
For Filmer, freedom may be enjoyed by anyone, save the people. Further, an 
assembly of patriarchs does not obtain in a natural condition, absent the state. 
Tyrrell proceeds as if Filmer applies a state-of-nature model, akin to his own. But, 
in Filmer, a natural condition persists in the original state, referential to Adam’s 
sovereignty. A patriarchal assembly, then, is still governed by a sovereign, or the 
principle of a government of one. Patriarchs, granted, claim no superiority over one 
another. They are, however, guided by the sovereign will, in the absence of the 
natural person of the monarch. 
Also, discord may persist in an assembly of patriarchs. The assembly, 
however, cannot but operate on the principle of a government of one, as would any 
democratic or an aristocratic regime. It ultimately operates on its mandate of 
sovereign will. Even in the case of a prevailing minority view, the assembly 
proceeds from a unitary will on the principle of a government of one, in its 
determination of a rightful heir. The tally is irrelevant to the determination of the 
heir. The operation of the assembly, inexorably, proceeds from, and is directed 
towards, a unitary will, of which a minority view is one case. 
In case a minority view leads to a division in the assembly of patriarchs, as 
Tyrrell (1681:89) suggests, such that a group of dissenting patriarchs may form a 
government of their own, this only further accentuates the Filmerian argument. For 
a splinter group of patriarchs would operate in the very same way, in determining 
their own heir, viz. on the principle of a government of one. If patriarchal 
dominions, on such dissension, enter into war with each other, the conqueror 
110 
  
ultimately is rightful monarch, as exemplified by Filmer’s (P, 59) charitable 
treatment of Nimrod, the imperial patriarch.98 
Tyrrell applies the standard of democracy on Filmer’s patriarchal assembly, 
which operates still on basis of a veritable monarchical regime. Patriarchal 
assembly carries democratic features, but it need not operate on majority-rule. 
Democracy constitutes but a feigned monarchy (F, 205). A patriarchal assembly 
operates as a government of one, unless it collapses into a state of anarchy. 
 
2.8.2. Patriarchal consent. 
 
In the assembly of patriarchs, it turns out that each head of a family holds supreme 
power. But, on Filmer’s (D, 233) own contention, it may be objected that two 
supreme authorities cannot agree. This objection would seem to apply to an 
assembly of patriarchs, wherein patri-political power is exercised by members in 
union. 
 We can reply to this objection, on Filmer’s behalf, by invoking the concept 
of a natural hierarchy. There is a case to be made that in a union of patriarchs, a 
single power reigns supreme. The sovereign power devolves to members of the 
assembly, which, in its determination of the heir, still defers to the will of the 
sovereign, viz. the principle of a government of one. A single sovereign actor, then, 
persists in the union of patriarchs. 
 The heads of families, in the absence of the natural person of the sovereign, 
wield the sovereign power in union. The assembly ultimately operates as a single 
political entity, feigning a monarchy. This accords with Filmer’s description of a 
democracy or an aristocracy, or any kind of assembly, as a feigned monarchy. 
 
98 Conflict, on my interpretation of Filmer, is an essential element in rendering Filmer’s system 
coherent. The figure of Nimrod, as discussed in Filmer, presents the prime example in favor of this 
interpretation. This is the topic of discussion in Chapter 5. 
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 Now, I observe, patriarchal consent is a case of non-binding consent, on the 
anarchical principle. An assembly of patriarchs is formed in a state of anarchy. Each 
head of a family presents a judgement in his own right. But the union also operates 
as a single judge, in the absence of an heir. In fact, the same would apply to Locke’s 
original compact, in respect to unanimous consent of original contractors, who, 
notably, may be conceived as patriarchs, within an historical framework.99 
 Now, Filmer in his Anarchy, on the assumption of natural rights, stipulates 
individual consent “not binding to any but only to themselves who consent” (286). 
This is anarchic consent. As I gather, it also applies to a union of patriarchal 
contractors, on basis of political requirements imbedded in the union. In patriarchal 
assembly, the sovereign will (or, the principle of a government of one) forms a 
political requirement of unanimity. This is the case, likewise, in Locke’s original 
compact, save in Locke, the sovereign will of original contractors ascends to 
governmental (supreme) powers. In Filmer, the sovereign power devolves to the 
assembly of patriarchs. 
 Here, I observe three instances of the anarchical principle. These are (1) 
anarchic individual consent, (2) patriarchal consent, and (3) unanimous consent of 
original contractors. 
The anarchical principle stipulates original consent of an individual or a 
union. A union operates, effectively, as a single body, in possession of power. 
Consent of the members is at their prerogative, within a union operating as a single 
political entity. 
 Original consent is anarchic. It signifies freedom of the consenter, who is a 
judge in his own case. In that sense, it is non-binding, relative to the consenter or 
 
99 Here, I refer to a political naturalist interpretation of Locke’s account of the original compact, as 
proposed in this thesis, where I integrate Locke’s patriarchalism into his political thought, in Two 
Treatises. We can compare my approach, most notably, to Martin Seliger’s treatment of Locke, in 




union of consenters. The consent of original contractors or members of patriarchal 
assembly, we could also say, is self-binding, in affirmation of the members’ own 
union. They are, essentially, mutually free to revoke consent as a single political 
entity. But consent is maintained provided the union holds. 
 To be sure, members of an assembly of patriarchs are due to obey the 
patriarch paramount, once nominated. However, patriarchal consent is not to be 
distinguished from the sovereign will, which is expressed in transient application 
of monarchical power in the form of assembly. 
 In Filmer, individual consent instantiates a state of anarchy (or, a collapse of 
the state), whereas patriarchal consent is expressed as a form of sovereign will, in 
the context of natural statehood. This is not a concession to the idea of ancestral 
contract.100 Patriarchal assembly resumes original statehood in Adam’s monarchy. 
It is formed for want of an heir, within the context of a natural hierarchy. 
 Also, unanimous consent of original contractors, as we find in Locke, 
divorces the idea of an original contract from ancestral consent, in removing the 
obligation of children to the state via parental consent. Ancestral consent, in Locke, 
is substituted for individual consent, viz. of those capable (Schochet 1975:262). 
But, as I understand, individual consent is referential to Locke’s original compact, 
which does not exclude some form of ancestral contract.101 
 
2.9. The free usurper. 
 
In the event of a patriarchal assembly, the sovereign power does not lie with the 
natural person of the monarch. A government of one, however, remains operational. 
 
100 Filmer addresses ancestral contract in his critique of consent theory (see 2.1). 
101 This proposition is fundamental to a political naturalist reading of Locke’s consent theory, as set 
out in his Two Treatises. This issue is discussed in Part 2, esp. Section B, Chapter 9, and Section C, 
Chapter 14 (14.1). 
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Political authority, in Filmer, does not necessitate a lawful monarch in the person 
of a rightful heir. The concept of sovereignty is reducible to mere possession of 
power, on Filmer’s definition of monarchy. Sovereignty is not only alienable and 
transferable, for Filmer (O, 256), but capable of being usurped. The natural person 
of the monarch, after all, may be an usurper.102 
 On Greenleaf’s (1964:85-6) reading, Filmer distinguishes between 
patriarchal and quasi-patriarchal power. This distinction does not apply, on our 
interpretation. Patri-political power relates equally to the usurper. 
 Also, Greenleaf (1964:85-6) relies here mistakenly on an analogical 
understanding of Filmer’s patriarchal theory. On this interpretation, once in 
possession of sovereign power, it is as if a ruler is positioned as the father of the 
people. An usurper, in that case, employs fatherly power in much the same way as 
a supposedly legitimate ruler whose genealogy cannot be traced to Adam and the 
patriarchs. 
 While Greenleaf’s analogical interpretation has some explanatory force, it 
misses the identification of political and paternal power, as definitive of Filmerism. 
For Filmer (A, 288; P, 60), all kings are fathers, heirs of fathers, or usurpers of 
fatherly right. As fatherly power may be transferred or aliened, so it may be 
usurped (D, 231); and “fatherly empire, as it was of itself hereditary, so it was 
alienable by the parent, and seizable by an usurper as other goods are” (O, 256). 
 
102 Filmer’s justification of the usurpation of princely power distinguishes Filmer most sharply from 
royalists in seventeenth-century England. 
Filmer discounts any resistance, and demands (passive) obedience to, an usurper. This is 
contrary to the royalist creed. Non-resistance to usurpers, in fact, contradicts the heart of royalist 
doctrine (Daly 1979:111). 
Royalists commonly agreed that England was not an arbitrary monarchy (Daly 1979:51). 
They may have conceded an element of arbitrariness in a monarchy, but Filmer made arbitrariness 
an essential element, or the principle, of monarchy (Daly 1979:51). Whereas Filmer espoused 
“legal” (political) patriarchalism in terms of which paternal and political power were identical, 
royalists maintained an analogical relation between political and paternal power (Daly 1979:70-1). 
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 Filmer, on my reading, presents a wholesale justification and legitimation of 
usurped power, despite his related caveats, which serve a supplementary utilitarian 
case for usurpation. The case is one of providential possessory right, as “was bound 
to clash with any theory of legal right” (Daly 1979:114). 
 The usurper reigns, by God’s permission. His reign is indefinite, “for he hath 
a possession by the permissive will of God, which permission, how long it may 
endure, no man ordinarily knows” (D, 232).103 Thus, during the reign of an usurper, 
we may only await providence, to judge of the legitimacy of his title (A, 289). 
Subjects of the true heir, so considered, “must go along and wait upon God’s 
providence, who only hath right to give and take away kingdoms, and thereby to 
adopt subjects into the obedience of another fatherly power” (A, 289). 
 Filmer, I understand, espouses a form of permissive providentialism, in the 
context of a de facto theory of political power. Permissive providence, in 
supplementation of possessory right, limits the scope of justification to the political, 
viz. a natural hierarchy from a divine grant or permission. Morality and legality are 
thus rendered non-essential for the justification of political power. Permissive 
providentialism circumvents a legal right to command (Daly 1979:114) and avoids 
the utilitarian basis (self-interest) of Hobbes’s doctrine and Ascham’s de facto 
theory (114).104 Here it matters not who has a legal right to govern, or what is the 
source and content of the law (114). 




103 To paraphrase, although an usurper may lack permission to reign ceaselessly, the usurper’s reign 
is indefinite, relative to human knowledge (absent revelation). 
104 A right to obedience, for Ascham (1649), is based upon the capacity of government to provide 
protection to its subjects and discharge the duties of government. (See also Daly 1979:114.) 
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whether by election, donation, succession or by any other means, for it 
is still the manner of the government by supreme power that makes 
them properly Kings, and not the means of obtaining their crowns 
(106). 
 
Passive obedience is thus extended to subjects of usurpers from those of a lawful 
king (Daly 1979:106). Yet it is not the case, on Filmer’s de facto theory, that 
obedience to an usurper is any less in extent than to a lawful king. On a de facto 
basis, obedience is equally unquestioning and so, even, active.105 
 Now, Filmer’s defense of usurpation is an ideological “extension” of the 
doctrine of non-resistance and passive obedience (Daly 1979:110). Yet Filmer’s 
justification of usurpation is reduced to providential possessory right, whereby 
political legitimacy of a ruler lawful or otherwise, is left to providence; and 
obedience is mandated either way. The difference lies in a moral justification. For 
a doctrine of non-resistance and passive obedience, a justification of usurped power 
lacks a reference to patrilineage and primogeniture proper but retains a utilitarian 
moral basis.106 In Filmer’s system, non-resistance and passive obedience are 
discussed within an additive moral justificatory framework. On a de facto basis, 
obedience to an usurper remains active as to a lawful king. 
 Now, a moral justification, extracted from Filmer’s Directions, proceeds 
from a duty of preservation and protection. The usurper’s reign is justified on basis 
of the preservation of the rightful heir, in sustaining the government to which he 
lays claim, in protection of the subjects. The usurper, then, is to be obeyed as may 
tend to the preservation of the rightful heir, the subjects, and, incidentally, the 
 
105 On this issue, see Tyrrell (1681:64, 71). We discuss this below (2.9.2) in terms of “things 
indifferent.” 
106 Utilitarian moral reasoning, referential to state protection and preservation, is not essential, on 
my understanding, for Filmer’s de facto theory of political power. A moral justification, rather, 
serves to supplement the de facto justificatory framework. 
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usurper himself (D, 232). In obedience to usurped power, the duty to the rightful 
heir, is thus fulfilled. 
 Filmer, to begin with, assumes the duty of self-preservation, in his defense of 
usurpation. Each has a duty to preserve himself “for the service of God, and of his 
King and Father” (D, 232). In preserving themselves under the reign of the usurper, 
in accordance with the duty of self-preservation, subjects, in effect, preserve the 
rightful sovereign and heir. For the sake of the rightful heir, they ought to preserve 
themselves; and under the reign of the usurper, the duty of self-preservation is 
fulfilled in preservation of the usurper. Thus, to obey an usurper is equivalent to 
performing one’s duty to the rightful sovereign and heir “who must be presumed to 
desire the safety of his subjects” (D, 232). 
 Accordingly, the usurper is not to be actively obeyed in anything tending to 
the destruction of the rightful heir (D, 234).107 For the rightful heir, in the end, is 
the usurper’s superior (D, 233-4). The usurper, then, has a conditional duty to 
protect the subjects, in sustaining the government (D, 234). This is a fundamental 
duty of the rightful sovereign and heir. But the usurper takes upon himself the duty 
of the rightful heir, in preservation of those usurped, namely, the subjects (D, 233). 
They are preserved in the sustaining of government (234). In taking the power of 
 
107 In his Defence (1684), Bohun admits Filmer does not determine when and to what extent subjects 
would be bound to an usurper. But Bohun (1684) reads Filmer as to allow non-destructive resistance 
against the usurper. Subjects, for Bohun’s Filmer, are bound to resist the usurper and support the 
rightful heir “as far as is possible without apparent destruction” (8). 
 However, Filmer at best sets forth an account of passive obedience, in this regard. Nowhere 
does Filmer entertain the notion of disobedience or resistance, even where the ruler commands evil 
acts, at which point his commands all the same must be tolerated (see D, 235). Instead, Filmer (D, 
233-4) states, the usurper need not be (actively) obeyed, insofar as the command would be carried 
out, in case he issues a command in the aim of destroying the rightful heir. His command, to that 
effect, may yet have to be tolerated (in terms of passive obedience). (I claim obedience here extends 
to active obedience, relative to the claim of the usurper.) 
 Daly (1979), on this note, believes Bohun misconstrues Filmer’s stance of usurpation, in 
favor of a royalist interpretation of Filmer’s system, to conform Filmer to the royalist cause (Daly 
1979:130). The issue of usurpation, indeed, may be understood as the greatest obstacle, for any such 
interpretation of Filmer’s system. 
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the rightful heir, the usurper sins; but not protecting those usurped would add 
murder to robbery (D, 233). 
 In obeying an usurper, obedience to the true superior is likewise fulfilled, as 
long as obedience aims at the preservation of the subjects and does not tend to the 
destruction of the rightful heir (D, 234). A society may thus join in the preservation 
of the usurper (234). 
 However, the foregoing is stated not in virtue of the usurper’s claim but the 
claim of the heir, in tension with the former. Although the usurper cannot gain a 
right from the rightful heir, the usurper may gain a right from his subjects, to whom 
he is the rightful sovereign; for in possession of power he has the true right (D, 
234). In possession of power, Filmer (D) states, the usurper has the best title, or, 
“better than the title of any other than of him that had a former right” (232), namely, 
the rightful sovereign and heir.108 It is not only the case that obedience to usurped 
power is equivalent to obeying “the first and right governor” (232). The usurper 
ought to be obeyed as the first and right governor; for momentarily, the usurper has 
the “better” or “best” title (232) and a “true right” (234). Yet conflict persists, for 
“divine right never dies, nor can be lost, or taken away” (232). 
 Further, the legitimacy of usurped power may increase over time. If an 
usurper has maintained power for so long that knowledge of the rightful heir has 
been lost, the usurper in possession is to be taken “by all the subjects” for the true 
heir and obeyed as “Father” (D, 232). Divine right, however, can never be nullified 
(232). A de facto theory of providential possessory right, thus, invites conflict 
pursuant to legitimate claim to power. 
 The passage of time affords legitimacy to the title of an usurper, given power 
is maintained over time. Yet usurped power is presently justified in virtue of 
possession and legitimated by permissive providence. On providential possessory 
 
108 The usurper, supposedly, does not have a “better” title without end. But, again, for how long an 
usurper may enjoy the best title, “no man ordinarily knows” (D, 232). 
118 
  
right and the test of time, the usurper is the rightful sovereign. The test of time 
renders the question of legitimacy primarily a political one. Political legitimacy is 
understood to proceed from the initial possession (or the taking)109 of power, in the 
establishment of which moral and legal considerations may follow. 
 This is a political justification in the form of a de facto theory, prior to a moral 
justification of preservation and protection. The claim of the rightful heir is also 
supported fundamentally on a de facto basis, in opposition to his power usurped. 
By Filmer’s own logic, the usurper is to be obeyed in destruction of the 
rightful heir, unless the heir reclaims his kingdom by conquest. A restriction on the 
usurper’s rule is made coherent in virtue of the claim of the rightful heir. But his 
claim stands in tension with the rule of the usurper, who has a present claim to 
power, in virtue of his possession of power. As Filmer (D) asserts, though the 
usurper can never gain a right from the rightful heir, a true right may yet be attained 
from the subjects, “for if they know no other that hath a better title than the usurper, 
then as to them the usurper in possession hath a true right” (234). The usurper, in 




In his Directions, Filmer likens the usurper to a thief. A qualified possessory right 
of an usurper is analogous to that of a thief’s title to the thing he possesses (D, 234). 
Here, Filmer considers the thief’s title above the title of any other to the thing 
possessed, on the exception of the true owner, or while the claimant remains absent 
(234).110 
 
109 A fuller version of a de facto theory of political power, I contend, includes a rudimentary form 
of conquest theory (or, the taking of power) (see Chapter 5). 
110 Usurpation or robbery, to be sure, Filmer considers a sin — but, again, not protecting those 




 Still, on a de facto basis, the thief is the true owner, while in possession of the 
thing. The claimant will have to take possession of the thing, to reclaim it by right. 
A prior right is ineffectual in the absence of possession. The right of an usurper, as 
that of a thief, is unqualified. Filmer’s qualifying of the right, given the tenets of 
his system, is dispensable. 
 This way Filmer is most coherent. The thief’s claim is no lesser than a rightful 
owner’s, even though the latter retains his claim to the thing. These claims 
contradict each other. A resolution is only given by taking possession of the thing. 
On this notion, a robber, Tyrrell (1681:61-2) complains, makes himself lord 
and master of a house, whereupon a wife, children, and servants, on a de facto 
theory of providential possessory right, are immediately bound to obey him. For 
the thief now has a better right than anyone else, save the true master of the house. 
Now, Tyrrell (1681) recognizes a case for passive obedience in the aim of 
protection and preservation, but there is no moral obligation “from Conscience and 
Reason” to obey the robber, beyond what cannot be helped; and there is full 
permission to “take the first opportunity to drive him out of the House, and call in 
[the] true Father or Master” (62). 
But Tyrrell does not distinguish between moral and political obligation. A de 
facto theory of providential possessory right stipulates a political obligation, prior 
 
Filmer is here engaged in supplementary moral reasoning. A justification of political power, on a de 
facto theory of providential possessory right, is strictly political. A de facto theory is fundamental 
to Filmer’s system. Moral reasoning is intended to supplement a de facto case; it forms a part of 
Filmer’s polemical reasoning. 
 Now, Filmer’s case of a thief’s possessory right, Tyrrell (1681:63) notes, is drawn from 
English law, as opposed to natural law or the law of reason. (See also Daly (1979:114, 117.) Yet, 
even so, this lends support to a de facto case of political obligation, without exclusion of natural law 
or the law of reason. Note, Tyrrell (1681) proceeds from a notion of a state of nature absent in 
Filmer. In Filmer, it is not the case that in a state of nature “a Thief by invading another mans Goods 
unjustly, and taking them away by violence, becomes an Enemy to all mankind; and so may lawfully 
be killed, or have what he hath so possessed taken from him by any other” (63). In fact, Filmer’s 
thief, by the same means, becomes a king to all under his dominion, whereupon he may lawfully (in 
expression of his will) exercise the power of life and death. 
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to moral considerations. On a providential possessory right, the robber does affirm 
his claim to the master’s wife, children, and servants; yet, on the claim of the true 
master of the house, the robber may be opposed. Still, opposition to the robber is 
likewise justified on a de facto basis, viz. in virtue of the master’s claim. The 
absence of a moral obligation to obey the robber is determined on the master’s 
claim. As it happens, moral utilitarian considerations support the de facto case of 
the robber, viz. non-resistance in favor of preservation and protection. The robber’s 
possessory right remains unqualified, save in virtue of the master’s claim. Moral 
conflict persists on political grounds. 
 
2.9.2. Things indifferent. 
 
According to Daly (1979:108), Filmer, in his Directions, retreats from his position 
on usurpation. On Daly’s reading, though Filmer does claim usurpers enjoy rights, 
Filmer denies the usurper full rights of sovereignty (108). Filmer’s usurper is to be 
obeyed in all things lawful and things indifferent, but he might be disobeyed in 
things distinctly unlawful, viz. tending to the destruction of the person of the true 
sovereign (108-9). 
 However, given the usurper is at present the true sovereign, and in proceeding 
from his claim to power, on a providential possessory right, a command to destroy 
the rightful heir, must also be obeyed. Any restriction on usurped power is set in 
virtue of the opposing claim of the heir. 
In supposedly retracting his claim of obedience to usurped power, Filmer, in 
the Directions, invokes “things indifferent” (adiaphora) to the law of God. Usurped 
power, Filmer (D, 234) maintains, may and ought to be obeyed in things lawful and 
indifferent. It is a matter indifferent for the usurper to command as the rightful heir 
presumably would have commanded (235). But for the usurper to disobey the heir, 
considered his superior, cannot be an act indifferent (235). 
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 Obedience is extended to usurpers but “if men command things evil, 
obedience is due only by tolerating what they inflict: not by performing what they 
require” (D, 235). Yet again, whether evil is commanded by a lawful king or an 
usurper, is here irrelevant. Passive obedience is due equally to both. 
 Now, as Filmer (D, 235) recognizes, if obedience is given to an usurper as 
well as to a lawful king in things indifferent, then, it may be objected, obedience to 
usurped power is equivalent to that to a lawful power. Yet, Filmer (D, 235) replies, 
some things indifferent to a lawful king, are unlawful (not indifferent) to an usurper 
(see also Daly 1979:108); “and if it never can be an act indifferent for the usurper 
himself to disobey his lawful sovereign, much less can it be indifferent for him to 
command another to do that to which he hath no right himself” (D, 235). Thus, 
passive obedience is sometimes given to an usurper where active obedience is 
required to a lawful king. 
 However, Filmer’s argumentation is here premised upon the claim of the 
rightful heir, in opposition to the usurper’s, which, on permissive providence and a 
de facto basis, implies the best right. Filmer’s doctrine, as Tyrrell (1681) objects, 
proposes not only passive but active obedience to the usurper111 “not onely in things 
lawful and necessary, but indifferent ones too” (64).112 An usurper and a lawful 
king, Tyrrell (1681) stresses, have an equally good title, on a de facto theory of 
possessory right and permissive providence (65). The differentiation of things 
indifferent and lawful “signifies nothing” (70). 
 
111 Tyrrell (1681:64) refers to Cromwell and the Rump parliament, in this regard. As Locke (I, 79) 
similarly remarks, Filmer makes Cromwell a king as anyone else (see also I, 121). Now, as Filmer’s 
Directions may in fact be considered a justification of the usurping of power during the Rump (“in 
dangerous or doubtful times,” as the title includes) (see Laslett 1970:219n), such critique falls flat. 
Also, the de facto theory of providential possessory right is the main strength of Filmer’s system, I 
argue, for it establishes a political justification prior to a moral and a legal justification of political 
power. 
112 Cf. p. 71. 
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 In terms of political justification, in respect to the usurper’s claim on 
possessory right, Tyrrell’s critique, at this juncture, illuminates the de facto theory 
on which Filmer system rests. There is, however, a moral justification available, 
given the claim of the rightful heir. This provokes an interminable moral conflict. 
 Still, justification of usurpation does not rest on moral considerations. It is 
limited to the political. In legitimation of the rightful heir, the political is 
supplemented with the moral. On utilitarian grounds, and in the passage of time, 
there is also a moral claim to be made for the usurper. 
 
2.9.3. A de facto genetic justification. 
 
On a de facto basis, the distinction of power usurped and power legitimate is 
gratuitous.113 A de facto theory renders power usurped and power legitimate 
indistinguishable. This “gives Filmer’s whole case away,” Laslett (1970:218n) 
claims. Since means by which power is attained are irrelevant, this would apply to 
patriarchal rule. 
 As Locke (I, 79) argues, if political power is his “who can by any Means seize 
upon it,” an usurper is no less legitimate than an heir. Filmer, Locke (I, 72) accuses, 
makes an usurper a lawful prince, “to unsettle and destroy all the Lawful 
Governments in the World, and to establish in their room Disorder, Tyranny, and 
Usurpation” (ll. 9-11). Since possessory right provides final justification of 
supreme power, Filmer could just as well have dispensed with the genetic 
justification of political power (heirs and inheritance) (I, 78). 
 In his Divine Right (1658), Gee makes a similar case against Filmer, on the 
issue of possession. Natural fatherly right and political power, Gee (1658) remarks, 
are made “a meer Equivocum” (159); and whereas power and title ultimately rest 
 
113 Cf. I, 78. 
123 
  
on sheer possession, by any means available, “there is no Power, but Fatherhood, 
no Fatherhood, but possession” (160). This amounts not only to a denial of popular 
consent but paternal power by birthright “and of every other special way of 
conveying a title to Government” (159-160). 
 However, patriarchal rule provides a longstanding means of possessing 
power, in procuring a title to government by bloodline, whereby power is 
maintained through generations. But in Filmer, conflict is permitted. While 
patriarchal power may indeed be usurped, the patriarch yet maintains his claim to 
legitimate power; and, in case he has the power, the patriarch may form his own 
empire, in usurping the power of other lords.114 Patriarchal power, in Filmer, is not 
to be understood as paternal in isolation but political at the same time. Usurpation 
is not a denial of patri-political power. There is, granted to Gee, no fatherhood but 
possession; yet biological fatherhood, as a form of possession, maintains power 
through bloodline. 
In Filmer, the genetic justification of political power is surrogate. 
Providential possessory right provides a final justification. Power maintained 
through patrilineage is ultimately justified on a de facto basis (possession and 
providence115, including power usurped and conquest116). But power usurped and 
conquest proceed from the paradigm of Adam’s sovereignty. Adam is sovereign in 
being granted universal monarchical power by divine authority. In principle, 
however, the highest secular position may be occupied, irrespective of means by 
 
114 This relates to our discussion in Chapter 5. The prime example of an imperial patriarch is the 
figure of Nimrod, as Filmer discusses in his Patriarcha. Filmer is taken to task on Nimrod by Locke, 
Tyrrell, and Sidney. 
115 In respect to patriarchal monarchial rule and usurpation, we may distinguish (prescriptive) 
directive from permissive providence, respectively. This distinction, however, is not observable in 
Filmer (see Daly 1979:118). It may be said, directive providence relates to Adam and the first 
patriarchs, while permissive providence is relevant, rather, to posterity. However, in Cain and Abel, 
we may already observe a conflict of birthright. A divine interference was even required for Adam 
and Eve (see Chapter 4). (See also Schochet 1975:151, 157, 222.) 
116 For our discussion of conquest theory, see Chapter 5. 
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which the possessor ascends to it. The possessor may grant himself the power, in 
coming into possession of it, pending providence. 
 Given the significance of a divine grant, Filmer’s system, on Daly’s 
(1979:99) perspective, rests on a divine, non-natural authority. But this relates to 
the final justification of a divine grant and providence in isolation, whereas a natural 
hierarchy proceeds on possessory right and patrilineage. Further, within a natural 
hierarchical structure, the possessor, as noted, may grant himself the power. 
Political naturalism, in Filmer, is a self-sustaining doctrine. As the non-juror 
Charles Leslie (1709) puts it, 
 
I place [Adam’s authority] not wholly upon Nature, (tho I think Nature 
alone wou’d do it) but I have Added the Institution of God to the 
Original of Government […] (23). 
 
All earthly power is either derived or usurped from the fatherly power, Filmer (D) 
states, “there being no other original to be found of any power whatsoever” (233). 
But fatherly power is political, and so it is natural in the sense of sheer possession, 




Political power, for Filmer, is supralegal and justifiable on a de facto basis. On a 
positive account of Filmer’s doctrine, political power, in possession of anarchic 
individuals, may obtain. 
 Greenleaf (1964), on his reading of Filmer, determines a dichotomy between 
monarchy and anarchy, “between the only natural form of government and no 
government at all” (88). While this may seem a rather straightforward reading of 
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Filmer, I do not concur. A dichotomy between monarchy and anarchy, in Filmer, 
does not apply. These represent, in fact, the same political situation. 
 The Filmerian free agent is the sovereign, whether a lawful king or an 
usurper, in possession of supreme power. Freedom in statehood is unattainable save 
in possession of supreme power. On this stipulation, a state of anarchy, assumedly, 
is devoid of freedom. However, in Filmer’s anarchy, individuals act at will. 
 Now, Israel of the Judges is Filmer’s prime example of a state of anarchy (or 
incomplete government).117 For Filmer, there is no government but monarchy. 
Popular government is a misnomer. Given this, Israel of the Judges constitutes a 
state of anarchy, or a “broken” monarchy, where every man is his own judge (F, 
224). 
Yet Filmer appears to make contradictory statements, on this subject. 
In his Forms, Filmer states, no king ruled in Israel but there was “some small 
show of government, such as it was, but it was so poor and beggarly, that […] every 
man did what was right in his own eyes” (189). However, Filmer also stresses that 
“where every man doth what he pleaseth, it may be truly said, there is no 
government; for the end of Government is, that every man should not do what he 
pleaseth, or be his own judge in his own case” (189).118 
However, in Patriarcha, Filmer insists the reign of the Judges is monarchical 
(84-6). As I observe, given monarchy is the sole natural form of government, a form 
of government obtains in Israel of the Judges, in the mode of patriarchal assembly. 
As Filmer (P) writes, 
 
 
117 Gen. 21.25. Filmer uses terminology for a state of anarchy similar to (KJV) Gen. 21.25 [In those 
days there was no king in Israel: every man did that which was right in his own eyes]. 
118 As Filmer (F) recognizes, Judges mentions some form of government in Israel (in the absence of 
a king), but “for the scripture to say there was no King, is to say, there was no form of government 
in Israel” (189). 
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God did always govern His own people by monarchy only. The 
Patriarchs, dukes, judges and Kings were all monarchs. There is not in 
all the Scripture mention and approbation of any other form of 
government. At the time when the Scripture saith [Judges 21.25]: 
‘There was no King in Israel, but that every man did that what was right 
in his own eyes’, even then, the Isrealites were under the kingly 
government of the Fathers of particular families (84). 
 
Again, we consider an assembly of patriarchs. Yet now it is not incumbent upon 
patriarchs to nominate an heir, for want of issue. The patriarchal assembly of the 
Judges of Israel is not transitory, in that sense. Instead, it is recognized as a 
continuous form of government. 
Filmer’s apparent contradictions, on the question of a government in Israel of 
the Judges, are rendered coherent, on his Genesis model of the original state.119 
Filmer (F, 224), on the Genesis model, discusses a “broken” monarchy. Here, the 
state is incomplete, due to its collapse, persisting in a state of anarchy. This applies 
to Israel of the Judges. 
Now, Daly (1979:47; 89n), in his administering a Filmerian reply, suggests 
Israel of the Judges, for Filmer, is understood as a pseudo-form of government or a 
counterfeit monarchy, that is, a society without a real form of government, under a 
patriarch paramount.120 This, however, is misleading. Filmer’s Israel of the Judges 
is a veritable form of government, albeit incomplete. Anarchy, in Filmer, does not 
imply the absence of the state or government. In fact, the state is based in the 
sovereignty of one, namely, Adam. 
 
119 Note here, Filmer does not proceed from a state-of-nature model, such as we find in contract 
theory. This is one major difference between Filmer and Hobbes. On a state-of-nature model, 
Filmer’s variant statements on government in Israel would be ill reconcilable. 
120 See also Daly (1979:112-3; 32n). 
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For Filmer, monarchy remains the sole natural form of government. An 
otherwise veritable form of monarchical government, wherein the position of the 
patriarch paramount remains vacant, is deemed broken (“poor and beggarly”), as in 
Israel of the Judges. As Filmer (F) writes, 
 
[A]narchy is nothing else but a broken monarchy, where every man is 
his own monarch, or governor (224). 
 
Israel of the Judges, for Filmer, is a state of anarchy, which implies a lack but not 
the absence of veritable government. There is no government proper in Israel; yet 
a form of government persists. A monarchy is broken, if it cannot, as a government 
of a king can only do, restrain supposed subjects from acting at will, viz. as judges 
in their own case (F, 189). If individuals act at will, unrestrained, there is but 
anarchy, which is a state in ruins. 
But, given this, anarchic individuals are free to act at will, as judges in their 
own case. In Israel, a specter of government remains, where judges preside over the 
land.121 But in a wholescale collapse of the state, mere individuals are judges in 
their own case, and qua natural judges, free agents. 
The sovereign enjoys freedom in possession of absolute, arbitrary power, 
while the people remain unfree, save in enjoyment of privileges granted by their 
sovereign.122 Anarchic individuals, as judges in their own right, exemplify Adam’s 
sovereignty, as does a union of patriarchs or a full-fledged state in the person of the 
sovereign. However, in statehood, individuals are mere subjects. 
 
121 Since a broken monarchy cannot properly restrain the populace, individuals may be deemed 
judges in their own case (see F, 189). Israel of the Judges, however, does employ governmental 
powers, though the natural person of the monarch is absent. In any case, in a state of complete 
anarchy (in the absence of external statehood), anarchic individuals do exemplify, I understand, 
Adam’s sovereignty, as atomistic monarchs. 
122 See P, 55. 
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Now, a free agent, Laslett (1949:12) claims, “subject to no authority but her 
own will,” is impossible, in Filmer. This, however, is only true of the people. In 
Filmer, free agents are anarchic, in the position of a sovereign of a state or due the 
state’s collapse. For the people, there is no right to be free. 
Filmerian freedom, however, is not mere privation. This applies but to 
popular freedom, which is a misnomer. Filmerian freedom is observed in Adam’s 




We isolate a political justification of political power in Filmer’s doctrine of 
providential possessory right. Here, political power is justified by possession of 
power. Permissive providentialism and the passage of time determine current 
possession of power as legitimate occupation. 
 Filmer’s patriarchal theory does not offer an alternative framework to his de 
facto theory of political power. In Filmer, we observe a political and a genetic 
justification of political power. Yet both are ingrained in his patriarchal theory. A 
genetic justification extends the political. Power by patrilineage is a form of 
possession, represented by Adam. 
 Filmer denies the natural liberty of the people. There is, however, a Filmerian 
case for a positive notion of freedom, given possession of political power, whereby 
the possessor acts at will within his domain. This forms the basis of a political 
justification of political power. 
 Filmerian freedom may also be positively construed, in terms of anarchic 
individuals as judges in their own case. While Filmer ostensibly denies the freedom 
of anarchic individuals, his denial would seem to presume these are under 
government rule, incomplete or otherwise. In the absence of government, the 
individual is a monarch onto himself. Recall, absent an heir to the throne, a 
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patriarchal assembly may be established to nominate one. In a void left by a 































Locke’s Reply to Filmer on the Question of Natural Freedom. 
 
Filmerian freedom, we have found, may be positively conceived. Also, anarchic 
consent is applied in Filmer’s challenge to consent theory. A positive account of 
Filmerian freedom and anarchic consent I have termed “the anarchical principle.” 
This principle is strategically applied in Filmer’s critical work. Filmer does not 
espouse it. Yet it may be extracted from Filmer’s system, in the interest of the 
revisionist project of this thesis. 
Filmerian freedom is recognized by Locke as a challenge to consent theory. 
Locke denies Filmer’s notion of freedom as acting at will. In Locke, freedom of 
sociable beings, within a moral framework of natural law, is proposed instead. But 
Lockean freedom, it turns out, is defined in view of a different agent. Locke, then, 
cunningly avoids addressing Filmer’s challenge on its own terms. 
The freedom of anarchic individuals to act at will renders Locke’s original 
compact groundless. Accordingly, Locke proceeds on a denial of Filmerian 
freedom. 
If in joining a political society, agents are free to act at will, then (1) the 
exclusion of non-consenters violates their liberty; and (2) a consenter is at any time 
at liberty to revoke his consent. This is Filmer’s challenge. Locke’s original 
compact removes its fundamental premise, namely, freedom to act at will. 
Locke, however, does not engage in full refutation of Filmerian freedom. 
Rather, in evading Filmer’s challenge, Locke proposes another kind of freedom, 
namely, that of social moral beings, within a particular framework of natural law. 
Non-consenting parties to the original compact, within this framework, would 
remain free and relatively unharmed in the state of nature. Thus, as Locke would 
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have it, a justification of political power is grounded upon an original compact. The 
grounding of political power in the union of original contractors nullifies the 
freedom of anarchic consenters. 
My objective here is to re-litigate Locke’s reply to Filmer, in the Second 
Treatise, on the question of freedom. Now, Marshall (1994:206-7) claims problems 
of political legitimacy and continuous order presented in Filmer’s challenge are 
comprehensively resolved in Locke’s Two Treatises. Filmer’s challenge, I concur, 
is resolved in Locke’s treatment of it. But Locke’s resolution relates to social moral 
beings in a state of nature of relative peace as well as prospective members of a 
political society. It remains unresolved for anarchic individuals. 
Further, Locke’s resolution of Filmer’s challenge is not brought within an 
antithetical political doctrine. As noted, Locke’s conception of freedom is 
introduced in denial of Filmerian freedom. But I question Locke’s supposed 
political voluntarist stance, in this regard. Within a political voluntarist 
interpretation, Locke’s consent theory is antithetical to Filmerism. Political power, 
on this interpretation, is derived from the granting of a right to political action by 
natural-right holders. Yet Lockean contractors are not conceived as bona fide 
individuals. Their identity, rather, is that of a political union. By the power of the 
union, the legitimacy of the political is established. 
Locke, in fact, operates on the anarchical principle. The difference lies in the 
free agent. The Lockean free agent is a prospective member of political society 
operating in unison with other members. For Filmer, an individual in possession of 
political power is veritably free. In his denial of Filmerian freedom, Locke removes 
a reference to anarchic individuals free to act at will. At the same time, original 
contractors are free to act at will, in unison. Ultimately, a political union possesses 
power, rather than individuals. 
 




As Locke (I, 6) observes, Filmer’s system is founded on a denial of natural freedom, 
but “if this Foundation fails, all his Fabric falls with it, and Governments must be 
left again to the old way of being made by contrivance, and the consent of Men” 
(ll. 7-9). The ostensible implication here is “that if Filmer is refuted, then the 
Lockean consent doctrine stands vindicated, as if Locke and Filmer were the only 
alternatives” (Zuckert 2002:135). 
Now, I object to such characterization of the debate. First, the denial of 
natural freedom does not ground Filmer’s system. It is rather the implication of 
Filmer’s fundamental proposition that the only natural form of government is 
absolute monarchy. Locke, in fact, misconstrues Filmer in his explication of 
Filmer’s system. 
Second, in addition to his denial of the freedom of the people, Filmer 
implicitly puts forth a positive account of the natural freedom of sovereign 
individuals. These may also be construed as anarchic consenters, given a collapse 
of the state. 
As we discussed in Chapter 2, patriarchal consent exemplifies a positive 
notion of freedom and consent. Contra Tyrrell, this is not a defect of Filmer’s 
system but one of its main strengths, in pursuance of a political justification of 
political power. 
Filmerism lends support to a de facto theory of political power, viz. in terms 
of a right of possession. That is, if our aim is to construct a political justification of 
political power, a positive rendering of Filmer’s critical doctrine provides a 
coherent framework, in that regard. A positive account of Filmerian freedom and 
consent allows us to conceive these within the context of political naturalism. This 




That is, if a thing is possessed by an agent free to act at will, within a state of 
anarchy, his claim is rightly founded on possession. He has come into possession 
of the thing, in appropriating it. Now, as it happens, the thing may also be taken 
from another. From this arises a conflict of competing claims to the same thing. But 
the best claim lies with the current possessor, in that the thing lies with him. 
Further, I object to Zuckert’s (2002) characterization of an antithetical 
relation between Locke’s political doctrine and Filmer’s system. Locke’s political 
doctrine, I observe, is not put forth as an antithesis to Filmerism. It is rather set forth 
within the context of Filmerism, yet in the form of a contract theory and an 
evolutionary account of the development of human societies. 
Locke’s consent theory, on a political naturalist interpretation, instantiates a 
positive account of Filmerian freedom and anarchic consent. This, notably, applies 
to civil freedom in the formation of government by consent. But civil freedom and 
consent, on this interpretation, does not apply to individuals save by reference to a 
political union, namely, an original compact. 
As I maintain, in denying Filmerian freedom, Locke sacrifices individual 
consent as a grounding of political legitimacy. Yet in so doing, Locke in fact adopts 
the anarchical principle of consent, within the context of the formation of 
government by original contractors. Also, Locke’s consent theory and labor theory 
of property are put forth within the Adamite paradigm. As in Filmer, Adam serves 
as the ultimate justification of the state and private property. 
However, we shall now examine where Locke and Filmer differ in respect to 
freedom and consent. As I observe, the difference lies in Locke’s and Filmer’s 
concept of a free agent. While Filmer conceives free agents as non-moral and non-
social, they are for Locke social moral beings. But recall, Filmer demands natural 
rights of free agents to be met in consent theory, which stipulates those rights, to 
begin with. The concept of a free agent appears within Filmer’s critical doctrine. 
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Locke, however, postulates a concept of a free agent at variance with Filmer’s 
demand. The challenge is thus shifted towards Locke’s own concept of a free agent. 
 
3.2. Filmer’s challenge to consent theory. 
 
The Filmerian individual is sovereign, in possession of supralegal power. Also, in 
anarchy, lawless individuals act at will, as sovereigns in their own right. This 
condition obtains in a broken monarchy (F, 224), where everyone is free to act at 
will, as his own lawmaker and judge, “his own monarch, or governor” (F, 224). 
This situation is observed in Israel of the Judges.123 Despite a judicial 
structure, individuals, supposed subjects to the judges, are judges in their own right. 
Here, the government is proven so “poor and beggarly” (F, 189) that each does what 
is right in his own eyes (Gen. 21.25). 
Now, Filmer (A, 285; O, 273-4) posits, if consent theory is to maintain a 
veritable foundation and operation of government, it must demonstrate the 
reliability of consenters in possession of natural rights. In a word, we proceed from 
a state of anarchy, where each is a judge in his own right. Anarchy is set to persist, 
if we cannot demonstrate how each would maintain his own consent, once a 
member of a political society. 
Consent theorists need “to resolve the conscience, touching the manner of the 
peoples passing their consent; and what is sufficient, what not, to make, or derive a 
right, or title from the people” (F, 226). Here, Filmer challenges the consent theorist 
on the legitimation of political power on grounds of individual consent, given the 
sovereignty of the individual and the freedom to act at will. 
Filmer’s challenge is set in fixing the consenter as sovereign, in possession 
of a natural right to act at will. As judges in their own right, individuals are in full 
 
123 This is Filmer’s prime example of anarchy, or a broken monarchy. 
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command of moral judgement. The legitimation of political power on grounds of 
consent, is thus required to maintain the sovereignty of the individual. Yet 
sovereign individuals are free to consent and to revoke consent at will. In granting 
a right to rule, the right, by the same token, may be revoked. 
On these grounds, any restriction of consent invalidates it, and thus renders 
political power illegitimate. Further, any exclusion of sovereign individuals, 
including non-consenters, is a violation of their natural liberty. Given such 
injustice, political power, again, is rendered illegitimate (F, 211). Political action, 
then, undermines its legitimacy in infringing upon any dissent or non-consent. 
As it happens, any member of society may revoke his consent. Punishment 
for dissent or non-consent, however, violates natural liberty. 
As Filmer (O, 273) argues, if political power is deemed legitimate by consent, 
the power is held on condition of unanimous consent. Political legitimacy is 
recognized, in that case, while unanimous consent is maintained. But once consent 
has been given, it may as freely be revoked by any member of society, who at any 
time may reclaim his natural freedom (273). The whole scheme of consent, as a 
result, is unreliable. 
Unanimous consent is invariably required for the legitimation of political 
power (A, 285). Still, even if unanimous consent incidentally obtains, an obligation 
to obey the law is not established, given revocation of consent applies throughout. 
The continuous unanimity of the citizens, in fact, is insufficient. The 
challenge, ultimately, concerns universal consent, where we consider the origin of 
private property; for “without a joint consent of the whole people of the world, no 
one thing can be made proper to any one man, but it will be an injury, and a 
usurpation upon the common right of all others” (A, 285). Thus, to establish private 
property, its very principle needs to be universally agreed upon; and consent, from 
that moment, to be maintained. 
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Every member of society, on the legitimating standard of consent theory, is 
entitled to membership and must be included. Yet, at the same time, no one is ever 
obliged to remain a member of the commonwealth. This is the quandary of consent 
theory, as presented in Filmer’s argument, proceeding from the anarchical principle 
of consent and the freedom to act at will. 
As I observe, Filmer, in his polemical challenge to consent theory, invokes a 
“basic legitimation demand” upon the state or government, as posited in Williams 
(2005:4). The state is here required to offer a justification of its power to each 
subject of the state, viz. anyone whom the state by its own lights may rightfully 
coerce (4). As Filmer perceives, consent theory sets itself up to meet this demand. 
However, on the Filmerist view, if the legitimating standard of state power is the 
granting of a right to rule by individual consent, the basic legitimation demand 
cannot be met. Legitimation on basis of individual consent is partial, at most, given 
non-consent. The state could not offer a justification of its power to dissenters and 
non-consenters. Yet the state, by its own lights, may rightfully coerce them, viz. 
given its monopoly on force. The state is otherwise disarmed of its exclusive power 
to punish. 
On a legitimating standard of consent theory, state coercion of non-consenters 
is deemed unjust, invalidating consent.124 Consent theory, then, cannot refer to the 
state’s exclusive right to punish, to meet the basic legitimation demand. It remains 
at odds with the state’s generic claim to legitimacy. 
 
3.3. Natural liberty and the liberty of man. 
 
 
124 In response to Williams (2005), morality is prior to the political, for consent theory, in that case. 
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In response to Filmer’s challenge, Locke invokes “the liberty of man.” This is the 
freedom of social moral beings, who have entered political society from a natural 
condition in the form of a compact. 
Sovereign power, in Filmer, is a precondition of freedom. For the multitude, 
there is no freedom to enjoy. Anarchic individuals may be considered free, but they 
enjoy freedom as sovereigns in their own right, from a collapse of the state. 
In Locke, contrarily, everyone is by nature free and equal. Given all are in 
nature equal, man is naturally free. As Locke (I, 67) writes, 
 
Man has a Natural Freedom […] since all that share in the same 
common Nature, Faculties and Powers, are in Nature equal, and ought 
to partake in the same common Rights and Priviledges, till the manifest 
appointment of God […] can be produced to shew any particular 
Persons Supremacy, or a Mans own consent subjects him to a Superior 
(ll. 20-7). 
 
Superiority is validated by consent, if not by God’s appointment. In a natural 
condition, human beings are otherwise presumed equal. Now, in Filmer, in his 
presenting a particularistic jure divino, an individual entitled to monarchical rule is 
to be identified (Waldron 2002:18). Locke, however, denies natural differences 
give rise to differences in authority (34-5). 
The state of nature, as Locke (II, 4) describes it, is the state in which all men 
naturally subsist, viz. in perfect freedom and equality125, whereby power and 
jurisdiction is universally reciprocal, and no one possesses more than another. 
Natural freedom, for Locke (II, 4), involves the ordering of one’s actions and 
 
125 For “perfect equality,” see also II, 7. 
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disposing of one’s person and possessions as one sees fit without dependence upon 
the will of any other — within the bounds of the law of nature (ll. 3-6). 
On presumption of natural equality, Locke (II, 22) distinguishes between 
natural and civil freedom.126 Natural freedom, incidentally127, is not being under 
secular power and positive law (II, 22). Here, one remains “free from any Superior 
Power on Earth [and has] only the Law of Nature for his Rule,” being “under no 
other restraint but the Law of Nature” (II, 22). The state of nature, on this notion, 
is at relative peace (see Ashcraft 1968:902). Under natural law alone, individuals 
and their property remain relatively protected, that is, presuming they abide by 
natural law. 
Still, in a state of nature, there is no common judge, save for divine 
judgement.128 While those of civil society may appeal to a common judge on 
positive law, those in a natural condition, upon distress, may appeal only to heaven 
(II, 168). (See also Scott 2000:553.) 
Locke proceeds from a legal-moral definition of the state of nature (Ashcraft 
1968:900). As Locke (II, 19) states, in the absence of a common secular judge, 
individuals are situated in a state of nature, under the law of reason alone. But 
natural individuals, for Locke, obey the law of nature, whereas in a state of war 
individuals are unfree, governed by force, not law (II, 19). (See also Ashcraft 
1968:903.) To avoid a state of war is “one great reason” to quit the state of nature 
 
126 Locke (II, 22) uses “the natural liberty of man” as distinguished from “the liberty of man” (i.e., 
civil freedom). 
127 Considering freedom, in Locke, is not limited by human law, I add “incidentally,” referring to 
the state of nature, where one happens to be free “from” (in the absence of) human law. It is not the 
case, in Locke, that one enjoys limited freedom in political society, given positive law. “Restraint” 
is not understood in Locke (II, 22) as restraint on freedom but violence. See further below. 
128 As Simmons (1993:18) would have it, the want of a common judge is stated as a sufficient, not 
a necessary, condition of subsisting in a state of nature. Common judges may yet be present in the 
state of nature (Simmons 1993:19-20). Still, they would lack political legitimacy as given by mutual 
consent in the formation of an independent civil society. (See also Grant 1987:101-2.) 
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and incorporate oneself into civil society (II, 21). Yet in so doing, individuals do 
not forsake their freedom. 
Civil freedom is enjoyed in political society within the domain of positive 
law, grounded in consent and trust in the legislative. Given a legislative power 
established by consent, one is relinquished from domination by the will of another 
and restrained by no law or enactments but those of the legislative (II, 22). 
Now, natural freedom and civil, for Locke, do not present a dichotomy. 
Positive law is not meant to restrict natural liberty. The law, on the contrary, is 
complimentary to natural liberty, and, rather than limiting, facilitates 
 
[…] the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest, 
and prescribes no farther than is for the general Good of those under 
that Law (II, 57). 
 
Freedom, here, obtains within the bounds of natural law, and obedience to positive 
law is consistent with natural freedom. Positive law, in extension of natural law, 
provides a protection of property, available but frail under natural law alone. 
Property is now permanently strengthened, by the introduction of positive law (see 
II, 222). 
Here, Locke’s understanding of civil freedom is negative. 
 
For Liberty is, to be free from restraint and violence from others; which 
cannot be, where there is no Law (II, 57, ll. 20-1). 
 
The end of the law, essentially, is freedom from restraint and violence, viz. not to 
abolish or limit but to generate a realm of freedom in which to dispose one’s 
possessions and property as seen fit under the protection of the law “and therein not 
to be subject to the arbitrary Will of another, but freely follow his own” (II, 57). 
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The law, in this sense, seeks to preserve and enlarge freedom, allowing greater 
freedom than what obtains in nature (II, 57). (See also Ian Parker 2004:128.)129 
This understanding of freedom follows Locke’s denial of Filmerian freedom 
(see Ashcraft 1968:903). Locke (II, 57), citing Filmer’s definition of freedom in the 
Forms (224), stresses 
 
Freedom is not, as we are told [by Filmer], A Liberty for every Man to 
do what he lists: (For who could be free, when every other Man’s 
Humour might domineer over him?)130 
 
129 Consider also freedom limited by the law, as a political voluntarist alternative to Filmerian 
freedom. Neither in Filmer nor in Locke, is limited freedom an object of concern. Algernon Sidney’s 
critique of Filmer, in his Discourses Concerning Government (1698), presents a notion of freedom 
limited by the law, posited against Filmerian freedom. Whereas Lockean liberty is consistent with 
obedience to the law, natural liberty, for Sidney, is partially given up in joining a political society 
proper. 
Sidney (1698:1.5) rejects Filmerian freedom, or “liberty solely consist[ing] in an 
independency upon the will of another” (17). Absolute monarchy, Sidney (1698:2.20) argues, 
contradicts freedom to act at will (191). Filmerian freedom, in fact, is inconsistent with any form of 
government (191). If, as Filmer maintains, monarchy is the only natural form of government, and 
freedom is only restrained in a monarchical government, in subordination of the multitude to the 
sovereign will, then “this is as much as to say, that all people naturally desire that which is against 
nature” (191). But “if man were by nature so tenacious of his liberty without restraint, he must be 
rationally so” (192). A desire for liberty without restraint, however, is irrational (192-3). Natural 
liberty is tempered by reason and “restrained by laws tending to the publick good” (193). 
For Sidney, freedom is thus naturally limited. Filmer, accordingly, is lambasted for positing 
a desire for freedom unlimited, in defiance of reason. Yet Sidney, in the foregoing, does not separate 
freedom from the desire for freedom. If we grant that freedom is naturally tempered by reason, a 
desire for freedom may yet be deemed irrational, because, in fact, freedom unlimited is the object 
of desire. 
Furthermore, absolute monarchy, in Filmer, does indeed contradict freedom of the people. 
Individuals do desire that which is against nature. A desire for freedom unrestrained is, for Filmer, 
contrary to absolute monarchy. However, the Filmerian individual in possession of supreme power, 
enjoys freedom unrestrained in virtue of his superior position. 
Sidney’s appeal to reason, contra Filmer, is misplaced. In his rebuttal, Sidney but affirms 
Filmer’s denial of natural popular freedom. At issue, again, is freedom by virtue of different agents. 
Sidney’s free rational agent operates on moral grounds for the good of the commonwealth, whereas 
Filmer’s free monarch, even though he has a duty to act for the good of the commonwealth, 
proceeds, as we find in Sidney (1698:1.5), on “an unlimited power of doing what he pleaseth” (17). 





Freedom, Locke (II, 22, 57) insists, is not doing whatever one likes but to act in 
accordance with rational requirements grounded in natural law, that is, to express 
one’s own will within the bounds of the law of reason. 
While Lockean freedom is not limited by positive law, it is limited by the law 
of nature. Individuals may act according to their will, while keeping within the 
bounds of the law of nature, viz. doing no harm to another in his life, health, liberty, 
or possession (II, 6). (See also Ian Parker 2004:129.) 
In Filmer, however, individual judgement applies to natural law, absent 
providence. In a state of anarchy, an individual is a final judge in his own right. 
Lockean and Filmerian freedom relate to different agents. Locke’s agent is a social 
moral being limited by the law of nature, while Filmer’s agent enjoys unlimited 
freedom, as a judge in his own right. 
Now, in confronting Filmer’s challenge, on his compatibilist account of 
natural and civil freedom, Locke (II, 95-6) evades Filmer’s challenge on basis of 
anarchic consent. Instead, Locke posits unanimous consent of original contractors. 
This is mutual consent in the act of every prospective member in agreeing to join 
one body politic (II, 99). As it happens, unanimous consent operates on majority-
rule, since unanimity is predictably absent in decision making. For this reason, 
every prospective member is simultaneously understood to accept the rule of the 
majority (II, 99). 
As Locke (II, 95) writes, 
 
When any number of Men have so consented to make one Community 
or Government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one 
Body Politick, wherein the Majority have a Right to act and conclude 




In consenting to one body politic, prospective members are incorporated in political 
communion. The majority, meanwhile, attains a right to act on behalf of and to 
“conclude the rest.”131 For “where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they 
cannot act as one Body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again” (II, 
98). Hence, prospective members uniting to form a polity must be understood to 
give up all power to the majority, necessary to the ends of the community thus 
formed out of a natural condition (II, 99). 
The foregoing presents a mechanical justification of the state. That is, the 
body politic necessarily operates on unity and, by extension, majority-rule. In 
joining the society, prospective members therein agree to these essentials. 
Further, Locke (II, 95) explains, 
 
This any number of Men may do, because it injures not the Freedom of 
the rest; they are left as they were in the Liberty of the State of Nature 
(ll. 9-11; italics added). 
 
Here, in applying the term “any number of,” Locke rebuts Filmer on the 
requirement of unanimous consent of prospective members, where none 
supposedly can be excluded. 
In prospective membership, the consent of anarchic consenters is replaced by 
that of original contractors. Any number of these may form a political society on 
majority-rule, as non-consenters will remain free in the state of nature. No injustice 
or injury, therefore, is done to them, given the compatibility of natural and civil 
freedom as well as relative peace of a natural condition. 
In the formation of a body politic, the nascent community has a right of non-
acceptance. Also, the body politic once formed, the majority has a right to make 
 
131 I suppose “the rest” refers to those who do not espouse and follow the view of the majority in 
civil society. In II, 95, there is an ambiguity as to what “the rest” means. (See further, below.) 
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and enact law under which dissenters are expected to live (II, 95-6). In forming a 
civil society, contractors of any number agree to mutually give up their natural 
executive power. In such incorporation, individuals thereby authorize government 
to make law in lieu of their natural executive right “as the publick good of the 
Society shall require” (II, 89). 
Contra Filmer, the political union of original contractors removes the 
requirement of unanimous consent of anarchic consenters, at liberty to revoke 
consent. The original union of contractors forms a political society proper, the 
governing body of which cannot operate but by law applicable to all. Consent 
entails acceptance of this scheme. Non-consenters, on these grounds, are justly 
excluded. They suffer no injury on remaining free under natural law alone. 
 
3.4. A Filmerist response. 
 
Locke resolves the issue of unanimity relative to his own ends. Now, Marshall 
(1994:206-7) considers Locke’s resolution here definitive. But Locke approaches a 
resolution in evading Filmer’s challenge, viz. in supposing the freedom of a 
different agent. 
Locke’s response to Filmer presumes the moral and social in a natural 
condition, under natural law. These premises are absent in Filmer’s challenge to 
consent theory. For Locke, freedom natural or civil involves moral considerations. 
Also, the state of nature is relatively peaceful, under natural law alone. Those 
excluded in an original contract, remain free in a natural condition, and relatively 
protected. In Filmer’s challenge, however, the moral depends upon individual 
judgement and prerogative. Freedom is not limited by natural law. Rather, it is 
unlimited by natural right. 
Now, in Locke, those left free in the state of nature do not enjoy the same 
protection as in a commonwealth. But a rational requirement is, then, imposed not 
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to leave oneself in a worse condition, viz. to enter political society (see II, 137). A 
Filmerist response attacks Locke’s compatibilist account of natural and civil 
freedom, in this regard. 
I conceive a Filmerist response as follows. 
In Locke, civil freedom, as consistent with natural liberty, presents freedom 
of a social moral being, viz. that of a member of society or a rational moral actor in 
the state of nature. Natural freedom, in Locke, is that of social moral beings, acting 
in conformity with natural law. Locke’s compatibilist account is here proposed on 
a denial of Filmerian freedom to act at will. 
Locke’s free agent is not the same as Filmer’s. In Locke, a naturally free 
individual remains (though prior to civil society) a member of society, even a 
property owner. In any case, those who persist in a natural condition without 
entering a state of war, are sociable. In Locke’s state of nature, individuals are social 
moral beings, who hold natural rights, indicative of social needs (Kendall 1965:66). 
(See also Gough 1973:29.) Original contractors proceed from a relatively peaceful 
condition, on presumption of their acting in accordance with natural law, in 
determination of their social needs, as relative to their estate. In Filmer, conversely, 
individuals are non-social non-moral individuals, each with an equal claim to 
government, existing as a “mathematical equality of units” (Daly 1979:92). 
Excluded non-consenters, in Locke’s original compact, are to be construed as 
social moral beings, left to a natural condition. Now, even if they may be left in the 
liberty and relative peace of a natural condition, just treatment, in that case, relates 
to the condition of social moral beings. But these are not anarchic consenters, for 
whom Filmer’s challenge, however, is set. It remains unjust to exclude anarchic 
consenters, on their equal claim to government. 
Filmerian freedom, then, is not dispelled. Lockean freedom is invoked to 
evade Filmer’s challenge, positing anarchic consent. Yet Locke (II, 22, 57) 
introduces his concept of freedom in a flat denial of Filmerian freedom. 
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On his definition of freedom, Locke (II, 57) denies Filmerian freedom. Now, 
acting at will, it might be said, is a privation of the freedom of social moral beings. 
In that case, Locke’s (II, 22, 57) denial of Filmerian freedom suggests that the end 
of the law is preserving and enlarging freedom, in negation of acting at will. 
Lockean freedom fully obtains within the law. Acting in excess or in breach of 
natural law, renders individuals unfree. For Locke, acting at will defies the law of 
reason. Filmerian freedom, separated from the precondition of moral conduct, is 
then a falsity.132 
Now, in Locke, the law does accommodate optional rights, i.e., rights to act 
freely while unbound by duty (Simmons 1992:74-5, 76). Lockean freedom, 
 
132 To compare, Locke, in his Essay concerning Human Understanding (1975), contradistinguishes 
the idea of government from the idea of absolute liberty, in a fashion quite reminiscent of Filmer. 
As Locke writes in the Essay: “No Government allows absolute Liberty: The Idea of Government 
being the establishment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws, which require Conformity to them; 
and the Idea of absolute Liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases; I am as capable of 
being certain of the Truth of this proposition, as of any in Mathematicks” (4.3.18). 
This is set forth as an analytic truth (Simmons 1993:74). The idea of government negates 
absolute liberty, i.e., the freedom to act at will. In accordance with Locke’s description, absolute 
liberty is here described as a freedom to act at will. This would seem to cohere with Filmer’s notion 
of natural freedom as well as Hobbes’s in The Elements. 
Now, Simmons (1993:74-5) remarks, Lockean consent is to approach the ideal of absolute 
liberty to the extent possible, by investing governmental acts with a moral significance of free 
choice. But an approach to the ideal of absolute liberty, as conceived by Simmons (1993), proceeds 
from Locke’s “the liberty of man,” (II, 22) viz. civil freedom in extension of the natural. Locke’s 
liberty of man is inconsistent with freedom to act at will. Lockean consent is premised upon the 
freedom of social moral beings, given a denial of freedom to act at will. 
Locke (II, 22), in rejection of Filmerian freedom, discounts “absolute” liberty, which, in 
the Essay, is described in these same terms. Notably though, the Essay (4.3.18) does not commit 
Locke to the idea of absolute liberty. 
Locke of the Essay expresses certainty on the proposition that absolute liberty is impossible 
under government. Absolute liberty, as here described, accords with Filmerian freedom. In Two 
Treatises, Locke (II, 22) denies this definition of freedom, committing himself to its non-existence. 
Locke of the Essay need not, however, be understood to affirm the existence of freedom to act at 
will. Consistency may thus be preserved on this point. 
Consistency is not preserved, where Locke is otherwise understood here to affirm the 
existence of freedom to act at will, whilst admitting some limitation of natural freedom under 
government. But Locke rejects the limitation of freedom by positive law. Freedom, for Locke, 
necessitates in fact being protected under the law, viz. to be free from the arbitrary will and 
domination of another. 
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however, is conditional upon duty, in contradistinction to Filmerian freedom, which 
is supralegal and unlimited. For Locke, free activity is defined by the law. 
Anarchic individuals, for Locke, are not recognized as free agents. They 
cannot be relied upon in formation of a political society proper, that is, to maintain 
the original compact. Locke’s mechanical justification dissolves the prerogative of 
reclaiming one’s natural freedom, in revoking consent. But, on Locke’s own 
standards, non-social non-moral beings would be left unfree in a natural condition. 
On a Filmerist critique, exclusion on these terms remains unjust. 
Anarchic individuals, on Locke’s own premises, would enjoy neither freedom 
nor protection in a natural condition. They are, however, capable of expressing 
consent, as distinguished from a promise. But they are excluded for being 
unreliable, in their acting at will. Now, a justification for exclusion is provided by 
Locke’s mechanics of the state and his state-of-nature model. The justification rests 
on Locke’s denial of Filmerian freedom. Yet, if anarchic consenters are left unfree 
in a natural condition, excluding them is unjust; for they would otherwise get to 
enjoy freedom in society. Granted, anarchic consent would not bind them to the 
compact, but the compact, on a mechanical justification, would commit them to 
society, nonetheless. They would, in that respect, count as original contractors. 
Locke’s consent theory, then, is put back in the quandary Filmer’s challenge 
presented. It remains unjust to exclude anarchic consenters from the original 
compact; yet, if they were to join, they could at any time revoke their consent. 
Now, in defense of Locke’s consent theory, anarchic consenters may be said 
to be unfree, because they are in breach of natural law. For Locke (II, 17), 
individuals in a state of war are ipso facto unfree. The state of war, in Locke, is the 
absence of freedom. In a state of war, anarchic individuals are justifiably excluded 
from the formation of a political society proper. A supposed freedom to act at will 
obtains only in a state of war, in violation of the law of nature. This is not freedom 
but a license to commit violence. 
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However, Filmerian freedom does not immediately violate the law of nature. 
In Locke, free action is predetermined within natural law, whereas in Filmer, the 
moral choice of anarchic individuals is undetermined. Filmerian individuals, by 
natural law, determine their action, being judges in their own right. Acting at will 
proceeds not from a state of war but individual prerogative; it does not necessitate 
a state of war. 
Lastly, even if anarchic consenters operate in a state of war, leaving them in 
this condition would remain unjust. Again, in the original compact, we can assume 
they consent to membership of society, though not in the form of a promise. But 
the compact, in any case, binds them to society, given a requirement of unanimity. 
Though any number of men form a body politic, moral reasons persist for the 
incorporation of anarchic consenters. To escape this result, the political must 
overrule the moral, in Locke’s consent theory. 
 
3.5. The extent of disagreement. 
 
Filmerian freedom, for Locke, is a falsity. Lockean freedom presupposes a society 
of moral beings, the realm of which is irrelevant, in the case of anarchic individuals. 
As Locke (II, 57) asks (paraphrasing): Who could be free under constant 
threat of domination? —Yet for Filmer, freedom is domination, in the case of the 
absolute monarch. 
However, in Filmer, freedom is not separated from the law of nature. The 
unlimited freedom of the monarch is definitive of the order of things, subject to 
divine judgement. The Filmerian individual, then, is unbound by rational 
requirements, as otherwise set by Locke’s doctrine of natural law. In Filmer, the 
law of nature is not so much “the law of reason” (II, 6) as the law of sovereign will, 
the judgement of which is final. 
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Consent theory, as Filmer (A, 285; O, 273) demands, must assume an agent 
free to act at will, in possession of a natural right so to act. If he is in a position, and 
thus at liberty, to dominate others, the Filmerian individual has in effect the right 
to rule over those others.133 Freedom, while not separate from natural law, is yet 
not irrevocably tied to human morality and sociability. A natural hierarchy is fixed, 
such that an individual, occupying the highest position in a domain (e.g., the head 
of a family), is free to act at will, and so at liberty to dominate others, within that 
domain. In this sense, the political is prior to the moral and social. 
There is, for Filmer, no right of resistance to the prince or father and “no 
commission to judge of the titles of kingdoms or causes of war,” (P, 105); for only 
God “hath right to give and take away kingdoms” (A, 289). To resist him would 
contradict the very order of things, to which his personal power is inseparable. 
In Locke, contrarily, members of the commonwealth have a right of 
resistance. Government, for Locke, is under a moral obligation to respect the law 
of nature and to frame its legislation accordingly (Gough 1973:42). Failing this, 
such that members of the commonwealth no longer can rely on government 
protection134, or their lives are under threat by government force, they have a right 
to resist the government, in “Appeal to Heaven” (II, 168). For where “the Body of 
the People” — or “any single Man”135 — is deprived of the right of self-
preservation or is put under a power without right and no appeal on earth, the 
people, or any among them, are at liberty to appeal to heaven “whenever they judge 
the cause of sufficient moment” (II, 168). 
 
133 This expresses Filmer’s de facto theory of political power. 
134 This is a matter of interpretation, that is, whether non-reliance would justify resistance, or 
government would have to be perceived as moving to destroy members of the commonwealth. 
135 Here, Locke “at his most anarchistic” (Laslett 1967; 397n) may be said to be an individualist, but 
this is expressed in the context of a state of war, viz. between the individual and the government. 
As noted, individuals are unfree in a state of war. 
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Still, a right of resistance, in Locke, is directed at government, not the state 
or commonwealth. The community does not rebel against itself. In case a right of 
resistance be exercised, the objective is not a return to a natural condition but a 
defense of the commonwealth against the government. 
As I observe, Lockean contractors have an obligation towards themselves and 
transitorily to the government, on condition of protection. A mutual obligation to 
obey is undertaken by original contractors; and, while they are obliged to act in 
unison, they are under an obligation to obey the law, in reference to their union. 
Given this, the extent of disagreement between Locke and Filmer is not as 
broad as may first appear. In fact, a right of resistance, in Locke, is referential to 
unanimous consent of original contractors. This is not, on my reading of Locke, to 
be understood in terms of voluntarism, proceeding from individual consent. 
Unanimity, instead, denotes a political union. 
Now, if Lockean consent affirms political reasons for a union, its application 
is indicative of the anarchical principle, as we would extract from a positive reading 
of Filmer’s critical work. That is, the original contractors lay claim to their union 
in mutually agreeing to abide by its procedure. The coalition is formed in a state of 
anarchy, where possessory right obtains by anarchic consent of those in union. 
Filmer’s challenge is resolved on basis of unanimous consent of original 
contractors. The exclusion of non-consenters is justifiable on political grounds. At 
issue is the possession of a union by any number of men in virtue of their mutual 
consent alone. No right of inclusion obtains, on this basis. 
This accords with my understanding of Lockean consent. The primacy of 
unanimity defies Lockean voluntarism, in terms of which individual consent is 
fundamental. I understand Locke’s political doctrine, rather, as a form of 
naturalism. 
Further, the basic legitimation demand, as posited in Williams (2005), is met 
on grounds of the unanimity of original contractors. The issue of non-consent does 
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not arise. The demand is satisfied apropos of the original contract, wherein 
unanimity is solidified. Also, the exclusion of anarchic individuals is justified on 
this basis. 
Lockean voluntarism, by contrast, does not satisfy the demand. The issue of 
non-consent persists on moral grounds, whereas a right to rule is granted by 
individual consent. Also, the exclusion of anarchic individuals, on this notion, 
remains morally objectionable, as they are capable of consent. 
A political voluntarist interpretation of Locke’s consent theory is presented 
in Simmons (2001:130, 137, 155). Here, reasons to obey political authority are 
continually addressed in the individual’s moral relationship with the state or 
government. Meanwhile, the state’s claim to legitimacy is generic. 
On my finding, Locke’s political doctrine does account for the state’s generic 
claim to legitimacy, on naturalist premises. Ultimately, I do not find Locke’s 
consent theory to be antithetical to Filmerism, unless we do proceed from political 




Lockean and Filmerian freedom relate to different agents. Locke does not dispel 
but flatly denies Filmerian freedom. The construction of the original compact and 
justification of political power hinge on Locke’s denial. Now, if we accept Filmer’s 
initial challenge to consent theory, the problem of unanimous consent of anarchic 
individuals persists. However, the invocation of unanimous consent of original 
contractors allows Locke to evade Filmer’s challenge. But this, I gather, is posited 
in the form of political union, as opposed to individual consent. Political obligation 
is fixed in the political union of original contractors. Individual consent is sacrificed 






The Kingdom of Adam. 
 
In setting out to argue against Filmer’s proposition that the only natural form of 
government is absolute monarchy and his corresponding denial of natural freedom, 
Locke (I, 11) attacks Filmer’s idea of the sovereignty of Adam. For Locke, 
however, Adam also presents a paradigm for politics, in that Adam represents the 
right of humanity to property. 
Locke and Filmer both proceed from Adam as a model of political society. 
This sets both thinkers apart from Hobbes (Reventlow 1984:209-10). Hobbes does 
not rely on Adam in articulation of his positive theory of governmental covenant 
(Mitchell 1993:81). Rather, Hobbes begins with Abraham (Reventlow 1984:210). 
Also, in Hobbes, the most prominent figure is Moses (Mitchell 1993:70). 
Locke, unlike Hobbes, relies on Adam (Mitchell 1993:97). Filmer, 
accordingly, is the target for Locke. But Locke agrees with Filmer’s central thesis 
of the political significance of Adam (81). The ground of political legitimacy is 
established in Adam. In this, Filmer and Locke are allies. But they differ as to what 
occurred after the Fall (81). 
Since Adam is a crucial biblical figure for Locke, Locke must address Filmer 
rather than Hobbes (Mitchell 1993:81). Adam, for Locke, operates as a basis of 
original communism, in opposition to Filmer’s Adam in representation of private 
property, divinely ordained. 
Now, Zuckert (2002:137-40) suggests, Locke embarks upon his refutation of 
Filmer’s system as a means of interpreting scripture. Supposedly, Filmer is applied 
as a surrogate for the Bible. To this end, Locke tends to distort Filmer’s statements 
to suit his own purposes (137-8). Yet, in Locke, Filmer remains the target 
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throughout. Filmer’s system is dismantled in minute detail, in Locke’s First 
Treatise. Locke’s critique of Filmer’s system is not selective. It is comprehensive 
and pedantic, in the aim of establishing an alternative Adamite paradigm. 
Locke, then, puts forth an alternative interpretation of scripture, in opposing 
Filmer’s patriarchal theory, in its account of Genesis. Filmer is not a mere 
“polemical target,” as Zuckert (2002:130) would have it, but a political and an 
ideological one. 
Now, Filmer’s patriarchal theory provides a genetic justification of political 
power. A genetic basis of justification is formed in the identification of political 
and paternal power. Here, Filmer invokes the power of Adam, to whom is to be 
granted universal dominion (Schochet 1975:7). 
Still, a genetic justification of political power, I observe, rests on a de facto 
theory of possessory right. A de facto theory is demonstrated in the Fall in the 
context of Adam’s rule over Eve, given original sin. The identification of political 
and paternal power, then, is demonstrated in a natural hierarchy. But, as we already 
observe in Cain and Abel, a natural hierarchy is reduced to a conflict of possessory 
right. 
The issue of conflict, however, need not undermine Filmer’s patriarchal 
theory. In fact, I propose a defense of Filmer’s system in locating its strength in 
admission of conflict, where a natural hierarchy is reduced to a question of the 
current possession of power.136 
Accordingly, I reject the orthodox claim that Filmer’s challenge to consent 
theory is resolved in Locke’s attack on his system. This debate, rather, is ultimately 
paradigmatic on the issue of the power of Adam. Locke and Filmer both rely on 
Adam for their politics, but Locke opposes Filmer’s static view of original natural 
inequality in the person of Adam. In Locke, an evolutionary account of the 
 
136 Cf. I, 21. While Locke recognizes this implication in Filmer, Locke considers it rather a weakness 
of Filmer’s system. (See also Faulkner 2005:458.) 
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beginning of human societies is set forth, instead. But Locke’s evolutionary account 
is fixed in Adam. 
In refutation of Filmer’s system, Daly (1979:80-1) and Ashcraft (1987:68) 
each maintain Filmer’s detractors only had to present a reasonable alternative 
interpretation of scripture, as the onus would have been put onto the patriarchalist 
in this respect, given his total reliance on scripture. 
Filmer, however, does not rely wholly on scripture (Leiter 2018:17). He 
applies also non-scriptural arguments (Greenleaf 1964:90). Paternal power is to be 
traced to Adam, but it is also the order of things (90). Bodin’s theory of sovereignty, 
further, is appropriated by Filmer for his theoretical framework (Daly 1979:20; 
Laslett 1949:17-8). Filmer, then, applies scripture for a narrative structure based 
upon this framework. 
Further, Locke is also “intimately dependent” on Genesis in developing his 
political views (Ian Parker 2004:96). As Leiter (2018:65) remarks, without 
scripture, Locke’s theory of moral government would be impossible. The same 
applies to Tyrrell. Locke and Tyrrell each put forth an interpretation of scripture 
suited their own political ideology, in pursuance of justification. Adam, as Ian 
Parker (2004:55) expounds, is a paradigm for Locke’s politics. In Locke, the first 
chapters of Genesis are reinterpreted to form the basis of Locke’s political theory, 
to render Genesis consistent with a thesis of natural freedom and equality (Ian 
Parker 2004:120). Locke’s reinterpretation of the Fall, as laid out in Two Treatises, 
is meant to support his account of human nature. 
Locke’s doctrine, accordingly, is best understood as a political theology 
(Mitchell 1993:73). He applies the figure of Adam to this own purpose, in 
challenging the patriarchalist view of natural subjection to political authority, i.e., 
natural inequality (Ian Parker 1994:95). 
Adam is “a founding political icon” for both Filmer and Locke (Ian Parker 
2004:103). Locke’s Adam retains a foundational status in Locke’s politics on a par 
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with Filmer’s (103). In Locke, Adam remains a symbol of political authority and 
human society (103). So, with respect to government, Adam has a central role, 
present in both Treatises (Mitchell 1993:74, 80). Adam is the essential 
representative figure, in that the right of government derives from the unity and 
equality of all in the original state of things (80). 
Contra Daly (1979), Ashcraft (1987), a defense of the patriarchal theory and 
its scriptural account is anything but futile. In my defense of Filmer’s account of 
Genesis, I remove the onus on the patriarchal theory. As Locke’s political doctrine 
seeks justification in scripture, the patriarchal theory, likewise, has an explanatory 
and justificatory force. 
We shall, on this note, examine a proper defense of the patriarchal theory. 
The crux of the defense is the concept of a natural hierarchy, which, I claim, is 
neglected by Locke and Tyrrell. The neglect of this concept is demonstrated in 
Locke’s and Tyrrell’s critique of Filmer’s interpretative account of scripture. This 
is visible in discussion of the Fall as well as the Noahic covenant. 
As I observe, Filmer’s justificatory framework, insofar as it is based in the 
patriarchal theory, is shown to withstand the onslaught of critique. I shall, then, 
provide rebuttals available to the patriarchal theory to Locke’s and Tyrrell’s 
objections, relevant to our purpose, in developing a defense of the theory, following 
Edmund Bohun.137 Further, the justificatory framework of Filmer’s system is 
developed in terms of a de facto theory of possessory right, as I observe in Genesis. 
Here, I suggest an interpretation of Genesis I deem consistent with, and favorable 
to, Filmer’s patriarchal theory. 
 
 
137 Edmund Bohun was a Tory defender of Filmer’s doctrine and a publisher of a 1685 edition of 
Filmer’s Patriarcha. In comparison, I shall also take note of the non-juror Charles Leslie’s defense 
of the patriarchal theory, as set forth in his The Finishing Stroke (1711). In this chapter, I reserve a 
discussion of Leslie for footnotes. 
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4.1. The politics of Genesis. 
 
Locke’s quarrel with Filmer concerns the derivation of political obligation from an 
interpretation of scripture (Ian Parker 2004:96). Filmer’s patriarchal theory 
stipulates the superiority of Adam over his progeny, by divine grant. Here, Adam’s 
superiority suggests political representation from a position of superiority. On this 
view, people can be held liable for the actions of their representative, without their 
own consent (Harris 1994:238). 
Locke does not reject the creation of Adam (Ian Parker 2004:107-8). In fact, 
Locke’s Adam is applied as a model of political society. So, Locke does not refute 
but reinterprets the Adamite paradigm. The project for Locke, I contend, is to render 
the Adamite paradigm consistent with his account of the development of patriarchal 
societies towards a civil society. The state, for Filmer, is original. Also, Filmer does 
not distinguish monarchy from the person of the monarch. Locke, however, puts 
forth this distinction within an evolutionary account of human societies, supported 
by his reinterpretation of Genesis. On Locke’s reinterpretation, original 
communism is rendered consistent with the first chapters of Genesis. 
Locke argues against Filmer’s position that Adam is granted private 
dominion with a right to rule over his progeny (Ian Parker 2004:108). For Locke, 
Adam had no private dominion (I, 29). The grant of dominion was not exclusively 
given to Adam (I, 29). Instead, an original community of all things was established 
in Adam (I, 37, 39, 40; II, 25). Adam had dominion in common with mankind (I, 
29). All things were held in common, and no one had an exclusive right to anything 
else (I, 40-1). (See also Ian Parker 2004:107.) 
In Filmer, Adam is made the political representative of the human species 
(Harris 1994:233). Adam sinned not only on his own account. His sin was 
representative of the species. Political power, then, obtains in, and is transmitted to 
subsequent monarchs from, original sin. 
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Locke’s Adam is given no political power to rule over other human beings. 
He is given dominion, rather, over “living creatures” created prior to human beings, 
namely, domesticated animals, wild beasts, and reptiles (I, 26-7). (See also Ian 
Parker 2004:108-9.) 
There is no grant to Adam alone but to humanity entire. The grant, further, is 
not political. It includes, rather, dominion as given to the whole of mankind over 
the inferior creatures. Political power, in that case, is not inherited from Adam. 
God’s grant to Adam is to the whole of the human species and one held in 
common, where Adam is understood in the universal collective (I, 29-31). (See also 
Ian Parker 2004:109.) Locke turns God’s grant of dominion to Adam into a right to 
property for the sake of the preservation of the species (Ian Parker 2004:109). 
Locke, I contend, retains the political representation of Adam, as otherwise 
found in Filmer’s system. I do not observe a basis for Ian Harris’s (1994) reading 
of non-representation of Locke’s Adam. Even though he does not possess political 
power over his progeny, Locke’s Adam still represents an eventual political 
situation within an evolutionary account of the beginning of civil society. 
On Harris’s (1994) reading, Locke’s Adam is construed as an individual 
whose actions are exclusive to his own person. Mitchell (1993), however, maintains 
Adam, for Locke, represents humanity. The disagreement over the identity of Adam 
concerns the right Adam possesses as a non-representative individual or a 
representative of humanity (Ian Parker 2004:104, 107). 
On Harris’s (1994:236) reading, Locke’s method of interpreting scripture is 
incompatible with Filmer’s use of Adam. The premises of the Second Treatise, 
especially, are said not to cohere with Adam’s representative quality and political 
inferences drawn from it (239). In his attack on Filmer, Locke then is to exclude 
Adam’s representative quality (236). Locke’s Adam, accordingly, is non-
representative of the human species. For Locke, humanity does not inherit sin from 
the person of Adam (236). (See also Ian Parker 2004:105.) 
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Locke’s attack on Filmer, on this reading, is meant to undermine the notion 
that “all are one in Adam” (Harris 1994:235). To concede Adam’s political 
representation would involve the corresponding admission in political theory 
(Harris 1994:238). That is, if Adam is to represent the human species, then 
absolutism persists. In that case, God could set a superior over mankind and people 
be represented without their own consent (Harris 1994:238). (See also Ian Parker 
2004:104.) 
Locke’s opposition to absolutism, however, is overstated. Arbitrary rule, 
granted, is illegitimate on basis of Locke’s political doctrine. This concerns the 
personal power of the monarch. But Locke (II, 151) admits absolute powers in a 
commonwealth established from an original compact. 
As Mitchell (1993) observes, representation is maintained in Locke’s 
political doctrine. Adam, for Locke, represents the human condition; one of 
equality and common ownership of the earth. In Mitchell’s (1993:82) words, 
Locke’s Adam is the undifferentiated human. The Adamite paradigm establishes 
Locke’s ultimate defense of universal human equality (80). 
In his reconstruction of the identity of Adam, Locke defends the idea of 
original communism. The question, in that respect, becomes how to proceed from 
common ownership in a natural condition to legitimate differentiation of property 
in political society (Mitchell 1993:80). 
In his Genesis account, Locke establishes the identity of Adam to be applied 
for the legitimation of ultimate differentiation from primordial unity (Mitchell 
1993:80). Adam, for Filmer, is given power as an individual. His power is to rule 
over his progeny. God, then, ordains inequality and difference among human 
beings, in the person of Adam (80). Inequality is natural, from the beginning. 
Against Filmer, Locke maintains Adam represents the whole of humanity, 
inheriting a right to rule over all creatures (80). In Locke’s view, all are equal in 
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Adam, whereas for Filmer, God ordained differentiation in the person of Adam 
(80). (See also Ian Parker 2004:105.) 
Proceeding from Mitchell’s (1993) account of Locke’s Adam, Locke attacks 
Filmer’s view of Adam as an individual, that is, human differentiation in Adam 
(105). For Filmer, God’s special grant to Adam establishes inequality within a 
natural hierarchy, subject to arbitrary authority, without safeguards for property 
(life, liberty, estate) (105). Locke’s Adam, according to Mitchell, is to be 
understood not as an individual but a representative of humanity, for Locke to retain 
the universality of freedom and equality (105-6). 
Adam, for Locke, was not granted dominion exclusive of, but in common 
with, all others (Mitchell 1993:81). His right to rule was the right of all human 
beings to rule over the creatures of the earth (81). Human beings, thus, were given 
a right of property in common (81). Adam does not establish a difference between 
human beings (81). The grant of dominion establishes, rather, a difference between 
human beings and other creatures or things created (81). 
I concur with Mitchell (1993) in his emphasis on Locke’s Adam as a 
representative of the human species. In Locke, paternal dominion and the right to 
rule are not derived from the person of Adam (Mitchell 1993:82). But, for Locke, 
the grounding of political legitimacy can still be found in Adam, insofar as we 
understand Adam as a representative of the species (82). Political power, in this 
respect, is derived from a grant of dominion to the whole of the species and a right 
to common ownership (82). Within an evolutionary account of human societies, 
private ownership is explained, as derived from the grant of dominion. 
Ian Parker (2004:107) proposes a synthesis of Mitchell’s and Harris’s account 
of Locke’s Adam, as supposedly consistent with scripture. In the First Treatise, 
Locke refers to Adam both as an individual and humanity writ large (107). A duality 
of Adam is retained in the Second Treatise (107). 
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But Harris’s interpretative account, I observe, should rather be dismissed. The 
duality of Adam is not the case. Granted, Adam is understood as a person. But in 
his person, Adam represents humanity. In granting Adam his power, God 
establishes the dominion of the human species over the earth and inferior creatures. 
An original state of common ownership is represented in the person of Adam. 
In his reading of Locke, Harris (1994) overestimates the individuality of 
Adam. The narrative of Genesis renders Adam an individual, but for Locke his 
representative quality is at stake. This quality transcends that of a father, seeing that 
Adam’s grant of dominion signifies immediate propriety for the whole of the 
species. 
Now, Ian Parker (2004:111) claims the objective of Locke’s reinterpretation 
of Genesis is to limit paternal power on a scriptural basis. But, in my view, it is not 
so much to limit paternal power as to distinguish paternal from political power 
within the context of an evolutionary account of human societies. In this way, 
Locke can operate within the Adamite paradigm, while locating the grounding for 
his political doctrine in the person of Adam. 
In Locke’s critique of Filmer’s use of Adam, Locke’s own account of Adam 
is compatible with Filmer’s, in respect to political representation. Locke’s Adam, 
rather, is rendered consistent with original communism, whereas Filmer’s Adam is 
inconsistent with the idea. For both thinkers, however, Adam is significant for the 
whole of the species. 
In conclusion, Locke adapts Filmerism to an evolutionary account of the 
appropriation of private property and legitimation of political power. Within his 
evolutionary account, Locke distinguishes paternal from political power. The 
identification of the political and the paternal, then, is dissolved, but the Adamite 
paradigm remains. 
 




Locke attacks Filmer’s patriarchal theory in the form of a reductio of Filmer’s 
identification of political and paternal power. In Filmer, the political and the 
paternal are identified in absolute monarchical power. Contra Filmer, Locke (II, 71) 
distinguishes political from paternal power. 
On Filmer’s (P, 57, 63-4) stipulation, Adam has undivided sovereignty and 
an absolute power over his children.138 But Locke (I, 68) takes issue with Filmer’s 
argument to the effect that Adam’s children, under Adam’s absolute power, are to 
have full command and absolute power over their own children, being absolute 
lords yet at the same time vassals and slaves (ll. 13-16).139 
Ian Parker (2004:114) gives Locke’s refutation on this point some credence, 
speaking of a “logical problem” in Filmer’s argument of the absolute sovereignty 
of Adam. However, in view of a natural hierarchy, I deem Filmerism coherent on 
the issue of the status of Adam’s children. Here, the degree of patri-political power 
within a given domain of power, is crucial to resolving the question. 
But let us first examine Locke’s engagement with Filmer, on the issue of the 
identification of political and paternal power. 
If, Locke (II, 71) argues, absolute paternal power is identified with political 
power, then paternal power is all to be invested in the prince and “the Subject could 
naturally have none of it” (l. 7). Yet a subject has as much paternal power over his 
children as the prince has over his own (ll. 11-13). Subjects, Locke (I, 66) reminds 
us, cannot, for Filmer, hold political power, which is held exclusively by the prince. 
Natural fathers thus have no right, claim, or title to political obedience or subjection 
(ll. 16-17). 
 
138 See also Locke’s discussion, I, 68, ll. 11-2. 
139 Compare I, 69, l. 27; see below. 
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Paternal power, for Filmer (P, 57), is absolute, unlimited political 
authority.140 By paternal right, Adam has absolute, unlimited political power over 
his posterity but “at the same time his Children had by the same Right Absolute 
Unlimited Power over theirs” (I, 69). Adam’s children have regal authority over 
their own children, while themselves being subject to the regal authority of their 
father (P, 57).141 
To this Locke (I, 69) objects, 
 
To have one Absolute, Unlimited, nay Unlimitable Power in 
Subordination to another, is so manifest a Contradiction, that nothing 
can be more (ll. 19-21). 
 
Power political and paternal, Locke (I, 69) charges, are two absolute unlimited 
powers simultaneously existing. These powers are irreconcilable (ll. 16-17). 
Adam’s children are absolute princes and slaves at the same time (l. 27).142 
In Filmer, paternal power is absolute and unlimited. Therein lies the problem. 
For an Adamite political power and absolute paternal power simultaneously obtain 
(Seliger 1968:327), where these are (or the latter in any case is)143 to be possessed 
by fathers, who are yet subjects of the state. 
Filmer presumes a natural right of dominion on basis of fatherhood.144 Adam 
and succeeding patriarchs, Filmer (P, 57) stipulates, have by paternal right political 
 
140 See also I, 70, ll. 5-6. 
141 See also I, 70, ll. 16-8. 
142 Compare I, 68, ll. 13-16; see above. 
143 Compare I, 69 and II, 71. Locke (esp. in II, 71) recognizes Filmer’s identification of political and 
paternal power. Still, Locke (esp. in I, 69) attacks Filmer’s system as if a distinction is made between 
two absolute, unlimited co-existing powers. Locke’s reductio would seem to operate on the 
identification of co-existing powers. Yet Filmer’s argument proceeds, rather, on basis of the 
identification of political and patriarchal power, where these are understood quite literally as the 
very same power, namely, patri-political power. 
144 See I, 50, ll. 3-4. 
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authority over their children. The subordination of children to fatherly authority, 
derived from the original right of fatherhood, is “the fountain of all regal authority” 
(57). 
But, Locke (I, 69) retorts, Filmer’s derivation of absolute sovereignty from 
paternal authority leads to the absurdity of the simultaneous existence of two 
absolute unlimited powers. Then every father shall claim political dominion “and 
there will be as many Sovereigns as there are Fathers” (I, 65).145 
As Sidney (1698:1.6) similarly argues, paternal power necessarily accrues to 
every father, on this principle; for every father is king by the same right as the sons 
of Noah (21). Further, Tyrrell (1681) remarks, if “these Fathers of Families were 
so many absolute Kings, yet it quite destroys [Filmer]’s Hypothesis, who will have 
but one true Heir to Adam, who if he could be known, had a natural Right to be 
Monarch of the whole world” (38). 
However, Filmer’s patriarchal theory is here attacked on basis of a distinction 
non-existent in Filmer. Political and paternal power, for Filmer, are the very same 
power, as originated in the birth of the state, by divine grant. Adam, the father, is 
the state. This I term “patri-political power,” the justification of which lies in its 
very structure, namely, hierarchy. Adam is the personification of patri-political 
power, which grounds the omni-state. 
Now, patri-political power is possessed by fathers as well as their children; 
yet it is invariably absolute and unlimited. But this is coherent within the context 
of a natural hierarchy. The reductio fails, in consideration of a natural hierarchy, 
defined by private dominion and domains therein. That is, an unlimited power in a 
particular domain obtains within the dominion of another. This concept of a natural 
hierarchy, I observe, is present in Filmer’s system. But in Locke’s critique of 
Filmer’s Genesis account of the origin of the state (on the question of Adam’s and 
 
145 See also I, 70, l. 32; I, 48, ll. 9-10. 
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Noah’s dominion), the concept of a natural hierarchy is recurrently absent, muted, 
or at best devalued. 
Within a hierarchical framework of patri-political power, a prince may have 
such power over all his subjects, while subjects have the selfsame power over their 
own children. Granted, subjects are not to hold political power (see I, 66). But 
natural fathers, qua subjects, lack political power, whereas natural fathers, in their 
own domain (i.e. the household), do hold political power, or the power of life and 
death over members of the family and serfs. 
Adam has absolute power over his posterity; yet his children have the same 
power over their own. But Adam retains full political authority as first man and 
grandfather, as any father or grandfather wholly retains authority over his children. 
This, again, is rendered coherent within the framework of a natural hierarchy. As 
Filmer (P) writes, 
 
[A]s Adam was lord of his children, so his children under him had a 
command over their own children, but still with subordination to the 
first parent, who is lord paramount over his children’s children to all 
generations, as being the grandfather of his people (57).146 
 
Sovereignty, on Filmer’s argument, lies with the grandfather.147 But, Locke (I, 64) 
remarks, the grandfather should, then, be able to discharge his grandchildren or 
 
146 See Locke’s discussion of this passage at I, 68, ll. 20-1. 
147 Following Locke’s reductio, two grandfatherly powers may be conceived, at odds. Each power 
is to be sovereign; yet they remain inconsistent in their commands. The grandfathers, further, may 
reside in separate domains. But they issue commands to the same grandchild, let us say. Still, this 
circumstance, I observe, does not present a conundrum for Filmer’s patriarchal theory, supported 
by a concept of a natural hierarchy. The conflict may be resolved in the following ways. (1) The 
paternal grandfather has a final say. (2) The genealogy of each grandfather and their descent from 
Adam, is examined. In this case, it would be possible for the maternal grandfather to have a final 




grandsons from paying honor to their father, in violation of the fifth commandment. 
It is evident, Locke (I, 64) claims, the grandfather cannot do this. Locke (I, 68), 
accordingly, rejects Filmer’s thesis of the subordination to the first parent. For it 
does not in fact refer to a delegated power to Adam’s children, such that they 
partake in Adam’s power, but “natural paternal power” or “natural power of 
fathers,” where Adam’s children have power by the same manner and title, by right 
of generation and fatherhood (ll. 28-34). 
Suppose, as Tyrrell (1681:30) hypothesizes, Adam commanded one of his 
sons never to marry. This command would be void; for Adam’s power would 
frustrate God’s command to mankind of replenishing the earth (30). Adam would 
not have had such a power by natural right; nor would Adam have this right by his 
sons’ consent (31-32). 
For Filmer, however, political authority proceeds according to a natural 
hierarchy, within a particular domain, though restricted to a certain level. 
Possession of power by paternal right, though absolute and unlimited within the 
domain of the father, is yet under the dominion of the patriarch paramount. The 
latter possesses unchecked power, relative to the father. Fatherly power is delegated 
to the children, who possess the power within their own domain. 
Thus, if the grandfather, following Locke’s objection, is not permitted to 
discharge his grandchildren from paying honor to their father, then this limit to the 
power of the grandfather is explained not by reference to subordinate fatherly 
power but a higher law, namely, the fifth commandment. Then again, relative only 
to fatherly power, the power of the grandfather is left unchecked, so that the 
grandchildren may in fact be discharged. The father would have no justifiable 
 
to the throne. Patriarchs would come to an agreement or nominate an umpire to judge of their 
dealings. This would be indicative of a “broken” (incomplete) government, as in Israel of the Judges. 
(4) Conquest terminates the dispute, as in the case of Nimrod (see Chapter 5). A natural hierarchy 
does not remove the potential for conflict. In fact, conflict is ingrained in the structure of a natural 
hierarchy, as we observe in the case of Cain and Abel, or Jacob and Esau. 
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recourse, relative to the grandfather. But given the action of the grandfather, we 
may await providence.148 
As to Tyrrell’s objection, Adam may wield arbitrary power over his children 
alone, though Adam is not at liberty to so command them, against God’s plan and 
command. Even Tyrrell invokes hierarchy in rendering Adam’s command void. But 
Adam’s command is void in respect to God’s, but simultaneously valid, in respect 
to Adam’s children alone, viz. relative to the household. 
Now, Tyrrell (1681:31) does envision a like reply from Filmer, such that 
Adam might have commanded his son never to marry, had Adam so wished, 
whereas Adam’s sons would have had no lawful means to resist, to counter the 
command. But Tyrrell fails to conceive the full potential of Filmer’s system149, 
wherein Adam’s command may simultaneously be said to be void, in the context 
of divine command. Though Adam violates a divine command, in directing his son 
never to marry, Adam’s command, to this effect, is yet valid towards his son, who 
has no lawful means to resist. 
 
4.3. The origin of the state in private dominion. 
 
Political justification of political power, in Filmer, proceeds from the origin of the 
state in Adam’s private dominion and possessory right. Locke attacks Filmer’s 
argument from private dominion, on basis of original communism. Competing 
interpretations of scripture on the significance of Adam, follow. Now, Locke does 
not doubt Adam’s significance. But Locke’s Adam represents human equality and 
 
148 On providence in Filmer, see A, 289; D, 232. 
149 Filmer’s system offers a larger view of natural and divine hierarchy than Tyrrell’s reply 
presumes. But Filmer’s response to Tyrrell’s objections, as here presented, is my own conception. 
Still, this response is well within the logic of Filmer’s system. 
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common ownership of the earth, in opposition to Filmer’s doctrine of private 
dominion. 
 
4.3.1. Original communism and compact. 
 
Locke’s attack on Filmer, particularly in the First Treatise, concerns original 
communism versus private dominion. The challenge for Locke, as presented in 
Filmer, is to explain how to proceed from common ownership to private property, 
protected by the government, that is, to eventual differentiation from non-
differentiation in an original state of things (Mitchell 1993:82). 
For Filmer, differentiation is already the order of things, in Adam’s private 
dominion. Locke proposes common ownership of land and living things in 
opposition to Filmer’s thesis of private property on basis of supreme authority, 
determined by paternal origin and maintained through patrilineage. Filmer (P, 63-
4) rejects original communism, in his denial of a “general community” between 
Noah and his sons. Locke, however, favors the idea in his interpretation of Genesis. 
To meet said challenge, Locke explains progression towards private property 
in the context of his labor theory of property, viz. the accumulation of property 
through labor (see Harris 1994:224). But in the beginning, God was to have given 
man property in common. 
The debate, accordingly, touches God’s grant of dominion, in Gen. 1.28, 
where God says to Adam and Eve, “Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the 
earth, and subdue it.” 
Now, Locke (I, 41) discounts the right of a proprietor, by virtue of his 
property, over the life of another, viz. arbitrary authority over the persons of men, 
“since ‘twould always be a Sin in any Man of Estate, to let his Brother perish for 
want of affording him Relief out of his Plenty” (I, 42). 
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On Locke’s (I, 40) interpretation, God’s grant of dominion sets mankind 
above the other creatures. This does not grant Adam private dominion over the 
world and his posterity but the species of man dominion over the inferior creatures 
(I, 40).150 The verse of Gen. 1.28, Locke (I, 40) claims, 
 
is so far from proving Adam Sole Proprietor, that on the contrary, it is 
a Confirmation of the Original Community of all things amongst the 
Sons of Men […] (ll. 22-4). 
 
By compact only, Locke (I, 43) concludes, one might attain authority over another, 
“since the Authority of the Rich Proprietor, and the Subjection of the Needy Beggar 
began not from the Possession of the Lord, but the Consent of the poor Man, who 
preferr’d being his Subject to starving” (ll. 5-9). 
Now, on Harris’s (1994:227) reading, Locke’s explanation of private 
property from original communism is incompatible with absolutism. As Harris 
contends, property, in Locke, is understood in terms of freedom. 
Locke’s labor theory of property assumes self-ownership and, 
correspondingly, the acquiring of property through the labor of one’s body. Every 
man, Locke (II, 27) states, has a property in his own person. His labor and work are 
properly his own; thus, he owns that with which he mixes his labor and removes 
out of the state of nature (II, 27). 
Now, in giving away their natural rights to government, individuals retain 
self-ownership. A right to resist is invoked by the failure of government to protect 
or in the case of destructive government action. Still, contra Harris (1994), the labor 
theory of property does not imply anti-absolutism, rendering Locke’s theory of 
property antithetical to Filmerism. Granted, Locke deems illegitimate absolute, 
 
150 This is argued against Filmer, as set forth in his Patriarcha, 63-4. 
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arbitrary power of the natural person of the monarch. However, personal power in 
arbitrary rule is to be distinguished from absolute power of the commonwealth, 
applied on grounds of the original compact. For Locke, the latter is viable. 
Note, for Locke (II, 28), the taking of what is common begins the property; 
and the taking does not depend on the express consent of commoners. The obtaining 
of property through labor does not infringe upon the right of others to own property 
(Ian Parker 2004:134). The labor theory of property, then, does not require original 
consent of others to appropriate what is necessary for one’s preservation (134).151 
Since the world was given to humanity in common, individuals could appropriate 
as much as they wanted or needed through their labor (II, 27). In the original state 
of nature, the appropriation of one would not subdue another in his appropriation. 
No one would acquire property to the detriment of another’s subsistence (II, 36). 
Government, then, protects property not founded in consent. But mutual 
consent in formation of government fixes the government’s jurisdiction over 
property, established originally by appropriation simpliciter. 
I reject Ian Parker’s (2004:134) claim that Locke’s objective here is to refute 
Filmer’s proposition of the naturalness of private property.152 Locke’s labor theory 
of property sets forth an evolutionary account of the acquiring of property. This, I 
claim, is Locke’s project, rather than a political doctrine of anti-absolutism and non-
naturalism. Government’s jurisdiction over property is founded in a natural 
condition of possession, absent individual consent.153 The original compact affirms 
the natural condition of possession, in the form of a political union, wherein 
absolute rule may obtain. 
To note, Olsthoorn & Apeldoorn (2020) claim Locke’s contractualism 
precludes political absolutism. But this conclusion is drawn absent a proper 
 
151 See II, 28-9. 
152 See also Tully (1980:99). 
153 See esp. II, 28, ll. 19-21; II, 120-22. 
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distinction between “absolute” and “arbitrary.” While it excludes the arbitrary will 
of a ruler, Locke’s original compact includes the formation of an absolute 
monarchy.154 
 
4.3.2. Adam’s private dominion. 
 
Adam, Filmer (P, 57) posits, was a prince of his posterity. Creation made man a 
prince of his posterity, in the form of Adam, who had no superior but God. (See 
also Bohun 1685:15s, 32s.)155 
On Filmer’s reading of scripture, God appoints Adam the first monarch. 
Adam, then, is granted ownership of the world (see Daly 1979:13), viz. universal 
dominion and the right to govern his wife, children, and generation. His posterity 
would be ruled within his dominion, in deference to his original right to rule. 
Filmer’s Genesis account is put forth in opposition to the Jesuits, most 
notably Bellarmine and Suarez.156 For Bellarmine, God entrusts power to no one in 
particular. Under God’s law, there is no private dominion ordained. Secular 
monarchs, then, do not possess supreme authority over their subjects by divine 
grant. Political authority, ultimately, is determined by the consent of the multitude, 
which delegates the power to a person or a group (De Laicis, ch. vi). (See also 
Cuttica 2012:92.) 
 
154 See esp. II, 132. Consider, also, Locke’s usage of “absolute” and “arbitrary,” as we discuss in 
Part 2, Section D, Chapter 15 (15.6). 
155 Bohun, in his Preface (1685), uses the phrase “no superior but [God]” (32s), expounding Adam’s 
supremacy. (In citing Bohun (1685), I refer to relevant sections (“s”).) 
Leslie, in his The Finishing Stroke (1711), argues in a similar fashion, with a familiar 
phraseology. Civil power or government is supreme and absolute, Leslie (1711:4, 39) maintains, 
where there is no civil (secular) power superior to it and able to control it. The civil power granted 
to Adam was of this kind; for which reason Adam’s power was supreme (4). Adam is supreme, 
having no superior but God (5). The subjection of Eve to Adam made him a monarch. There was no 
other superior to him (7). 
156 See P, 53-4, 56-7, 74-6, 78, 84. 
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As Bellarmine hypothesizes, in his De romano pontifice (1586-9): If many 
had been created out of the earth, then all ought to have been princes over their 
posterity. But Filmer (P, 57) takes these words, somewhat ironically, as “evident 
confession”157 of Adam’s princely power over his posterity. Since in the beginning 
of the world, one man was created, he became a prince of his posterity, or, in effect, 
mankind (P, 57). Adam, in his very creation, is monarch anointed, imbued with 
fatherly power. From the moment of Adam’s creation and in the state of innocence, 
future others, his wife, children, and posterity, would be subjected to his paternal 
regal authority. After the death of Adam, patriarchs and fathers represented, being 
assigned to, or having inherited, Adam’s supreme authority. 
Or, as Filmer expounds in The Anarchy, 
 
[T]he first Father had not only simply power, but power monarchical, 
as he was a Father, immediately from God. For by the appointment of 
God, as soon as Adam was created he was monarch of the world, 
though he had no subjects […] yet by the right of nature it was due to 
Adam to be governor of his posterity: though not in act, yet at least in 
habit. Adam was a King from his creation: and in the state of innocency 
he had been governor of his children (289; italics added). 
 
So, when Eve is created, and Adam and Eve multiply, whereupon Adam is governor 
in act, Adam’s rule is justified by a right of nature, given by his creation, as first 
progenitor. His power by a right of nature is absolute. It is the power of life and 
death over his children, that is, the right to issue a death sentence (P, 57, 76). The 
succeeding patriarchs have the same power over their children, under the supreme 
 
157 Filmer (P, 57) notes this as a tacit admission. Otherwise, Filmer (P, 57) rejects Bellarmine’s 
thesis of power given to the multitude by God, on the premise of human equality, and power granted 
to the king by the multitude, according to natural law. 
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authority of Adam (P, 57, 76). (See also Daly 1979:65.) Their legitimacy rests on 
inheriting, or being assigned to, Adam’s fatherly power. 
 
4.3.3. Use of Selden and Genesis. 
 
In his interpretation of Adam’s power and property, Filmer adopts Selden’s 
account, from Selden’s Mare Clausum (1652)158, of Adam’s “private dominion,” 
viz. of Adam’s earthly kingdom and propriety.159 Adam, on Selden’s (1652) 
understanding of “private dominion,” has the right to use, enjoy, as well as to 
dispose of, land, sea, and creatures as he sees fit, where the same right of future 
others is removed save under, or in succession to, Adam (1.4, 16, 19-20). 
Filmer (P, 63-4), via Selden, claims Adam by donation from God, in Gen. 
1.28, was made the general lord of all things160 (or, in Filmer’s own words, the 
monarch of the whole world), where “none of his posterity had any right to possess 
anything, but by his grant or permission, or by succession from him” (F, 188). 
In support of his interpretation, Filmer (A, 283) refers, inter alia, to Gen. 
3:16,161 where Eve is expressly subjected to the rule of Adam in “the original grant 
of government.” This is God’s special grant to Adam. 
 
158 Filmer uses the 1635 publication of Selden’s Mare Clausum (Laslett 1970:174n; 1949:64n). 
Here, I apply Marchamont Nedham’s 1652 translation of Mare Clausum. 
159 Selden (1652, 1.4, 16-23) does not speak of Adam as “monarch,” “prince,” or “king.” For Adam, 
“lord” is rather applied. However, based upon Adam’s private dominion, Selden, in “The Author’s 
Preface” to Mare Clausum, does proclaim the king of Great Britain lord of the sea, which is 
therewith to be an inseparable and perpetual appendant of the British Empire. 
160 This phrasing (“the general lord of all things”) Filmer adopts from Selden’s Mare Clausum 
(1635) (see Laslett 1970:174n). In Nedham’s 1652 translation, Selden is made to use “lord of the 
whole world” (1.4, 19). “Lord” Filmer takes to be synonymous with, or equivalent to, “monarch,” 
“prince,” or “king.” In Selden’s usage, “lord” denotes ownership (propriety). “Monarch,” etc., is 
Filmer’s appropriation of Selden. 
161 The most significant part of the verse, in this context, is “thy desire shall be to thy husband, and 
he shall rule over thee” (Gen. 3.16). In full: “Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy 
sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy 
husband, and he shall rule over thee” (Gen. 3.16). 
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Now, Zuckert (2002:139-40) ascribes the view of the original grant of 
government (in Gen. 3.16) to Philip Hunton, not Filmer.162 As Zuckert observes, 
Filmer does discuss the original grant of government in the context of Hunton’s 
Treatise of Monarchy. However, the term “original grant of government” is 
Filmer’s own. Moreover, Filmer (A, 284) takes Hunton’s interpretation of Gen. 
3.16 as a confession, albeit forced, to the patriarchalist view. 
As I understand, the original grant of government, in Filmer, is applied as a 
subset and a reaffirmation of the grant of dominion. However, as Filmer’s 
detractors stress, the grant of government, given its place in scripture (Gen. 3.16), 
is delivered after the Fall, while Filmer’s Adam is to be made monarch at his 
creation. So, if Adam is granted rule after the Fall, the purpose of the grant is the 
punishment of Eve, rather than a grant of ownership. A defense of Filmer’s 
patriarchal theory will have to demonstrate, then, the significance of the punishment 
of Eve to Adam’s dominion. As I propose, Eve’s punishment, for Filmer, reaffirms 
the divine grant of dominion to Adam. 
 
4.4. The postlapsarian objection. 
 
Locke, in Two Treatises, and Tyrrell, in his Patriarcha non Monarcha (1681), 
attack Filmer on his use of Genesis. Now, Filmer, in his Patriarcha (1680), under 
the influence of Selden’s Mare Clausum (1635), maintains an interpretation of 
Genesis, wherein God had granted Adam political authority over his posterity, by 
virtue of, and at the moment of, Adam’s creation. Filmer’s Adam, accordingly, is 
the first universal monarch. 
 
162 Zuckert (2002:139-40), accordingly, suggests Locke, in his critique of Filmer’s account of Gen. 
3.16, misconstrues Filmer on this issue, that is, in ascribing the view to Filmer. 
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 Filmer (A, 283), in support of this interpretation, cites Gen. 3.16, which for 
him describes “the original grant of government,” in the subjection of Eve to Adam. 
Locke and Tyrrell each object on the ground that Eve was subjected to Adam only 
after the Fall. Dominion had been granted equally to Adam and Eve, prior to the 
Fall. Adam, then, could not have been granted monarchical power at his creation. 
 This is the postlapsarian objection. On this issue, we shall consider the 
creation of Eve and her subjection to Adam. It crystallizes the controversy between 
the patriarchal theory and the Whig theory of the interpretation of dominion, in the 
origin of man. 
 
4.4.1. The grant of government. 
 
God, Locke (I, 45) remarks, would have made Adam “but a very poor Monarch.” 
Seeing that God, in Gen. 3.16, denounces Adam along with Eve for disobedience 
and declares wrath on them, God would hardly, by the same words, grant Adam 
universal dominion (I, 44). (See also Ian Parker 2004:111.) 
On Locke’s (I, 47) reading of Gen. 3.16, no grant is even made to Adam. In 
fact, no words are meant for, or spoken to, Adam. Rather, the punishment of Eve is 
at issue. God speaks to her. 
The text of scripture, Locke (I, 49) maintains, does not refer to absolute 
monarchical power,163 only the subjection of Eve to Adam, as a wife to her husband. 
There is no scriptural basis for an “original grant of government” of man over 
woman, viz. a patriarchal political order, where the female sex would be naturally 
bound to the authority of the male. 
 
163 I understand this to mean absolute, arbitrary power of the natural person of the monarch. From 
Locke’s original compact, absolute rule may obtain (see II, 132), that is, where absolute powers are 
exercised by the executive. 
174 
  
Further, if Adam, in Gen. 3.16, is granted a power, it would not be deemed a 
political power of life and death over Eve, or their posterity (I, 48). If, Locke (I, 48) 
argues, the words of Gen. 3.16 are to be understood as a law to which Eve was 
made bound and subject to Adam, her subjection would denote a mere conjugal 
duty. Likewise, Adam’s power would have been conjugal only (ll. 10-11). As 
Tyrrell (1681:13) also infers, Eve’s subjection to Adam is conjugal, not filial. So, 
if Gen. 3.16 is to be understood as the original grant of government and the 
foundation of monarchical power, “there will be as many monarchs as there are 
husbands” (I, 48). God, then, does not grant authority to Adam over Eve but only 
foretells of the “Womans Lot” (I, 47), viz. to be subject to her husband. (See also 
Zuckert 2002:132.) In this way, Locke limits God’s speech to statements of fact or 
prediction (Ian Parker 2004:112). 
 
4.4.2. The grant of dominion. 
 
Locke maintains the grant of dominion does not include private ownership. 
Accordingly, Locke’s Adam is not granted private dominion. In Gen. 1.28, Adam 
is maximally given dominion over all earthly inferior creatures. 
Tyrrell, in his Patriarcha non Monarcha (1681), argues the same case. 
Locke and Tyrrell each take issue with Filmer’s inferring from the verse of 
Gen. 1.28 that Adam is made monarch of the world, because, for one thing, Eve 
also is given dominion, in the very same verse, and thus, in effect, mankind. 
Tyrrell (1681:10) rejects the use of Gen. 1.28 to support the interpretation of 
Adam’s absolute monarchy by donation from God. In Gen. 1.28, Tyrrell (1681:10) 
argues, Adam is granted no power over his future children, as the text implies no 
more than a power conferred on mankind, in the form of male and female, to use 
the inferior creatures (though not for consumption). Further, since God only grants 
man a power to consume the inferior creatures for food after the Flood, Adam lacks 
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a power of life and death over those creatures (10). Moreover, Adam cannot be 
presumed to possess a power of life and death over his wife and children (10). 
On Locke’s (I, 40) interpretation, God, in the grant of dominion (Gen. 1.28), 
sets mankind above the other creatures. In the grant of dominion to Adam, God 
commands the whole of humanity to preserve its own species, given man is part of 
God’s property and workmanship (II, 6). (See also Ian Parker 2004:127.) 
For Locke, the grant of dominion provides common ownership of land and 
animals. In the original natural state, everyone had an equal claim to land and 
animals. No one had a prior right to property. God provided equally for everyone. 
In His grant of dominion (Gen. 1.28), God had given the earth to humanity in 
common, so that the species could make use of land and animals for its preservation 
(II, 26). Thereby, human beings had the right to preserve themselves by making use 
of natural material (I, 80). (Ian Parker 2004:133.) 
Also, Locke understands the command to labor, in Gen. 1.28,164 not so much 
as a punishment as a requirement to preserve humanity (Ian Parker 2004:136). The 
grant does not only stipulate dominion over land and animals but also the 
cultivation of the earth (II, 32), which assists in the preservation of the species, thus 
fulfilling natural law (Ian Parker 2004:145). 
Common ownership is expressed, in that God speaks to Adam and Eve. As 
Locke (I, 29) notes, until Adam had his wife, God did not grant dominion. In Gen. 
1.28, God speaks to a plurality, in granting them dominion over the earth or earthly 
creatures (I, 29).165 “Them” refers to humanity granted dominion over the inferior 
 
164 “…and replenish the earth, and subdue it” (Gen. 1.28). Compare Gen. 3.17. 
165 On Locke’s literal, as well as linear, reading of scripture, dominion over the earth or earthly 
creatures is given to the human species, in a grant to Adam and Eve. As Locke (I, 27) notes, the 
inferior creatures (beasts, cattle, and creeping things) are enumerated, in Gen. 1.25, where man has 
not yet been created (l. 26). So, we cannot suppose man is here included (ll. 23-6). In Gen. 1.26 
(“Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion”), “them” signifies 
the species of man, not Adam alone (I, 30, ll. 5-7). Man is then created in Gen. 1.27. Gen. 1.28 again 




creatures. Even if “Them” would refer only to male and female, there must be joint 
sovereignty (Ian Parker 2004:109). Accordingly, Adam’s is not a private dominion 
(see Zuckert 2002:132). He is not granted ownership of his wife or children, his 
posterity, or even the inferior creatures, Locke (I, 24) argues. The grant procures 
for Adam no private dominion over the world and his posterity but the species of 
man dominion over the inferior creatures (I, 40). 
 
4.4.3. The punishment of Eve. 
 
Gen. 1.28, Locke and Tyrrell each object, warrants no interpretation of Adam’s 
universal monarchy. Adam, Locke (I, 24) claims, is not a monarch by a universal 
charter. There is no exegesis of scripture to warrant God’s grant to Adam of 
dominion over his posterity (I, 25-7). Similarly, Tyrrell (1681) writes, 
 
I see no divine Charter in Scripture of any such absolute despotick 
power granted to Adam or any other Father (10). 
 
On Locke’s and Tyrrell’s reading of scripture, God neither grants Adam private 
dominion nor political authority over Eve, within that dominion. Instead, dominion 
is granted to them, or the species (see Zuckert 2002:132). Eve is punished after the 
Fall, by imposition of a conjugal duty and an invocation of suffering in childbirth. 
From the punishment of Eve, is derived no patriarchal or princely authority. 
 Now, the words of Gen. 3.16, as Tyrrell (1681:13) notes, are not spoken in 
the state of innocence but after the Fall. Here, the punishment of Eve is invoked. 
Therein, according to Filmer, God grants Adam the right to govern his wife and 
 
given dominion. Dominion over the earth or earthly creatures (excluding human beings), thus, is 
given, likewise, to Adam’s wife and progeny. 
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posterity. However, the text, Tyrrell (1681:101-2*) stresses,166 does not warrant any 
such interpretation; for dominion is granted after the creation of Eve and jointly to 
Adam and Eve. Therefore, a postlapsarian punishment, wherein Eve is subjected to 
Adam, does not imply Eve’s loss of a right to dominion. 
 Locke (I, 16) puts forth the same objection, thusly, 
 
1. Filmer asserts: Adam is appointed proprietor of the world, by a positive grant of 
God, at Adam’s creation. So, by a right of nature, it is due to Adam to be governor 
of his posterity (ll. 25-31). 
 
2. However, God does not grant Adam dominion (in Gen. 1.28) until Eve has been 
created. Also, God does not grant Adam the right to govern (in Gen. 3.16) until 
“Adam was somewhat, at least in time, and very much, distant in condition from 
his Creation,” (ll. 39-40) namely, after the Fall (ll. 32-43). 
 
3. Since by a right of nature, it is due to Filmer’s Adam to be governor of his 
posterity (per Gen. 3.16), a special grant to appoint Adam monarch of the world is 
superfluous (ll. 43-51). 
 
For Locke, there is no scriptural evidence for Adam’s monarchy, or an appointment 
thereof, at his creation. God grants Adam no private dominion; and Eve is subjected 
to Adam’s rule after the Fall. Eve, thus, is not subjected to Adam’s rule in 
reaffirmation of Adam’s private dominion. Rather, she is subjected to Adam’s rule 
by a divine decree of punishment, by which she cannot be supposed to lose “her 
 
166 I use an asterisk for the relevant pages to indicate an original printing error in Tyrrell’s work. In 
the published work, we observe a first and a second pagination. The error appears at p. 136 of the 




right of preserving her self by the fruits of the earth, or her using any of the 
Creatures, suppose the milk of a Cow without her husbands consent” (Tyrrell 
1681:102*). 
 
4.5. The subjection of Eve. 
 
Filmer applies Gen. 3.16 to his own advantage, on his interpretation of Adam as a 
universal monarch. The subjection of Eve, as Filmer (A, 283) maintains, is “the 
original grant of government,” established in fatherhood in the form of a monarchy. 
The quality of Adam’s power is in question, viz. whether it is political or merely 
conjugal. 
God, on Locke’s (I, 47) interpretation, merely foretells of the “Womans Lot,” 
viz. to be subject to her husband. Eve was not subjected — and a wife is not subject 
— to her husband by reason of an obligation by a divine decree but because 
“generally the Laws of Mankind and customs of Nations have ordered it so” (ll. 32-
3). But Locke adds, “there is, I grant, a Foundation in Nature for it” (ll. 33-4). If the 
male sex is naturally advantaged, its advantage does not presume an obligation by 
nature to obey it. Adam’s superiority is accidental (I, 44). (See also Ian Parker 
2004:111.) Still, Locke (I, 47) grants, the natural advantage of the male sex does 
contribute to an explanation of a tradition of marriage and cultural privilege. 
However, Locke (I, 48) stresses, any power Adam is given (in Gen. 3.16), is 
conjugal only, not political. The reductio “As many monarchs as there are 
husbands” (ll. 8-10) is then invoked. The text of scripture, Locke (I, 49) claims, 
speaks nothing of absolute monarchical power, only the subjection of Eve, as a wife 
to her husband. Whereas Gen. 1.28 only signifies dominion over the inferior 
creatures, Gen. 3.16 signifies only the subjection of a wife to her husband (ll. 45-
8). Yet a woman’s natural obligation to her husband has not thereby been decreed 
by the deity, even though there may be a foundation in nature for her lot — but a 
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wife might conceivably be exempted from subjection, if her marriage contract 
would so stipulate (I, 47). Similarly, if a remedy for pain in childbirth obtained, she 
would not still be obliged to suffer in childbirth (ll. 11-13), alas, “which is also a 
part of the same Curse upon her” (l. 13). 
Now, the subordination of Eve can be interpreted as privileging (1) Adam 
over Eve, paving the way for Adam’s heirs; (2) husbands over wives; or (2) men 
over women (Waldron 2002:22). 
 In Filmer, the subjection of Eve is interpreted as (signifying or exemplifying) 
the original grant of government, instituting Adam as a universal monarch. The 
institution of Adam’s universal monarchy privileges men over women, or husbands 
over wives. Yet patriarchal privilege is not just a man’s or a husband’s, or, that of 
the male head of a family. A patriarch may well be of the female sex, e.g., Elizabeth 
I.167 
 Now, on Locke’s reading of scripture, God grants Adam no political authority 
over Eve. Neither is patriarchal authority derived from Eve’s punishment. Locke 
distinctly denies any political authority vested in Adam’s possession. Yet whether 
there is, in Locke, a sense in which men have a natural advantage and a cultural 
privilege over women, is in question. 
 If, Locke (I, 48) argues, Gen. 3.16 is to be understood as a law to which Eve 
was made bound and subject to Adam, her subjection would denote mere conjugal 
duties. But there is no basis, Locke continues, for an original grant of government 
of man over woman, that is, a patriarchal political order, where the female would 
be naturally bound to the authority of the male. If Adam, in Gen. 3.16, is granted 
any power, it would not include a power of life and death over Eve, or their 
posterity; it would be conjugal only (I, 48). 
 
167 As suggested below, Eve herself may be understood as a patriarch, or in possession of dominion. 
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On Simmons’s (1992:173) reading of Locke (I, 47-8), a man has by nature no 
dominion or political authority over a woman, or a husband over his wife. Women 
are not naturally subject to men; and wives are not naturally subject to their 
husbands. 
A husband, though, does, in Locke, have priority over his wife; and she owes 
him limited subjection (Simmons 1992:172). The conjugal power Adam is given is 
“the Power that every Husband hath to order the things of private Concernment in 
his Family, as Proprietor of the Goods and Land there, and to have his Will take 
place before that of his wife in all things of their common Concernment” (I, 48). 
Now, in granting a foundation in nature for the husband’s priority, Locke (II, 
82) notes a man’s superior strength and ability. In marital union, Locke (II, 82) 
stipulates, the “last determination” or “rule” must be fixed, and it falls naturally to 
the man’s share as the abler and stronger.168 This, however, does not signify (or, 
 
168 The notion of a “greater force” in the body, Simmons (1992:174) observes, is invoked in terms 
of marital union as well as in the body politic. Although in Locke’s discussion (II, 82) of “last 
determination” of the husband, there is no explicit reference to a “greater force,” whereas in his 
discussion of majority-rule, Locke (II, 96) does indeed refer explicitly to a “greater force.” 
 In voluntary unions, on Simmons’s (1992:174) reading, the right to determine the actions of 
the body (or, the institution of marriage) is to be understood to lie with the greater force, qua “last 
determination,” (II, 82) as it necessarily should be placed somewhere; and absent stipulation as to 
where it should be placed, it naturally falls to the man’s share (II, 82). The idea of a “greater force” 
is here to undergird Locke’s understanding of majority-rule, as determined by the original compact, 
as well as “last determination” in marital union. 
 Now, for Locke (II, 82), the husband has the right of “last determination” by reason of his 
greater strength and ability. Since this right is to be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the man’s 
share as the abler and stronger. 
 Compare this to Locke’s (II, 96) mechanical justification of majority-rule (see also Laslett 
1970:109), the greater force of which is to carry the body politic. On a supposed similitude, if not 
stipulated otherwise, the right to last determination must be placed where the greater force obtains, 
in accordance with the operation of the institution of marriage, given natural differences. The body 
will otherwise not operate as it must and should. 
There is, however, an essential difference in Locke’s discussion of the “greater force” of 
the body politic and “last determination” in the institution of marriage. Note, to begin, the “greater 
force” is applied for justification of the body politic, whereas “last determination” is not so much 
applied for justification as explanation. In his use of the term “last determination,” Locke seeks to 
explain the priority of the husband; yet, as Locke stresses, the priority of the husband is non-essential 




the wife’s duty is not equivalent to) a duty of a subject to a prince (I, 49). The “last 
determination” of the husband does not extend to the life of his wife but to common 
interest and property (II, 82), leaving the wife in full and free possession of her 
conjugal rights, as stipulated by contract (ll. 7-10). Further, depending upon the 
marital contract, a wife may divorce her husband, at which juncture it will remain 
to be determined, to either of whom their children will fall (ll. 11-16). 
On Simmons’s (1992:173-4) interpretation,169 a “foundation in nature” refers 
to the man’s superior strength and ability; yet physical superiority is not, for Locke, 
a foundation of the husband’s authority by nature, or his natural dominion. Rather, 
physical superiority is a “natural fact” with which convention in marriage accords, 
such that the man, if not stipulated otherwise, has “last determination,” that is, a 
final say as to property and matters of common interest (Simmons 1992:173-4). So, 
while it may be natural for a wife to defer to her husband, it is not obligatory for 
her so to do, whereas it may be stipulated in the marriage contract, that the husband 
 
 As Simmons (1992) recognizes, “last determination,” for Locke, is not a matter of necessity. 
Rather, customary priority of last determination is explained by greater strength and ability. Yet 
these are hardly synonymous with a “greater force” of the majority, which in fact is a matter of 
necessity. 
 Also, for Locke, a husband and a wife do not have an obligation, in virtue of their union, to 
let “last determination” fall to the husband’s share. This is, rather, a contractual obligation, 
depending upon stipulation. Original contractors, however, are obliged by the “greater force” of the 
body politic. That is, they have an obligation to abide by the decisions of the majority, unless they 
agree “in any number greater than the majority” (II, 99). The marriage contract is not to be construed 
in such normative terms, save in terms of the very conditions stipulated by the marriage contract. 
 The notion of “last determination” denotes a natural tendency, whereas a “greater force” is a 
matter of natural necessity, or, the mechanics of the body politic. If the institution of marriage could 
not operate without “last determination” of the husband, then, in agreeing to enter the institution, 
the wife-to-be, on the same logic, would be obliged to abide by a fixed contractual requirement, as 
would the husband-to-be. But, as it happens, the institution of marriage can operate without “last 
determination” of the husband or either party. Contrarily, the body politic, for Locke (II, 95-9), 
cannot operate in the absence of majority-rule; thus, original contractors place themselves under an 
obligation, in entering one body politic, to abide by majority decision. 
 The authority of the majority is, we might say, natural, whereas the authority of the husband 
is artificial. In the original contract, there is no escaping the power of the majority. In the marriage 
contract, however, the authority of the husband is negotiable. 
169 See esp. I, 47-8; II, 82. 
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lacks precedency. The marriage contract, thus, is understood in conventional terms, 
though guided by natural facts, where, if not stipulated otherwise, the husband has, 
or is given, precedency. Locke, then, speaks not of natural necessity, duty, or 
obligation but of a tendency towards precedency of the male sex, given natural 
differences between the sexes. 
Priority of the husband, on Simmons’s interpretation, does not amount to 
“natural” authority. The authority of husbands, Simmons (1992:174) remarks, is 
for Locke neither natural nor necessary. Rather, precedency, in Locke, is artificial, 
viz. given a marriage contract wherein decision making has not been otherwise 
addressed. Parties, then, may agree on a stipulation whereby authority of the 
husband is overridden, even so that the wife is made to have the right of last 
determination (174).170 
Locke, minimally, denies political authority of the husband, in terms of a 
natural dominion, where the wife is subject as to a prince. Yet this leaves room for 
conventional authority with a foundation in nature, viz. a tendency towards 
precedency of the husband as the stronger and abler. But such authority may, 
likewise, be deemed “natural,” absent an obligation by nature to obey. 
Now, as Waldron (2002) maintains, Locke, in admitting a foundation in 
nature for the “woman’s lot,” proposes differential authority relative to natural 
qualities. Contradictorily, Locke’s politics rest on a principle of natural equality, 
“flattening out the traditional hierarchies within the human species” (34), viz. in 
denial of authority, as legitimated upon natural differences (34-5). 
But this need not be for Locke an “embarrassment,” as Waldron (2002:40) 
opines. For Locke’s notion of natural equality, in fact, coheres with priority given 
to husbands. As Locke (II, 54) clarifies, natural equality does not denote “all sorts 
of Equality,” given differences in (e.g.) age and merit. All men, Locke (II, 54) 
 
170 Cf. II, 82-3. 
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states, are by nature equal, in their possession of an equal right to natural freedom, 
viz. not to be subjected to the will or authority of another. Yet this is a right all men 
possess despite their natural differences, which may give some a just priority (l. 3). 
Age or virtue, Locke (II, 54) notes, may give a just precedency as merit may place 
some above the average. 
 
Birth may subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an 
Observance to those to whom Nature, Gratitude or other Respects may 
have made it due; and yet all this consists with the Equality, which all 
Men are in, in respect of Jurisdiction or Dominion one over another (ll. 
4-9). 
 
So, Locke does not isolate the question of power and priority from the qualities and 
status of those who come to hold power and enjoy priority. But Locke does deny 
the identification of paternal and political authority.171 An equal right to natural 
freedom does not negate natural or societal inequalities, as the institution of family 
and marriage exemplifies. Now, in marriage, for Locke, a husband and a wife may, 
if so stipulated, be equal parties to the marriage contract. Their status, contractually, 
is equal, despite natural differences. A wife might even claim a higher status, if so 
stipulated, that is, of last determination (cf. II, 82-3). Absent any stipulation 
otherwise, last determination, in accordance with custom, is however assumed to 
fall within the husband’s domain. Custom, here, has a natural foundation, viz. a 




171 Though this denial may be ill accommodated in Locke’s (II, 74-6; 105-12) rendition of patriarchal 
monarchy, in the context of his concessions to the patriarchal theory. 
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4.6. The creation of Eve. 
 
We proceed onto a defense of the patriarchal theory, against Locke’s and Tyrrell’s 
objections. We follow Bohun’s (1684; 1685) defense of the theory. 
As Waldron (2002:27-8) mentions, Eve, for Filmer, is subject to Adam prior 
to original sin and the Fall. Already she was, from her innocent nature, disposed to 
submit to him. As Filmer (A, 289) states, Eve was subject to Adam before he 
sinned. Thus, political authority is not instituted in or after the Fall but existed prior, 
from the creation of Adam. 
The original grant of government does not alter the nature of Eve. She was 
not coerced or directed to submit to Adam, in receiving her punishment (see 
Waldron 2002:27-8). Here, God’s command, subjecting Eve to Adam’s rule, is 
issued, as Bohun (1685:26s) asserts, in view of Eve’s altered nature from original 
sin. The command is issued, as Eve is no longer in a state of innocence. If she had 
continued in that state, the command need not have been issued. 
Now granted, Eve (in Gen. 3.16) is subjected to Adam after the Fall. But 
Locke and Tyrrell gloss over Genesis 2, narrating the creation of Eve from Adam 
(Gen. 2.22), to secure help for Adam (Gen. 2.20). Here, Adam has priority over 
Eve, in virtue of her creation from him. 
As Bohun, in his Preface to the 1685 edition of Patriarcha172, replies to the 
postlapsarian objection, the man is not of the woman, but the woman is of the 
man.173 Also, the man was not created for the woman, but the woman was created 
for the man.174 Accordingly, prior to the Fall, and prior to the command issued by 
God, Eve was in a state of subjection to her husband (Bohun 1685:25s). 
Bohun, in his Defence (1684), writes, 
 
172 Bohun was the publisher of this edition of Filmer’s Patriarcha. 
173 See 1 Cor. 11.8 




[I]f God laid the foundation of Mankind, in one single Person Adam, 
and out of him, and after him, and for him, made Eve, then was the 
Subject naturally to him (9). 
 
Further, Bohun (1684) states (referring to Gen. 2.18), 
 
Eve, and all her Children, were produced for the Good of Adam (11). 
 
The subjection of Eve (in Gen. 3.16), as expressed after the Fall, is, then, a 
reaffirmation of her natural subjection, prior to the Fall, in confirmation of her 
status in the hierarchy of creation. Her punishment is consistent with how and why 
she was created, viz. from and for Adam, in natural subjection to him. Thus, in Gen. 
3.16, God renews Adam’s title (Bohun 1685:26s), reasserting his position in virtue 
of the Fall. 
Now, in God’s granting “them” dominion, Adam and Eve are not thereby 
equally granted dominion, as Locke and Tyrrell, however, presume. In God’s grant 
of dominion to them, He delivers it principally to Adam and to Eve under Adam. 
The grant of government (Gen. 3.16) reasserts Adam’s position in virtue of the Fall, 
whereby Eve is, so to say, put in her place and made aware of her own position, 
viz. in natural subjection to her husband. Her punishment constitutes such 
reprimand and suffering which she had not suffered in innocence. 
Adam, Bohun (1685:28s) asserts, is created to be lord and sovereign over his 
wife. As Bohun (1684) puts it, 
 




The submission of the wife is founded upon the position of the daughter, in the 
person of Eve. Thus, all subjects are united in their common father (Bohun 
1684:14). Bohun, effectively, identifies paternal and conjugal power in Adam’s 
lordship. The power of the father and that of the husband are species of Adam’s 
princely authority.175 
But, given this, let us now propose, Eve, being a wife and a daughter, was a 
queen and a princess. 
Bohun (1684; 1685) does not discuss positively Eve’s status in creation, only 
her subordinate position. But subordination does not explain why Eve, along with 
Adam, is granted dominion. Once Eve’s royal position is also determined, the grant 
of dominion is made coherent, in terms of the patriarchal theory. 
Adam, for Filmer, need not have enjoyed an isolated dominion, such that Eve 
(and their seed) had none, but such that Eve (and their seed) enjoyed dominion 
under (and after) Adam. They are both granted — yet not equal — dominion. Locke 
and Tyrrell, however, each take Filmer to be advocating Adam’s private dominion 
on basis of Adam’s supremacy alone, that is, with no dominion granted to Eve (and 
their seed) under Adam. While this interpretation of Filmer’s text may be 
warranted, it is not charitable. 
 
4.7. Natural hierarchy of the children. 
 
 
175 Leslie, in his The Finishing Stroke (1711), presents a somewhat different argument, on this point. 
Civil (secular) government was given to Adam, Leslie (1711, 2-3) argues, and in Gen. 3.16 “some 
sort of government” was granted; thus, Adam had civil rule and government over Eve. Now, Leslie 
(1711) concedes Adam’s power over Eve is essentially conjugal. Yet Leslie maintains Adam’s 
marital as well as paternal power are “some sort of government,” or civil government. 
 So, Leslie’s defense deviates from Bohun’s, in that Leslie maintains Adam essentially has 
conjugal power over Eve, whereas Bohun maintains Adam, likewise, has paternal power over Eve. 
For Leslie (1711:23) though, both conjugal and paternal power are a form of civil (secular) authority. 
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The grant of government (Gen. 3.16) may be compared with God’s grant to Cain 
(Gen. 4.7). If the grant to Cain is explained by his natural relation to Adam, this 
relation may begin to unravel the structure of patriarchal government. At this stage, 
Abel and Seth are also introduced. Abel shares power with Cain, though Abel is to 
be under Cain’s rule. These relations we now consider, in further examining the 
concept of a natural hierarchy, as extracted from Filmer’s system, in its defense. 
 The heir of Adam, Filmer (P, 61) maintains, is not only a lord of his children 
but his siblings and all others also subject to their fathers. Here, Filmer cites Gen. 
4.7, where God speaks to Cain, at which juncture the law of primogeniture is 
expressly invoked. According to his birthright, Cain, as first-born, has an 
overarching dominion in which his seed, siblings, and their seed are included. 
As Bohun (1685) observes, God uses a similar expression in Gen. 4.7 as in 
Gen. 3.16, towards Cain (“unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over 
him”), concerning his brother Abel, whose desire, on God’s ordinance, should be 
subject to Cain’s rule. These words, Bohun (1685:27s, 50s) asserts, denote an 
absolute rule and subjection, investing Cain with a power of life and death over 
Abel (50s), as the murder of Abel demonstrates (39s). Further, if Cain possessed a 
power of life and death, it would apply even more so to Adam (39s). 
 
4.7.1. The punishment and protection of Cain. 
 
Tyrrell, to whom Bohun (1685) directs his text, objects to Filmer’s use of scripture, 
on the issue of Cain and Abel. If, Tyrrell (1681:11) argues, Adam has a power of 
life and death over his children, then Adam would have the right to punish Cain for 
the murder of Abel. However, in Gen. 4.14-5, not only Adam, it is said, but 
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everyone or any shall176 slay Cain, upon finding him. From this, Tyrrell (1681:11) 
infers, punishment for murder constitutes a law of nature. Accordingly, the right to 
punish and the power of life and death do not belong to Adam alone, qua father. 
Also, if Adam has no right in this case, it cannot be supposed that Adam has such 
a right in any case (11). 
 A rebuttal, however, is available to Tyrrell’s case of the rightful punishment 
of Cain. First note, Cain, in Gen. 4.14 (“every one that findeth me shall slay me”), 
is himself speaking. But here Cain may be understood to be making a mere 
prediction of being slain by anyone on his path. In case Cain refers to a general 
right to slay him, it still does not negate Adam’s supreme right to punish, where 
others have a right to punish in deference to Adam’s. 
To be sure, the verse affirms no general right to slay Cain. It merely states: if 
anyone shall find him, the selfsame will slay him. After all, Adam may have the 
sole right to slay Cain. Further, in Gen. 4.15, God promises, in response to Cain, to 
set a mark upon Cain, to protect him. So, it was not the case that Cain ought to have 
been slain. By providence, Cain built a city and fathered a generation (Gen. 4.17). 
 
4.7.2. Distinct territories and a transfer of right. 
 
On Locke’s (I, 112) reading, Gen. 4.7 is not to be understood such that Cain as first-
born had natural dominion over Abel. For, Locke (I, 112) notes, these words are 
expressed as a conditional (“If thou doest well”). They are meant only for Cain. 
Prior, Abel had distinct territories by right of private dominion (ll. 12-14).177 But, 
Locke (I, 112) argues, Abel could not have had private dominion if Cain was to 
 
176 Tyrrell uses “should” to refer to Gen. 4.14 [KJV], where however it says “shall.” In Gen. 4.15, 
it is stated “lest any finding him should kill him,” but here “should” likewise may be read “shall,” 
“would,” or “will.” 




have inherited universal dominion. If these words are to signify the charter of 
primogeniture, they supposedly would include all Cain’s siblings (ll. 17-20). (See 
also Leiter 2018:68.) 
If, Locke (I, 76) further argues, Adam’s children possess “distinct territories,” 
then Cain is not heir to the entire dominion of Adam, such that Cain has private 
dominion over Abel’s possessions. Accordingly, Cain does not have sovereignty 
over Abel. Rather, two sovereigns reign (I, 76). Or, if Cain is a prince over Abel, 
the origin of government, it follows, does not rest on property (ll. 22-3). 
Locke (I, 139, 142, 149) reasons as follows. 
Given a rule of primogeniture, where Adam’s universal lordship descends to 
the eldest, the younger siblings are deemed but his subjects or slaves; for there is 
one sovereign over all.178 However, if lordship descends by right equally to all sons, 
then by the same right, Adam’s lordship will descend to humanity entire, such that 
every father will be deemed Adam’s heir, on a coequal claim to political power. 
But then ancestral rule is meaningless; for, in that case, all are equally and 
independently heirs to Adam’s monarchy; and all are monarchs (I, 139). If 
patriarchs hold sovereign power as by right has descended to them from Adam’s 
lordship, then either there must have been one sovereign over them all; or every 
father must have been equally a prince, viz. with an equal claim to royalty (I, 139). 
But again, we defend the patriarchal theory on basis of a concept of a natural 
hierarchy. 
To begin, “If thou doest well…” (Gen. 4.7) refers to Cain’s offering rejected 
by God. “Unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him” (Gen. 4.7) is 
not conditional. Also, in the very next verse Cain employs his power, as expressly 
 
178 Locke (I, 139, 142) discusses the sons of Noah, not Adam’s. Given the world was divided 
amongst the sons of Noah, Locke (I, 139) poses the question: which of the three is the rightful heir 
of Adam? (ll. 7-9) But Locke’s reasoning here might apply to Cain, Abel, and Seth (Adam’s 
children) as well. On the issue of Noah, consult 4.9. 
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given, by killing Abel. But Cain had abused his power of life and death. God wanted 
to appease Cain, but Cain acted out of sin (jealousy). Cain, accordingly, is punished 
by forfeiture of his birthright. Yet he is also protected by the mark. 
Further, while he retained his birthright, Cain did enjoy a superior right to 
Adam’s dominion. This does not negate Abel’s right to his own territorial domain. 
Abel’s right to propriety is given within the dominion of Cain, under that of Adam. 
True, the grant of government (Gen. 3.16) and ensuing birthright rest not on 
property — but creation. Adam is proprietor by virtue of his creation. Cain has 
sovereignty over Abel by reason of proximity to the origin of fatherly authority. 
Now, Locke’s (I, 139, 142) ultimatum of slavery under primogeniture or 
equal right to inheritance ignores the right of transfer under a natural hierarchy. The 
transfer of Adam’s lordship to the eldest does not negate a transfer of right to others, 
who, by ancestry, would be entitled to it. The right of others is given on condition 
of a superior right of the eldest, that is, within his dominion. 
Locke still does recognize, in a different context, the relevancy of a transfer 
of right. But, Locke (I, 85) argues, the heir of Adam could have no right or title, 
unless God expressly granted it likewise to him. If God granted dominion and 
government to Adam alone, his heir would have no right upon Adam’s sole right, 
save at Adam’s death, whereupon it would revert to God, granting an heir the same 
right (ll. 14-24). 
Locke, however, omits any discussion of “permission,” in this context. As I 
observe, unless a transfer of right has been barred by divine decree, Adam and his 
heirs are permitted to transfer their fatherly right, as they see fit. In fact, as patri-
political power is absolute, it may be transferred and assigned at will. So, the law 
of primogeniture applies save where the patriarchal monarch decrees otherwise, 
viz. in dividing the estate (Bohun 1685:68s). The sovereign’s fiat, in Filmer, 
overrides the law of primogeniture. God, Filmer (D, 231) states, may transfer 
fatherly power from the father to some other. Also, the father is granted by God a 
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right to transfer his power to any other “whence we find the sale and gift of children 
to have been much in use in the beginning of the world […] Whereupon we find 
the power of castrating and making eunuchs much in use in old times” (231). 
Cain’s birthright, after all, is conditional, but in a sense coherent in terms of 
the patriarchal theory. It is acquired by the law of primogeniture, if not stated 
otherwise by fiat. Then, if acquired, it may be forfeited. Now, in the case of Cain, 
it is granted by God (in Gen. 4.7). But the right is transferred to Seth upon Cain’s 
forfeiture of his birthright, without God’s express intervention. Eve only assumes 
Seth is a replacement for Cain (Gen. 4.25). A transfer of right, then, does not require 
the act of transferring. A natural hierarchy obtains for a transfer of right. 
Now, Locke (I, 112), invoking “distinct territories by right of private 
dominion,” refers to a passage, which Filmer (P, 63-4) quotes for his own purposes, 
from Selden’s Mare Clausum (1635). Selden (1635) states that 
 
by donation and assignation, or some kind of cession (before [Adam] 
was dead or left any heir to succeed him) his children had their distinct 
territories by right of private dominion (1.4).179 
 
But Locke (I, 112), though elsewhere recognizing the issue, omits the question of 
“assignation” or “cession,” that is, a reference to a transfer of right. Paternal power, 
Filmer (D, 231) maintains, is never lost, as it may be transferred and usurped. 
Adam’s private dominion, in Selden, does include his children, while he lived, i.e., 
prior to succession. While Adam lives, Adam’s children claim territories assigned 
 
179 The passage reads as rendered in Filmer (P, 63-4), from Selden’s Mare Clausum (1635). In 
Nedham’s 1652 translation of Mare Clausum, the same passage reads “[…] by Donation, 
Assignment, or any other Grant Whatsover, it appear’s (before hee died or left any Heir to succeed 
him) his children did enjoy their several Bounds and Territories, in a way of peculiar Dominion or 
Possession” (1.4, 20). 
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to them under Adam’s private dominion, that is, from Adam’s grant, or the right 
per se, in which case the cession occurs, absent a grant. 
Further, if Adam’s children were assigned distinct territories under Adam’s 
rule, within his dominion, the same may apply to Cain and his dominion, where 
Abel is assigned a territory under Cain’s rule and dominion.180 A natural hierarchy 
is not conceived only in terms of succession, as, however, Locke (I, 112) presumes. 
On Tyrrell’s (1681:22) definition, paternal power is a natural relation, the 
limits of which are determined by civil law, not to be created or assigned farther 
than permitted by the law. Paternal political power, by implication, must end at the 
death of every prince. A family unit, also, must be understood as a distinct and 
independent monarchy. Accordingly, Adam’s power over his descendants would 
have ended at his death.181 
Here, Bohun (1685) objects, applying the concept of a natural hierarchy, as 
outlined in Selden. While he lived, Adam might, Bohun (1685:50s) explains, permit 
his children, or assign them, to execute his monarchical power, for the governing 
 
180 Leslie, in his The Finishing Stroke (1711), recognizes such an argument in favor of the patriarchal 
theory. But Leslie presents a weaker argument than the one presented here. 
Adam, Leslie (1711:12) affirms, had absolute power over his descendants. Further, fatherly 
power implies subjection to the grandfather upwards to Adam’s supreme authority (12-13). Only 
where the supreme or superior father did not interpose, was the power of each father absolute, and 
not to be controlled by any of his descendants (13). But now, Leslie (1711:30) concedes, the eldest 
child, during the life of the father, does not rule over the younger. The younger would not be a 
subject of the elder, because both are subject to the father; and the father may overrule the elder in 
favor of the younger. Accordingly, Leslie (1711:29-30) maintains, the power granted to Cain over 
Abel was not the same as that of Adam. The elder had superiority, yet not a power equivalent to 
supreme fatherly power (29). Upon the death of the father, the elder succeeded to a part of his 
father’s power, that is, to a power over his younger siblings or brothers (30). 
The weakness of the argument concerns the partiality of power. This, I believe, is an 
unnecessary concession. It can be argued, rather, that the eldest has the same kind of power as his 
father, yet while the father lives, it is liable to be checked by the father. Upon the death of the father, 
the eldest (or whomever granted power by fiat), enjoys full supreme authority within the family’s 
domain, yet, again, liable to be checked by a superior (a patriarch paramount), outside the family’s 
domain. So, if Cain had maintained his birthright, after the death of Adam, Cain would have enjoyed 
full supreme authority, in the absence of an earthly superior. Likewise, Seth outlived Adam; and so, 
upon the death of Adam, Seth would have enjoyed full and unconditional supreme authority. 
181 See also Bohun (1685:49s). 
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of their own families, any other organization being impossible. Further, Adam’s 
power became hereditary to the second and third generations. These also had a right 
to assign their power and subdivide it as they saw fit “till Civil Laws took from 
Princes this Power” (50s). But when rulers were no longer natural parents of their 
subjects, they were still representatives of natural parents; and they succeeded to 
the right of natural parents, by divine decree (i.e., the grant of government) (50s). 
 
4.8. The dominion of Eve. 
 
Following the logic of Filmer’s system, Locke (I, 99) appeals to our moral disgust, 
in suggesting Adam’s heir, by right of Adam’s fatherhood, supposedly should have 
inherited sovereign power over Eve, his mother.182 If a right to fatherhood obtains 
by begetting, then, if inherited, the heir must come into possession of a right to 
govern Eve, because Adam begot Eve (I, 99). 
But this is ill-founded, given a natural hierarchy, wherein, if a right obtains 
by begetting, Eve should have secondary, if not supreme, power, as she begot Cain, 
Abel, and Seth. 
Locke and Tyrrell, notably, each apply such line of reasoning against Filmer, 
on the question of begetting. That is, if absolute dominion over the child is given 
by reason of a cause of being (begetting), then the mother should have an equal, if 
not a superior, right over the child (I, 55; Tyrrell 1681:14). Now, in the context of 
Adam’s dominion, this argument falls flat, as Eve was formed out of Adam. Yet it 
may credit Eve with secondary power under Adam’s dominion. 
Contrarily, Locke (I, 99) maintains an ultimatum. Either Adam and Eve are 
equal partners in dominion; or Eve remains enslaved under Adam’s rule. But Eve 
 
182 This, if applicable, would have applied to Seth, outliving Adam. But here Locke also mentions 
Cain as a contender. 
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is enslaved under Adam’s rule no more than Abel is enslaved under Cain’s. If Eve 
is enslaved under Adam’s rule, her children, I suggest, are enslaved under her rule, 
or within her dominion. 
In Gen. 1.28, Eve is granted dominion, along with Adam. I propose, then, Eve 
has a royal position, secondary to Adam, within the dominion granted to them. 
To be sure, this is not stated in Filmer. However, Eve’s royal position does 
not contradict any tenet of Filmer’s system. This feature would fully cohere with 
Filmerism. Also, Eve’s royalty renders Filmer’s system invulnerable to Locke’s 
and Tyrrell’s objections, in respect to the grant of dominion to them. 
Notably, Filmer, in his Inquest (1648), discusses Elizabeth I as any other 
monarch, without ever questioning her authority.183 In his In Praise of the Virtuous 
Wife, Filmer notes kingdoms have often been well steered by women, as during the 
reign of Queen Elizabeth.184 Since Filmer’s patriarchal theory does not rest on 
strength, ability, or traits, a monarch may possess the throne, irrespective of sex or 
gender. 
Now, Eve was subject to Adam before he sinned (A, 289) and prior to her 
own sinning. She was then subjected to his power anew in the grant of government. 
As Filmer (P, 53) posits, the desire of liberty was the cause of the fall of 
Adam. The cause, I suggest, was Eve and her desire of liberty, by which Adam was 
seduced. Eve removes the fruit off “a tree to be desired to make one wise” (Gen. 
3.6). In the grant of government, her desire is said to be to her husband, who shall 
rule over her (Gen. 3.16). But in sinning, she proceeds from her own desire, in 
 
183 Bohun, in the Epistle dedicatory to his The Character of Queen Elizabeth (1693), describes 
Elizabeth I as “the Greatest Princess that ever Sway’d this or any other Scepter. A Princess, whose 
Natural Endowments and Acquired Abilities, made her the Envy, or the Example, of all the Crowned 
Heads about her; whose Fame filled the World whilst she lived, and the Histories of all Countries 
since she died.” 
184 Cuttica (2012:30-3) mentions the passage in question. But Cuttica (2012:127) otherwise persists 
in describing Filmer’s patriarchalism as exclusive of the female sex, in its supposed gendered stance. 
This is a misreading of Filmer’s patriarchal theory. It does not proceed from strength, ability, or 
traits. Accordingly, Elizabeth I may be deemed a rightful monarch, irrespective of her sex or gender. 
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taking the fruit and giving it to Adam, who eats. At this moment, Adam does not 
rule over her. In giving the fruit to Adam, she momentarily usurps his power, 
leading him to sin, until she is reprimanded by God for challenging Adam’s 
authority and made to serve anew. 
God intervenes in creation, in punishing Eve. However, intervention sets no 
precedent. Among the patriarchs, we do witness competition over birthright, 
without intervention. E.g., Jacob claims the birthright by swindle, offering starving 
Esau stew in exchange (Gen. 25.33). It is not the case, Locke (I, 48) notes, that God 
appoints Jacob Esau’s sovereign, in Gen. 25.23 (“the elder shall serve the 
younger”). This, rather, is a foretelling. But now such interpretation may be applied 
in favor of the patriarchal theory. While God intervenes in original sin, God does 
not intervene in a competition of birthright between Jacob and Esau. Jacob, rather, 
becomes Esau’s sovereign, in claiming the birthright, viz. in coming into possession 
of it. Birthright, effectively, is up for grabs.185 
 
4.9. The expansion of the kingdom of Adam. 
 
The Noahic covenant, on Filmer’s scriptural account, introduces a resettlement of 
the earth under an extended kingdom of Adam. Noah is granted private dominion, 
under Adamite rule.186 Filmer’s Noah, in continuance of Adamite rule, is the sole 
heir of the world (P, 64). 
Now, Filmer (P, 63-4), in adopting Selden’s rendition of Adam’s “private 
dominion,” objects to Selden’s espousal of a “general community” (i.e., common 
 
185 Cf. Leiter (2018:68-9). 
186 This, to be sure, is my reading of Filmer. Locke, polemically or otherwise, takes Filmer to admit 
Noah is not granted property (in private dominion), under Adamite rule. This is disputed, on my 
reading. See below. 
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ownership) of Noah and his sons.187 A common ownership of Noah and his sons 
would discontinue Adam’s kingdom over his posterity (P, 64-5). 
Filmer (P, 64) claims scripture does not warrant a general community of Noah 
and his sons. Noah, rather, is left sole heir to the world (P, 64). Though Noah’s 
sons, admittedly, are also stipulated in the grant (Gen. 9.2), it is, as relates to them, 
properly understood “with a subordination or a benediction in succession” (P, 
64).188 
It is improbable, Filmer (P) argues, Adam’s private dominion is abrogated 
upon a new covenant instituted between Noah and his sons. Noah would not be 
disinherited of his birthright and made “of all men in the world the only tenant in 
common with his children […]” (64)189. 
Contrarily, for Locke, Noah and his sons inherit the world in communion, for 
mankind to resettle the earth. This is consistent with Locke’s interpretation of 
scripture from original communism. 
As Locke (I, 40) lays down, God grants mankind dominion in common, 
where Adam and Eve are given dominion for mankind to inhabit the earth as the 
domineering species. A right is given, in Gen. 1.28, to mankind over the inferior 
creatures.190 
God’s grant to Noah, Locke (I, 32-6) stresses, relates also to Noah’s sons. 
(See also Ian Parker 2004:109.) Noah, then, is granted propriety over the earth or 
the inferior creatures in communion with his sons, where mankind, in effect, is 
 
187 The notion of a common ownership of Noah and his sons is based on Gen. 9.2 (“into your hands 
are they delivered”). 
188 For this, there is scriptural evidence. In chapter 6 of Genesis (Gen. 6.14-16), Noah is commanded 
by God to build the ark. This command is not addressed to Noah’s sons. Then, in Gen. 6.18 (“with 
thee I establish my covenant”), God speaks to Noah, establishing His covenant with Noah, in 
particular. After this, God commands, still addressing Noah alone, that Noah’s wife, his sons, and 
their wives, shall enter the ark. Further, in Gen. 9.9, God says to Noah, “I establish my covenant 
with you, and with your seed after you.” 
189 This is posed as a rhetorical question, in P, 64. I omit the question mark. 
190 Locke, (I, 25-7) maintains there is no exegesis of scripture where God grants Adam dominion 
over other men, that is, his posterity. Compare Tyrrell (1681:10). 
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given a right to use and consume the inferior creatures, in the form of a new and 
expanded covenant. 
Locke (I, 39) emphasizes the issue of consumption, as permitted in the Noahic 
covenant. God’s grant to Noah is substantially different, Locke (I, 39) observes, in 
that Noah is given a right to kill the inferior animals for food, whereas Adam is 
only given a right to consume vegetation (Ian Parker 2004:109).191 Adam, then, 
cannot be said to be an absolute monarch, since Adam, unlike Noah, is not given a 
right to kill animals for food (109). Noah is given property over and above Adam’s 
(109). 
It is improbable, Locke (I, 36) acknowledges, that Adam’s private dominion 
is abrogated. However, Adam is granted no private dominion, to begin with. Also, 
Noah should have the same title, property, and dominion as Adam before the Flood; 
— thus, no private dominion is given to Noah either (I, 36). God grants to Noah 
and his sons dominion in communion; and for the sons, this is not in subordination 
to, or in succession of, Noah (I, 34).192 
 
191 Locke (I, 39) notes, contra Filmer, that Adam was not given the right to consume the meat of 
animals. In another place, Locke (I, 86), however, states Adam has property in the creatures, founded 
upon a right to make use of them as necessary or useful to his being. See also Ian Parker (2004:117). 
192 Locke (I, 139, 142), relatedly, attacks Filmer’s rendition of the Noahic covenant on the issue of 
primogeniture. The world, Locke (I, 139) does grant, was divided amongst the sons of Noah (see P, 
58). But who was the rightful heir of Adam? If (1) Adam’s monarchical power descended only to 
the eldest, then the younger two are rendered but his subjects or slaves; yet if (2) by right Adam’s 
power descended to all three, then by the same right, Adam’s power shall descend to all mankind, 
in which case all men or fathers are heirs to Adam’s monarchy and, consequently, all monarchs (I, 
139). (See also I, 142, ll. 31-2.) 
Now, in Locke’s argumentation, at this place, I take issue with his neglect of the concept of 
a natural hierarchy, in Filmer. As Locke (I, 149) assumes, Adam’s monarchical power “could 
descend but to one at once, and from [Adam] to his right Heir only, and so there could by that Title 
be but one King in the World at a time” (ll. 24-9). It is not the case, within a natural hierarchy, that 
Adam’s power descends “but to one at once” in exclusion of others. Adam’s sovereignty, rather, 
descends to one as prime heir, yet simultaneously to the others within the dominion of the prime 
heir. 
Further, the claim to Adam’s sovereignty, as I argue, rests not merely on primogeniture but 
on conflict and conquest, as exemplified best in the figure of Nimrod (see P, 59). We already observe 
conflict in the case of Cain and Abel. This is even the case in Eden (original sin). 
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Now, there is “considerable difference,” Filmer (P, 64) admits, between 
Adam’s grant (Gen. 1.28) and Noah’s (Gen. 9.2). Here, Locke (I, 38) takes Filmer 
to concede the grant to Noah conveyed no property or dominion. Whereas Adam is 
given property and dominion, Noah is granted an “enlargement” of Adam’s 
kingdom193, or, to what it amounts, liberty to use the inferior creatures for 
consumption. 
Filmer (P) does claim, in the grant to Noah, there is “no alteration or 
diminishing of [Adam’s] title to a propriety of all things, but an enlargement only 
of his commons” (64). As Locke (I, 38-9) then surmises, property and dominion 
are omitted in the case of Filmer’s Noah; the grant to Noah involves no alteration 
of property (I, 39). 
Locke (I, 39), contrarily, claims neither Adam nor Noah enjoys private 
dominion, that is, any property exclusive of their posterity. They both, however, 
enjoy common property, whereas Noah, in Gen. 9.2, is given a wider domain of 
propriety than Adam (I, 39). While Adam is not permitted to consume the inferior 
creatures, God grants Noah that liberty. Noah, then, is given property over and 
above that given to Adam. In this sense, property is altered and enlarged after the 
Flood.194 
Locke, however, misconstrues Filmer on the issue of propriety in the Noahic 
covenant. Filmer does not concede the grant to Noah conveys no property. As 
 
193 Or Adam’s “commons” (see I, 38, l. 15). 
194 For Locke (I, 39), the use of the inferior creatures signifies property in them; or, property in the 
creatures is nothing but the permission to use them (ll. 51-2; see also ll. 27-6). Man’s property, then, 
may be altered and enlarged, as in the grant to Noah and his sons, in permitting them the use of the 
inferior creatures (ll. 53-5). The use of the inferior creatures here includes consumption. This is not 
the case in Adam’s dominion. 
Notably, in this section (s. 39 of the First Treatise; see also I, 42), Locke starts to hint at the 
labor theory of property. As Locke interprets scripture (Gen. 9.3), in the grant to Noah and his sons 
to use the inferior creatures, Noah and sons had been given “the utmost Property Man is capable 
of,” (I, 39, ll. 20-1) viz. a right to destroy anything by use of it (ll. 21-2). 
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Filmer (P, 64) states, Noah’s sons are to inherit the earth in succession of, or in 
subordination to, Noah. Further, 
 
The blessing [Gen. 9.2] might truly be fulfilled, if the sons either under, 
or after, their Father, enjoyed a private dominion (P, 64).195 
 
Here, Filmer affirms a private dominion of Noah and his subordinate sons. A 
natural hierarchy is renewed under Noah, wherein his sons claim a proprietary 
domain, while their father lives or in succession. An “enlargement,” then, involves 
private dominion granted to Noah and his sons, under Noah. Noah enjoys private 
dominion under Adam’s, and Noah’s sons, likewise, under Noah. Adam’s 
dominion is extended in propriety on stipulation of the Noahic covenant. 
 
195 “After” (in succession) and “under” (in subordination), I gather, allow alternate accounts of a 
claim to inheritance. Noah’s sons, conceivably, may enjoy private dominion, while Noah lives, that 
is, under Noah as prime heir. But Noah’s sons, alternately, may enjoy private dominion in succession 
of (after) their father. These accounts, notably, are not mutually exclusive. 
Now, Locke (I, 32-5) does recognize the relevancy of this sentence, or its equivalent. But 
Locke either dismisses it or sets out to argue its contrariety with scripture. At the same time, 
however, Filmer is said to acknowledge the grant to Noah did not include propriety. 
1. Locke (I, 32) sums up Filmer’s scriptural account as stating “God did not give to the Sons 
of Noah the World in common with their Father, because ’twas possible they might enjoy it under, 
or after him” (ll. 39-41) Here, Locke remarks with a certain irony, this is “A very good sort of 
Argument” (ll. 41-2). 
2. Locke (I, 33) notes, Gen. 9.1 (“Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth”) may, if 
deferred 350 years, be understood as to mean in succession of Noah (l. 9) — but it cannot be 
understood to mean in subordination (l. 12) “unless [the sons] must ask leave of their Father Noah 
to lie with their Wives” (ll. 12-13). To which, I observe, may be conceded, without consequence. 
3. Locke (I, 34) notes, Gen. 9.2 (“the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every 
beast of the earth”), should be understood as referring to Noah as much as to his sons (ll. 2-3) and 
to the latter not in subordination or in succession (ll. 3-4). But even if this is addressed to the sons 
as much as to Noah, there is no signification of equality (or inequality) between them; so, Locke 
interjects his own view of scripture. 
4. Locke (I, 33) objects, Gen. 9.2 (“into your hands are they delivered”) is not conditional 
upon “…if your father please” or “…hereafter.” But as God says to Noah: “I establish my covenant 
with you, and with your seed after you” (Gen. 9.9). So, it would seem the grant to Noah and his sons 
is conditional after all, that is, on the authority of Noah. 
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A claim to inheritance is subordinated to the living prime heir. Now, Filmer 
concurs with Selden’s (1635) account of the inclusion of the children in Adam’s 
“private dominion.”196 Yet, contra Selden (1635), a general community of Noah 
and his sons defies scripture, seeing the consequence “that the private dominion 
which God gave to Adam, and, by his donation, assignation or cession, to his 
children, was abrogated” (P, 64). Within Noah’s private dominion, the sons’ 
dominion and inheritance are not denied but the equal share of Noah and his sons. 
Filmer, in fact, affirms Selden’s account of a natural hierarchy, in respect to Noah 
and his sons as patrilineal heirs. Propriety implies natural inequality, where the 
children yet enjoy their current domain. 
Filmer maintains Noah’s private dominion, by divine grant, on the continuum 
of Adam’s universal kingdom, maintained through patrilineage, save now, the 
inferior creatures may be used for consumption. Locke attempts to undermine 
Filmer’s commitment to propriety, in contributing to Filmer said admission. But in 
Filmer, propriety is fixed in a natural hierarchy, which is neglected in Locke, in 




I have applied the concept of a natural hierarchy in defense of Filmer’s patriarchal 
theory. The neglect of the concept allows Locke and Tyrrell to put forth an 
alternative interpretation of scripture, presenting an opposing Adamite paradigm. 
But Filmer’s account of Genesis explains Biblical conflict over birthright as well 
 
196 Filmer, in his Patriarcha, renders the relevant passage from Selden’s Mare Clausum (published 
1635): “[…] by donation and assignation, or some kind of cession (before he was dead or left any 
heir to succeed him) his children had their distinct territories by right of private dominion” (63-4). 
Nedham (1652) translates the same passage from Mare Clausum: “[…] by Donation, Assignment, 
or any other Grant Whatsover, it appear’s (before hee died or left any Heir to succeed him) his 




as entitlement in patrilineage. Primogeniture does not rule out conflict. Original 
communism, however, provides insufficient interpretative means of understanding 
motives in conflict, e.g., the killing of Abel, Jacob’s deceit. The onus might very 
well be put on the advocate of original communism to produce an explanation of 
murder, deceit, seduction, and strife in a world equally inherited. In such a world, 



























The Empire of Nimrod. 
 
We aim to isolate a political justification of political power in Filmer’s system. 
Here, we engage in a mode of justification based upon political reasons. Filmer’s 
patriarchal theory is encapsulated in a political naturalist justificatory framework. 
But Filmer’s patriarchalism, I observe, is to be understood in terms of sovereignty 
theory. 
 Filmer’s system rests on sovereignty theory upon which his political197 
patriarchalism is grounded. My political naturalist reading of Locke’s doctrine, 
also, proceeds within the framework of sovereignty theory, in discussion of Locke’s 
anthropological patriarchalism.198 
 The difference between Locke’s and Filmer’s political ideologies lies not in 
the concept of sovereignty but one of legality. For Locke, legality is established in 
the original compact, whereas in Filmer, legality is fixed in a natural hierarchy, by 
divine grant. 
 Now, sovereignty theory is fundamentally a justification theory (Sagar 
2018:135). As Sagar (2018:135) remarks, it asks not only who has or should have 
political power but who has or should have legitimate authority to exercise political 
power. But here, I contend, “who” is overstated. The person of the ruler (who heir) 
lies outside the scope of justification, as demonstrated in Filmer’s as well as 
Locke’s political doctrine. In Filmer, the figure of Nimrod exemplifies a political 
 
197 Here, I opt for “political” in lieu of “ideological” (Schochet 1975:11-5). “Political,” also, is 
distinguished from “legal” (Daly 1979:71; 49n). The term “legal,” in Daly’s usage, opposes by mere 
connotation my interpretation of Filmer’s system, wherein legality is determined by the political. 
This applies, notably, to divine, natural, as well as to positive law. A divine grant grounds Filmer’s 
justificatory framework, in the context of a natural hierarchy. Positive law expresses the will of 
secular authority. 
198 A discussion of Locke’s political doctrine is reserved for Part 2. 
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naturalist mode of justification, where the person of the heir is rendered immaterial. 
This, I claim, is a strength of Filmer’s system, in the context of a de facto theory of 
political authority. 
 
5.1. A de facto conquest theory. 
 
The “great” question, for Locke (I, 106, 122), is who heir? or who has the right to 
be obeyed? Here, Locke does not ask whether there is (paternal) power or whence 
it came — but who should have it. As Locke (I, 81) argues, in justification of 
political power, the person of the ruler must be designated. If one knows not whom 
to obey, then one may just as well consider himself the ruler (ll. 16-18). To know 
of the existence of power, does not suffice in providing reasons to obey (ll. 35-7). 
It must be known who by right possesses (is vested with) political power (ll. 36-7). 
 Though Locke is here engaged in refutation of the patriarchal theory, the 
foregoing argument is set up against a de facto theory of political power, viz. the 
proposition that whoever possesses political power, does so by right; for the very 
possession of power justifies power. 
Now, Locke (I, 107) continues, given the assignment of civil power by divine 
institution, per Filmer, the person in power ought to be designated, so that no one 
may divert power from that divinely assigned person. But Filmer, Locke (I, 110) 
complains, offers no clear rules of descent of Adam’s fatherhood by which it may 
be determined to whom political power descends, so that obedience may be imposed 
by that person in virtue of a right to rule. 
As Filmer (A, 283) proposes, the descent of Adam’s monarchical power is 
limited by divine ordinance to Adam’s line and posterity. But, Locke (I, 111) 
objects, this relates to the entire species of man. In justification of political power, 
if Adam’s monarchical power may be applied thereto (viz. such that rulers possess 
power by right of possession), it would have had to be conveyed in entirety to 
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another person and to posterity up till the present time (I, 82). Otherwise, the power 
of Adam does not provide a justification of political power (I, 83). Consequently, 
rulers will have no better claim to authority than any other (ll. 7-9). 
Political obligation cannot be due unless one may be bound to obey the 
paternal power of a man who has no more paternal power than one’s own (I, 124). 
If we do not know who heir — whom to obey — the monarchical power of Adam 
is inapplicable to establish political power and political obligation (I, 125). But if 
political power is derived only from Adam’s sovereignty, then political obligation 
is groundless (I, 125-6). Thus, Filmer’s doctrine “cuts up all Government by the 
Roots” (I, 126).199 
However, given Filmer’s patriarchal theory is grounded in a de facto theory 
of political power, the person of the ruler is indeterminate, until power is possessed 
by the ruler. Patrilineage provides a path for the next ruler, unless it be diverted by 
an usurper or a conqueror. But power itself is rightfully possessed. In principle, no 
one indeed has a better claim than any other — until one possesses power. 
 Sovereignty, in Filmer, is recognized ultimately not by paternity but power 
(Scott 2000:549). Here, the possession of power defines sovereignty (Scott 
2000:549). Those powers definitive of sovereignty, namely, marks of sovereignty, 
determine the sovereign power of their possessor. As Filmer (P) writes, 
 
These acts of judging in capital crimes, of making war, and concluding 
peace, are the chiefest works of sovereignty that are found in any 
monarch (58). 
 
199 If, Locke (I, 126) reasons, political power is derived only from Adam’s sovereignty, by the 
ordinance of God and divine institution, the right to political power is antecedent and paramount to 
all government (ll. 4-7); and thus, positive law cannot determine the foundation of law and 
government (ll. 7-9). Here, without a divine natural rule, a divine natural right cannot be conveyed 
to posterity (ll. 17-20). If the assignment of civil power were by divine institution to the heir of 
Adam (as Filmer would have it), where the person of the heir yet could not be known, then “there 




Filmer’s doctrine of genarchy is reduced to a possessory basis of political 
legitimacy. Possession of power justifies power. A right to rule is generated by the 
possession of power. The means by which kings come to power are ultimately 
irrelevant (P, 106). In Filmer, kingship is rather equated with the possession and 
exercise of supreme power (Daly 1979:105-6). It is not the means but the fact of 
possession that defines power and justifies power by its own lights. 
 As Sidney (1698:1.19) expresses the same notion, in the context of 
usurpation, 
 
We are to look upon the power, not the ways by which it is obtained: 
Possession only is to be regarded; and men must venerate the present 
power, as set up by God, tho gained by violence, treachery or poison: 
Children must not impose laws upon, nor examine the actions of their 
father (67). 
 
Genarchy is maintained on basis of a natural hierarchy, which permits conflict and 
conquest, at the conclusion of which an usurper may have the best claim to the 
throne.200 A final justification of political power is established only by a divine 
hierarchy, i.e. providence (A, 289).201 
 It is not the case, then, that “Filmer’s entire case for royal absolutism 
depended upon his patriarchal theory” (Schochet 1975:139). The patriarchal theory, 
rather, is parasitic on a de facto theory of political power. Patriarchs hold 
sovereignty in their possession of a power of life and death and a power of war and 
 
200 This claim is supported by a passage in Filmer’s Directions (1652), where, it is stated, “the title 
of a usurper is […] better than the title of any other than of him that had a former right” (232). 
201 This may apply to Filmer’s Genesis account of universal monarchy. On my proposed 
interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis (in Chapter 4), a divine judgement may be understood 
to have been passed on Eve’s usurping of Adam’s power. 
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peace (P, 58). These are the marks of sovereignty, as stipulated by Bodin 
(1945:172-3). The exercise of patri-political power involves marks of sovereignty, 
given a particular domain. The extent of patri-political power, not power in kind, 
separates the power of a prince and that of the father (P, 63). But within his own 
domain of the family, the father reigns supreme, even so that he may alienate the 
fatherly right. 
As Filmer (O) writes, 
 
[T]his fatherly empire, as it was of itself hereditary, so it was alienable 
by the parent, and seizable by a usurper as other goods are: and thus 
every King that now is hath a paternal empire, either by inheritance, or 
by translation or usurpation, so a Father and a King may be all one 
(256).202 
 
Now, as Daly (1979:113) explains, Filmer does not adopt a de facto theory like that 
of Anthony Ascham, set forth in Ascham’s Of the Confusions and Revolutions of 
Governments (1649). For Ascham (1649), the right to obedience rests on a 
government’s capacity to protect its subjects and discharge the duties of 
government. (See also Daly 1979:113.) However, Filmer deploys a de facto theory 
with no such condition but a mere referral to providence, in the case of 
usurpation.203 
 
202 Compare A, 289. 
203 Note, I do concur Filmer’s de facto theory is not deployed in the vein of Ascham’s. Filmer applies 
a de facto justification of patri-political power, while Ascham (1649) uses moral reasons for 
obedience beyond a strict de facto framework. But here, contra Daly (1979), I take issue with a 
reading of Filmer’s espousing a doctrine of passive obedience, though I will grant Filmer does 
extend this doctrine to subjects of usurped power. Yet providential possessory right, on Filmer’s de 
facto theory, may be understood to dictate active obedience, whereas passive obedience relates 
rather to a moral (utilitarian) justification, which supplements the de facto theory. 
207 
  
 Hierarchy is prior to patriarchal rule. The means by which the sovereign 
attains power, are grounded in hierarchy, not bloodline. Yet hierarchy carries a 
royal bloodline, where power is so maintained. 
In Filmer’s patriarchalism, we understand descent from Adam as derivation 
from Adam (Daly 1979:134).204 Descent is not analogically applied. But the 
patriarchal theory, ultimately, is non-essential to justification of political power, in 
Filmer’s system. Patriarchal succession is justifiable by possessory right, viz. given 
power is so maintained. A genetic justification of political power extends a 
justificatory framework of possessory right. 
In his adaptions of Filmer’s system, the non-juror Charles Leslie emphasizes 
possessory right over patriarchal succession (Daly 1979:134), which need not 
proceed on primogeniture alone. It may so proceed, unless the estate is divided by 
the father (Bohun 1685:68s). Fatherly right, also, may be alienated. 
Now, Filmer (O, 254-5) states, Adam’s sovereignty is the only kind possible. 
All sovereigns possess this kind of power, irrespective of how they come to power 
(Daly 1979:134). But Adam’s sovereignty is hierarchy, on basis of which 
patrilineage may be maintained. 
“King,” Leslie (1709:22) clarifies, is no more than supreme authority. 
Authority is supreme, with no superior, viz. where the use of a power of life and 
death is not limited by a higher authority (22-3).205 Now, it cannot be supposed 
Adam has less authority (23). Therefore, 
 
[…] he was King and Supreme Civil Governour, as well as Father. But 
because the first King was Father of all his Subjects, and they who 
 
204 This, also, accords with the non-juror Charles Leslie’s understanding of Adam’s descent (Daly 
1079:134). 
205 Leslie (1709:22-3) echoes Filmer’s (Inq., 157) understanding of supreme authority as, by 
definition, arbitrary, and unlimited. 
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Succeeded him did Succeed to his Authority, therefore Kings were 
call’d Fathers of their Country. And Father became a Name to Express 
Authority (Leslie 1709:23). 
 
Adam’s universal monarchy presents a paradigm of first possession. But first 
possession is present possession, on the principle of Adam’s sovereignty. Hence, 
the usurper has no lesser claim to legitimate authority. Leslie (1709), however, 
fumbles over this implication of the Filmerian doctrine. Possession, Leslie 
(1709:27) states, gives right against all who have not a better right. (See also Daly 
1979:135.) Yet the possessor of the right has the best right — the only right (D, 
232).206 It is not the case, as Leslie (1705:47) would have it, that the usurper has a 
better right save for the lawful prince (see also Daly 1979:137)207; rather, the 
usurper has the best right, simpliciter. For power possessed is power justified; and 
power usurped is power possessed. 
The usurper’s rule is justified by reason of possessory right. The mere 
difference between a lawful prince and an usurper is inheriting and taking, 
 
206 In the Directions, Filmer writes: “As the power of the Father may be lawfully transferred or 
aliened, so it may be unjustly usurped: and in usurpation, the title of a usurper is before, and better 
than the title of any other than of him that had a former right: for he hath a possession by the 
permissive will of God, which permission, how long it may endure, no man ordinarily knows” ( 
232). Thus, in the reign of the usurper, we may only await providence (A, 289). 
207 Leslie (1705) qualifies the thought, in stating that “the Possessor has the Right of the 
Government, where there are none who Claim a Better Right” (47). This leaves room for a better 
right (by the lawful king), while power is possessed by an usurper or one with a lesser claim. But, 
on Filmer’s de facto theory, there is as strong a case to be made for the usurper as for a lawful king, 
while power is possessed by either. Leslie’s case may be viewed as a moderate adaptation of 
Filmer’s system. A moderation, however, presents an imbalance within a de facto theory, for it 
recalls the genetic justification of political power, which now is put on an equal footing with the 
former. Leslie’s own rendition of a Filmerian doctrine also is shown to be convoluted, as Leslie, in 
his adaptations of Filmer’s system, has taken pains to accentuate possessory right over patriarchal 
succession. 
 Note further, the non-juror Leslie supported Queen Anne, though the passage in question 
might reveal his support to have been rather lukewarm (see Daly 1979:138). Queen Anne ruled by 
hereditary right, but arguably, she did not rule with the best right. It would appear Leslie’s dealings 
with the monarch mirrored the imbalance of his account of a political right. 
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respectively. Taking is coming into possession of a thing by force or robbery. This 
changes nothing for possessory right. 
I observe, at this juncture, a novel kind of conquest theory that may be 
extracted from Filmer’s system. A de facto theory, extracted from Filmer’s system, 
implies a conquest theory208 limited to the political.209 Power possessed involves 
the taking of power, whereby the conqueror comes into possession of power. The 
justification of political power, whether possessed by a divine grant or usurped, is 
the same, I contend, for Filmer’s system to remain coherent. 
To be sure, conquest theory is to be distinguished from a de facto position, 
whereby a duty of allegiance to a king, in possession of power, is asserted, 
 
208 Conquest theory was applied by the Tories, in the reign of William III, in support of the doctrine 
of passive obedience and non-resistance, contra the claim that William III was an elected king by 
the people (Goldie 1977:570). 
 On Pocock’s (1987:149) reading, Filmer makes no (serious) use of conquest theory. While I 
concur Filmer does not maintain a conquest theory within a moral or a legal justificatory framework 
(on a de facto claim or a conquest claim of just war), I do claim Filmer makes significant use of a 
novel kind of conquest theory, limited to the political, in his treatment of the figure of Nimrod (see 
below). Conquest theory, as here understood, is set forth on a de facto basis, limited to the political, 
that is, prior to the moral and the legal. 
209 I extract from Filmer’s system a de facto conquest theory, not a conquest theory per se. Conquest 
theory is here limited to the political. A de facto conquest theory, as I understand, does not posit 
passive obedience in moral legitimation of the conqueror. Rather, the rule of the conqueror is 
deemed legitimate on a de facto basis alone, viz. in terms of the political. But seeing that the 
conqueror has taken power by force, the genetic justification of political power loses ground or is 
rendered non-essential. Obedience is unquestioning on basis of possession (taking) and thus remains 
invariably active. 
 A de facto conquest theory, limited to the political, is a novel one, as it cannot be placed in 
any of the three categories of conquest theory, stipulated by Goldie (1977:570-71). Following the 
revolution of 1688, conquest theory, on Goldie’s (1977) analysis, was postulated (1) in the 
Hobbesian tradition, on a de facto claim of submission by reason of state protection (irrespective of 
legal title); (2) in a historico-legal tradition, as continued by non-jurors; or (3) in the Grotian ius 
gentium tradition, as espoused by Bohun (570-71). Now, if Bohun is here taken to proceed from the 
tenets of Filmer’s system, Bohun not only misconstrues conquest theory (Grotius), as Goldie 
(1977:581) asserts, but also Filmer’s justificatory framework, in seeking a moral justification of 
political power (namely, the title of Williams III). The surest place, supposedly, to otherwise 
accommodate Filmer, in this schema, is in the Hobbesian tradition. Protection, however, is not an 
essential means of justification, in Filmer’s system. This is not a de facto claim made by Filmer but 
(e.g.) Anthony Ascham, William Sherlock. Lastly, the non-jurors, in denial of the title of William 
III, would hardly find a friend in Filmer, given Filmer’s defense of usurpation, as evidenced by 
Leslie’s grappling with the issue. 
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irrespective of his legal title (Goldie 1977:569). A de facto argument does not apply 
the doctrine of just war but rests its case on usurpation, which is deemed an unjust 
force (580), in favor of passive obedience. Conquest theory maintains the 
legitimacy of a magistrate, whose title is conferred by a right of just conquest (570). 
However, a de facto conquest theory, as here presented, does not apply a 
moral or a legal justificatory framework. It does not, on a de facto moral claim, 
assume protection as a precondition of political obligation, in the vein of Ascham 
(1649). Nor does it, on a conquest claim, presume a just cause of war, in the aim of 
establishing legality. Rather, it is posited, possession of power entails a political 
right. Power may be possessed through conquest, from which obtains a political 
right. This theory of possessory right, I contend, is imbedded in Filmer’s system. 
A de facto or a conquest case of passive obedience is not proposed on a de 
facto conquest theory. Rather, obedience to the usurper, as to a lawful king, is 
invariably active. 
Now, Bohun, in his reconstruction of Filmerism, does not present a de facto 
argument (or, a justification of usurpation) but a conquest theory of just war (Goldie 
1977:580). Though Bohun (1689) does discuss a de facto position. As Bohun 
(1689:31) summarizes, if the person is in possession, her title is true; if she is out 
of possession, her title is false. But this is not a position to which Bohun subscribes. 
Rather, Bohun counters it, in favor of conquest theory. 
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In support of William III’s reign,210 Bohun espouses a conquest theory of a 
right of conquest, on basis of ius gentium, within a Grotian framework (Goldie 
1977:573, 577). In reference to the revolution of 1688,211 Bohun (1689) writes, 
 
Conquest, a voluntary Surrender, and a wilful Desertion of a Crown, 
will put an End to the best founded Title in the World (31). 
 
However, if Bohun’s conquest theory is to be an adaptation of Filmer’s system, the 
latter would be misconstrued. There is no such moral or a legal justificatory 
framework, on which Filmer relies, in his justification of political power.212 Rather, 
justification is limited to the political, wherein possessing and taking are two sides 
of the same coin. A final justification is provided in providentialism. 
The figure of Nimrod, as applied by Filmer, demonstrates a de facto conquest 
theory. Nimrod, as Filmer (P) recounts, was by right of succession a king over his 
 
210 William III, on Bohun’s account, had a just cause to make war upon James II (Goldie 1977:580). 
Though, for Bohun, conquest per se is not a sufficient ground for William III’s authority. A just 
cause presupposes rather a prior right (580). James II’s retreat, notably, was voluntary (Bohun 
1689:5-6). 
 William III, on Bohun’s (1689) judgement, “had a just Cause to make War upon James II. 
and if he was conquered by him, he has as good Right to our Allegiance, on that score, as ever any 
conquering Prince had” (5). The right of conquest, invested in William III, is as good as his just 
cause “to invade this injurious Prince who had injured both him and his good Subjects, and without 
a War would do no right either to the Prince or us” (6). 
 Every conquest, Bohun (1689) clarifies, may not create a legitimate title “but here it is 
confessed the present King [William III] had the most just cause to make a War upon James the 
Second, that ever Man had” (25-6). Again, it is not the case that everyone has a right of conquest 
(26). A subject has no right of conquest, in rebellion against his sovereign, “but William the Third 
was a Sovereign Prince when he entered England, and by the Law of Nations had a right to vindicate 
his, and his Ladies Injuries, and obtain by the Sword, what he could not get by a fair Treaty” (26). 
211 Also, Bohun adheres to the legitimacy of the Norman Conquest (Goldie 1977:577). 
212 Notably, Filmer, in his Originall, puts forth a critique of Grotian just war theory, wherein Filmer 
denies force makes a right. But this is not textual evidence against a de facto conquest theory, as 
here proposed. Force, it may be granted within the context of just war theory, does not make a right 
for a just title, as Filmer in fact means to argue. However, on a de facto conquest theory, an unjust 
force does make a right, by sheer possession, and an unjust title may, in time, be considered just, 
given permissive providence. See the discussion in 5.2. 
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family, yet Nimrod enlarged his empire “against right,” in seizing the rights of other 
lords of families, “and in this sense he may be said to be the author and first founder 
of monarchy” (59). Against right is by right. Nimrod, in seizing the rights of other 
patriarchs, expands his patriarchal rule, in the making of his empire. Yet the right 
of patriarchal rule is extended not on a prior right of conquest (i.e., a just cause of 
war) but a right of possession, in the act of conquest. Once Nimrod occupies an 
imperial position, Nimrod is made a rightful monarch. Thus, in the taking of power, 
Nimrod attains legitimate rule, where we only await providence to judge otherwise. 
No right, Sidney (1698:1.11) remarks, obtains by conquest “unless there were 
a right of making that conquest” (32). But, for Filmer, the taking of power is 
rightful, as a form of possession. Usurpation is legitimate on the same principle as 
primogeniture, namely, the justification of power by mere possession. Hence, on 
the issue of birthright, conflict is permissible. 
Now, on Tyrrell’s (1681) view, the figure of Nimrod speaks against Filmer’s 
argument for the natural right of fathers to be kings over their descendants. For 
Nimrod, in the position of grandson213, interrupted the paternal empire through 
conquest over his own family and descendants (36-7). As Tyrrell (1681:5) remarks, 
if Nimrod had patriarchal right, “it proves no more, than that this Patriarchal Right 
could not long continue” (5). 
On this note, Sidney (1698:1.8) argues, Nimrod “must therefore have usurped 
this power over [or in violation of] his father, grandfather, and great grandfather; 
or, which is more probable, he turned into violence and oppression the power given 
to him by a multitude” (27). Either interpretation is inconsistent with paternal 
monarchy (1.8, 27-8). The actions of Nimrod, proceeding by sheer force, show he 
 
213 Nimrod is the son of Cush, the eldest son of Ham, the son of Noah. But on rules of primogeniture, 
power was to be transferred to other sons of Noah, Shem or Jepheth. Ham was cursed and made to 
be a servant to his brothers. As noted by Sidney (1698:1.8), Ham and Cush were living when Nimrod 
claimed the throne (27). See Gen. 9-10. 
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did not rule by paternal right (derived from Noah) but rather “in a direct opposition 
to it” (42). The kingdom of Nimrod was set up in opposition to paternal right, viz. 
by force and the usurpation of a power to which no right had been ascribed (54-5). 
Nimrod did not inherit kingship; thus, no hereditary right of kingship and dominion 
could be derived from him (42, 55, 57). Seeing that Filmer does admit usurpation 
and tyranny pertains to the empire of Nimrod, Filmer “might as well have 
acknowledged the same in the beginning” (32), that is, for Adam. 
Yet in usurping fatherly power, Nimrod makes himself the sovereign of 
fathers. Sovereignty is attained by conquest. A prior right of conquest is not 
required; for power is rightfully possessed, simpliciter. 
In fact, we may accommodate Sidney’s critique. The same power may be 
acknowledged for Adam as for Nimrod, whereas Nimrod merely exploits the power 
in a territorial expansion of Adam’s monarchical power, as it relates to Nimrod’s 
own domain. This is not a weakness but a strength of Filmer’s system. It serves a 
mode of justification, in support of the patriarchal theory. A de facto conquest 
theory operates on a concept of sovereignty, which underpins the patriarchal theory, 
in justification of patri-political power. 
Locke argues in a similar fashion to Sidney. As Locke (I, 148) lays down, the 
extension of dominion beyond the sphere of the family, as exemplified by Filmer’s 
Nimrod, presents either “Tyranny and Usurpation, or Election and Consent of 
Fathers of Families, which will differ very little from Consent of the People” (ll. 
25-7).214 Nimrod would either maintain power through force or patriarchal 
assembly (the heads of families the power of whom is usurped) (see Leiter 2018:78-
9). 
But, on a Filmerist view, we may accept Locke’s charge. The consent of the 
people differs indeed not much, if at all, from patriarchal consent. Though 
 
214 Compare Sidney 1698:1.8, 27-8. 
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patriarchal consent, recall, is invoked by devolution of sovereign power. 
Conversely, the consent of the people feigns a monarchy (F, 205), in ascending 
from assembly to the formation of a unitary will. Patriarchal and popular consent, 
in that case, are indicative of tyranny and usurpation. 
Filmer’s system is grounded in sovereignty theory. Sovereignty, for Filmer, 
is “omnicompetent” (Daly 1979:13), viz. unrestricted and unlimited in respect to 
the will of the sovereign, given the territory under his rule. For Filmer, any limit on 
the sovereign implies another sovereign (see Daly 1979:34). The supreme power, 
by definition, is unlimited and arbitrary; “for that is arbitrary which hath no superior 
on earth to control it” (Inq., 157).215 Contra Milton, Filmer (O, 254-5) maintains 
arbitrariness is definitive of all power. No government can do without arbitrary 
power (O, 254-5).216 
Adam, for Filmer, forms a paradigm of the free monarch and thus of 
legitimate rule (cf. Daly 1979:57). Nimrod is the free usurper and a legitimate 
earthly ruler. In the exercise of a freedom to act at will, the possessor’s hold on 
power is justified, and his title legitimate, on permissive providence and the passage 
of time. 
 
5.2. Filmer’s critique of Grotian just war theory. 
 
In his Originall, Filmer opposes Grotius’s conquest theory. But Filmer’s opposition 
to conquest theory is to the theory of just war. I propose a form of conquest theory 
for Filmer’s system, on a de facto basis. 
Force, Filmer (O, 269-71) states, cannot give a moral right. If the conquering 
ruler had a moral right, the right is made effective by conquest (Daly 1979:118). 
 
215 Filmer (A, 291, 306, 308) applies interchangeably the terms “absolute” and “arbitrary.” These, 
also, are applied on an equivalent basis. (See also Daly 1979:52.) 
216 See also Cuttica (2012:99); Daly (1979:52). 
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Absent a right and a valid claim prior to conquest, victory cannot generate a right 
and a just title. Neither is the acceptance of the conquered community a valid 
standard by which to evaluate the right of conquest (O, 270) (See also Daly 
1979:118.) For Filmer (O, 269, 271), war cannot be just without a precedent title in 
the conqueror. A just war only puts the conqueror in possession of his prior right 
(269). Also, conquest cannot give the conqueror a full right of propriety (270). 
Now, the foregoing ostensibly does not accord with our interpretation of 
possessory right by conquest. However, on the de facto theory here proposed, 
conquest is embarked upon without a moral right but in the generation of a political 
right. A political right obtains in the act of conquest; it is not present prior. Thus, 
an unjust war procures a political right, whereby, on permissive providence and in 
the passage of time, a moral right may yet obtain. 
As Filmer (O) writes, 
 
[I]f it be admitted, that he that attempts to conquer hath a title, and he 
that is in possession hath none: here the conquest is but in nature of a 
possessory action, to put the conqueror in possession of a primer right, 
and not to raise a new title, for war begins where the law fails (270). 
 
Here, Filmer distinguishes between possessory right and a legitimate title. But note, 
“legitimacy” is here discussed within the context of a critique of Grotian just war 
theory. Filmer makes the case that for a just war, the conqueror must have a prior 
right. On providential possessory right, the usurper is deemed legitimate. An unjust 
conqueror, also, may be deemed legitimate. Thus, in usurpation or unjust conquest, 
a prior moral right is not required; but a possessory right is obtained, whereby the 
usurper or conqueror is deemed legitimate, on a permissive providential case and 




5.3. Political justification. 
 
A de facto political justification is established in Filmer, prior to moral justification. 
Here, justification and legitimation of political power rest on sheer possession. 
Legitimation, I understand, is procured in due course, in maintaining possession. 
On his political voluntarist account, Simmons (2001) distinguishes between 
justification and legitimation of political power, given “the considerations that 
justify the state cannot by themselves also serve to legitimate it” (139). 
Justification, Simmons (2001:123-5) notes, is a “defensive” concept, viz. for 
demonstrating the prudence or moral acceptability of an act, whereas legitimacy, 
by contrast, is based on consent. Accordingly, a state justified is not ipso facto 
legitimate. Justification of the state does not procure its legitimation, viz. a right to 
rule and the imposition of obligation (Simmons 2001:129). 
Political legitimacy, for Simmons (2001), is an “exclusive right” (137) to 
impose — or a “complex moral right” the state possesses to be “the exclusive 
imposer” of (130) — duties or obligations on its subjects. The state requires its 
subjects, accordingly, to comply with legal directives, enforcing those by coercive 
measures on compliers and non-compliers alike (137). 
Still, a “legitimacy right,” as Simmons (2001) lays down, is held against 
subjects duty-bound to the state, arising from “morally significant relations” (130). 
For Simmons (2001:137), a legitimacy right and correlative duties constitute “a 
special moral relationship” between the state and each consenting individual. As 
Simmons (2001:129; 18n) maintains, consent is necessary but not sufficient for 
political legitimacy and obligation. So, a legitimacy right does not obtain by 
consent alone but also correlative duties or obligations, whereby a special moral 
relationship is formed, such that one is rendered duty-bound to the state. 
Justification provides moral reasons for refraining from undermining the 
state, but “the mere justifiability of an arrangement need not give us any moral 
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reason at all to support that arrangement” (Simmons 2001:138). Justificatory 
reasons pertain to all states, not any state in particular; thus, they provide no 
grounding of a moral relationship between a specific state and an individual (137; 
see also 129; 17n). Instead, interaction with a specific just state grounds a special 
obligation on one’s part to comply with the laws of that state (Simmons 2001:138). 
In evaluation of morally significant features of an interaction and the moral history 
of an individual and the state to which he belongs, a legitimacy right may be 
inferred based on consent, or consensual relation (Simmons 2001:149). 
Given a justification of the state, consent is yet not to be inferred. Granted 
though, reasons may obtain to support the state (Simmons 2001:129; 17n). 
Individual consent, Simmons (2001:148) recognizes, offers no “common ground,” 
the enterprise of which is instead one of justification, proceeding from generic 
features of the state (e.g., justice). Yet if so, a special moral relationship offers none 
either. 
As Simmons (2001:130) admits, legitimation is partial, relative to a special 
moral relationship with the state. But the state’s claim to legitimacy, I observe, 
relates simultaneously to all its subjects, on presumption of its exclusive right to 
the use of force. Accordingly, legitimation of political power, on the basic 
legitimation demand (William 2005), need be comprehensive, applicable to all 
subjects of the state. A partial legitimation right to the use of force, however, fails 
to fulfil the state’s generic claim to legitimacy and the basic legitimation demand. 
At the same time, political justification, on a de facto theory of political 
power, succeeds on this test. On a de facto political justification, legitimation 
follows from justification, in due course. Possession serves the purpose of 
justification, whereas maintaining possession legitimates the possession. Notably 
though, as soon as the thing is taken (stolen), a new possession is thereby justified. 
Still, the rightful owner, from the first possession, retains a claim upon the thing 
entire. Thus, on a de facto political justification, conflict is admissible. 
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Here, the priority of the moral is removed. Though, I observe, the basic 
legitimation demand, in Williams (2005), maintains the priority of the moral. As 
Williams (2005:6) notes, anyone over whom the state claims authority is 
understood to have a right to treatment justified by the basic legitimation demand. 
Although a de facto political justification satisfies the basic legitimation demand, 
there is, on a political justification, no such prior right. On the priority of the 
political, we proceed from sheer possession. Thus, a de facto enterprise deviates 
from Williams (2005). 
Now, possession of power, for Williams (2005), does not justify power. Also, 
Williams (2005:5-6) takes as an axiom that might does not imply right. The power 
of coercion does not justify the power to coerce (5-6). Terror and domination, 
Williams (2005) claims, “is not per se a political situation: it is, rather, the situation 
which the existence of the political is in the first place supposed to alleviate 
(replace)” (5). A political solution “cannot simply be an account of successful 
domination [but] something in the mode of justifying explanation or legitimation: 
hence the B[asic]L[egitimation]D[demand]” (5). 
However, on the premise that the political is supposed to alleviate terror and 
domination, given a prior right of each subject to treatment on the basic legitimation 
demand, the priority of the moral remains. But possession of power allows the state, 
in the first place, to render a generic claim to legitimacy, such that the basic 
legitimation demand (on supplemental moral consideration) obtains. 
Consider lastly, Williams (2005:5) discusses terror and domination in the 
context of a relationship between political societies (“of one lot of people 
terrorizing another lot of people”). For Williams, the political objective here is to 
alleviate conflict and insecurity, thus, to overcome a political situation of terror and 
domination. However, in respect to a political solution within political societies, 
domination of the populace, it may be argued on a Filmerist view, establishes 
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Nimrod, the free usurper and imperial patriarch, presents a paradigm of justified 
political power, in extension of Adam’s dominion, on a principle of sheer 
possession. A de facto theory of political power, in Filmer’s system, procures a 
political justification of political power. Filmer’s system is here distinguished from 
Ascham’s. In Ascham (1649), a moral justificatory framework persists, while in 
Filmer, it may be detached. Filmer’s system is distinguished from Williams’s, on 





















Political Naturalism in Locke’s Two Treatises. 
 
I have, in Part 1, presented an account of Filmerism as well as a defense of Filmer’s 
patriarchal theory, demonstrating its coherence. In this context, we have observed 
a political justification of political power, limited to Filmer’s de facto theory. 
In Part 2, I proceed in developing a political naturalist reading of Locke’s 
consent theory. Locke’s doctrine, I claim, rests on a naturalist foundation, in the 
context of a body politic formed in an original compact. The objective, in Part 2, is 
to show Locke’s commitment, in his state-of-nature model and construct of the 
original compact, to a Filmerian paradigm. In this way, Locke’s anthropological 
patriarchalism is illuminated within the context of his political philosophy. A 
political voluntarist reading, I find, does not achieve this understanding. 
Part 2 is divided into sections A, B, C, and D. 
In Section A, I discuss the limitations of a voluntarist interpretive account of 
Locke’s consent theory. 
Section A combines Chapter 6, 7, and 8. 
In Chapter 6, I examine a voluntarist interpretation of Locke’s political 
doctrine. As I argue in Chapter 7, voluntarism does not explain a justification of 
political power, applicable to Locke’s political doctrine. In Chapter 8, I reject the 
voluntarist proposition that philosophical anarchism represents a Lockean political 
doctrine. 
In Section B, I set forth a political naturalist account of Locke’s construct of 
the original compact. 
Section B combines Chapter 9, 10, and 11. 
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In Chapter 9, I present an interpretation of Locke’s original compact, in 
demonstrating a political justification of political power. I reject a voluntarist 
account, in its claim that individual consent grounds the compact. In Chapter 10, 
Locke’s account of tacit consent is shown to cohere with said interpretation, as 
opposed to voluntarism. The interpretation proposed controverts a hypothetical 
contractarian reading of Lockean consent, as I discuss in Chapter 11. 
In Section C, I weigh the significance of Locke’s concessions to the 
patriarchal theory. 
Section C combines Chapter 12, 13, and 14. 
In Chapter 12, I enumerate Locke’s main concessions to the patriarchal 
theory. I lay out, in Chapter 13, Locke’s anthropological patriarchalism, in the 
context of his evolutionary account of human societies. This discussion resumes, in 
Chapter 14, in terms of a natural right of inheritance and bequest. 
In Section D, I discuss the concept of sovereignty in Locke’s political 
doctrine. 
Section D combines Chapter 15 and 16. 
A concept of sovereignty, I argue, pertains to Locke’s account of a civil 
society and its formation in an original compact. In Chapter 15, I observe a 
justification of Locke’s commonwealth in terms of a concept of sovereignty. 
Absolute monarchy, I contend, applies to a formation of civil society, in Locke. In 












The Limits of Lockean Political Voluntarism. 
 
This thesis proposes to comprehend Locke’s political doctrine within a political 
naturalist framework. Lockean consent, on this account, obtains within a political 
union formed in the original compact. Conversely, a political voluntarist reading of 
Locke’s consent theory posits individual consent as the grounding of political 
authority. My interpretation of Locke’s political doctrine eschews the premise of 
individual consent. On my naturalist reading of Locke’s consent theory, Lockean 
political voluntarism is rejected. Individual consent, I argue, does not ground 
Locke’s consent theory. 
I consider, in this section, the limits of a political voluntarist reading of 
Locke’s doctrine. On a Filmerist view, political obligation cannot be established on 
a doctrine of political voluntarism. Political legitimacy, on a voluntarist account, 
rests on a right to govern, as granted by individuals. Political voluntarism is 
challenged by Filmer to maintain political authority, on this premise. 
Filmer’s challenge, in fact, persists in Locke’s doctrine, considering Locke’s 
own view of the state’s exclusive right to the use of force. Natural individuals do 
not hold an exclusive power to use force. Thus, they cannot give it away to a body 
politic by their own consent. 
The issue at stake is the derivation of political authority from the natural 
rights of individuals. Political power cannot be derived from the consent of natural 
individuals if they lack those rights to be given up to a body politic. 
But here, individual consent is assumed as the grounding of political 
legitimacy. A political naturalist reading of Locke’s doctrine is more apt to meet 
Filmer’s challenge. Locke’s construct of the original contract, I propose, is set 
within a Filmerian paradigm. 
223 
  
In this section, I discuss the limits of a political voluntarist reading of Locke 
in terms of his natural law doctrine of a right of individuals to punish others for 
offenses against the law of nature. While Filmer’s challenge persists, I do consider 
resolutions within Locke’s doctrine, as proposed by Simmons, most notably in his 
The Lockean Theory of Rights (1992). These are particularly relevant to the topic 

























Lockean Political Voluntarism. 
 
I examine a political voluntarist account of Locke’s consent theory. It presents an 
antithesis to a political naturalist interpretation, as proposed in this thesis. 
Now, A. John Simmons has developed a political voluntarist account of 
Locke’s consent theory.217 Here, Simmons is influenced by Plamenatz (1963; 
1968). But I focus on Simmons’s account, in main. 
On a political voluntarist account, consent is rendered an authorization, viz. 
the act of granting another a right to act in a certain way (Simmons 1979:76; 
Plamenatz 1968:9-10). Put otherwise, another is permitted to act. On these grounds, 
political authority is granted in expression of individual consent. A right to rule is 
derived, in that case, from the consent of individuals. Lockean consent, on a 
voluntarist interpretative account, implies a right granted by individuals to a 
governing body. 
As Locke (II, 141) stipulates, political authority obtains by “a positive 
voluntary Grant.” On Simmons’s interpretation, Lockean consent is here to be 
conceived as a voluntary alienation of the right of an individual to a governing 
body. 
Now, an act of consent is described by Plamenatz (1963:227) as “a voluntary 
act intended by the doer of it to give other people a right they would otherwise not 
have.”218 Plamenatz (1963:222-23) understands Locke to treat consent, in this 
 
217 Simmons develops a political voluntarist account of Locke’s political doctrine in his Justification 
and Legitimacy (2001), On the Edge of Anarchy (1993), The Lockean Theory of Rights (1992), and 
Moral Principles and Political Obligations (1979). 
218 Here, intention is overstated, given Plamenatz’s revised account in the postscript to the second 




sense, as personal and deliberate. Lockean consent, Plamenatz (1963:223) 
maintains, is essentially a matter of choice, viz. an act of choice whereby an 
obligation to act accordingly is undertaken. 
Following Plamenatz, Simmons (1993) construes Lockean consent as “the 
actual, personal consent of each individual,” (60) whereby obligation is undertaken 
and right transferred. Lockean consent, Simmons (1993:69) expounds, includes 
instances of deliberate, voluntary alienation of rights and the undertaking of an 
obligation. In that way, Lockean consent may be compared to promising, 
contracting, and entrusting (Simmons 1993:69). Locke’s doctrine, as Gough (1973) 
also states, “affirms the moral duty of keeping promises” (64) on the foundation of 
natural law, such that consent, once expressly219 given, is irrevocable (64). 
 
consent theory, such that consent need not be understood to veritably express a sincere intention (a 
wish or desire). 
That is, the granting of a right for another to act denotes no sincere intention (wish or desire) 
for that other to act. An authoritative utterance need not be considered true, such that it expresses a 
sincere intention for another to act. It suffices that an intention is communicated for granting another 
to act in a certain way. To undertake an obligation, the consenter need only express what may be 
taken as his intention, viz. to grant another a right to act in a certain way. 
A voluntarist account of consent, as set forth by Plamenatz (1968), culminates (in the 
postscript) in a like schema for consent as we find in Searle (1964; 1969), in the case of promising, 
effectively treating the act of consent as a speech act. As Searle (1969:62) expounds, insincere 
promises are bona fide promises, as it suffices that intention is communicated in the act of 
promising. The speaker undertakes an obligation in stating his intention, irrespective of the sincerity 
of his statement. 
Plamenatz’s account is adopted by Simmons (1979; 1993), with variations. For Simmons, 
sincere intention also need not be set as a condition for the undertaking of an obligation from an 
expression of consent. Still, Simmons (1993:214) does maintain some element of mental acts in the 
giving of consent. 
Dunn (1967:159; 1980:34) discusses a “strong sense” of consent including sincere 
intention, while suggesting a weaker notion of Lockean consent as voluntary acquiescence (un-
coerced acceptance). This notion of Lockean consent is weaker than that presented in Simmons and 
Plamenatz. Voluntary acquiescence may obtain even in the absence of communication. 
219 Gough (1973) does not qualify consent as “express,” in this place. But the irrevocability of 




On this interpretation, Simmons (1993:76) states “the central Lockean 
claim,” viz. an actual act of consent is necessary to establish political obligation.220 
Consent, for Simmons’s Locke, is the sole legitimating ground of political 
obligation and authority (59, 73, 198).221 Legitimate government can only be 
founded on the consent of the governed (198). 
But consent, in this respect, is understood as the acting of an individual, in 
granting a right to a governing body. For Simmons’s Locke, actual individual 
consent is solely capable of generating political obligation. It stands as the only 
legitimate source of political authority (Simmons 1993:59-60, 73, 208).222 
This, further, applies to Locke’s original compact. For, Simmons (1993:60) 
argues, only by consent may Lockean individuals depart from the state of nature. 
Lockean individuals remain in the state of nature until by their own consent they 
take on membership in political society (II, 15).223 For Locke, neither forfeiture of 
rights nor prescription yield political power (Simmons 1993:59; 2n). 
On Simmons’s (1993:62, 69) interpretation, Locke’s state-of-nature 
argument posits a derivation of political power from consent as voluntary alienation 
of the natural rights of individuals (cf. II, 128-30). However, I reject the premise of 
individual consent as the grounding of Locke’s original compact. Individual 
 
220 The essential premise of Lockean consent theory, Simmons (1993:72, 198) lays down, is that 
consent is not only sufficient but necessary for political obligation and authority. But this statement 
would be presented with a caveat. That is, given certain limits of political power (e.g., an 
independent legislature), consent is sufficient and necessary for political obligation and authority. 
If appropriate limits do not apply, consent is deemed necessary, not sufficient (69, 76). (See also 
Simmons 1979:86-8.) 
Simmons’s (1979:86-8; 1993:69, 76) own view, as I take it, stipulates consent as necessary, 
but not sufficient, for political obligation. This stipulation, for Simmons (1979:86; 1993:198), may 
yet accord with Lockean consent, as in Locke, consent is sufficient, given appropriate limits of 
political power. Consent may otherwise be understood as necessary, not sufficient, for political 
obligation. 
221 Compare von Leyden (1982:168), where, it is stated, consent is a necessary condition for political 
legitimacy and political obligation. 
222 Simmons bases his interpretation here on (e.g.) II, 95, 121, 192. See also Simmons (1976:285; 
1979:87). 
223 See also II, 95, 192. 
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consent, for our interpretation, is not original. It is, rather, referential to a political 
justification, in the form of a compact to form a government. Individuals express 




























The Power of the Commonwealth. 
 
The limits of Lockean political voluntarism, I observe, relate particularly to the 
issue of the derivation of political authority. This, also, is the crux of Filmer’s 
critique of political voluntarism. Locke’s reply to Filmer’s challenge I find 
insufficient, insofar as we proceed from a voluntarist interpretation of Locke’s 
political doctrine. 
Now, in his Forms, Filmer challenges the consent theorist to demonstrate the 
derivation of a right to rule from the natural rights of individuals (226). In his 
challenge to consent theory, Filmer (A) asks, 
 
[I]f no man can have power to take away his own life without the guilt 
of being a murderer of himself, how can any people confer such a power 
as they have not themselves upon any one man, without being 
accessories to their own deaths, and every particular man becoming 
guilty of being felo de se? (285). 
 
That is, if we assume a natural law doctrine prohibiting suicide, individuals do not 
possess the power to end their own life. Also, they cannot transfer this power to 
another, without implicating themselves in a moral transgression. Yet a body politic 
is to legitimately exercise a power of life and death. 
Locke’s “natural conceptual resolution” of the derivation of the power of life 
and death, posed here by Filmer, introduces a power to execute the law of nature 
(Marshall 1994:210). This power is employed by individuals in a natural condition. 
It is then renounced in the formation of a government. However, a natural executive 
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right is equally applied by any individual. No one has an exclusive power to execute 
the law. The state yet assumes a monopoly on force. Political power, for Locke (I, 
120), is the power to command and be obeyed, in the application of a power of life 
and death. But on a political voluntarist interpretation, such power is to be derived 
from a universal application of a natural executive right. 
In fact, Filmer’s challenge, as it is worded above, relates to Locke’s doctrine 
of natural law. For Locke (II, 23), no one has the power to end his own life. The 
power of life and death, rather, is activated at a transgression upon the law of nature, 
where the offender forfeits his right to life (II, 7, 8, 23, 172-3). But, the Filmerian 
interjects, if a power to punish is transferred to a body politic in legitimation of a 
state monopoly on force, one has become an accessory to one’s own death. 
Locke’s reply, as it may be construed, proceeds from the absence of a power 
to end one’s life. This power cannot be conferred upon another (II, 23). But Filmer’s 
challenge persists, in that a legitimate polity claims a power of life and death. In 
Locke (II, 65), further, capital punishment is recognized. If political authority is to 
be derived from consent, it cannot exceed powers inherent in consent, viz. a transfer 
of natural rights. 
The state’s exclusive right to punish stands in opposition to the proposition 
of political voluntarism of a right to rule derived from individual rights. A 
voluntarist reading of Locke, further, is inapplicable to a proper justification of 
political power, seeing that Locke affirms state monopoly on force and capital 
punishment. In Locke, sovereign entities are social moral beings. Their actions are 
circumscribed within a moral framework. A voluntarist moral framework limits a 
Lockean justification of political power, such that the derivation of political power 






Political power, Locke (I, 120) stipulates, is the right to command and be obeyed. 
The governing body, on this standard, has an exclusive right to the use of force and 
punishment. A claim to political power, accordingly, is generic. Those who fall 
under its domain are subject to it. 
Lockean political voluntarism, Simmons (1992; 1993) acknowledges, is 
challenged, given its stipulation of the derivation of political authority from 
voluntary alienation of natural rights. On Locke’s own standards, the state or 
government possesses an exclusive right to the use of force and punishment. But 
such power no one holds in a natural condition. 
Now, Lockean individuals in the state of nature are judges of natural law. In 
a natural condition, Locke (II, 13) proposes, everyone has the executive power of 
the law of nature. Upon its trespass, everyone is by right an executioner of the law 
of nature (II, 8). A natural judge possesses a right to enforce natural law in punitive 
action against an offender of the law, provided the punishment is proportionate to 
the offense, “as may serve for Reparation and Restraint” (l. 7). Here, a power over 
another obtains by his transgression of the law of nature (II, 8). For reasons of 
retribution and for the sake of deterrence,224 the law of nature may be invoked 
against its offender, who “declares himself to live by another rule, than that of 
reason and common Equity” (ll. 10-1). 
A transgression of the law of nature, Locke (II, 8) stresses, is an affront to the 
species, compromising peace and safety. Thus, for the sake of the preservation of 
the species, all have an equal moral right to punish transgressors of the law of nature 
(II, 7, 89). (See also Simmons 1992:127.) 
Still, Locke (II, 13) recognizes, natural judges may tend to partial 
determinations. Also, their punishment may be disproportional to the offense. They 
 
224 See also II, 11, ll. 20-31. 
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can be carried away with their passions, in seeking revenge. Confusion and disorder 
follow; and for this reason, God has appointed government (ll. 7-9). 
Now, for Locke (II, 13), government is the proper remedy for the 
inconveniences of the state of nature. But Locke (II, 13) rejects arbitrary rule as a 
remedy for a natural condition. The state of nature is “much better” (l. 26) than 
arbitrary rule, “where one Man commanding a multitude, has the Liberty to be 
Judge in his own Case, and may do to all his Subjects whatever he please, without 
the least liberty to any one to question or controle those who Execute his Pleasure 
[…]” (ll. 20-4). 
Natural freedom, in Locke, is defined by the natural executive right, given 
the power of self-preservation. Here, we may also account for the liberty of 
“innocent delights” (II, 128). By a power of self-preservation, one possesses the 
liberty of doing “whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others 
within the permission of the Law of Nature” (II, 128). The power to punish for 
offenses committed against the law of nature “he might before [joining civil 
society] imploy in the Execution of the Law of Nature, by his own single Authority, 
as he thought fit” (II, 130). 
Now, for Filmer, a natural judge is sovereign. This is also the case in Locke. 
But, given Locke’s (II, 16-21) distinction of the state of nature and the state of war, 
we observe a crucial difference. A Lockean natural judge executes the right of 
nature as he thinks fit, yet in accordance with rational requirements of natural law. 
Here, a state of war is absent, where freedom would otherwise be forfeited. The 
content of natural law is thus given, prior to individual judgement. 
In Filmer, however, a natural state of anarchy (following a collapse of the 
state) just is a state of war between individual monarchs. Individual judgement is 
not limited within the moral and the rational. The Filmerian individual remains the 
judge of the law of nature. The Lockean judge, by contrast, is sovereign on 
condition of his benevolence, limited by the law of nature. 
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Now, the natural executive right and the right of self-preservation225 are each 
given up in entering political society (II, 128-30). (See also Simmons 1993:62.) 
Whereas individuals thus have quit the state of nature, it is now incumbent upon 
the state or government to punish transgressors of natural law (Simmons 1992:133-
4). However, political power is legitimated on the relinquishing of said natural 
rights, neither of which excludes the rights of others to punish. 
As indicated by Locke (II, 130), the natural executive right is eliminated in 
the joining of political society, whereas the right of self-preservation rather is 
limited, as the latter is given up to be regulated by civil law as far as the preservation 
of society requires (II, 129). The right of self-preservation, once renounced, is 
adopted by the legislative “to direct how the Force of the Commonwealth shall be 
imploy’d for preserving the Community and the Members of it” (II, 143). 
By contrast, each wholly gives up his natural executive right (II, 130), 
whereupon it is transferred to a common judge and exercised by government, in its 
executive and federative powers (II, 144-48). (See also Simmons 1993:62.) Thus, 
a prospective member of the commonwealth, in giving up his natural executive 
right, “is to part […] with as much of his natural liberty in providing for himself, 
as the good, prosperity, and safety of the Society shall require” (II, 130).226 
 
225 Simmons (1993:62) speaks of a right of self-government with respect to the right of self-
preservation and the right of “innocent delights” (indifferent conduct), in combination. The natural 
executive right stands as a separate concept. 
To construe this in Filmerian terms would be to include the natural executive right in “self-
government.” Inclusion of both rights, along with indifferent conduct, suggests a political power of 
the individual, who remains judge and executioner in a natural condition. This accords with 
Filmerian freedom to act at will. 
226 See also II, 149. Compare “so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that Society 
shall require” (II, 129, ll. 3-4); “as the Law thereof shall require” (II, 130, ll. 4-5). Here, limitation 
of freedom is indicated rather than extension of natural freedom in civil law. This is inconsistent 
with Locke’s account of civil freedom, in II, 22, 57. 
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While said powers are renounced in incorporation, the liberty of “innocent 
delights” (II, 128) is retained.227 Members of the commonwealth remain at liberty 
to engage in indifferent conduct (Simmons 1993:62; cf. II, 128-31). The domain of 
indifferent conduct may, however, be regulated (Simmons 1993:63). 
In short, prospective members of the commonwealth surrender their natural 
rights in creating or joining civil society, as far as the preservation or the good of 
the society requires, while retaining their right to morally indifferent conduct 
(Simmons 1993:64; 14n). 
But note, a transfer of the natural executive right only grants government the 
right to punish transgressors of natural law (Simmons 1993:63). Government, 
however, enforces law to a greater extent, regulating acts that are not in violation 
of natural law. That is, acts not prohibited or required (permitted) by natural law, 
are prohibited or required by civil law (63). This is a legitimate use of force 
provided government is granted additional rights to regulate morally indifferent 
conduct, viz. conduct not prohibited or required (permitted) by natural law (63).228 
The natural executive right does not include a right to make law to punish others 
for morally indifferent conduct, as a lawful government, however, is entitled to 
proceed. So, to render Locke consistent on this point, Simmons (1993:64) suggests 
the surrendering of a portion of a right to “innocent delights.” Only by a surrender 
of those rights may civil laws prohibiting or requiring morally indifferent actions 
be legitimated. 
To offer a Filmerian critique, giving up a part of one’s natural rights is giving 
up no rights at all. A self-governing individual, on the foregoing account, possesses 
 
227 See also II, 129-31. Compare Locke’s Letter concerning Toleration ([1689] 2010), on things 
indifferent. In the Letter, Locke does concede the ruler may legislate on matters indifferent, though 
here the ruler is not permitted to decree whatever he please. For the end of the law is the public good 
(23). 




no government over others. Yet, in giving up a portion of self-government, political 
power is to be legitimated over all those subsisting within the territory of the state. 
A limited transfer of rights procures at most partial legitimacy. But partial 
legitimacy is no legitimacy at all. 
At issue is the derivation of an exclusive right to the use of force from 
individual natural rights. The polity claims an exclusive right to the use of force to 
comprehensively regulate human conduct. Natural judges, however, do not possess 
such a right. A transfer of their natural executive right does not satisfy the state’s 
generic claim to legitimacy and state sovereignty, in its use of capital punishment 
and the power of war and peace.229 
Now, Locke (II, 171) speaks of political power as “that Power which every 
Man, having in the state of Nature, has given up into the hands of the Society, and 
therein to Governours” (ll. 1-3). But to derive a polity’s exclusive power from the 
rights of prospective members, Simmons (1993:64) suggests the latter be taken in 
sum. For no prospective member will possess exclusive power in isolation. 
Political power, Simmons (1993:64) proposes, is for Locke the sum of the 
rights received from individual consenters to membership of the society.230 The 
political stipulation of individual right is given by a collection of the first powers 
of members (Simmons 1993:62; 9n).231 
Even so, a polity, in its claim to legitimacy, requires an excess of the sum of 
fundamental rights granted to government, namely, an exclusive power over all 
 
229 The power of life and death (capital punishment) and the power of war and peace are hallmarks 
(“marks”) of sovereignty, as stipulated by Bodin (1945:172-3). This is also recognized by Locke (I, 
131). 
230 Cf. II, 88, 171. 
231 Cf. II, 126. 
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those in its domain. Natural right-holders do not singularly or in sum possess any 
such power.232 
For Locke, the natural executive right is implied in the right to preserve 
oneself and the species (Simmons 1992:133). Punishment of a transgressor of 
natural law, accordingly, is justifiable by the general right of preservation,233 in 
implementation of a right to punish given a forfeiture of right, upon transgression. 
This is an equal right to be exercised by any natural judge. 
 
232 To derive political power from the granting of individual natural rights, an alternative reading 
may here be suggested. Instead of the sum of all rights, the right of every prospective member is 
irrevocably given up, in the joining of civil society. Prospective members of the commonwealth, in 
that case, surrender the entirety of their natural rights in creating or joining civil society and retain 
none. That is, upon joining a political society proper, they only enjoy civil rights (Cox 1960:115-
23; Kendall 1965:62, 103-4, 112-13; Macpherson 1962:256-61). (See also Simmons 1993:65; 17n.) 
Simmons (1993:65; 17n) brings forth his reading of Locke’s doctrine of natural rights in 
opposition to such interpretation. The project, for Simmons (1993), is to render Locke’s doctrine of 
natural rights consistent with philosophical anarchism. Simmons’s interpretation is supported (e.g.) 
by Locke’s (II, 129-30) discussion of the transfer of powers as far as the preservation or the good 
of the society shall require. It suffers, however, from the vulnerability discussed. A claim to political 
legitimacy is generic, in that exclusive power is to be legitimately maintained over all those in the 
polity’s domain. A sum of the rights of prospective members, as Simmons proposes, does not fulfill 
a claim to exclusive state power. A power exclusive is originally held by none. The sum of the rights 
granted would not generate exclusivity by consent alone. 
The alternative reading proposes to solve the problem of the derivation of political power.  
However, it suffers from the same vulnerability. Prospective members are to irrevocably give up 
their natural rights, none of whom possess an exclusive right to a use of force against others. The 
irrevocability of individual natural rights does not allow us to derive an exclusive right to the use of 
force from the renouncing of those rights. 
On Locke’s (I, 120) own standards, a polity ultimately requires a monopoly on force. But 
a monopoly on force cannot be granted by the rights of individuals, in sum or by total relinquishing 
of those rights. The state’s exclusive right to punish and regulate human activity includes the right 
to punish aliens and non-consenters within the territory of the state. It also relates to indifferent 
conduct and a variety of areas in the personal lives of the members of society. 
233 This is not to say that the power to punish is equivalent to a right to self-defense against offenders 
of the law of nature. The right to self-defense cannot justify a general right to punish, viz. 
punishment of any violator of natural law as allowed by the executive right of nature (Simmons 
1992:132). Here, then, we distinguish between the right to self-preservation and the narrower one 
of self-defense. So: All persons have a right to punish transgressors of natural law for the purpose 
of restraining or deterring transgression. But this right does not derive from the right to self-defense 
but, rather, the right to self-preservation. From the narrower right of self-defense, a right to take 
reparation (i.e., of compensation) may only be derived (II, 7). (See also Simmons 1992:132-3.) 
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Now, in the case of forfeiture, either a general or a special right to punish 
obtains (Simmons 1992:122, 148-51).234 According to Simmons (1992:154-5), a 
right to punish, in Locke, is to be taken as a general liberty right, not a special claim 
right. A right to punish amounts to mere permission, or the absence of an obligation 
to refrain. Here, a special right is lacking. That is, anyone is at liberty to punish the 
transgressor, such that there is no obligation to refrain from punishment, as in view 
of a victim’s entitlement to punish her transgressor (Simmons 1992:154-5). 
A general right to punish a transgressor obtains, derivative of a right to 
preserve the species (by God’s authorization). It is to be exercised equally by all 
(II, 8),235 for the sake of deterrence and by reason of retribution.236 The transgressor 
has renounced reason and is thus deserving of punishment (II, 11), as he has 
“declared War against all Mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a Lyon or a 
Tyger, one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor 
Security” (ll. 24-6). 
It is not the case, for Locke, that a victim holds a special right to punish her 
transgressor, by the latter’s forfeiture of a right to life or not to be harmed.237 A 
 
234 On this issue, Simmons (1992:150) maintains an “inconsistency” in Locke’s account of the 
forfeiture of right. But the issue of a special right of the victim would appear to be, at most, a matter 
of ambiguity, since some special right of the victim (beyond reparation) need not discount a general 
right to punish the transgressor, unless the former be deemed an exclusive right. The victim, 
however, may hold a non-exclusive special right to punish her transgressor (cf. II, 23, 172). 
235 See esp. II, 8: Everyone has a right to punish the transgressor, as an executioner of the law of 
nature (ll. 23-4). 
236 The victim, though, has a special right (of self-preservation) to seek reparation from the offender 
(II, 10-1). On deterrence and retribution, see II, 8, ll. 5, 7; II, 11, ll. 20-31. 
237 Here, we may present a caveat. Locke does place an emphasis on a victim’s prerogative in the 
context of his justification of a form of slavery (captivity). The victim obtains a right to place her 
transgressor in captivity, provided she has engaged in a just conflict (II, 23, 172). Upon forfeiture 
of a right to life, it is at the prerogative of the victim (who has thus become the master) to delay 
capital punishment “and make use of [the transgressor] to his own Service” (II, 23, ll. 9-12). Thus, 
we observe victimhood, in fact, as justification of a form of slavery (captivity). Further, the 
transgressor “renders himself liable to be destroied by the injur’d person and the rest of mankind, 
that will joyn with him in the execution of Justice, as any other wild beast, or noxious brute, with 
whom Mankind can have neither Society nor Security” (II, 172, ll. 16-9). Again, Locke puts this 
forward as a justification of a form of slavery, viz. of captivity in a just and lawful war (l. 20). See 
also Olsthoorn & Apeldoorn (2020:3). 
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special right of the victim would generate an obligation for others to refrain from 
punishing the offender, or not to interfere with the victim’s carrying out the 
punishment. The transgressor forfeits his right towards any natural judge. However, 
if the victim were to attain a special right to punish, the transgressor would forfeit 
his right in special regard to the victim (Simmons 1992:150-1). Yet this would 
permit the victim’s forgiveness or leniency towards her offender, who is yet 
understood to trespass against the entire species (151).238 
Such result, Simmons (1992:151) concludes, runs counter to a Lockean 
theory of rights. A natural judge, for Locke, possesses a moral, not an exclusive, 
right to punish. A victim, accordingly, obtains a right of reparation, not a special 
right to punish (II, 10-1). 
Yet, in the original compact, the state or government acquires an exclusive 
right to punish, where it is granted this right by mere liberty-right holders (Simmons 
1992:155). In Simmons’s Locke, a legitimate governmental right to punish is 
transferred by a voluntary undertaking, in which case the right of government, 
supposedly, is composed of redistributed natural rights of prospective members 
(Simmons 1992:123-4). The natural executive right must be alienated by all 
contractors (Simmons 1992:161). Each prospective member must entrust to 
government a portion of his right to self-government necessary for legitimate 
government to operate (161-2). 
However, as Simmons (1992:163) acknowledges, the government cannot 
obtain from prospective members, by a simple transfer of their natural rights, an 
exclusive right to punish moral wrongdoers. For individuals, as they enjoy freedom 
 
238 As Simmons (1992:151) further argues, a special right possessed by the victim is inconsistent 
with her right of reparation, on Locke’s argument from a right to preserve the species. Still, we 
might conceive a primary right of the victim to punish her transgressor. These readings may, on that 
stipulation, be rendered compatible (cf. II, 23, 172). The victim may hold a special right (by reason 
of retribution) over and above all others, in which case all others yet have a secondary right (for the 
sake of deterrence) to punish the wrongdoer. 
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within the bounds of natural law, possess an equal right to punish (162). Since the 
freedom of the individual is set within the bounds of natural law, the right to punish 
moral wrongdoing, as possessed by a prospective member, is not tantamount to a 
claim right, capable of granting a monopoly on force (162). Thus, if granted by 
prospective members a right to punish, the state or government is in mere 
possession of a liberty right to punish, to the same extent as any other (162). A 
government, then, competes with its citizens in its right of punishment (162). 
On these terms, there is no transfer of an exclusive right to punish. Yet if the 
state or government excludes its citizens from punishing offenders, the government 
interferes, in that case, with citizens’ natural right to punish (163). 
Now, Simmons (1992:163-4) suggests, for Locke’s commonwealth to obtain 
an exclusive right to punish moral wrongdoers, a contract is to be made thereto, viz. 
for the natural executive right to be given up. Here, each prospective member gives 
up — or must agree to239 give up — the right to punish moral wrongdoers. The 
right to compete with the state in punishing, is thereby relinquished. Only then may 
the government acquire an exclusive right (or what would amount to a claim right) 
to punish moral wrongdoers. 
As Simmons (1992:162) recognizes, the government’s exclusive right to 
punish, acquired in the original compact, is, in effect, equivalent to a claim right. 
But the claim to legitimate use of state power rests not on the granting of a right to 
punish but a political requirement, viz. to agree to give up the natural executive 
right for the state alone to execute the right. This is a stipulation of the contract, set 
by the very authority established by the contract. A claim right to punish, thus, is 
 
239 Each prospective member, Simmons (1992:162; see also 75n) states, must agree not to compete 
with the state in punishing wrongdoers. This is the appropriate phraseology, with respect to Locke’s 
(II, 95-9) account of the original compact. As I shall argue, Locke’s must-statements, indicative of 
political requirements, are inapplicable to political voluntarism and a theory of Lockean rights, 
based upon individual consent, espoused by Simmons. The original compact presumes the authority 
of one body politic, in the giving of mutual consent to that very effect. 
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given in political union, the acceptance whereof is expressed in mutual consent. 
The consent of original contractors, however, in establishing for its union an 
exclusive right to punish, is prior to individual consent, from which a mere liberty 




To fix the state’s exclusive right to punish, within Lockean political voluntarism, 
Simmons (1992) explores avenues of argument, relating to the status of aliens. 
These arguments, while relevant for our ensuing discussion, I deem unsuccessful. 
Here, Locke considers the rightful punishment of aliens by the state. Aliens 
are justifiably punished, Locke (II, 9) argues, in virtue of a natural executive right. 
(See also Simmons 1992:137.) In support of his “strange Doctrine,” Locke (II, 9) 
maintains the existence of a natural executive right, on this fact. That is, the state, 
if by rightful punishment it may put to death or punish an alien for a crime 
committed within its domain, then punishment in this case denotes the exercise of 
a natural executive right. 
Locke (II, 9) assumes legislative authority does not extend to aliens. Since 
they have not consented to the power of a foreign state, aliens are unbound by the 
laws of that state. There is no political authority by which a state may put to death 
or punish an alien for any crime the alien may commit in the territory of that host 
polity (II, 9). Magistrates, for the alien, are but men without authority (l. 12) with 
“no more Power, than what every Man naturally may have over another” (ll. 16-
17). 
Aliens, while in a civil relation to fellow citizens, remain in the state of nature 
with respect to the host polity (II, 9). (See also Simmons 1993:16.) Unless a natural 
right to punish obtains, a state or government cannot rightfully punish an alien for 
designated crimes committed within its territory. But, Locke (II, 9) maintains, given 
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states or governments can rightfully punish criminal aliens, a natural executive 
right must obtain. States or governments, in exercising the natural executive right, 
rightfully punish offenders of the law of nature (as would otherwise be considered 
a state crime)240. Here, state punishment is legitimate yet equivalent to an 
individual’s exercise of the right. The right to punish, however, is solely exercised 
by the polity, given its members have departed a natural condition (Simmons 
1992:133-4). 
Now, Locke’s foregoing argument is meant to demonstrate the existence of a 
natural executive right. It does not resolve the derivation of political power from 
individual natural rights. But Simmons (1992) observes an alternative avenue for 
Locke’s argument on the issue of a rightful punishment of aliens by the state, 
concerning Locke’s account of tacit consent. 
As Simmons (1992:137) discusses, rightful punishment of aliens can also be 
explained by reference to Locke’s account of tacit consent.241 For Locke (II, 119), 
express consent is not necessary for political obligation. Tacit consent suffices. To 
tacitly consent to the rule of a state or government, one need only enjoy the facilities 
within the domain of that state or government. In tacitly consenting, one is obliged 
to obey the laws of that state or government. 
To cite Locke’s examples, traveling freely on the highway, or keeping a 
lodging, within the territory of a state or government, counts as enjoying certain 
facilities in its domain (II, 119). In fact, merely being situated within the territory 
of the state or government, renders one obliged to obey its laws (II, 119). 
As Locke (II, 121) states, political obligation begins and ends with the 
enjoyment. That would relate to aliens as much as members of the commonwealth. 
 
240 This would, strictly speaking, not fall under a state crime. But, as it happens, the state is 
positioned to wield the natural executive right, since its members have relinquished the right. 
241 In another context, Simmons (1979:89; 1993:13) rejects the validity of tacit consent, on the 
account of mere enjoyment, in Locke. 
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Indeed, Locke’s examples are relevant to the former. Aliens are thus rendered tacit 
consenters to the host polity and obliged to obey its laws (Simmons 1992:137-8; 
1993:21; 22n). 
As Simmons (1992) further argues, rightfulness of punishment does not 
necessitate the invocation of a natural executive right. Here, aliens need not be 
conceived as in a state of nature in respect to the state visited (Simmons 1992:137). 
Within the territory of the host state, traveling freely on the highway, etc. (II, 119), 
they have accepted to abide by the law of the land. Aliens, then, tacitly consent to 
the authority of the host polity, in entering its territory. They authorize the state to 
punish them, should they violate state law. The state’s right to punish, in that case, 
can be sufficiently explained in terms of tacit consent of the visitor. 
The law of the land does, in fact, apply to aliens. Criminal aliens are liable to 
be punished by the law of the host polity. As mandated by the host polity, they may 
face, e.g., extradition. Upon entrance into the territory of the host polity, the law 
immediately applies, whereupon aliens are given the status of visitor, with 
appropriate restrictions. The visiting alien, in entering the territory of the host 
polity, accepts her restrictive status and proceeds accordingly. Yet if so, although 
she is not incorporated into the commonwealth, the alien is liable for any breach of 
restrictions attached to her status as well as any offense otherwise, according to the 
law of the land. Invoking a natural condition is thus not required to explain alien 
status. 
Locke (II, 9) insists the use of force against the alien is in fact an exercise of 
a natural right to punish. However, appropriate punishment is determined by virtue 
of legal obligations undertaken by the visiting alien, who, as it turns out, may be 
construed as a tacit consenter. 
Now, if the state’s right to punish aliens can be explained without reference 
to a natural executive right, then, assumedly, the state’s right to punish citizens can 
also be so explained (Simmons 1992:137-8). So, to entrust to the state or 
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government an exclusive right to punish, claim-right holders are no longer required. 
Rather, Simmons (1992:138) suggests, natural individuals possess a sole right to 
punish themselves. Lockean contractors entrust, then, a portion of their natural right 
to government, in giving up the right of self-punishment, granting the polity 
therewith a right to punish them in case they violate its laws. Ultimately, once 
government has received authorization from each prospective member, the 
government has a right to punish all, upon violation of its laws. Thus, without 
appeal to a natural executive right, an exclusive right of the state to 
comprehensively punish its citizens is justifiable (Simmons 1992:138). 
If, however, the state’s right to punish is derived from the right to self-
punishment, then state power is limited to those cases where the law of nature has 
been transgressed. Yet, again, the state criminalizes and regulates even indifferent 
activity, beyond the law of nature. 
Further, I object, Locke (II, 23) discounts a right of suicide.242 Yet a 
legitimate state is presumed to rightfully exercise the power of life and death 
(capital punishment). The natural executive right, in fact, provides a solution to this 
quandary, for it includes the right to punish transgressors with death. Upon transfer 
of this right, the power of life and death is granted to government. Simmons 
(1992:139), recognizing this objection, suggests revising Locke’s doctrine to 
abandon the prohibition on suicide. But this maneuver throws the baby out with the 
bathwater, departing from Locke’s theory of natural right. For Locke (II, 23), one 
does not possess the power to give up his right to life. 
Thus, to establish the state’s exclusive right to punish from an original 
contract, the right must be stipulated in the contract. But, again, this is a political 
 
242 Locke (II, 23) makes an exception in the case of a captive in an unjust war, where the hardship 
of his enslavement outweighs the value of life (ll. 13-15). In resisting his master, the captive has a 
right (or it is in his power) to end his own life (ll. 14-15). But he has already forfeited his own life, 
in aggressing upon another (ll. 9-10). Compare II, 172, ll. 23-30. 
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requirement, as opposed to the granting of a right in expression of individual 
consent. In joining or establishing a polity, prospective members must agree to the 
state’s exclusive right to punish all within its jurisdiction. In their enjoyment of 
state facilities, members and aliens affirm, by tacit consent, the state’s generic claim 




We resume the discussion relating to the topic of the tacit consent of aliens (see 
Simmons 1992:137-8). The issue of the tacit consent of aliens has implications for 
non-consenters at large, in Locke’s political doctrine. We now consider this larger 
aspect of tacit consent. 
Relatedly, Hume remarks in his “Of the Original Contract” (1985:476), the 
“truest” tacit consent is a foreigner’s, who settles in his non-native country, the laws 
of which he must accept. Though his allegiance is seen less dependable than that of 
a natural born subject, it is more voluntary (476). In Locke’s account, tacit consent 
rather demonstrates the power of the state, in its monopoly on force. The voluntarist 
aspect of tacit consent is undermined. 
A Lockean non-consenter is one remaining in the state of nature or the state 
of war, unwilling to, or incapable of, consent. Yet, effectively, non-consent is 
strictly limited due to Locke’s account of tacit consent. Non-consenters may, in 
fact, be positioned or act in such a way as to tacitly consent to state power, viz. 
within the territory of the state. 
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As Locke (II, 9) would have it, aliens do not join civil society of the host 
state. Yet, as discussed prior, aliens tacitly consent to the laws of the host polity, in 
entering its territory and enjoying its facilities (Simmons 1993:21; 22n).243 
But now the argument of tacit consent, as applicable to aliens, relates to non-
consenters at large, who are to remain free in a natural condition (II, 95). The natural 
freedom of non-consenters is compromised, be they situated within the territory of 
the state. They are liable to state punishment, in that case. Aliens or non-residents, 
by mere reason of being within the territory of the state or using its facilities, tacitly 
consent to abide by the law of the host polity. They do not adopt membership of 
the host polity. Yet, while located within state territory, they subject themselves to 
the law of the land. This also applies to those unwilling to consent. 
Now, Simmons (1992) considers the Lockean position on political legitimacy 
to view “standard state practices” as being justifiable in respect to freely consenting 
individuals, where “independents must simply be accepted by the Lockean as 
remaining in the state of nature and as being beyond coercive assimilation into the 
state” (163). Yet non-consenting independents, situated within state territory, adapt 
to state law and practices, tacitly consenting to state power. Non-consenters, thus, 
are subject to state power and liable to punishment by the state. They do not remain 
in a natural condition independent of state coercion. 
This objection undermines Locke’s (II, 95) reply to Filmer’s challenge, to the 
effect that any number of men may establish a commonwealth, whereas the rest 
remains free in a natural condition. Non-consenters, it turns out, are tacit 
consenters, liable to state punishment, if situated within the territory of the state. 
To succeed, Locke’s reply must stipulate the presence of non-consenters in a 
pristine natural condition, beyond the domain of the state. 
 
243 Cf. II, 119. Here, we continue to follow Simmons’s suggestion of the tacit consent of aliens by 
their mere presence within state territory. 
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Lockean natural individuals, on Simmons’s (1993:5; 7n) reading, may 
establish a political relationship and society, in voluntarily alienating their natural 
freedom. Their freedom remains untouched prior to incorporation; or it is restored 
to a natural condition following a departure from civil society. In case of 
wrongdoing, one could not re-establish a political relationship (in the same polity). 
Prospective members, further, depart from a natural condition by their own 
consent in the establishment of a body politic, among fellow contractors; or they 
may join a pre-established body politic (II, 89). (See also Simmons 1993:61.) Either 
way, Simmons (1993:61) notes, the moral content of consent is the same, where 
rights are renounced in undertaking obligations. The political relationship, 
established by equals, is a moral one among free persons, based in consent or 
consensual transactions. It is “essentially voluntary and consensual” (Simmons 
1993:5-6).244 
Now, Lockean “members” or “subjects” are oath-takers, native-born or 
naturalized; landowners, citizens, or residents; and the native-born, propertied or 
without property (Simmons 1993:85). 
Non-consensual relations, in Locke, are formed in a natural condition. These 
are natural bonds, including parent-child245 relations. But non-consensual relations 
may also obtain in a state of war, e.g., between conqueror and the vanquished 
(Simmons 1993:11). 
Natural or transgressive individuals are, on these terms, non-consenters, in 
relation to the state. They may not (yet) have consented, being incapable of consent. 
This is relevant in the case of children (II, 15, 118), as well as those devoid of right 
reason, namely, “lunatics,” “idiots,” and “madmen” (II, 60). These subsist in a 
natural condition, though subject to legitimate government (Simmons 1993:16). 
 
244 Cf. esp. II, 99; also, II, 95, 175. 
245 Each person is born (free) into the state of nature (II, 191). 
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Also, we may conceive those unwilling to consent, having refused, in which 
case they remain in the state of nature (II, 95). Otherwise, non-consenters return to 
a state of nature from a civil condition, restoring their natural freedom, under an 
illegitimate regime (II, 17-20).246 This is relevant in the case of the vanquished in 
relation to their conqueror, where political society is dissolved (II, 211). (See also 
Simmons 1993:22.) 
In the case of visitors, they temporarily dwell within the territory of the state, 
without adopting membership (II, 9). Lastly, criminal members, in violation of the 
law of nature, put themselves in a state of war with their fellow members; thus, they 
forfeit their moral rights as well as membership of a natural and civil community 
(II, 8, 10-12). (Cf. Waldron 2002:143, 146.)247 
Foregoing stipulations of non-consent refer to the original compact. 
Like aliens, those unwilling may yet be conceived as tacit consenters, in case 
they remain situated within the territory of the state. A restoration of a natural 
condition invites the same concern, unless political society, established in the 
compact, is dissolved. 
Children await their civil status under a “temporary government” (II, 67) of 
the father. They are born free in a natural condition (II, 191). But children are “born 
to” reason, freedom, and equality (II, 55); and thus, they are treated as future 
citizens under parental authority, which includes membership. Now, reaching 
maturity, children are to determine their own membership in civil society (II, 55, 
 
246 Here, on Simmons’s (1993:15-16) line of argument, the government may be illegitimate with 
respect to some individuals who thereby subsist in a natural condition, relative to the government. 
The government need not be illegitimate towards all citizens, residents, etc. If accurate, this notion 
of the state of nature supports a version of a Lockean doctrine as a system of philosophical 
anarchism. Let it be noted, however, this interpretation of Locke’s doctrine, as presently laid out, is 
limited to the term “government,” “regime,” and such descriptors of the apparatus of the state. But 
government is not the extent of Lockean sovereignty. See further: Section D, Chapter 15. 
247 Note, my interpretation is here limited to those in violation of natural law. Locke (II, 12) does 
account for proportionality in punishing offenders. Compare Waldron’s discussion of Lockean 
criminals, in Chapter 5 (VIII) of his God, Locke, and Equality (2002), pp. 141-150. 
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58, 170). (See also Simmons 1993:36-7.) Still, voluntary membership, in this case, 
is fixed in original consent, as maintained by the parents. 
Those otherwise incapable are so judged in view of the compact, whereas 
they lack the reasoning faculties to maintain the compact in expression of individual 
consent. These are in the state of nature even within legitimate polities (Simmons 
1993:21). To maintain original consent is required for membership. 
Criminal members, in offending against the law of nature, are guilty of 
universal crime (Graf 2018:564-6). Yet they are exclusively punished by the state, 
by reason of their membership. 
Given this, I do not agree with Simmons (1993:5-6) in stating the essential 
voluntariness of the Lockean political relationship. The political relationship is 
voluntary on presumption of the authority of the body politic. Voluntariness is not 
essential to the political relationship. Rather, given a political union, an individual 
may subsist in a non-consensual relationship with the union. But provided he is 
situated within the territory of the union, a non-consenter is under the authority of 
the union. He may decide to depart from the union, to restore his natural freedom 
or to join another commonwealth. Yet to be relieved from its authority, a non-
consenter must leave the territory of the state. Otherwise, he is rendered a tacit 
consenter, in merely being within the territory. Or, if he is incapable of consent, his 
status is defined by his incapacity. He is, in fact, a non-member. 
 
7.4. Anarchic consenters. 
 
The state’s exclusive right to punish, as discussed, cannot be derived from a natural 
executive right employed by individuals. The natural executive right does not grant 
a claim to an exclusive right to punish. The latter, then, cannot obtain from a transfer 
of the former. Yet the state does require a monopoly on force, on the principle of a 
common judge over all citizens. 
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As Simmons (1992) recognizes, the failure to derive political power from a 
natural executive right “requires a remedy, if there is to be one judge over all 
citizens” (162). In the original contract, a transfer of individual sovereignty is 
required, to satisfy the legitimacy of the state’s exclusive right to the use of force. 
However, challenging a voluntarist interpretation of a Lockean theory of rights, 
social moral beings joining civil society do not hold by themselves or in sum a 
monopoly on force. They have a power of life and death, in the case of an offense 
against natural law. But this power may be exercised by any natural judge. 
Now, let us say, a victim possesses a special right to punish her offender,248 
such that others ought not to initiate punishment of the offender or interfere with 
just punishment carried out by the victim. We might, then, conceive any potential 
victim’s right to punish to be conferred onto government, for it to procure a claim 
right to the use of force. Alas, following Simmons (1992:151), we dismiss reliance 
on a victim’s claim right, seeing that the offender may be excused at the prerogative 
of the victim. A power of forgiveness does not cohere with a Lockean theory of 
rights. The latter would not negate rightful punishment of the transgressor by a third 
party. 
Supposing a successful derivation of political power from natural rights, 
forgiveness may be said to be equivalent to the power of pardon, relative to the 
state. Now, a victim’s claim right, even if not exercised, forbids punishment to be 
carried out by a third party. Also, within state domain, if a transgressor is not 
punished by legal means, a right to punish is not left to a vigilante. However, in a 
natural condition, everyone remains a natural judge, capable of exercising a right 
to punish. 
If deriving political power from the natural rights of individuals is to succeed, 
then individuals must possess an exclusive right to the use of force in some mode 
 




or fashion. At best, a sum of individual rights may grant a polity the right to punish 
each party to the contract. But this does not satisfy the state’s generic claim to an 
exclusive right to the use of force. The contract, rather, remains individualized. 
Now, as it happens, anarchic individuals, extracted from Filmer’s system, do 
claim a right to absolute power. In case these are parties to the contract, then each 
prospective member, contradictorily, possesses an exclusive right to the use of 
force. 
In Locke, a natural judge acts in accordance with rational requirements, under 
natural law. A Filmerian judge, however, is not constrained by the moral and social, 
save by providence.249 Here, amongst the ruins of the state, everyone acts at will as 
his own monarch, on his own final judgement. Accordingly, we may extend natural 
judgement, such that each is a judge in his own case and in the case of others. 
Granted, natural monarchs contradict one another, in their assumption of the 
generality of their private judgements. Yet the contradiction appears to be resolved, 
if each party to a compact confers his power onto a body politic, which then 
assumes a claim right to the use of force. 
However, the motivation of natural monarchs to give up their power is 
unexplained. Also, even if motivation lies in a desire to protect property,250 we 
cannot rely on their maintaining consent, following the establishment of a body 
politic. Anarchic consent is revocable at the prerogative of the consenter, who 
remains a judge in his own case. The state, inexorably, resorts to force to maintain 
anarchic consent. 
Still, in a patriarchal monarchy, the rights of individual monarchs have been 
usurped. The patriarch paramount, as exemplified by Nimrod, possesses absolute 
power, in usurping the rights of other natural judges. Conceivably then, an 
exclusive right to the use of force is conferred by the patriarch paramount or a 
 
249 On the issue of providence, in Filmer, see A, 289; D, 232. 
250 This is one motivation for entering civil society, Locke (II, 134, 136) explains. 
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patriarchal assembly to a body politic, securing mutual interests of separate 
monarchies. 
Anarchic consenters are unreliable, save their consent is maintained by force. 
In a patriarchal monarchy, however, the rights of natural judges are usurped, prior 
to the formation of a body politic. 
Here, I suggest a Filmerian approach to the problem of deriving political 
power from natural rights, in Locke’s political doctrine. Filmerian freedom is 
applied to ground the polity’s exclusive right to punish, as derived from the natural 
rights of anarchic consenters. 
This is not, to be sure, a moral justification of the state but rather a political 
one. But in Locke, this approach may turn out to be more apt than expected. 
In Locke (II, 13), obedience to natural law is given, in the case of natural 
judges. However, an absolute monarch, acting arbitrarily, is bound to act contrary 
to the law of nature. He is in a state of nature towards his subjects. Now, natural 
judges are characterized as social moral beings, at relative peace. Meanwhile, the 
arbitrary will of an absolute monarch is deemed unjust. Absolute monarchs, as 
Locke (II, 13) remarks, are but men at liberty to be judges in their own case. Yet 
the same applies for naturally free individuals simpliciter. There is no reason, then, 
to distrust an absolute monarch, rather than any individual in a natural condition. 
Or, conversely, there is every reason to distrust naturally free individuals as 
absolute monarchs. 
A Lockean reply, at this juncture, fixes the absolute monarch in a state of war, 
whereas natural judges are found to be at relative peace. But a state of war may be 
introduced at any time. A moral objection invoked at an offense against natural law 
does not render natural judges more reliable. 
I do not claim Locke adopts the foregoing approach to the derivation of 
political power. Still, within an historical framework, Locke (II, 74-6; 105-12) does 
conceive the evolution of a patriarchal monarchy towards a civil society. But the 
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commonwealth is established by original contractors. These are not ipso facto 
patriarchal monarchs or members of a patriarchal assembly, though on an historical 
account this may be inferred. 
As we shall discuss in the next section (B), I propose Locke does in fact set 
forth his account of the original compact within a Filmerian paradigm. But the 
original contractors, I observe, are not anarchic individuals. Rather, Locke 
conceives a union of original contractors, in the formation of a civil society. This 




The state’s generic claim to legitimacy and its purported exclusive right to punish 
is not derivate of natural rights of prospective members of the commonwealth. This 
presents a challenge for political voluntarism, in proceeding from a Lockean theory 
of rights. Simmons (1992) proposes resolutions to this challenge in his re-
interpretation of Locke’s account of tacit consent. These I find lacking. They rather 
serve to undermine Locke’s reply to Filmer, in respect to incorporation into the 

















Filmer, in his Originall, complains political voluntarism, i.e., a political theory of 
natural freedom and equality, is a harbinger of anarchy (260). (See also Schochet 
1975:254.) In response, Locke claims natural individuals, rather, predictably join a 
commonwealth (Schochet 1975:254). Yet consent to membership may be refused 
or revoked. 
For Simmons (1993), Locke’s doctrine does signify a form of anarchism. But 
a Lockean form of anarchism does not involve a freedom to act at will. As Simmons 
(1993) writes, 
 
Lockean anarchism […] insists that persons in existing societies are by 
no means free to do as they please, but rather that they have a wide 
range of moral duties […] prohibiting physical harming and most 
serious disruption of others’ lives (262-3). 
 
A voluntarist reading of Locke, on this note, invites us to adopt philosophical 
anarchism, as opposed to the anarchism of Filmerian freedom. Given Lockean 
political philosophy is “essentially voluntarist,” Simmons (1993) remarks, “this 
means that Lockeans must also accept philosophical anarchism” (260). Further, as 
Schochet (1975) maintains, philosophical anarchism is “an unavoidable result of 
political voluntarism, for the only way to demonstrate that men do not have the 
right of choice is to place political obligation on a naturalistic and involuntary 
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basis” (254).251 Supposing consent is necessary to bind citizens to the state, while 
accepting Hume’s252 argument that few have performed any such consent, 
philosophical anarchism follows (Simmons 1993:201). Consent theory, then, is to 
commit us to a moderate form of philosophical anarchism, where some 
governments are morally legitimate to some (significant number of) citizens (see 
Simmons 1993:198, 250, 260).253 
In this context, Simmons (1993) affirms a supposed tenet of Locke’s consent 
theory, to the effect “that each person is born to natural freedom (i.e. to moral 
freedom from political obligation and the de jure authority of others)” (260; 93n). 
Political voluntarism, on this tenet, is singularly consistent with the natural freedom 
of persons (260; 93n). 
However, in civil society, a person is born to natural freedom on presumption 
of the political. The natural freedom of children, as prospective members of a 
commonwealth, is indicative of civil freedom. Children are naturally free pending 
a choice of membership, while they remain duty-bound to their parents (II, 67-9).254 
Now, parental power is dissolved at the age of maturity (II, 69).255 But voluntary 
membership is referential to the formation of government in an original compact. 
 
251 Here, I do not concur fully with Schochet’s statement. Political naturalism, as I understand, does 
not negate the voluntary but voluntarism. As I maintain, a political naturalist interpretation of 
Locke’s doctrine is available, one that does more justificatory work for political legitimacy and 
obligation, by Locke’s own standards. 
252 See Hume (1985:471). 
253 Simmons also considers a Rawlsian account of political obligation on a principle of fairness. 
However, Simmons (1993:260) remarks, a voluntarist account of the principle of fairness cannot be 
assumed to entail political obligations for a significant number of citizens in existing states. Thus, a 
voluntarist account of the principle of fairness, invoked as a supplement to Lockean consent theory, 
is limited in its pursuit of a general account of political obligation (260). Incidentally, the same 
critique, I maintain, applies to political voluntarism, proceeding from Lockean consent, as 
developed in Simmons (1993). See discussion below. 
254 Parents have a natural right of obedience from their children as well as a right to be respected (II, 
67). Paternal or parental power is maintained until the children “come to the use of reason” (II, 170), 
but parental rights are perpetual (II, 67). (See also Simmons 1992:177-9.) 
255 A natural parental right to receive respect, reverence, and gratitude from their children exceeds 
the age of maturity (II, 67-9). This right of parents is perpetual (II, 67) and inalienable (I, 65). (See 
also Simmons 1992:179.) 
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The political unity of original contractors implies non-consent, where unity is not 
affirmed in individual consent. Yet non-consent, in effect, maintains the union. 
This is entailed in Locke’s reply to Filmer. As Locke (II, 95) states, non-
consenters are to remain free in a natural condition. Yet, as I have argued, they are 
at the same time rendered tacit consenters, whenever situated within the territory of 
the state. Though children are naturally duty-bound to their parents, the latter 
maintain parental power over their children as members of the commonwealth. At 
the very least, parents are tacit consenters, within state territory. 
Once children, upon maturity, choose to remain bona fide citizens or 
emigrate, the choice either way confirms their political circumstance. Emigration 
is determined by individual consent; yet it is referential to a political union. An opt-
out is permitted given the justifiable exclusion of non-consenters (see II, 95-6). 
Now, philosophical anarchism is an “argumentative expression of anarchism” 
(McLaughlin 2010:25), from a skeptical, quietist attitude towards political 
authority. The adjective “philosophical” signifies a lack of obligation to support or 
oppose political authority. The attitude is one of non-committal to practical or 
political authority. The “argumentative expression” proceeds on a balance of 
reasons, viz. evaluation of pro tanto reasons for supporting, refraining from 
opposing, or opposing the state. If applicable, moral reasons to support the state 
override a right to resistance or reasons to oppose it (Simmons 2001:109). 
As Simmons (2001:103-4, 107) explains, though subjects are not considered, 
given the illegitimacy of the state, to be under an obligation to obey the law, a moral 
obligation to oppose the state does not obtain. For philosophical anarchism, this is 
a matter of the evaluation of pro tanto reasons to support the state (109). 
Philosophical anarchism, in this regard, is separated from political anarchism, 
which states the illegitimacy of all possible states and imposes a corresponding 
obligation to oppose the state (Simmons 2001:109). 
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For Simmons (2001), philosophical anarchism is to be defined by its tentative 
denial of political legitimacy (viz. empirical claims about states),256 thus to be 
contrasted with political anarchism in virtue of the latter’s insistence upon an 
obligation to oppose the state. The former requires no such opposition (109). 
Now, in presenting his moderate version of philosophical anarchism, 
Simmons (1993; 2001) responds to Robert Paul Wolff’s version of philosophical 
anarchism. As it happens, Wolff’s strand of philosophical anarchism is akin to 
Filmer’s challenge to consent theory, as I observe in Wolff’s (1970) thesis of the 
incompatibility of moral autonomy and political authority.257 
Political authority, Wolff (1970:5) observes,258 claims a right to be obeyed. 
The possession of authority is one of a right to be obeyed, where a claim to authority 
is acknowledged. De jure authority, accordingly, is the right to command and be 
obeyed (4). A legitimate command, in that case, is binding.259 
But now Wolff (1970) takes as given moral autonomy.260 Further, Wolff 
(1970:18) asserts, the exercise of moral autonomy (i.e., responsibility) is a primary 
obligation. Insofar as a person is autonomous, she fulfils her obligation to exercise 
 
256 A denial of political legitimacy, Simmons (2001:103; 2n) grants, entails a denial of political 
obligation. Still, Simmons (2001) does not define anarchism in terms of a denial of political 
obligation, as however does Horton (1992), Gans (1992). 
257 Filmer’s challenge to consent theory, to be sure, is not recognized by Wolff (1970). Recall 
Wolff’s (1970) damning words for Filmer that it was for Locke “worthwhile to devote an entire 
treatise to Sir Robert Filmer’s defense of the hereditary rights of kings, but today the belief in all 
forms of traditional authority is as weak as the arguments which can be given for it” (21). Yet 
Wolff’s incompatibility thesis introduces, in effect, the problem of political legitimacy, inherent in 
Filmer’s challenge, vis-à-vis the sovereignty (autonomy) of the individual. 
258 Locke (I, 120) makes the same observation. 
259 Wolff’s definition of authority is one of entailment. As Wolff (1970) proposes, political authority 
entails the right to command and be obeyed. Accordingly, a command issued by a legitimate 
political authority entails an obligation to obey. 
260 Moral autonomy, in Wolff (1970), is conceived in terms of self-legislation, in the context of 
Kantian ethics. However, in his “A Reply to Reiman,” (1976) Wolff proceeds from Lockean contract 
theory, on his stated belief “that social contract theory, with its central reliance upon a strict notion 
of the consent of the governed, is a direct attempt to overcome the conflict between the primary 




her autonomy (14). Yet if so, she will resist a claim to authority over her. That is, 
she will resist to act in accordance with a command because the action is required 
by the command (18). As Wolff (1970) writes, 
 
For the autonomous man, there is no such thing, strictly speaking, as a 
command (15). 
 
By implication, an autonomous individual will deny an obligation to obey the law 
by virtue of the law, viz. in terms of an inherent right of the state to command and 
be obeyed (18). Yet the state requires the individual to obey, given its right to 
command and be obeyed. Thus, moral autonomy and the authority of the state are 
incompatible (18). 
Wolff (1970:71), lastly, presents an ultimatum. If moral autonomy and 
political authority are incompatible, philosophical anarchism must be adopted or 
the pursuit of autonomy given up. Absent a principle of autonomy, submission to 
the government is in order. But if an obligation of moral autonomy is primary, then 
subjects of a state are not obligated to obey the laws of the state, viz. on grounds of 
the legitimacy of the state. 
Now, an obligation of moral autonomy is primary. Hence, the only reasonable 
political belief to be adopted is philosophical anarchism (Wolff 1970:19). 
Wolff’s incompatibility thesis is akin to Filmer’s challenge, in that the 
authority of the state, as stipulated, is premised upon a denial of the autonomy of 
the individual; and vice versa. The difference lies in Wolff’s application of a moral 
justification, in his argument from the primacy of a moral obligation to exercise 
one’s autonomy.261 In Filmer, the sovereignty of the individual is antithetical to 
 




political authority, given individuals possess natural rights as judges in their own 
case. 
In response to Wolff’s incompatibility thesis, Simmons (2001:110) 
distinguishes between a priori and a posteriori anarchism. Simmons then opts for 
the latter. A state, on a posteriori anarchism, is not by definition illegitimate. On 
Wolff’s a priori anarchism, all possible states, by reason of their coercive character, 
are morally illegitimate, given the primacy of moral autonomy. By contrast, on a 
stipulation of a posteriori anarchism, existing states, in their contingent character, 
do not satisfy criteria of legitimacy (105). Existing states are thus deemed morally 
illegitimate on empirical grounds. 
Still, a definition of a state does not preclude its legitimacy (Simmons 
2001:105). States are justifiable, though no legitimate existing states may be 
observed. That is, while no existing state satisfies (e.g.) the principle of consent, a 
state may act justly or be deemed just, and so deserve support, or, minimally, a 
restraint from opposition (McLaughlin 2010:18). 
Now, given justifiability of the state, philosophical anarchism, as proposed in 
Simmons (2001), must demonstrate how political legitimacy is conceivable, on a 
balance-of-reasons approach. It does not, however, satisfy the state’s generic claim 
to political legitimacy, based upon the state’s monopolistic right to command and 
its requirement to obedience. As Simmons (2001:130) recognizes, a posteriori 
anarchism procures at most partial legitimacy,262 viz. where some governments are 
deemed morally legitimate to some citizens. (See also Simmons 1993:198.) 
Now, political power, for Locke (I, 120), is the right to command and be 
obeyed. This given, the state has an exclusive right to the use of force. A monopoly 
 
262 State legitimacy, Simmons (2001:130) explains, may be “complete or partial,” relative to a moral 
relationship with the state. But this, effectively, is partial legitimacy. Complete legitimacy, here, is 
merely hypothetical, supposing, I gather, a satisfactory moral relationship between the state and all 
its subjects. Yet such a relationship, at any moment, may dissolve. Filmer’s challenge to consent 
theory, thus, remains. 
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on force, however, is nullified by partial legitimacy. An evaluation of moral reasons 
to support the state defies the state’s generic claim to legitimacy. Partial legitimacy 
operates on individual consent. Philosophical anarchism does not accommodate a 
state monopoly on force, in reliance upon individual consent. Yet in a Lockean 
theory of rights, the state’s exclusive right to the use of force is to be acknowledged. 
Further, the basic legitimation demand, as set forth in Williams (2005), 
remains unfulfilled. If the state, as here required, is to legitimate its power to all 
those subject to it, then state legitimacy presumably rests on a generic claim. Partial 
legitimacy, however, undermines a generic claim to state legitimacy. 
Hitherto, Wolff’s incompatibility thesis applies. The state’s generic claim to 
legitimacy is found incompatible with a moral justification of the state, proceeding 
from philosophical anarchism. Even in case of compliance, an autonomous 
individual follows a command not because it is so required but on his own moral 
reasoning (Wolff 1970:9). However, as Simmons (1993:60) stresses, to obey the 
law consists not just in acting as happens to be required by the law but doing what 
the law requires because the law so requires. 
Wolff, indeed, sets up the foregoing argument in favor of the principle of 
moral autonomy and the adoption of philosophical anarchism. I do think, however, 
Wolff is mistaken in positing the primacy of the principle of moral autonomy. As 
Reiman (1972:7-8) objects, moral autonomy is not to be construed as an obligation, 
since moral autonomy “cannot be given up on moral grounds because to do so 
would be a morally autonomous act, and to continue to do so would be to continue 
to be morally autonomous” (7). That is, on the presumption of moral autonomy, 
one cannot perform a moral act but by the exercise of autonomy. In acting morally, 
one is autonomous. Moral autonomy, rather, is properly understood as a property 
259 
  
of moral action. This is corroborated in Kant (G 4:400), where autonomy is said to 
be a property of a free will.263 
The autonomy of the individual is demonstrated in Wolff (1970) within a 
framework of Kantian ethics. In Filmer, by contrast, autonomy (sovereignty) is 
construed in terms of individual prerogative and possessory right. At issue is a 
political question, concerning anarchic individuals. 
A Filmerian resolution to Wolff’s incompatibility thesis submits a political 
justification of political power, namely a de facto theory of possessory right in the 
form of political patriarchalism. But as the philosophical anarchist undermines the 
























In this section, I lay down the crux of a political naturalist reading of Locke’s Two 
Treatises. This relates to Locke’s account of the original compact to the formation 
of a government. 
First, the original compact involves a political requirement of unanimity. The 
authority of the body politic, as manifested in the union of members, is presumed 
in the very giving of consent. The original compact entails political requirements 
tied to membership of the polity. These obtain in the formation of government, 
fixed in the unitary arrangement and direction of the body politic. 
It is not the case, pace Marshall (1994:209), that Locke is committed to 
individual consent in response to Filmer. Locke resolves Filmer’s challenge, rather, 
in subjecting the idea of individual consent to a political requirement of unanimity. 
Now, the question of the form of the compact may be considered within either 
a juridical or an historical anthropological framework (Sagar 2018:110). (See also 
Ashcraft 1968:898.) These, I stress, are not mutually exclusive. As I take it, Locke’s 
account of the compact and the state of nature is not conceived either as an 
expository device for the application of natural law or an historical fact. The 
historical framework operates on the popular consent of tacit consenters in a 
patriarchal monarchy, prior to their joining a political society proper (see II, 74-6, 
105-12). Meanwhile, a juridical account remains abstract, isolated from historical 
anthropology. But these interpretative frameworks may, in context, be applied 
alongside each other (see Ashcraft 1968:898). 
However, the juridical framework presents an account of individual consent, 
whereas the historical framework renders consent general (i.e., popular tacit 
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consent). Also, within the juridical framework, consent may be designated as 
“express,” in terms of a permanent legal condition, applicable to one’s moral 
relationship with the state (Simmons 1993:16; Dunn 1969:106, 110-13, 121, 173). 
In this section (B), I discuss the juridical account of Locke’s original compact. 
In the next (C), I examine Locke’s concessions to Filmer’s patriarchal theory, in 
the context of an historical framework of the compact. 
On a juridical account, the form of Lockean consent, given in the compact, is 
anarchic. That is, it is self-referential qua obligation-generating act. Original 
contractors are bound to themselves, in undertaking an obligation to obey civil law. 
In this sense, I take Locke to apply the anarchical principle, in a Filmerian 
fashion. Individual consent is expressed apropos of the compact. 
As I shall discuss, it is not the case that Locke “wields the contract […] as a 
purely hypothetical argument” (Herzog 1989:78). The anarchic form of consent is 
not to be construed as “hypothetical,” in that political consent is given on the 
assumption of the political virtues of a civil society and reasonableness of its 
members. Neither a juridical nor an historical framework invites a hypothetical 
contractarian reading. 
Rather, Locke applies a justification of the state based upon political 
requirements. These obtain prior to moral and rational requirements. The political, 
in Locke, is defined by a requirement of unanimity, in the formation of government. 
Original consent is expressed in unanimity to form a commonwealth. In Locke, the 













Locke, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1975), remarks that for the 
Hobbist and the Christian, the keeping of contracts is “a great and undeniable Rule 
in Morality” because it is so required by the public or God, respectively (1.3.5). 
The same, I argue, is true of Locke — because it is so required by the polity. 
Now, Locke, Lamprecht (1962) states, 
 
was so intent on explaining what ought to be that he did not enough 
consider what is (149). 
 
The logic of the Two Treatises, however, suggests otherwise. As I read Locke, what 
ought to be is methodically derived from what is the political reality of the original 
compact. But this I do not understand primarily in a moral sense. Rather, the 
political reality of the compact presents a justification on political grounds. 
Lockean contractors agree to obey the law of their own union. At that point, they 
are no longer in a state of nature, having chosen to depart from it. Yet an obligation 
to obey, I find, does not rest on a choice to depart a natural condition. It arises from 
a political reality given by the compact. 
Now, Locke’s commonwealth alleviates the insecurity of a natural condition 
(II, 13, 134). This provides reasons for individuals to enter the state, viz. to protect 
their own property. Individuals expect their interests to be better served within a 
civil condition (see Cohen 1986:311). A natural condition presents a worse option. 
So, rational preferences lie within a civil condition. 
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The need to protect property explains how and why a commonwealth comes 
into being (see II, 134, 136). But to explain a departure from a natural condition, 
civil society needs to be judged overall preferable (Simmons 2001:129), or, 
“rationally preferable to all feasible nonstate alternatives” (126). Also, the polity 
cannot be governed by the arbitrary will of the ruler, in which case a natural 
condition would present the better option (II, 13). 
On these grounds, Locke does present an explanation for the departure from 
a natural condition. His mode of a justification of the state, however, ultimately 
does not lie in a rationale for leaving the state of nature but in political requirements 
imbedded in the original compact. In entering or being in the body politic, one is 
obliged to act in unison with the rest and thus to contribute to the preservation of 
the polity, according to the ends for which it was established (II, 138). 
Rational preferences for departing a natural condition are not essential to a 
justification of Locke’s commonwealth. While rational preferences provide an 
explanation of incorporation, a justification of Locke’s commonwealth is derived 
from political reasons. A political union of original contractors forms a justificatory 
basis for members of that union to obey its government, insofar as the government 
maintains the original contract. 
Even if preferences amount to rational requirements to enter the state, we 
persist in an explanation of why rational beings choose to leave the state of nature. 
Granted, the explanation indicates individuals ought to leave a state of nature, given 
they are rationally required to enter a civil society at a moment a natural condition 
presents a worse option. Yet political obligation, at this point, has not been 
established. Though individuals are rationally required to enter a civil society, they 
are not thereby obligated to obey the law of that society. 
On my reading of Locke, a political union, referential to original consent, is 
deemed ipso facto legitimate. A requirement of unanimity forms a justification, 
while incorporation explains a departure from a state of nature. 
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As Locke (II, 96) states, any number of men may establish a political society, 
in consenting to it in unison. Agreed upon in the original compact, is one body 
politic (II, 95), that is, a political society to be governed as one body. Here, a 
uniform direction of the body politic is pre-determined. In the establishment of a 
body politic, prospective members agree to uniformly act, given a political society 
operates by necessity as a single entity (II, 95-9). 
Although it may be separated into the legislative and executive branch, the 
polity cannot but move in a single direction (II, 95-6). Incidentally, it is carried by 
the “greater force,” – the majority, – given the predictable absence of unanimous 
decision in the making of policy and law (II, 96). As Locke (II, 96) further states, 
the power to act as one body is only exercised by the determination of the majority. 
Any form of a political society acts as one body; and it is necessary to that which 
is one body to move in a single direction. Thus, a political society must act as one 
body proceeding in a single direction, impelled by the majority. 
The body politic necessarily moves in that direction in which the majority 
impels it (II, 96). In uniting into one body politic, contractors agree that it should, 
given that it must, act as one body. Accordingly, contractors are bound by their 
mutual consent to proceed as one body, by the will of the majority. 
The original compact implies majority-rule (Laslett 1970:107). Still, the rule 
of the majority is grounded in unanimous rule. A body politic rests on a principle 
of unanimity, in its founding. But the consent of the majority is invoked in the 
application of governmental power, where unanimous decision cannot be relied 
upon (II, 95). 
Locke’s polity, as Laslett (1970:107) describes, is a collective body. The 
“gravitational logic” of the body politic requires non-resistance to the direction in 
which it ultimately shall move (107). The body politic is carried inexorably in a 
single direction. Its founding is one of unanimous decision. Decisions are otherwise 
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made by the majority, seeing that unanimous decision on any given issue “is next 
impossible ever to be had” (II, 98). 
Majority-rule is introduced by extension of a requirement of unanimity in 
adoption of membership of the society. Since the body politic cannot operate 
otherwise, prospective members effectively consent to majority-rule, viz. a system 
of governance by which the body politic necessarily operates (II, 95-6). 
Now, Cohen (1986:314) remarks upon an incoherence in Locke’s argument 
for majority-rule, given Locke proceeds from the natural freedom of individuals. If 
Lockean individuals are naturally free, in that they are not under political 
obligations, then majority-rule is unjustified; because such rule would imply an 
antecedent obligation to comply with decisions of a group (314). 
But this, I claim, is precisely the case. Prospective members are not 
individuals simpliciter but contractors. A requirement of unanimity denotes a 
collective. At this juncture, the operation of a union of contractors imposes political 
obligations tied to membership. 
As Cohen (1986:316) recognizes, the choice situation is not a state of nature. 
Individuals, at this stage, have departed the state of nature. But, in that mode, their 
coalition is relevant to political legitimacy and obligation. Natural freedom, 
apropos of the compact, validates a right to emigrate and of resistance (II, 121, 
168).264 
On Cohen’s (1986:314) understanding, political authority requires a 
consensual justification, where the parties to the contract are naturally free and 
equal individuals. But, as Cohen (1986:314) also remarks, the agreement must be 
unanimous. A requirement of unanimity, however, renders the parties to the 
contract a collective. 
 
264 On emigration, see also II, 113, 115, 121, 191; on a right of resistance, see II, 202-10. 
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A consensual justification proceeds from a requirement of unanimity. The 
consent of natural individuals remains material to the compact in relation to 
emigration and a right of resistance. But these rights affirm conditions of the 
compact, relative to membership. 
As Locke (II, 99) lays down, original contractors must be understood to 
consent to act in unison with the movement of the body politic and thus to give up 
all power to the majority, viz. necessary to the ends for which they unite into one 
political community. 
Prospective members, in coming to agreement, undertake an obligation to 
obey “the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it” (II, 97). 
Otherwise, their compact is rendered meaningless (II, 97). The union of contractors 
is implemented in the form of government and positive law. Once in agreement to 
form a government, members ought to act in unison and, by extension, abide by the 
decision of the majority (II, 132). They are uniformly bound by the will and 
determination of the majority. 
Contractors must, and are obligated by agreement to, act by the uniform 
operation of a body politic. Here, Locke presents a mechanical justification of a 
body politic (Laslett 1970:109). If the body is to continue as a single entity, it must 
move in unison (Gough 1973:66). The uniform operation of the body politic obliges 
contractors to act accordingly. Otherwise, they cannot act as one body – as they 
must. 
The “must”-statement stipulates a political requirement. For contractors to 
join a political society, it is required of them to give up the power to execute the 
law of nature. That is, as prospective members mutually agree to form a 
government, they must be understood to consent to being governed by that 
government, in virtue of their membership. 
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Here, a justification of political power is put forth in terms of a uniform 
direction of the political, as manifested in mutual consent. It serves to derive 
political obligation from unanimous rule, given the necessity of uniformity. 
Locke’s mechanical justification, I observe, operates as a political 
justification of political power. It attempts to derive an ought from a “must”-
statement. Membership entails agreeing to obey the government, seeing that the 
body politic cannot operate otherwise. This is a fact about a political union of 
contractors. In mutually consenting to a political union, contractors place 
themselves under an obligation to obey the will and determination of the majority, 
in extension of a requirement of unanimity. 
The argument (II, 95-9) proceeds from a description of the body politic and 
its uniform operation. Normative statements are derived from this description, on a 
premise of the necessity of uniformity. An obligation to obey is undertaken in 
joining a body politic operating on that premise. 
Locke (II, 99) presents his argument in descriptive terms, where, it is stated, 
original contractors must be understood to give up their power to the majority, viz. 
necessary to the ends for which they unite into one political community. In agreeing 
to membership, contractors thereby give up the power. That is, consent suffices to 
renounce it. On the other hand, we observe a normative statement in Locke’s 
rendition of the compact, where each prospective member of society is said to put 
himself under an obligation to every other member, in joining the polity and 
consenting to its membership (II, 97). 
Now, Seliger (1963:555-6) objects to the understanding of Locke’s 
majoritarianism that it is based upon the necessary operation of a body politic. For 
Seliger, Locke’s statements on majority-rule carry a prescriptive meaning. On this 
view, the majority has a moral right to be justly governed; and so, it should 
determine the movement of the body politic. Accordingly, the body politic is 
properly directed towards the consent of the majority. 
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Seliger’s (1963) reading, however, distorts Locke’s argument, in rendering it 
primarily a moral one. Locke’s project, contrarily, is to derive an obligation to obey 
from descriptive statements about the uniform operation of a body politic. 
Locke (II, 96) maintains “it is necessary the Body should move that way 
whither the greater force carries it” (italics added). This describes the inexorable 
operation of the body politic, impelled by the determination of the majority 
(“greater force”). Here, I understand “should” such that, given the necessary 
movement of the body politic, the body must (“should”) move towards the 
determination of the majority (ll. 8-9). 
In applying “should,” Seliger’s Locke maintains “that the body should move 
the way the majority carries it and not that the body unavoidably does move this 
way” (Seliger 1963:556). The “should”-statement, however, is explicitly 
descriptive, on the very premise of inevitability. It denotes a “must,” relative to the 
necessary operation of a body politic. But from this statement, Locke makes 
normative conclusions about members of the commonwealth. In virtue of 
unanimous consent, every member ought to act in deference to majority consent, 
given the body politic must so operate (II, 97).265 
Contra Seliger, Locke’s justification of the state and the majority principle is 
political. An obligation to obey is to be derived from the mechanics of the body 
politic. Ostensibly, individuals undertake an obligation to abide by the decisions of 
the majority by their own consent. Yet political obligation only incurs given 
unanimous consent of original contractors. 
A requirement of unanimity manifests the operation of the body politic. 
Political obligation is imposed, seeing that in political union, contractors cannot act 
 
265 To take an alternative approach, we might concede a confluence of an “ought” (“should”) and a 
“must,” in Locke’s account of the compact. A “must,” as it relates to the body politic, also relates 
to agents. The “should”-statement, as it relates to agents, combines “is obliged” and “is obligated” 
(cf. Hart 1961:6, 82-4). Contractors are obliged (obligated) to act uniformly or by majority consent 
(viz. as they must), relative to their membership of the commonwealth. 
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otherwise. They must act in unison; and in adopting membership, they undertake 
an obligation to maintain a requirement of unanimity. 
The political grounds Locke’s justification of political power.266 In effect, 
original contractors take possession of a body politic in vacuis locis,267 by agreeing 
to act in unison. Recall, also, Locke’s labor theory of property does not require 
consent for the appropriation of property (see II, 28). Contractors set up a 
government for the protection of their property, justified by their own labor. 
Justification by means of consent is introduced at the formation of government. But 
the form of consent is not individual but unanimous consent. 
Now, Simmons (2016) contrarily claims Locke’s construction of the original 
compact “is no functionalist argument for political authority: it is only an argument 
concerning how best to understand the content of the political consent that grounds 
all such authority” (118). That is, Locke’s ostensible mechanical justification does 
not relate essentially to the necessary operation of the body politic. The content of 
consent, rather, is fundamentally at issue, viz. the transfer of individual natural 
rights to a governing body. 
However, I take the content of consent to be unanimous rule. The notion of 
unanimous consent is fully aligned with the operation of the body politic. It is in 
fact the very expression of political union operating inevitably as a single entity. 
The operation of the body politic is implied in the content of consent, namely, 
unanimous rule. In the making of a political union, a requirement of unanimity 
 
266 Political justification of political union, in Locke, may be contrasted with a moral justification of 
the same argumentation, in Grotius’s De Jure Belli (2005). As Grotius (2005) argues, it is 
unreasonable that a greater number be governed by a lesser (the majority by the minority). The 
majority, accordingly, has a natural right and authority over the whole of society. Therefore, the 
whole body of a public society, or the majority thereof, obliges each member of the society 
(II.V.XVII, 545-7). That is, each member of society has a moral obligation to obey the decisions of 
the majority, in virtue of the moral right of the majority to make decisions for the whole of society. 
In contrast, Locke (II, 95-9) does not proceed from the moral right of the majority but the inexorable 
operation and direction of a body politic, viz. given political requirements to obey and unite. 
267 II, 121. 
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obtains for original contractors to mutually agree to give up their natural executive 
right. They do so in response to that requirement. 
Unanimous rule is fixed in the body politic, which operates by necessity as a 
single entity. In the establishment of a body politic, prospective members, 
accordingly, must agree to act as one. Qua members, they ought to act as one. 
A formation of political union presents unanimous rule, logically prior to the 
renouncing of individual natural rights. On this interpretation, political authority is 
not derived from a transfer of natural rights but the requirement to give up those 
rights, given a body politic cannot operate otherwise as a single entity (see II, 96). 
The natural rights of individuals are transferred after the fact. The transfer of 
natural rights does not contribute to the very formation of union. It is, rather, 
referential to the union. In deference to a political requirement, mutual consent is 
expressed to form a government and obey its laws.268 
On Simmons’s (1993:92) interpretation, Locke does not retreat from 
individual consent in his rendition of the original compact. Majority consent, 
Simmons (1993) maintains, may be reduced to the consent of “each member [who] 
has personally authorized the majority to act for him by the consent he has given to 
be a member of the society” (92). Yet prospective members are required to 
“authorize” the majority to act, in mutuality. Political obligation is not incurred by 
individual consent but the unanimous consent of prospective members. 
Accordingly, members are not to revoke authorization.269 
 
268 Conversely, as Gough (1973:66) would have it, individual consent is required only at the 
initiation of a political community. Otherwise, Locke maintains tacit consent. The government, 
further, subsists not by the keeping of consent (65). Rather, it is subject to the law of nature via a 
threat of revolution, upon its failure (65). A threat of revolution, however, implies political consent. 
Also, revolution does not threaten the commonwealth (or the state) but the government or agents of 
the state. In resistance to the government, unanimous consent is affirmed in defense of the state. 
Resistance is due to a government in violation of the foundation of the state (see II, 168). 
269 This is not to deny the option of emigration, in Locke (II, 113, 115, 121, 191). As I argue, 
membership requires authorization; thus, revocation of consent necessitates emigration. 
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Now, in his claiming actual consent within the compact, Simmons (1993:92) 
does in fact invoke a political requirement. As Simmons (1993:92) acknowledges, 
each prospective member must consent “before” he is subject to political power. 
“But,” Simmons (1993) then adds, “this personal consent to be a member just is 
consent to be determined by the majority” (92). It entails the right of the majority 
to rule (92).270 Yet, if actual consent must be performed, each member consents to 
being governed in response to a political requirement. An obligation to obey does 
not, in that case, follow from individual consent but the requirement to perform 
consent. The requirement is manifested in unanimous consent; and consent would 
only entail majority-rule, by extension. 
It is not viable, in maintaining political obligation, to reduce unanimous 
consent to the consent of each member. Otherwise, the Filmerian objection is again 
invoked, whereas it would be the prerogative of each member to revoke consent. It 
is in fact the mutuality of consent, given in the compact, that incurs an obligation 
to obey, not consent per se. 
Locke (II, 97) recognizes as much, rejecting the idea of consenting to what 
one sees fit as an obligation-generating act. A compact, on those conditions, would 
signify nothing (ll. 4-6). In incorporation, one is rather understood by his own 
consent to put himself under an obligation to every member of society. There is no 
 
270 On this point, also consider Macpherson’s (1962:254) claim to the effect that an equation of 
individual and majority consent is consistent only within the framework of proprietary relation in 
the aim of securing property. As Macpherson (1962) recognizes, “the consent which every 
individual who wishes to enter civil society must give to enter it, is the consent to be bound by the 
decisions of the majority [without which] there could be no society” (254). Individual and majority 
consent are equated, Macpherson (1962:254) takes it, given the terms of agreement necessary to the 
establishment of a civil society. 
Locke’s construal of the compact, Macpherson (1962:255) states, renders individual 
consent impossible on its own. The preservation of property alone equates individual and majority 
consent, combined in the acceptance of the will of the majority as necessary to preserve one’s own 
property (e.g., by means of taxation) (254-5). 
Individual consent, I concur, is not relevant to Locke’s original compact. On our thesis, 
however, political union of original contractors proceeds from unanimous consent, where individual 
(express or tacit) consent is understood to affirm a requirement of unanimity. 
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new obligation271 generated, where one is “no farther tied by any Decrees of the 
Society, than he himself thought fit, and did actually consent to […]” (II, 97). 
Now, Simmons (1993:92) acknowledges the requirement of unanimity in the 
grounding of political legitimacy, in Locke’s original compact. However, Simmons 
(1992) attempts to rescue the idea of individual consent, in stating that “personal 
consent entails a right of the majority to rule” (92). But here we need to distinguish 
the consent of individuals from that of prospective members. The latter, I maintain, 
is the case. It is, further, defined by mutuality. At no point does it proceed from the 
prerogative of the individual, insofar as it remains the grounding of political 
legitimacy and obligation. 
In Locke’s original compact, Simmons (1993) concedes, authorization is in 
fact “twice removed from the individual” (97). The actions of the government are 
authorized by the majority which in turn has been authorized “by each individual” 
(97), that is, the mutual consent of members. But the latter denotes contractual 
requirements in the obtaining of one body politic. Authorization at no stage 
commences by individual consent, qua obligation-generating act. Consent is 
rendered binding on political requirements. 
Still, only by her own consent may a person remove herself from the state of 
nature, Simmons (1993:68-9) notes. A person is naturally free till by her own 
consent she subjects herself to an earthly power, in adopting membership of a body 
politic (II, 15, 119). However, an obligation to obey is not incurred by her removal 
from a natural condition. In entering a civil condition, contractual requirements are 




271 On this point, Locke uses the term “Engagement” but from the context of section 97 (esp. ll. 1-
3), it unambiguously signifies obligation. 
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In conclusion, Lockean consent is applied for the justification of the state not 
through individual consent but unanimity in the founding of the state. Political 
power is not justifiable on individual consent. Rather, individual consent affirms a 
political union, after the fact. 
On this reading, I believe, we can demonstrate a coherence in Locke’s 
political doctrine, in his espousal of a state monopoly on force as well as voluntary 
membership and a right of resistance. The state’s exclusive right to command and 
be obeyed is derived from an original political union of contractors. These impose 
an obligation on themselves tied to their membership. 
Locke’s consent theory presents a political justification of political power. 
Political legitimacy is grounded in original possession by unanimous rule. The 
polity, then, rests on a de facto basis. Here, we observe a similitude in Locke and 
Filmer. In fact, the form of Lockean consent is anarchic,272 in that the original 





















A major advantage of a political naturalist interpretation of Locke’s political 
doctrine is its accommodation of tacit consent, as Locke genuinely construes it in 
his Second Treatise. By contrast, within a political voluntarist account, Lockean 
tacit consent is ill accommodated. For here, Locke allows non-intentional consent. 
I now briefly discuss this aspect of a political naturalist interpretation, as here 
proposed, versus that of political voluntarism. 
As Locke (II, 119) remarks, for the giving of consent, the voicing of it is not 
a necessary condition. (See also Dunn 1980:162.) Locke (II, 119-22), accordingly, 
proceeds to distinguish express from tacit consent. 
Tacit consent, Locke (II, 121) states, begins and ends with the enjoyment of 
state facilities. Making use of these resources suffices to consent to political 
authority. Express consent may take a declarative form of oaths of allegiance (II, 
151). (See also Simmons 1993:84.) Here, Locke (II, 119, 121) refers to actual 
agreement or any sufficient express declaration of consent.273 Accordingly, 
Simmons (1993:84) suggests express consent, in Locke, may be limited to verbal 
and written agreements (oaths, declarations).274 
 
273 Oaths to a foreign power, Locke (II, 134) notes, do not discharge a member of the society from 
his obedience to the legislative, the supreme power of the commonwealth (ll. 8-9, 21-4). 
274 Oaths of allegiance, notably, are not required for the citizenry. Contra Farr and Roberts (1985), 
Locke, in his “On Allegiance and the Revolution,” ([1690] 1997) in the aftermath of the Glorious 
Revolution, does not call for an oath of allegiance to be made to William III, for the populace at 
large. 
Locke expresses his thoughts on the Glorious Revolution in this sketch, dated 1690 (Farr & 
Roberts 1975:386). In it, Locke is concerned with the perceived legitimacy of William III and makes 
a plea for William III to be publicly recognized as king de jure and James II to be abjured. 
But Locke, Farr & Roberts (1985) claim, demands public declarations or oaths of express 




Locke’s express-tacit distinction denotes a degree of political obligation 
(Simmons 1993:81). In expressly consenting, one is deemed a full (“perfect”) 
member of the society and a subject to the government (II, 119). In that case, 
consent is irrevocable (II, 121). Tacit consent, by contrast, implies conditional 
(revocable) membership (II, 199, 122). (See also Simmons 1993:81.) 
Express consenters are permanently, while tacit consenters are transitorily, 
obliged to obey the law of the land (Simmons 1993:82). Tacit consenters retain a 
right of emigration,275 while express consenters are obliged to remain subjects of 
the state (II, 120-2). (See also Simmons 1993:81-2; Dunn 1969:133; 1980:42.) Still, 
upon emigrating, tacit consenters must abandon their property (II, 121). 
On Locke’s (II, 119) doctrine, tacit consent is obligation-generating, though 
given without intention, by virtue of property or possession, lodging, traveling, or 
merely being within the domain of a state or government. (See also Simmons 
1993:199.)276 
Tacit consenters (citizens, landowners, residents etc.) need only be situated 
within the territory of the state or make use of its resources (II, 119). (See also 
 
is overstated. As Farr & Roberts (1985:387) do recognize, Locke directs his plea at the Tories, or 
those who argue in favor of William III as regent of James II (387). When Locke ([1690] 1997) does 
make an explicit demand for express consent, he refers to “the great men at court” who should 
declare their allegiance openly to the government, whereas such public acts “shall fix the rest of the 
nation in a steady resolution of fidelity and obedience” (312). 
Lastly, in his reply to Farr and Roberts (1985), Simmons (1993:84-5; 11n) notes the absence 
of the term “consent” in Locke’s sketch. This is not altogether correct, as Locke ([1690] 1997) does 
note he is not calling for a “union of consent” but “consent of thought, till by true methods all men 
were brought to be of the same mind, if that can ever be expected” (307). However, Locke does not 
refer here to express consent but recognition and acceptance of William as king de jure. 
275 As Dunn (1969:133) notes, for a full member to emigrate, would require permission of the legal 
sovereign. On the issue of emigration, see II, 113, 115, 121, 191. 
276 As Plamenatz (1968:7) remarks in opposition, traveling freely on the highway (etc.) does not 
imply even so much as a willingness to obey the law; and even if it were implied, a willingness to 
obey is not equivalent to consenting to obey the law. Guy Fawkes, we might otherwise assume, was 
willing to obey the law and to have it enforced, while present in the cellars of Westminster Palace 
(Plamenatz 1968:7; Gough 1973:70-1). To counter, it need not be presumed Guy Fawkes was 
willing to obey the law. But Guy Fawkes, on the argument of Lockean tacit consent, had consented 
to English law in his being situated within the territory of the state. If his grievance was invalid, 
Fawkes still ought to have obeyed the law, irrespective of his unwillingness. 
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Simmons 1993:199.) That is, by one’s mere presence within state territory, one 
tacitly consents to obey the laws of the state or government and is thus obliged to 
obey. 
Now, Simmons (1979:91) insists that Locke, committed to individual 
consent, undermines his own doctrine of consent qua voluntary alienation in 
introducing tacit consent. In this account of tacit consent, Locke does not require 
intention for genuine consent to be expressed.277 
To render Locke’s account of tacit consent coherent within a political 
voluntarist interpretation, Simmons (1979:89) distinguishes consent-implying acts 
from signs of consent. Lockean tacit consent is attributed to the former category. It 
“is not expressed but […] given in the performance of certain acts” (90). These are 
“enjoyments”; and they lack the intention to consent. They are not deliberate 
undertakings (91). 
As Simmons (1979:90) argues, Locke construes enjoyments as tacit consent, 
but these do not constitute signs of consent. They merely imply consent. Implying 
consent, however, is not sufficient for political obligation (89-91). An obligation is 
not generated based upon a genuine consensual act (91). Thus, it would not obtain 
under a principle of consent but, rather, a principle of fairness278 or gratitude (see 
Simmons 1979:94; Plamenatz 1968:24). 
 
277 Simmons follows Plamenatz in rendering Lockean consent an act of voluntary alienation of a 
right. But Simmons (1979:97) rejects aspects of Plamenatz’s argument, viz. in its proceeding from 
an attitudinal sense of consent. While he understands consent as the granting of a right, Plamenatz 
also presumes approval in the expression of genuine consent. Attitude, Simmons (1979:93) 
maintains, is irrelevant to genuine consent, rights, and obligations. Attitudinal consent denotes a 
sign of approval; it does not signify consent proper. 
Notably though, in the postscript to his Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation (1968), 
Plamenatz does depart from the understanding of consent here attributed to his account, approaching 
Simmons’s preferred sense of consent in terms of an act of consent. 
278 This refers to the Rawlsian principle of fairness and duty of fair play. If a practice, institution, or 
a social scheme is based on just social arrangements, obligations of “fair play’’ may arise or be 
generated (Rawls 1958:178, 183), in which context participants make commitments to, and have 
expectations towards, one another. Participants are bound by “the duty of fair play,” once they 
knowingly engage in a just and fair practice, of which they accept the benefits (183). 
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Accordingly, Simmons (1993:203-4) conceives Lockean tacit consent as 
“willing benefaction.” Benefaction, for Locke, is a form of consent and an 
obligation-generating act (Simmons 1993:204; 14n). But Locke errs, Simmons 
(1979:91) charges, in identifying consent with consent-implying grounds for 
obligation, namely, “enjoyments.” 
Receipt of benefits from the state, on this argument, may be understood to 
generate political obligation. But, while receipt of benefits imply consent, the 
implication of consent is irrelevant to the incurring of an obligation. Enjoyments 
generate an obligation not because they imply consent but because they form a 
moral relationship (of fairness, gratitude) (Simmons 1979:94-5). 
Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent allows (e.g.) residing or traveling to denote 
consent, such that one would consent unintentionally, or without “conscious 
choice” (Simmons 1993:199-200). But, Simmons (1979:95) stresses, though it may 
imply consent, residence (etc.) is not a sign of consent. It does not constitute 
genuine consent, as a “choice situation” (of assent or dissent) is missing (95).279 
Now, tacit consent, in Locke (II, 121), is conditional upon emigration or 
departure.280 If not explicitly expressed,281 a member may revoke his consent, in 
giving up his membership. But, Simmons (1979:98-100) argues, emigration is not 
only “unpleasant” but unreasonable and overly challenging to the dissenter. It does 
not meet conditions of reasonable means to dissent and non-detrimental 
consequences for dissenting (80-2). Thus, an opt-out by emigration does not meet 
conditions of the validity of consent. 
Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent, Simmons (1993:203) remarks, relies on a 
ground of political obligation inconsistent with political voluntarism. As Simmons 
 
279 If, Plamenatz (1968) argues, residence (etc.) implies consent, “then there never existed any 
government but ruled with the unanimous and continuous consent of all its subjects” (7-8). 
280 Also, consent is conditional upon a right of resistance (II, 168). 
281 See II, 119-22. Express consent (if given by oath) nullifies the right of emigration, whereas tacit 
consenters retain this right (II, 120-1). 
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(1979:83) argues, tacit consent, if genuine, is to be expressed with the intention to 
consent (or such that intention is communicated). But, in Locke, intention is not 
required for tacit consent. Lockean tacit consent amounts to mere acquiescence. As 
a result, Locke undermines his political voluntarist doctrine (Simmons 1979:91). 
Bona fide consent requires freedom to choose and to do otherwise. 
Acquiescence, however, does not rest on choice (Simmons 1993:214; 45n). It thus 
fails to ground political obligation (216). Notably though, Simmons (1993:213) 
acknowledges a potential in Lockean tacit consent, under some conditions, to be 
deliberately and voluntarily given (with intention). Lockean consent, after all, is 
designed to ground political obligation and political power (216). Therefore, 
Lockean consent proper, including tacit consent, is to be of the voluntary kind. 
Otherwise, Locke’s consent theory “justifies virtual subjection by birth” (200) and 
thus “can in no way be consistent with Locke’s affirmation of our natural freedom 
to choose where our allegiance will lie” (200). 
All the same, Simmons is constrained in his voluntarist interpretation, in that 
it largely rejects Lockean tacit consent. Our interpretation, from a political 
naturalist perspective, need not make this sacrifice. 
First, consider the question of freedom. Tacit consent, though not based in 
intention, is not devoid of a reference to freedom. But to discern this reference, we 
need to apply tacit consent to the original compact. 
In extension of natural freedom, Locke proposes “the liberty of man,” (II, 22) 
in his construction of the original compact. In this context, the choice of joining a 
body politic is rendered coherent, in terms of freedom. The choice of entering a 
political society proper is one of social moral beings, in consideration of their 
interest in securing their life, liberty, and estate (II, 171). 
I wish to defend Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent on grounds of the original 
compact. Tacit consent, on this ground, defers to unanimous rule, viz. the political 
authority of one body politic (II, 95). 
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As Locke (II, 120) explicates, in uniting oneself to the commonwealth, one’s 
person and possessions become subject to the government. Also, whoever enjoys 
property submitted to the government, “must take it with the Condition it is under; 
that is, of submitting to the Government of the Commonwealth, under whose 
Jurisdiction it is, as far forth, as any Subject to it” (II, 120). Here, Locke refers to 
incorporation and enjoyment of the property annexed by government, in validating 
the tacit form of consent. Absent this reference, Locke’s account of tacit consent 
lacks ground. 
Now, a voluntarist account emphasizes intention and awareness of genuine 
tacit consenters. Voluntariness, however, is not stressed in Locke’s examples of 
tacit consent (see II, 119). These examples, on the contrary, undermine 
voluntariness, as is their purpose and design. As Simmons (1993:38; 62n) 
recognizes, political voluntarism is compromised, given such passivity of Lockean 
consent. But Lockean consent is admissibly passive in a civil society founded by 
compact. The activity of members within the domain of the state affirms the 
compact on which the state is founded. This, recall, may also apply to visitors. 
The passivity of Lockean consent does not signify benefaction but the 
extension of original consent in the activity of members within state domain. An 
obligation is fixed not in tacit consent but political requirements, imbedded in the 















Lockean consent, on my interpretation, entails political requirements. But the form 
of Lockean consent proposed is not hypothetical, in that supposedly, contractors 
would consent upon joining the commonwealth. Rather, in joining the society, they 
do consent to being governed, given that they must agree to unanimous rule. 
The right question is not what would be but what is agreed upon in entering 
civil society. For Locke, prospective members inevitably agree to a principle of 
unanimity and, by extension, majority-rule. This, I propose, is properly understood 
in terms of political requirements imbedded in the original compact, rather than 
rational or moral requirements. 
Now, Cohen (1986:312) suggests a rationale for leaving a natural condition 
is unnecessary for the purposes of justification in Locke’s argument of the original 
contract. On Cohen’s approach, “the question of what would be agreed to by free, 
equal, and rational individuals” aware of the insecurity of a natural condition, is to 
be separated from what would be the agreement of individuals in the state of nature 
(312). Here, Cohen adopts a hypothetical contractarian reading of Locke’s political 
doctrine. But this skews Locke’s account of the original compact, in my view. 
Instead, I will distinguish the question of what is agreed upon in incorporation from 
what motivates rational agents to leave a natural condition. 
So, I reject a hypothetical contractarian reading of Locke’s consent theory, as 
we would find in (e.g.) Pitkin (1965) and Waldron (1988). Though I oppose the 
voluntarist interpretation of Locke’s political doctrine, I do concur with Simmons 
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on this issue,282 viz. that hypothetical consent does not present bona fide Lockean 
consent. 
This is important to note, because a hypothetical contractarian reading 
prioritizes a moral obligation over the political. Our thesis states the reverse: the 
political establishes an obligation to obey. 
On Pitkin’s (1965) reading, Lockean consent, ultimately, is construed in the 
form of willing benefaction. Here, a legitimate government, for Locke, is of such 
quality that rational contractors would consent to its rule, viz. agree to being 
governed by a just or otherwise virtuous government, according to appropriate 
limits of political power. (See also Simmons 1993:205.) 
Waldron (1988:273) also makes a case for hypothetical contractarianism, in 
his interpretation of Locke’s original contract. But hypothetical consent, for 
Waldron, is here negative, akin to Kant’s formulation of this type of consent.283 
On Waldron’s (1988:205) reading, a rational person cannot be supposed to 
intentionally change her condition for the worse, as in accepting the terms of a 
tyrannical government, presenting a direr circumstance than the state of nature (see 
II, 137). If so, then the performance of consent is not necessary to establish political 
legitimacy and to impose political obligation. (See also Simmons 1993:205-6.) 
As Pitkin (1965:996-7) would have it, Lockean consent is “virtually 
automatic,” “hypothetical,” and “essentially irrelevant” to political obligation. For 
Pitkin, Locke’s (II, 119) account of tacit consent corroborates such a reading. 
Possession or property, or one’s mere presence within the territory of the state, 
suffices to impose political obligation. Consent is tacit on these premises. It is 
expressed merely by acting, moving, or being within the domain of the state. 
 
282 See Simmons 2001:135; 32n; 1993:206; 1979:86-8. 
283 See Immanuel Kant’s “On the Common Saying: ‘This may be true in theory, but it does not apply 
in practice’,” 79, in Kant’s Political Writings (1970). 
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Still, Pitkin (1965:995) stresses, Locke rejects that propriety, using facilities, 
or otherwise being within the territory of a tyrannical government constitutes tacit 
consent to that government. Lockean consent, accordingly, does not denote 
universal obligation (995), that is, in acting, moving, or being within the territory 
of a government. These activities or inactions do not invariably constitute consent. 
If the government acts contrary to the terms of the original compact, consent does 
not obtain. A citizen, in that case, is not bound to the laws of the government. 
As Pitkin (1965:994-5) explains, the limits of political authority are defined 
by the original compact. Tacit consenters are not bound to obey laws or decrees 
outside the limits of, or contrary to, its terms. They retain a right of resistance in 
case of a tyrannical government, exceeding the limits of its derivative authority 
(995-6). Members, then, are not invariably bound to obey. If the fundamental terms 
of the compact are violated, obligation is abolished. However, given the 
government acts within the bounds of the compact, members are bound to obey its 
laws (996). 
On Pitkin’s reading, political obligation is not determined ultimately by 
individual consent. In that respect, I concur. For Pitkin, however, Lockean members 
supposedly ought to obey the law, provided the government adheres to the compact 
in being just or otherwise morally virtuous. 
Members, on Pitkin’s (1965) reading, are not bound to obey because they 
have consented but in virtue of “certain characteristics,” the “nature” or the 
“character,” of the government. The ground of political obligation is the moral 
quality of government.284 Whether one has consented, is “essentially irrelevant,” as 
 
284 A point of contention, here, is Pitkin’s (1965) discussion of government, without a proper 
distinction of state and government. Yet, if we only proceed on a proper distinction of state and 




consent is presumed on the assumption of conformity to the terms of the original 
contract “imputed to hypothetical, timeless, abstract, rational men” (997). 
Now, Simmons (2001:135; 32n) objects to Pitkin’s reading of Lockean 
hypothetical consent. As Simmons (1979:87) maintains, this reading ignores 
Locke’s reliance on individual consent, which is the sole ground of political 
obligation.285 Genuine consent is for Pitkin understood to constitute a sufficient 
condition of political obligation (Simmons 1979:86; 1993:206). However, 
Simmons (1979:86) insists, Lockean consent is (or may be understood to be) a 
necessary, not a sufficient, condition.286 Given this, a member may veritably 
consent to an illegitimate regime, yet not bind himself to it (87). As this is missed, 
Pitkin errs in concluding Lockean consent is essentially irrelevant, opting instead 
for the moral quality of government (Simmons 1979:86-8; 1993:206). 
For Simmons (1979:97), consent grounds political obligation. Since a person 
lacks the power to enslave herself (II, 23), an obligation to a tyrannical state or 
government is not incurred, even if one genuinely does consent to its rule 
(Simmons’s 1979:87). Bona fide consent, in that case, fails to bind, viz. on the 
premise of its being necessary, not sufficient, for political obligation. 
Now, I do agree Lockean consent remains the ground of political obligation. 
On the other hand, our thesis contrasts with Simmons’s view, in that we understand 
consent as the original act of forming unanimous rule. That is, insofar as Lockean 
consent grounds obligation, it is expressed in unanimity at the formation of 
government. As such, it is not only necessary but sufficient for political obligation. 
 
285 See also Simmons 1976:285; 1993:59, 73, 198. 
286 Simmons (1993:72, 198), in fact, also proceeds from Lockean consent as a sufficient condition 
(within appropriate limits of political power), in his voluntarist interpretation of Locke’s consent 
theory. Still, Simmons (1993) construes “the central Lockean claim” (76) as that of consent being a 
necessary condition of political obligation. As I take it, consent, given a legitimate polity, may be 
deemed sufficient for political obligation, whereas outside appropriate limits of political power (in 
the case of an illegitimate regime), it is not sufficient but necessary for political obligation. However, 
this, again, would amount to “the central Lockean claim” of consent as a necessary, not a sufficient, 
condition for political obligation. Simmons (1993) leaves us with some ambiguity on this issue. 
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Original contractors place themselves under an obligation to their own union. They 
retain a right of resistance to the government. But the right is retained in defense of 
the state, namely, the commonwealth. The error in Pitkin, on this view, arises from 
a lack of distinction between the state formed in unanimous rule and its apparatus 
in the guise of government. 
Lockean consent is not hypothetical, in that members ought to obey a just 
polity by reason of its being just. Members, I contend, ought to obey “the greater 
force” (II, 96) of the commonwealth, viz. the majority as an extension of a principle 
of unanimity. The state, on this premise, is irrevocably good. If the government 
violates the compact, members may exercise their right of resistance, in defense of 
their union. 
It is not the case that natural individuals ought to join the state.287 But if they 
do join, they thereby consent to being governed. Further, if the apparatus of the 
state is employed for the public good, they are bound by their own consent to obey 
the government. They are not bound to obey in virtue of the moral quality of the 
state. Rather, given government acts for the public good, members are bound to 
obey (if they wish to retain their membership).288 The public good is not essentially 
a moral good. It is conceived in a political union formed by the compact. The 
 
287 Compare Kant (MM 6:312). In The Metaphysics of Morals (1996), Kant (6:312) stipulates a 
moral obligation to enter a civil condition. The state of nature, as Kant here defines it, is devoid of 
justice. Thus, unless any concept of right be renounced, naturally free individuals ought to depart 
from a state of nature and join a civil condition. The concept of right dictates an obligation to enter 
a civil condition (6:312). Contrarily, I posit for Locke’s doctrine, in his Two Treatises, a political 
justification of political power. Political obligation, then, is imposed and a moral obligation ex post 
facto. It is not the case that naturally free individuals ought to join the state, but if they do join the 
state, they must undertake a political obligation to obey, and only then are they morally obliged to 
obey. 




government, then, may exercise an absolute power, provided its power is not 
applied arbitrarily towards the union.289 
The weakness of Pitkin’s argument lies in her use of the concept of 
“government.” Pitkin, I find, does not distinguish properly between state and 
government within the context of Locke’s political doctrine. The right of resistance, 
on my reading, is not a right of resisting the commonwealth but the apparatus of 
the state, namely, the executive and the legislative. An act of resistance is directed 
against the government in defense of the state (see II, 155, 168). No one possesses 
a right to resist the commonwealth. 
As Dunn (1969:143) remarks, the objective in Locke’s consent theory is not 
to discriminate between governments to be and not to be resisted but to explain 
rightful resistance to any government. That is, a government in violation of the 
original compact, may be resisted. But the government is set up in extension of 
unanimous rule. Its purpose is not fundamentally a moral one. 
I reject, then, the hypothetical form of Lockean consent. But Lockean 
consent, in a sense, is automatic in the formation of union. This feature of consent 
relates to original consent. However, in the context of individual expression, 
consent is referential to its original form. 
Express consent is evidently non-automatic. It remains a choice. With respect 
to tacit consent, one may be understood to consent and so to be bound to obey the 
law, absent a tyrannical regime, even on the premise of one’s presence alone, within 
the territory of the state (see II, 119). But a tacit consenter may revoke consent by 
emigrating to another commonwealth or (returning to the state of nature) 
establishing a new one in vacuis locis (II, 121). Also, a tacit consenter may return 
to, and then remain in, a natural condition (II, 95). Here, revocation of consent is 
permitted on juridical conditions fixed in the compact. 
 
289 I discuss the conceptual difference between absoluteness and arbitrariness at length in Section 
D, Chapter 15. 
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On our account of unanimous consent, prospective members may be said to 
automatically agree on the necessity of unanimity and, by extension, to majority-
rule (see II, 95-6).290 Mutual consent obtains in performative agreement of political 
union. It expresses a contractual requirement in the formation of a body politic. 
In a supposed demonstration of individual consent, Simmons (1993:206) 
notes Locke’s speaking of “the consent of every individual” (II, 96) and one’s “own 
Consent” (II, 95), in entering political society proper. But in these passages, 
individual consent is subordinated to unanimous rule. For, as Locke (II, 95) adds, 
the only way anyone divests himself of his natural liberty is to put on the bonds of 
civil society in agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community (II, 95). 
Political requirements, I propose, ground political obligation, as inexorably 
undertaken in formation of union. These are imbedded in Locke’s original compact. 
Unanimous consent is expressed in affirmation of political union, where obligation 
to obey is imposed by original contractors themselves. Also, the limits of 
governmental power are juridically determined by the compact. 
It is not the case that good government ought to be obeyed because it is good. 
Conversely, government is good because it ought to be obeyed. Also, Lockean 
consent is not presumed given the fulfilment of stately virtues. Rather, in 
incorporation, the authority of the state is implied. Further, individual consent 
affirms the authority of the state. 
Tyranny is in breach of political requirements. However, this is due not to the 




290 On this conclusion, I object to Kendall’s (1965:117) suggested construal of Lockean consent as 
“additive” (see also Gough 1973:68), save in the sense of individual consent, viz. in affirmation of 






Locke’s Concessions to the Patriarchal Theory. 
 
I shall, for present purposes, adopt an historical framework of Locke’s state of 
nature and the original compact. This is not to discount an ahistorical account, e.g., 
Dunn’s (1969) reading of Locke’s state of nature as a juristic condition of natural 
law. But an ahistorical account, as a state-of-nature model, does not exclude an 
historical account of the state of nature. 
An historical rendering of Locke’s consent theory introduces his 
anthropological patriarchalism, in view of concessions he makes to Filmer’s 
patriarchal theory. Locke, I suggest, maintains a Filmerian view of the political, in 
his account of patriarchal societies. 
Also, Locke’s doctrine of inheritance and bequest is properly understood 
within a political naturalist framework. In this context, we observe Locke’s 
patriarchal view in his theory of property in pre-civil and civil societies. 
We are, in this respect, indebted to Martin Seliger, in his study of Lockean 
naturalism, as put forth in his The Liberal Politics of John Locke (1968). Seliger’s 
project is to demonstrate the naturalism in Locke’s political doctrine. While Seliger 
proceeds from Locke’s historical anthropology, our thesis proposes the priority of 
the political over the natural. 
The political aspect of Lockean patriarchalism deserves emphasis, in addition 
to the anthropological. I do not concur with Cuttica (2012:5) that the former is to 
replace the latter. These are not mutually exclusive. 
Now, given that each person is born free in the state of nature, natural 
individuals, supposedly, lack political obligations (see Simmons 1993:26). (See 
also Cohen 1986:313.) A natural condition, in this sense, is understood as a pre-
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political state. But Locke’s (II, 74-6, 105-12) anthropological account refutes this 
conclusion. A patriarchal monarchy, as described by Locke, is properly political, 
though pre-civil. 
This contradicts Aschraft (1968:913) contention that a patriarchal monarchy 
does not qualify, for Locke, as a political society, since its subject monarchy are 
still in the state of nature. But a distinction here is needed between the political and 
the civil, where the latter includes legality, viz. the formation of a legislative. 
Ashcraft (1968) assumes the political is attached to the legal. But a form of the 
political subsists in a natural condition, namely, a pre-civil one. 
A pre-civil political society is what I term “anarchical.” This sense of the 
political I observe in Filmer as well as in Locke. 
Filmer’s system grounds the patriarchal theory on the political. I argue this is 
also the case in Locke. In fact, Locke constructs his theory of an original compact 
within a Filmerian paradigm. Our positive rendering of Filmer’s system is to 
demonstrate an anarchical version of consent theory. Locke, on my reading, applies 



















Yoram Hazony, in his The Virtue of Nationalism (2018), faults Locke for 
dismissing political and moral obligation arising from natural bonds. Locke’s 
account of political obligation “is painfully lacking as a description of the empirical 
political world,” since it ignores responsibilities intrinsic to familial and ethnic 
communities, not arising from consent (29). Membership and moral obligation to a 
human community, for Locke, depends wholly upon consent. Moral relationships, 
as a result, are isolated within the framework of consent (29). The emergent state, 
as described in Locke’s Second Treatise, is derived from the consent of arbitrary 
property owners (30-1). Locke’s account, thus, “is in effect a far-reaching 
depreciation of the most basic bonds that hold society together” (29). 
However, Locke’s consent theory is infused with his account of the beginning 
of human societies in the form of patriarchal monarchy. Although Locke’s consent 
theory may be limited to arbitrary property owners, it may also be analyzed in terms 
of an historical anthropological account, in which Locke makes his concessions to 
the patriarchal theory. 
Ian Parker (2004), in his more positive critique of Locke, also accentuates a 
supposed non-naturalism in Locke. Locke’s project, on this critique, is 
demonstrating that scripture does not impose naturalism (107). Human beings, on 
a proper scriptural account, are not to follow the dictates of sheer nature but reason, 
in overcoming their nature in construction of civil society (107). Locke, according 
to Ian Parker (2004:120), severs the connection between scripture and the 
patriarchal order, in demonstration of the conventional origins of patriarchal 
politics, as opposed to natural. However, the distinction between the natural and the 
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conventional in Locke’s political doctrine, is not appropriate. The conventional, I 
observe, rather extends the natural, within the context of Locke’s evolutionary 
account of the beginning of human societies. Reason, for Locke (II, 6), is the law 
of nature. 
Locke, on Ian Parker’s (2004:140) reading, argues from his Genesis account 
that political society does not obtain from a patriarchal monarchy. Yet Locke (II, 
74-5) does concede that political societies in all probability developed in the form 
of a patriarchal monarchy. In Locke, Adam signifies the patriarchal origins of civil 
society, but these are ultimately understood in terms of original communism, as 
opposed to original natural inequality. 
A non-naturalist interpretation of Locke’s political doctrine, as we find in 
Hazony (2018) and Ian Parker (2004), proceeds from Locke’s juridical account. 
But the historical framework of Locke’s doctrine is not given its due. This follows 
the example of Dunn (1969:106), where a juridical condition of the original 
compact is understood as apolitical, beyond an historical context. For Dunn (1969), 
the legal thus has precedence over the political, in formation of Locke’s 
commonwealth. 
Locke’s juridical account describes, in abstract, the establishment of an 
independent judge in the formation of civil society, by arbitrary freemen, in 
protection of their life, liberty, and estate. But, on an historical account, the 
formation of civil society obtains in transition from a patriarchal monarchy. 
As I gather, the historical and juridical framework are not mutually exclusive. 
The juridical account does not exclude the historical framework in which Locke 
makes his concessions to the patriarchal theory. The state of nature is not merely a 
“transhistorical moral or legal concept that defines the relationship among any 
individuals or groups without a recognized terrestrial superior” (Scott 2000:553). 
The juridical framework, in isolation, need not even be thought of as ahistorical 
(Sagar 2018:110n). On the juridical framework, Locke’s state of nature is not 
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“temporally bounded” but rather defined by the absence of a common arbiter to 
settle disputes, in which case individuals may resort to exercising the natural right 
to punish (Sagar 2018:111). The state of nature accordingly may obtain at any 
historical moment (111). 
Contra Ian Parker (2004), Locke’s Genesis account nowhere undermines the 
patriarchal origins of political society. On the contrary, these are confirmed. On 
Locke’s evolutionary account, political society arises from a patriarchal monarchy. 
Though patriarchal origins of political society may be abstracted in terms of 
Locke’s juridical account, the historicity of Locke’s doctrine is not thereby 
excluded. Locke proceeds within a naturalist framework but his is an evolutionary 
theory of the beginning of human societies. For Filmer, the state is original. Further, 
the juridical account of Locke’s political doctrine is in fact naturalist, in that it relies 
ultimately on the possessory right of original contractors, in virtue of unanimous 
consent to the formation of a political society, in protection of their property. 
As I observe, pace Dunn (1969), the juridical condition is not to be 
understood as apolitical. Though a juridical condition may be abstracted from its 
historical origins, it is not to be understood as apolitical. The politics of the original 
compact are grounded in possessory right and unanimous rule in defense of that 
right. Within the historical framework, the formation of government in unanimous 
rule is then understood within an evolutionary framework of the beginning of 
human political societies in the form of patriarchal order. 
We consider, on this issue, Martin Seliger’s interpretative account of Locke’s 
political philosophy. As Seliger (1968) maintains, Locke’s political doctrine is 
grounded in anthropological patriarchalism,291 seeing that Locke makes significant 
 
291 Seliger’s (1968) contribution weighs heavily on my own interpretative account of Locke’s 
consent theory, as I render within a political naturalist framework. I do, however, take issue with 
Seliger’s attribution of priority to the patriarchal theory, on the analysis of Locke’s concessions to 
the theory. On my interpretative account, the patriarchal theory is parasitic on sovereignty theory, 
in Locke’s doctrine. In Filmer, however, these are identified. 
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concessions to a traditionalist Aristotelian view of the beginning of human 
societies, one espoused by Richard Hooker, quoted accordingly in Two Treatises. 
Locke (II, 74-6; 105-12) concedes to the patriarchal theory the following. 
Patriarchal monarchy was most suitable to first human societies. Accordingly, an 
evolution of human society towards a patriarchal monarchy was most probable. 
Thus, the first human societies manifested a patriarchal one-man rule; and the 
transition to a political society proper proceeded from a patriarchal monarchy. 
As Seliger (1968) affirms, Locke concedes the proposition that in a natural 
condition, a patriarchal society governed by one-man rule subsists. Further, in 
Locke’s commonwealth, absolute monarchy is a viable form of government, 
effectively prolonging patriarchal monarchy in political society proper (see II, 132). 
Now, while I concur Locke, within an historical framework, conceives 
patriarchal monarchy in a state of nature, I do question Seliger’s (1968) thesis as it 
relates to the inevitability of a patriarchal monarchy in the advent of the original 
compact. Locke’s patriarchal account is grounded, rather, in retrospective 
probabilistic reasoning, given his view of the human condition and the historical 
record. 
Seliger (1968:89, 220; 1969:22) maintains the formation of a patriarchal 
society, in the beginning of societies, is, for Locke, inevitable and definitive of 
society proper. So, a patriarchal monarchy would naturally emerge, whereas non-
monarchical non-patriarchal societies would deviate from a natural form of 
government. Hence, a political society proper would naturally emerge from a 
patriarchal monarchy, whereas a transition to a commonwealth from a non-
monarchical non-patriarchal society would be deemed an evolutionary deviation. 
Locke, however, qualifies his concessions to probability rendering such 
evolutionary determinism an exaggeration of his conciliatory statements in respect 
to the patriarchal theory. Nonetheless, Locke’s concessions are significant enough 
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to render Locke’s political doctrine patriarchal, within an anthropological 
evolutionary framework. 
Also, Seliger (1968) tends to speak not only of natural cohesion but 
nationhood, in the context of Lockean patriarchalism. It would seem “nationhood” 
overestimates the meaning conveyed by Locke’s discussion of natural 
communities. 
There is, further, a distinction to be drawn in Locke between a natural 
condition and the original compact, vis-à-vis consent, rendering a reference to 
natural cohesion non-essential in the original compact, within a juridical 
framework. While Locke, on his evolutionary view of human societies, does make 
significant concessions to the patriarchal theory, the advent of the original compact 
does not entail a patriarchal monarchy, pace Seliger (1968). Here, my observation 
is however limited to the juridical account of Locke’s political doctrine. 
A Filmerist critique of the Lockean framework, as I observe, proposes 
however an inevitable evolution of a patriarchal monarchy, even in the form of a 
democratic or an aristocratic regime, from the Adamite paradigm. 
Patriarchal communities, it may be inferred from Locke’s concessions, 
subsist in the advent of an original compact. But, as Seliger (1969) would have it, 
given the continuum of the family and the state by mediation of compact, then, 
“while government rested on consent, no other form of pristine government could 
have evolved than patriarchal monarchy” (23). This I dispute as a statement of 
Locke’s anthropology. Still, on Filmerist grounds, I observe the more purist 
argument: no other government could have evolved but monarchy, simpliciter. 
These grounds, then, may be applied to Locke’s (II, 132) own rendition of the 
formation of government. 
In his account of the state of nature and the original compact, Locke, for 
Seliger (1968:222, 229; 1969:22-3), presumes a naturally cohesive patriarchal 
society, governed by one-man rule, i.e., a patriarchal monarchy. Though I dispute 
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Seliger’s reading as to the question of inevitability, I do affirm Locke’s construction 
of the state of nature and the original compact suggests the existence of a patriarchal 
monarchy. 
On Locke’s historical account of the development of human societies,292 
human societies subsisted in the form of a patriarchal monarchy in a natural 
condition. Accordingly, the original compact emerges from a patriarchal monarchy. 
On a juridical account of Locke’s original compact, natural cohesion is 
immaterial. Also, Locke’s evolutionary account of patriarchal societies towards a 
civil society does not necessitate such evolution. Still, one-man rule and natural 
cohesion may be inferred, in the formation of civil society. 
In his evolutionary account of human societies, Locke (II, 74-6, 107, 112) 
does acknowledge the probable development of a patriarchal monarchy. Since 
children had been accustomed to the rule of the father, “it was likeliest 
[government] should, by the express or tacit Consent of the Children, when they 
were grown up, be in the Father, where it seemed without any change barely to 
continue” (II, 74, ll. 17-20). 
Men, Locke (II, 107) explains, had become accustomed to the rule of one man 
(l. 3), so they would “naturally run into that Form of Government, which from their 
Infancy they had been all accustomed to; and which, by experience they had found 
both easie and safe” (ll. 7-10). 
 
Thus we may see how probable it is, that People that were naturally 
free, and by their own consent either submitted to the Government of 
their Father, or united together, out of different Families to make a 
Government, should generally put the Rule into one Man’s hands, and 
chuse to be under the Conduct of a single Person, without so much as 
 
292 See esp. II, 74-6; 105-12. 
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by express Conditions limiting or regulating his Power, which they 
thought safe enough in his Honesty and Prudence (II, 112, ll. 1-8). 
 
Within a juridical framework, however, the original compact is not premised upon 
natural cohesion. In a transition of a naturally cohesive patriarchal society to a 
political society proper, natural cohesion is inefficacious. Natural cohesion rather 
accompanies the transition to civil society and so may be inferred. 
Locke (II, 74-6, 107, 112) admits the probability of an evolution of a 
patriarchal monarchy and of a political society proper arising from it. Still, the 
development of human societies does not necessitate a patriarchal monarchy. 
However, on an historical account, natural cohesion is assumed within a society of 
one-man rule. Absent an evolutionary account, “patriarchal” merely signifies 
“hierarchical.” As Seliger (1968) recognizes in Locke, 
 
Pristine political leadership has the complexion of paternal authority 
even when the leader is not a father, nor a monarch in the formal sense, 
but a judge or general (220). 
 
Lockean patriarchalism, however, is not analogical. Rather, the “complexion” of 
paternal authority, for Locke, is prior to patrilineage, in that the structure of political 














I present a naturalist interpretation of Locke’s consent theory. A non-naturalist 
account of Lockean consent is challenged by Locke’s concessions to Filmer’s 
patriarchal theory. These are put forth in the context of Locke’s anthropological 
patriarchalism. 
Lockean patriarchalism invokes the notion of an elective monarchy. While 
Locke admits the probability of patriarchal monarchy in the evolution of human 
societies, Locke stresses the elective quality of those societies. The patriarch-
monarch would have possessed power, as his merits would have been appreciated 
by his people. He would fulfill a protective militaristic role, given a threat of 
invasion. 
The notion of an elective monarchy accommodates Locke’s consent theory. 
But it does not depart from a Filmerian paradigm. On the contrary, it fixes the 
paradigm firmly in place, in its concept of the political. 
The consent of the people in elective monarchy is of the anarchic form. An 
examination of Locke’s original compact demonstrates this form of consent. But 
this form of consent I recognize as Filmerian. That is, it rests on a concept of the 
political, where power is possessed de facto. The original compact, I understand, is 
based upon an immediate possession of power given by mutual consent of original 
contractors. 
 




Locke, in Two Treatises, sets out to dismantle Filmer’s patriarchal theory. 
Filmerism posits a form of patriarchalism pursuant to a justification of the state, 
given the identification of power political and paternal. It is essentially not a matter 
of historical anthropology. 
 Now, Locke would not be much inclined to make any substantial concessions 
to Filmer’s justification of hereditary293 monarchy as the only natural form of 
government. But Locke does make concessions to an historical anthropological 
account of the patriarchal theory. If significant enough, I observe, said concessions 
render Locke’s doctrine vulnerable not only to an anthropological but political294 
patriarchalism. 
 As Filmer (A, 283) posits, government is by nature monarchical. Locke (II, 
106) rejects Filmer’s postulation of the monarchical nature of government. Also, 
Locke (II, 106) affirms, government does not belong to the father. 
 It is a mistake, Locke (II, 106) stresses, to infer from the historical record of 
patriarchal societies the monarchical nature and patriarchal ownership of 
government. An evolutionary account of patriarchal monarchy, for Locke, does not 
establish the patriarchal monarchical nature of government. That is, it demonstrates 
not the inevitability295 but the probable eventuality of patriarchal societies, given 
natural human tendencies and conditions of early human societies.296 
 Now, despite Locke’s rejection of the patriarchal monarchical nature of 
government, Seliger (1968) deems Locke in favor of patriarchal monarchy as a 
 
293 I do, in fact, dispute Filmer (A, 283) construes hereditary monarchy as the only natural form of 
government. Rather, for Filmer, the natural form of government is monarchy, simpliciter. However, 
it would be fair to assume Locke considers hereditary monarchy the veritable tenet of Filmer’s 
system. Cf. Arneil (1996:36). 
294 Here, I apply “political” in lieu of “ideological” (Schochet 1975:11-5) or “legal” (Daly 1979:71; 
49n), as distinguished from “anthropological” (Daly 1979; Schochet 1975). 
295 Seliger (1968; 1969) interprets Locke to maintain inevitability in the progression of human 
societies towards a patriarchal order. There is, however, no textual corroboration to this 
interpretation. Locke speaks of probability, in this context. 
296 Here, Locke (II, 111) discusses the Golden Age. 
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natural form of government. Patriarchal monarchy, for Seliger’s Locke, may be 
understood as natural “in that nothing else would be feasible and better in given 
conditions” (229).297 Locke, however, rejects a sense of “natural” in that “nothing 
more was required to become monarch than to be a father, or that it was unnatural 
eventually to displace or modify it” (229). 
 The natural, thus stated, is limited to an evolutionary account of patriarchal 
monarchy. Now, Seliger (1968; 1969) maintains, for Locke, the evolution of human 
societies towards a patriarchal monarchy is inevitable. This, however, is overstated. 
Locke (II, 105-6), rather, infers from the historical record the probability of the 
evolution of human societies towards a patriarchal order. Though patriarchal 
monarchy, given conditions of ancient societies, was the most feasible form of 
government, Locke leaves room for non-patriarchal non-monarchical societies. 
Patriarchal monarchy, let it suffice, was most feasible, as indicated by the historical 
record.298 
 Now, Locke (II, 74) grants, 
 
[…] ’tis obvious to conceive how easie it was in the first Ages of the 
World, and in places still, where the thinness of People gives Families 
leave to separate into unpossessed Quarters, and they have room to 
remove and plant themselves in yet vacant Habitations, for the Father 
of the Family to become the Prince of it (ll. 10-15). 
 
It is well conceivable, as Locke (II, 74) assesses, early human societies manifested 
a patriarchal order, where the rulership of the father was established “from the 
 
297 Seliger (1968) insists patriarchal monarchy, on Locke’s view, is inevitable in the evolution of 
human societies. The wording here, however, would accord rather with the probability of a 
patriarchal structure of human society, seeing that we state “in given conditions.” 
298 As I shall argue, Locke, in view of his account of the formation of government (see II, 132), 
consistently operates on an evolutionary account of patriarchal societies. 
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beginning of the Infancy of his Children” (ll. 15-6). (See also Seliger 1968:219.) 
Here, Locke infers the evolution of patriarchal societies from what he considers a 
pre-historical fact, namely, the rulership of the father in ancient human societies. 
This need not be understood as an inevitable human progression. But the formation 
of a patriarchal monarchy, for Locke, was most probable, in the natural 
development of human society (see Simmons 1992:217). 
 Onwards, Locke (II, 76) further acknowledges, 
 
the natural Fathers of Families, by an insensible change, became the 
politick Monarchs […] (ll. 1-2). 
 
This appears as a striking admission, as could have been authored by Filmer 
himself. The political role of the patriarch is here noted. 
 Locke (II, 76) continues, 
 
So th[e natural fathers of families] laid the Foundations of Hereditary, 
or Elective Kingdoms, under several Constitutions, and Manners, 
according as Chance, Contrivance, or Occasions happen’d to mould 
them (ll. 4-7). 
 
Here, Locke invokes the notion of elective monarchy, that is, a natural community 
ruled by a patriarch-monarch, whose power is invested in his people. A kingdom is 
founded in accordance with genealogy, in the person of an elected heir, viz. by the 
acceptance of the natural community. 
 As Locke (II, 106) explains, though patriarchal monarchy was the form of 
government “generally pitch’d upon,” in the beginning of political societies, a 
patriarchal order of one-man rule would have been predominantly elective, 
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established not due to a respect of paternal authority but given the merits of the 
ruler, in protecting his community.299 
 Lockean patriarchalism, as described, is set forth within an evolutionary 
account of early human societies. Locke’s concessions to anthropological 
patriarchalism do not, to be sure, commit him to a genetic justification of political 
power. Still, in view of the rulership of the father, patriarchal pre-civil societies are 
construed as political in structure. 
 
13.2. Natural cohesion. 
 
A patriarchal society, as here conceived, develops from familial structures, 
governed by heads of families. But while a patriarchal society may be understood 
as an ethnic community prior to civil governance, a caveat is in order, relative to 
the issue of natural cohesion of patriarchal societies, as this is discussed in Locke’s 
Two Treatises. In Locke’s original compact, the issue of natural cohesion is to be 
deemphasized. 
Here, I do not mean to argue for the absence of natural cohesion. However, I 
find the political to be prior to the familial, in Locke’s account of the formation of 
government in the original compact. The priority of the political, likewise, forms 
the basis of Filmer’s system. 
My interpretation, in this regard, deviates from Seliger’s interpretative 
account of Lockean patriarchalism. Seliger (1969) emphasizes the element of 
natural cohesion in Locke’s evolutionary account of patriarchal societies. Elective 
monarchy, for Seliger’s Locke, is grounded in familial structures. Also, “Locke 
reckoned […] from the outset with emotional togetherness and affection beyond 
the family circle” (22-3). As Seliger (1969) further states, 
 




As if analysing ‘nationalist’ attitudes, Locke coupled neighbourly 
attachment with apprehension of outsiders. The propensity for natural 
cohesion enabled, and danger from the outside necessitated, political 
society (22-3). 
  
Natural cohesion, in Seliger’s Locke, is “an inevitable form of existence” (22). 
Political society proper, in that case, “presupposes the coexistence of contractual 
with such natural ties as the modern conception of a nation associates with it” (22). 
The original compact, accordingly, is “effected by tacit consent […] as an 
outgrowth of family life” (Seliger 1969:22). The advent of the compact is explained 
by a progression of a natural community, seeking security and protection beyond 
its present capacity. Here, a natural community is re-established in the form of 
contractual bonds within the emergent civil society. Natural relations and 
structures, in Seliger’s Locke, precede and are congruent with those of contractual 
kind as formed in the original compact. 
Political society proper, on this account, inevitably arises from familial 
societal structure, given the impulse for self-preservation under a threat of invasion. 
Here, the original compact, within an historical framework, eventuates in 
continuance of the structure of family, on the premise of a temporal confluence of 
familial organization and existential threat, whereupon a political society proper 
emerges. 
Consent, on this picture, is understood as an “intermediary which turns family 
into political ties” (Seliger 1969:22). Also, Seliger (1969) defines consent, in 
somewhat rosier terms, as “the instrumentality of political freedom and the 
presupposition for ascribing a will and hence self-consciousness to a group” (32). 
Now, Seligerʼs (1969:32) definition of consent (if to be taken as such), in its 
reference to group identity, is descriptive of popular tacit consent, manifesting in 
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its expression the identity of a people. The familial structure and the extended 
community are, on this notion, molded into a political society towards a full-fledged 
state. 
The compact, as Seliger (1968) lays it down, constitutes “the tacit compliance 
of the grown-up sons with the continuance of the father’s authority in the form of 
monarchical power” (224). On Seliger’s (1968:224) reading, this is made explicit 
in Locke’s (II, 99) reducing the compact to incorporation, viz. the joining of an 
emergent body politic. On this point, Locke (II, 99) writes, 
 
[A]greeing to unite into one Political Society […] is all the Compact 
that is, or needs be, between the Individuals, that enter into, or make up 
a Common-wealth (ll. 5-8). 
 
But individuals entering and joining the commonwealth are not here described as 
heads of families but freemen. Political society is constituted in “the consent of any 
number of Freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a 
Society” (II, 99). As becomes evident, “freemen” denotes “People free and in the 
State of Nature, that being met together incorporated and began a Commonwealth” 
(II, 103). This description offers a minimalist understanding of “people” joining a 
commonwealth from a natural condition. We only assume their being in proximity, 
capable of covenanting. 
“Any number of men,” Locke (II, 95) stipulates, may coalesce to form a 
political society, agreeing thereby to majority-rule, given the inexorable operation 
of a political society proper. The term “any number of men” signifies unanimity. 
Natural ties, it may be inferred, obtain prior to a coalition by unanimous consent to 
establish a political society; yet this need not be the case. 
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Now, Seliger (1968:222) finds support in Locke’s references to 
acquaintanceship and friendship among original contractors. Or, as Locke (II, 107) 
writes, 
  
Since […] those, who liked one another so well as to joyn into Society, 
cannot but be supposed to have some Acquaintance and Friendship 
together, and some Trust on in another; they could not but have greater 
Apprehension of others, than of one another: And therefore their first 
care and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure 
themselves against foreign Force (ll. 33-9). 
  
But “trust” need not imply natural ties, though these may be inferred. It suffices 
here to assume relations of trust, capable of forming reliable expectations in the act 
of covenanting. Also, Locke’s emphasis here is rather on the threat of invasion than 
natural ties. 
“Any number of men,” then, may be drawn from a near vacuum. At most, we 
presume that individuals, capable of covenanting, subsist in proximate habitat. 
Their origin and relation, in the original compact, are not stipulated but left to 
reflective empirical reasoning. For Locke, what binds individuals, ultimately, is not 
their natural community but their ability to apply natural law in the original 
contract. 
To conclude, the evolution of human societies towards a patriarchal 
monarchy is probable, though not inevitable, on Locke’s anthropological account. 
Further, natural ties of original contractors may be inferred. But these are not 
essential to Locke’s original compact. The political is encapsulated in the compact. 
Original contractors need to engage with one another to incorporate into a body 




13.3. Tacit consent in elective monarchy. 
 
Locke’s notion of elective monarchy does not depart from a patriarchal theory. On 
the contrary, Lockean patriarchalism and its basis upon the political are further 
consolidated, on this notion. Also, though Locke’s account of the original compact 
is not reliant on natural cohesion, it invokes a non-voluntarist concept of the 
political, in its more abstract version. Locke’s concept of the political, I find, has 
not escaped a Filmerian paradigm. In fact, it serves to strengthen and develop a 
Filmerian view of the origins of political society. 
Now, in Locke’s anthropology, we infer patriarchal monarchy as the form of 
government in the beginning of human societies. But, Locke (II, 106) claims, it is 
also to be inferred “all petty Monarchies” would have been elective. The reason 
“why People in the beginning generally pitch’d upon this form” (II, 106) and 
“continued the Form of Government in a single Person, was not any Regard, or 
Respect to Paternal Authority” (ll. 15-16). Rather, the merits of the ruler were 
acknowledged out of a concern for the public good (II, 110). 
Here, Locke (II, 74) denies a paternal right, prior to consent. In elective 
patriarchal monarchy, a right to paternal power would be given by consent of the 
children. A paternal right may become properly political only by permission of the 
children to the father to solely exercise natural executive power and, by extension, 
a monarchical power (II, 74). (See also Seliger 1968:220.) 
Now, to demonstrate the grounding of paternal authority in consent, Locke 
(II, 74) envisages a stranger’s attack upon a family, where, in that case, the father 
might punish the offender not by a paternal but a natural executive right, the 
enforcement of which has been laid in the hands of the father alone. However, the 
patriarch paramount would, by paternal right granted unto him, punish the offender 
of any household within his domain and, by the same token, enforce the law of 
nature against an invader. Locke’s example is meant to undermine a natural paternal 
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right, viz. as fixed in nature. Yet the father alone exercises the right of nature to 
punish the offender, within the domain of his family. For the patriarch paramount, 
the right applies to society at large. A paternal right is thus infused with a natural 
executive right. 
In Locke (II, 74), paternal power is limited to nonage. However, at this stage 
of the state of nature, familial societal structure is indistinguishable from patriarchal 
monarchy. Here, as Locke (II, 75) recognizes, we make no essential distinction 
between minority and full age, since the children “could have no desire to be out of 
their Pupilage” (ll. 13-14). 
Locke dismisses the monarchical nature of government. But, Locke (II, 75) 
adds, 
 
’[T]was easie, and almost natural for Children by a tacit, and scarce 
avoidable consent to make way for the Father’s Authority and 
Government (ll. 1-3). 
 
The father was granted power within the family and in his extended role as the 
patriarch-monarch, from separate households within a natural community. The 
children “could no where find a greater security to their Peace, Liberties, and 
Fortunes, than in the Rule of a Father” (ll. 16-17). So, they naturally tended towards 
patriarchal government. Though monarchy is not by nature monarchical, it was 
natural for the children to consent to the authority of the patriarch-monarch and 
thus maintain his rule. 
Now, consent of the children to the rulership of the father, in Locke, is to be 
understood as tacit (Seliger 1968:224), viz. voluntary acquiescence of the father’s 
rule given his merits. The rulership of the father came to be accepted, in a time of 
relative innocence of the Golden Age (II, 111), through a habitual way of living, 
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under the protection of the father. As Locke (II, 110) describes an aspect of such a 
society, 
 
a Family by degrees grew up into a Commonwealth, and the Fatherly 
Authority being continued on to the elder Son, every one in his turn 
growing up under it, tacitly submitted to it, and the easiness and 
equality of it not offending any one, every one acquiesced, till time 
seemed to have confirmed it, and settled a right of Succession by 
Prescription (ll. 1-6). 
 
Or, rulership came to be accepted in virtue of military leadership, as a matter of 
people’s existential concern, given a threat of invasion, from “the need of a General, 
whose Conduct might defend them against their Enemies in War” (ll. 9-10).300 
Either way, rulership of the “nursing Fathers tender and carefull of the publick 
weale” (ll. 22-3) was maintained for the public good and safety (l. 19). 
At variance with the foregoing, Sagar (2018:112) describes the evolution of 
early human societies towards Locke’s commonwealth without referring to tacit 
consent to the rule of the patriarch-monarch. Tacit consent, instead, is isolated 
 
300 This demonstrates a pre-emptive Lockean reply to a Humean critique. As Hume (1985) discusses, 
a chieftain, in pre-civil human societies, “ruled more by persuasion than command” (468-9). “No 
compact or agreement, it is evident, was expressly formed for general submission; an idea far 
beyond the comprehension of savage” (468-9). “The sensible utility [of the authority of the 
chieftain] gradually produced an habitual, and […] a voluntary, and therefore precarious, 
acquiescence in the people” (468-9). But this, in fact, is Locke’s precise position, on the matter. 
Locke does conceive pre-civil political societies under military leadership, where the formation of 
such societies may be explained primarily by a threat of invasion and voluntary acquiescence of the 
people. A society governed by military rule is here understood as a form of patriarchal rule in the 
Golden Age (see II, 111). 
Also, the very utility of military leadership, to which Hume (1985) refers, may provide an 
historical explanation, consistent with Locke’s anthropological patriarchalism, of the eventuation of 
the original compact. For post-Golden Age (see II, 111), the natural person of the ruler, as the 
governing principle, has become a disvalue for the people, given accumulative corruption of 
political power, upon the realization of which the people coalesce in original contract to form a 
political society proper, viz. involving an independent legislature. 
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within a juridical account of the original contract and commonwealth (114). Early 
familial collectives “remained within the juridical state of nature insofar as 
obedience was delivered to the patriarch not because subservient family members 
consented to his rule as a political relationship, but out of gratitude, filial piety, and 
informal convenience” (112). The juridical paradigm of the natural condition, as 
Sagar (2018:113) expounds, was departed by an imperceptible301 change from a 
“non-political” patriarchal authority to a political society proper as grounded in 
consent. On Sagar’s (2018:114) interpretation, Locke presents an account of tacit 
consent to compensate for the lack of an historical record by which to substantiate 
a government founded upon consent for the preservation of property. 
However, as Locke (II, 75, 110, 106) discusses, an established patriarchal 
rule, in the form of elective monarchy, existed prior to a political society proper. 
Popular tacit consent, as in elective monarchy, is not expressed in the formation of 
government (see II, 132). Elective monarchy is defined by tacit consent of a people, 
whereby the merits of the ruler are evaluated and judged. In an original contract, 
prospective members join in political union in mutual consent, in the absence of the 
natural person of the ruler. 
Tacit consent, then, is conceived not only in terms of a juridical but an 
historical paradigm of the state of nature, whereas the latter relates to Locke’s 
discussion of the evolution of pre-civil political societies towards a political society 
proper. Patriarchal societies, as illustrated in Locke, rest on tacit consent, as 
explicated in terms of an historical anthropological account. The juridical paradigm 
relates to express and tacit consent of supposed individual members of society.302 
 
301 See II, 76, ll. 1-2. Here, I use “imperceptible,” but Locke (II, 76) speaks of an “insensible” 
change. 
302 As I do contend, individual consent, within a juridical framework, is to be understood in reference 
to unanimous consent of original contractors. Individual consent, in tacit or express form, relies on 
the original contract for its expression. 
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As presented in Locke’s anthropological account, tacit consent is general, however, 
and political as such. 
Now, as Seliger (1968) would have it, veritable express consent does not 
abound in Locke’s political doctrine. Seliger’s Locke only accounts for express 
consent in the case of unanimity, “where the recipient of all the power is a number 
greater than the majority” (224)303. Express consent “is evidenced not in an act but 
in tacit compliance with an imperceptible process” (225). Thus, effectively, express 
consent is identified with the tacit form of consent. Its only test is the absence of 
dissent (261). 
Express and tacit consent, however, need not be thus conflated. “Scarce 
avoidable” consent to the power of elected monarchs (see II, 75) is limited to the 
state of nature, or to a certain period therein. Express consent applies outside this 
context. Further, the forms of consent at issue belong to separate interpretative 
accounts of the state of nature as well as the original compact. While popular tacit 
consent applies on an historical account, express consent applies rather to on an 
ahistorical juridical304 account. Popular tacit consent remains the form of consent 
applicable to the state of nature, within an historical account. Locke, in the context 
of his contract theory, thus accommodates an evolutionary account of patriarchal 
monarchy, as grounded in consent. 
Now, we have been concerned with the state of nature, in the Golden Age, 
that is, a virtuous age when ambition, luxury, and evil concupiscence had yet to 
corrupt the power of governors (II, 111). At the juncture of a future age, where the 
extravagances and abuses of power are operationally restrained, for the sake of the 
 
303 This is a variation of II, 99, ll. 4-5 (“unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the 
majority”). 
304 As Sagar (2018:110n) notes, a juridical framework need not be understood as ahistorical. But 
here we may account for an ahistorical account. Also, a juridical framework would not be considered 
“historical” in any such sense as given by historical anthropology. Rather, it is meant, a juridical 
condition may apply “at any historical moment” (111). 
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public good, a people covenant to form a body politic. But Seliger (1968:225) 
further claims that the original compact accommodates patriarchal monarchy and 
its naturally cohesive society in the form of popular tacit consent. The form of 
consent in the state of nature and in the transition to a political society proper, is 
here interpreted to be the same, namely, tacit consent of the children. 
Seliger’s Locke applies the compact to legitimate the joining of political 
society by tacit consent under what would at that stage naturally constitute a 
patriarchal monarchy (Seliger 1968:225). That is, a people of a more virtuous age, 
out of a concern for their safety and survival, found themselves accepting of 
patriarchal organization and, in an age enlightened of power corrupt, an eventual 
shift towards a political society proper.305 
While this is a fair reading on an historical framework, Locke’s account of 
the original compact also offers a juridical framework. In the latter, we are 
presented with an alternate form of consent, namely, unanimous consent of original 
contractors. This form of consent, I argue, is anarchic. Further, it fixes the priority 
of the political, in Locke’s account of the original compact.  
In that respect, Locke’s consent theory does not, within a juridical framework, 
abandon its concessions to Filmer’s political doctrine. A requirement of unanimity, 
in Locke’s account of the original compact, extends a Filmerist view of political 
society. 
 
13.4. Anarchic consent versus hypothetical. 
 
Lockean consent, I observe, is not hypothetical in form. 
Consent, in case hypothetical, may be expected of reasonable contractors in 
pursuance of their rational interest. This is illustrated (e.g.) in Rawls’s original 
 
305 See Locke’s (II, 111) account of the Golden Age. 
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position306, where consent is presumed, given a reasonable political arrangement, 
based upon principles of rationality and political virtues (justice). 
Hypothetical consent, put otherwise, is “cognitive agreement,” upon which is 
fixed an obligation to support a reasonable or a just political arrangement, as would 
be accepted by rational contractors (Simmons 1993:76). So, under posited 
counterfactual conditions, one would have consented to a political arrangement 
established on principles of justice, the enforcement of which is compatible with 
one’s autonomy (Waldron 1988:272). In negative terms, certain political 
arrangements obtain, such that rational consent to those arrangements is 
unthinkable (273). Rational contractors could not agree to certain unjust laws or 
political arrangements.307 Here, an act of consent is irrelevant (Simmons 1993:76). 
The test of hypothetical consent is independent of actual consent and is compatible 
with explicit dissent (Green 1988:161). 
The anarchic form of Lockean consent, as I conceive, is inverted. Here, it is 
not the case that consent is presumed, given political virtues. Conversely, in the act 
of consent, political authority is presumed. This would be most evident in the case 
of testifying, as in taking an oath. Testifying, however, is not anarchic. In Locke’s 
original compact, I call this form of consent “anarchic,” because the presumption 
of political authority involves a self-reference. That is, the act of original consent 
refers to the union established in mutual acceptance. Original contractors thus grant 
themselves political power in mutually undertaking an obligation to obey. 
 
306 The original position, in Rawls (1971/1999), corresponds to the state of nature in contract theory, 
but it is conceived “as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain 
conception of justice” (11). It is set forth in terms of an isolated conception of the basic structure of 
society, wherein principles of justice are the object of agreement of free and equal rational persons, 
in consideration of their own interest in mutual disinterest (10-12). The principles of justice at stake 
are those free and rational persons “would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the 
fundamental terms of their association” (10). 
307 See Immanuel Kant’s “On the Common Saying: ‘This may be true in theory, but it does not apply 
in practice’,” 79, in Kant’s Political Writings (1970). Kant lays out the hypothetical form of consent 
in negative terms. 
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Seliger (1968), by contrast, construes original consent of Locke’s compact as 
“hypothetical,” such “that if the participants to the undertaking had been asked, 
they would have explained their compliance in terms of consent” (224). 
Most relevant to this claim, Locke (II, 99) writes, 
 
Whosoever […] out of a state of Nature unite into a Community, must 
be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for which 
they unite into Society, to the majority of the Community, unless they 
expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority (ll. 1-5). 
 
Now, Seliger (1968:224) reasons as follows. If the original contractors “must be 
understood” to have resigned their natural executive power, then consent is inferred 
ex post factum, rather than in the act. This signifies a hypothetical form of consent, 
as stated above. 
Recall, however, Seliger’s maintaining popular tacit consent in elective 
monarchy and, by extension, in Locke’s original compact. But, on the assumption 
of the hypothetical, the form of original consent is not indicative of elective 
monarchy. Whereas tacit consent is expressed in quiet acceptance, hypothetical 
consent need not be given in action or inaction. Rather, it is supposed reasonable 
members would consent. 
Furthermore, the must-statement308 at issue does not indicate contractors 
would consent. It is already stated that they do consent, viz. in the act of joining a 
political society proper. This is not a case of hypothetical but anarchic consent. The 
consent of prospective members presumes the authority of their own political 
union, in the very act of original consent. Lockean consent, thus, is self-affirming. 
 
308 In Section B, Chapter 9, we discussed Locke’s attempted derivation of an “ought” from a “must,” 
as given by the statement at issue. 
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Original contractors must be understood to consent, given the end for which 
they unite, viz. in their present establishment of an independent legislature. “Must 
be understood” is set forth in consideration of the movement and operation of a 
body politic instituted in the compact. This signifies a political requirement upon 
joining a civil society. Uniformity is required in decision making, “it being 
necessary to that which is one body to move one way” (II, 96). 
The original compact implies a uniform movement, viz. a single direction in 
which one body politic moves or is moved. The movement is carried by the 
majority, unless unanimity applies, in which case it is moved by unanimous 
decision. The will of the majority impels the body politic in a single direction, viz. 
“whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority” (II, 96). 
Majority consent, however, is referential to unanimous rule, which, given 
discord on policy, operates by rule of the majority. Unanimous consent of 
prospective members grounds majority consent and rule (II, 95-9). The union is 
established for the very purpose to abide by the determination of the whole, as 
represented by the majority. 
Original consent is not hypothetical but anarchic. 
Prospective members must be understood, in the act of consent, to give up 
the natural executive right in their joining of one body politic, whereby the right is 
granted to a common judge, upon trust. Thus, in consenting to the uniform 
operation of the body politic, original contractors affirm the very existence of the 
commonwealth. Indeed, they must so do. In adopting membership of the 
community, the authority of the body is presumed, in self-affirmation of political 
union. 
Elective monarchy, as our exegesis has shown, operates on popular tacit 
consent. However, once individuals coalesce to form a political society proper, it is 
not only the case that they do but must consent. They agree to act in unison, in the 
form of majority-rule, “unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the 
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majority” (II, 99). Here, the act of consent involves the mutual self-granting of a 
right to an original political union. The contractors commit to their own union, in 
the act. 
In this sense, Lockean consent is consistent with the anarchical principle, as 
we have laid out. But, in the case of Locke’s compact, the consenter is not a 
Filmerian individual but a body of original contractors. 
The obtaining of a political union by mutual consent invokes a political 
requirement. Here, upon joining the society, contractors require one another to obey 
the unanimous rule of the commonwealth, the governance of which operates by 
majority-rule. A political requirement explains, in turn, why one must be 
understood to consent and be obliged to obey the law. “Must” does not imply 
reasonable contractors would consent, in joining the society. Conversely, mutual 
consent of prospective members presumes the authority of their political union. 
That is, they cannot but consent, in virtue of their prospective membership. 
A political requirement, further, is extracted from Locke’s rendition of the 
compact, namely, the concept of one body politic. As Locke (II, 96) stresses, 
 
it is necessary the Body [politic] should […] act or continue [as] one 
Body, one Community, which the consent of every individual that 
united into it, agreed that it should […] (ll. 7, 9-11). 
 
A uniform operation, put otherwise, is necessary to a body politic. Accordingly, 
original contractors are “bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority” 
(ll. 11-12) on the assumption that unanimous consent on any given issue “is next 
impossible ever to be had” (II, 98). They are ultimately bound by unanimous 
consent on the principle of uniformity of the governing body. Majority consent, 
however, substitutes unanimous consent on any given issue. 
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The body politic necessarily moves in unison. Thus, in entering the body 
politic, one must be understood to act in unison with it. Members join the society, 
on this premise. In thus consenting to being governed, contractors undertake an 
obligation to obey. They are bound, by virtue of their membership, to abide by the 
will of the majority, acting thus effectively in unison. But they are committed only 
to themselves. Their union, in that sense, is anarchical, formed by mutual consent 




Locke sets forth an evolutionary argument for the existence of patriarchal societies. 
Here, Locke concedes the probability of patriarchal monarchy in early human 
societies. Those societies, however, had an elective quality. On our interpretation, 
the political aspect of Lockean patriarchalism deserves emphasis. The issue of 
natural cohesion of patriarchal societies, though it may be inferred, does not explain 
the advent of the original compact. An explanation for the compact is rather located 
















Inheritance and Bequest. 
 
In setting forth a naturalist reading of Locke’s political doctrine, the issue of 
inheritance and bequest is one of significance. The case for Lockean political 
naturalism resumes, on this issue. 
Now, on my reading, the question of inheritance and bequest, in Locke, 
supports a political naturalist reading of Locke’s consent theory. There is a case to 
be made, in Locke, for a natural right of bequest and inheritance. Also, in Locke, a 
natural right of bequest and inheritance is solidified in a legal system, in the 
establishment of a civil society. This is a significant concession to the patriarchal 
theory. 
On this question, my reading diverges from Ian Parker’s (2004) interpretation 
of Locke’s doctrine. The case for a natural right of the father, also, does not accord 
with the view of Tully (1980) and Waldron (1988) in their respective study of 
Locke. 
Ian Parker (2004) accentuates the role of custom and tradition in Locke’s 
view of fatherly power. Now, in Locke (II, 55-6, 58), given children are the 
workmanship of God, parents are obliged to nourish, educate, and preserve their 
offspring according to the natural law of preservation. Still, Ian Parker (2004:139) 
claims Locke seeks to undermine the idea that parents have a natural right to rule 
their children. Though it may appear a father rules by a natural right, he rules only 
by custom and tradition (Ian Parker 2004:140). 
As discussed, Locke (II, 71) is at pains to distinguish paternal from political 
power. But, as Ian Parker (2004:140) does concede, the right a father possesses to 
delegate his inheritance and its attendant conditions to whomever he pleases, may 
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be said to resemble political power, as this is expressed in Locke (see II, 72-3). But, 
further, not only do I argue Locke espouses a natural right of the father but a 
formation of a civil society maintaining this right. Locke’s distinction, in the end, 
serves to consolidate a natural right of the father within a civil societal structure. 
 
14.1. Ancestral consent and political obligation. 
 
Political obligation, for Locke, is not grounded in ancestral contract or, as relates 
to inheritance, ancestral consent. But Locke’s consent theory, I propose, rests on a 
naturalist foundation, relating to the political, rather than the familial. This I observe 
in Locke’s treating the acceptance of inheritance with a concomitant obligation to 
submit to the government. 
Now, Seliger’s (1968) naturalist account of Locke’s doctrine,309 proceeding 
rather from the familial, is challenged by a voluntarist reading of Locke, with some 
textual warrant. A father’s “Compact” to the government, Locke (II, 73) explains, 
is in respect to his children “no natural Tye or Engagement, but a voluntary 
Submission” (ll. 9-10), his children “being by Nature as free as himself, or any of 
his Ancestors ever were” (ll. 11-2). Also, “whilst they are in that Freedom, [they] 
choose […] what Common-wealth they will put themselves under” (ll. 12-14). 
However, a political society proper attaches conditions to property, giving 
rise to political obligation (II, 50). (See also Schochet 1975:253.) To enjoy 
inheritance, children or kin must submit to conditions attached to the estate (II, 73). 
Ownership and inheritance are conditional upon membership and governmental 
regulation. 
 
309 Recall our discussion of Seliger’s naturalistic account of Locke’s doctrine. The naturalistic, I 
gather, is overemphasized in Seliger (1968), whereas, in Locke, natural cohesion is non-essential to 
the formation of a government in an original contract. The body politic, rather, provides a legal 
structure for a naturally cohesive society, within an historical framework. On a juridical framework, 
natural cohesion is immaterial. 
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In receipt and enjoyment of inheritance, Locke (II, 117, 120) understands the 
heir to accept the condition of governmental jurisdiction and tacitly consent to 
political power, to which the estate is attached. Acceptance of inheritance thus 
incurs political obligation (Schochet 1975:252-3), which “begins and ends with the 
Enjoyment” (II, 121) in the jurisdiction of government. 
Further, in case a propertied member expressly declares his allegiance, the 
member is no longer at liberty to abandon the property and emigrate, or to 
incorporate himself into a new commonwealth. He is, rather, “perpetually and 
indispensably obliged to be and remain unalterably a Subject to [the government]” 
(II, 121). 
Seliger (1968), on this note, attempts to smuggle in ancestral consent through 
express declaration tied to inheritance. On Seliger’s (1968:270-1) reading, the heir, 
if his father did expressly consent, is likewise required to so consent to the 
government’s jurisdiction over the property (cf. II, 121-22), in which case “heirs of 
propertied members refrain from renouncing their inheritance” (Seliger 1968:270). 
The text of Two Treatises,310 however, warrants no requirement by ancestral 
consent to expressly declare allegiance to the government, in receipt of inheritance, 
thus qualified.311 Rather, to render null revocation, express consent of the current 
heir is needed, in supplementation of the explicit will of the owner (II, 121). For 
Locke, this remains optional. 
Express consent312 binds one to the commonwealth (II, 121-2). Tacit consent 
tied to inheritance may, then, be supplemented by express consent, thus binding the 
 
310 See esp. II, 120, ll. 16-21; II, 121, ll. 11-18; II, 122, ll. 16-18. 
311 A condition, as I understand, is tied to inheritance as to require the heir to give express declaration 
to allegiance; and so, if accepted, the heir is understood to expressly declare his allegiance. Yet this 
is a condition peculiar to the estate in question. If it so happens that the owner had declared 
allegiance to the government, the condition of express allegiance is not automatic, towards the heir. 
312 In this context, Locke uses “actual Agreement’’ and “express Declaration” (II, 121); “positive 
engagement” and “express promise and compact” (II, 122). This may be read as a reference to taking 
an oath, rather than plain express consent. 
318 
  
heir to the commonwealth, such that he “can never be again in the liberty of the 
state of Nature” (II, 121), unless the government be dissolved, or his membership 
nullified. 
As Locke (II, 73) stresses, obligation undertaken by receipt of inheritance is 
derived not from paternal right (or the father’s commitment to the government) but 
the estate under the government. Allegiance, I understand, is here referential to 
political requirements of incorporation, on grounds of the securing of property. In 
its placement under the jurisdiction of a government, property is annexed in the 
joining of a political society proper (II, 120). Government acquires jurisdiction over 
property in the joining of property to society, in the formation of government 
(Simmons 1992:212). Whereas in a natural condition one’s person and possessions 
are “free,” incorporation requires the submission of one’s person and possessions 
to the government, to be regulated within its jurisdiction (II, 120). 
A compact enshrined in one generation, then, is not binding for another. An 
heir is not bound to property by reason of ancestral contract, nor to the government 
under the jurisdiction of which the property remains.313 Now, enjoyment is 
equivalent to tacit consent, namely, acceptance of inheritance. Yet the owner is at 
liberty to give up his property and emigrate, or incorporate into a new 
commonwealth (II, 121). The children, likewise, are free to reject their inheritance. 
But Locke’s argument thus far, on Seliger’s (1968:222) reading, does not 
dispute the development of political society from the institution of family. The 
 
313 In his edition of Two Treatises (1798), Elrington challenges Locke’s argument as to the absence 
of ancestral consent. “A degree of obligation,” Elrington (1798:62n) notes, may be imposed by 
virtue of the acts of one’s ancestors insofar as those acts were to the advantage of society. Ancestral 
consent, in that respect, “may fairly be considered as given” (62n). Now, if at all present in Locke, 
consent given by the acts of one’s ancestors would be construed as tacit. As such, it would allow the 
waiving of a right to inherited property. Ancestral consent, if made express by the heir, would 
however bind him to the commonwealth, given express consent, in Locke, is irrevocable, fixing 
membership in the commonwealth (II, 119, 122). (Cf. Simmons 1993:80-1.) In any case, in view of 
Elrington’s remark, reasons to accept inheritance and so to abide by the law may obtain by ancestral 
consent, without implication for Locke’s argument, as long as those reasons are not understood to 
amount to an obligation, established rather by express consent of the heir. 
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compact, Seliger (1968) claims, is rooted in familial ties, without which it would 
be “unthinkable” (222). It is premised upon “natural proclivities” towards cohesion 
(Seliger 1969:23). 
Now, in the act of covenanting, natural ties assumedly obtain. However, as 
Locke (II, 73) maintains, obligation does not arise from natural bonds. Obligation 
is generated, contrarily, by voluntary submission to the government. In the case of 
inheritance, a condition tied to the estate imposes the obligation. But a voluntary 
submission, although it negates natural ancestral ties as obligation-generating, is 
fixed in the natural structure of political society, viz. in the formation of government 
and concomitant political requirements. A naturalist account of Locke’s doctrine, 
in this sense, is premised upon the primacy of the political. 
The holding of property indicates tacit (supplemented by express) consent. 
Heirs are tacit consenters (II, 117, 122). (See also Schochet 1975:252.)314 This is a 
form of political consent. Ancestral consent does not bind the heir (to declare his 
allegiance to government). Political requirements, however, generate an obligation 
to obey, tied to membership and propriety. Political consent is here referential to 
the original contract, wherein a natural right of bequest and inheritance is 
consolidated. 
 
14.2. A natural right of inheritance. 
 
There is, in Locke, rich textual warrant for the notion of a natural right to inherit 
paternal property. This is a major component of Lockean patriarchalism. However, 
 
314 Schochet (1975:253) claims Locke is inconsistent in II, 117 and 122. In, 117, the tacit consent of 
proprietors is discussed, relative to their membership of civil society. However, in II, 122, it is 
maintained membership of civil society is not adopted but by express consent (an oath of allegiance) 
— yet the meaning here, we may presume, is one of full membership, where the possibility of 
emigration is removed. There is still a case for veritable membership by tacit consent alone, retaining 
the right of emigration (in forfeiture of property). 
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it does not give credence to Seliger’s (1968) naturalistic formulation of Locke’s 
doctrine, proceeding from ancestral consent. Rather, a right to inherit is fixed in 
natural law, prior to ancestral consent. It is, then, consolidated in the original 
compact, in a new license of inheritance. 
Locke’s account of inheritance rests on the natural law of self-preservation 
and the property of human beings in the other animals. Self-preservation, as Locke 
(I, 86) expounds, is a principle of action, manifested in a strong divinely implanted 
desire (ll. 2-3, 19-21). Thus, by God’s expressed will, a natural right obtains to 
make use of the inferior animals, viz. as necessary for preservation (ll. 23-8). 
Further, Locke (I, 88) posits, a right to inherit is grounded in the natural law 
of self-preservation and the preservation of the species. First, a right to the use of 
things derives from the natural law of self-preservation, or, the right to subsistence 
and enjoyment of the conveniences of life. From this right we conclude a right of 
children to subsistence and care (I, 97). Accordingly, a right of children to 
commodities from their parents’ possessions, obtains. This is the right of 
inheritance (I, 97). 
Children possess a right to subsistence and comfort, insofar as the 
circumstances of their parents allow (I, 89). Parents (insofar as able) have a 
correlative duty to provide for their offspring, given, by extension, its natural right 
to succeed to (a share of) its parents’ possessions, for its own good. So, if not 
disposed of otherwise,315 paternal property descends naturally to the children (I, 
87), for whom parents are by nature bound to provide (I, 89). 
As the practice of inheritance is universal, Locke (I, 88) notes, its cause 
assumedly is “natural.” Also, parents make no express declaration as to the right of 
their children to inheritance (I, 89). The right to inherit, accordingly, is 
fundamentally natural, as distinguished from “positive” (I, 88). A positive right to 
 
315 This condition is crucial and is discussed further below. 
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inherit derives from “common tacit” (political) consent, whereas a natural right to 
inherit does not rely on political consent but obtains by extension of a natural right 
to subsistence and care (I, 88). The latter is given by natural law, which, as Locke 
(I, 88) renders cogent, appoints the descent of property to children (ll. 13-14). 
Children, it is plain, have a natural right to inherit paternal property (ll. 14-15). 
Political consent, however, does not mark a departure from the natural. In 
fact, consensual rights, for Locke, may in a sense be taken as natural rights (cf. 
Simmons 1992:92). Compact, as Locke (II, 14) explains, does not terminate the 
state of nature. On the contrary, the obligation to keep promises and contracts316 
“belongs to Men, as Men, and not as Members of Society” (ll. 18-19). In a natural 
condition, promises and contracts are binding, by reference to human relationships 
alone, as “between a Swiss and an Indian, in the Woods of America” (ll. 15-16). 
Now, on the question of “natural right,” Simmons (1992:92n) suggests 
“natural,” for Locke, is meant to signify “logically pre-political,” rather than “not 
arising from human actions.” A right given by consent, so understood, may be 
possessed in a natural condition. But here I object to Simmons’s rendition. Natural 
rights, in Locke, are not pre-political but pre-civil, i.e., prior to legality. 
Recall, Locke concedes patriarchal monarchy as definitive of early human 
societies, prior to an original compact. But in a patriarchal monarchy, a natural right 
to inherit is also political. The pre-political, if anything, applies to original 
communism. Patriarchal monarchy describes a later stage of a natural condition, 
where claims to property exist. 
 
316 Here, we observe the infusion of consent and promising, in Locke, in terms of a natural condition. 
Consensual or contractual obligation is understood on the same grounds as promissory obligation. 
However, on my interpretation, the unanimous consent of original contractors exemplifies the 
anarchical principle of consent. Bindingness, in that respect, is understood relative to the union of 
contractors. That is, the obligation to maintain consent arises from political requirements in joining 
the society. In this case, contractual obligation is not understood essentially in terms of promising. 
But, again, we may yet retain the naturalistic framework, in the context of a formation of government 
from a natural condition. 
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A right to inherit, given a patriarchal society, I deem political. As Tyrrell 
remarks in his Patriarcha non Monarcha, it cannot be supposed “all Propriety […] 
ceases with the life of the Occupant” (49). This, effectively, is a natural political 
right. 
As Schochet (1975:253) remarks, a pre-political right of property is ill 
reconciled with a political obligation tied to ownership. But a right of private 
property and inheritance is exercised in a form of political society. In original 
communism, the right is not applied, though extant by natural law. Original 
communism, in Locke, persists where natural right of property has not been 
instituted. But it has been instituted in patriarchal monarchy. However, in a political 
society proper, a legal obligation tied to ownership is introduced. 
Political (common tacit) consent, in context of legality, gives rise to positive 
consensual rights, viz. as granted by civil government (see Simmons 1992:91). A 
right to inherit, by contrast, is fundamentally natural. However, the naturalness of 
a right to inherit is not to be contrasted with the “non-naturalness” of positive 
consensual rights. Natural law, rather, determines a right to inherit, affirmed in the 
original compact, in the form of political consent. 
 
14.3. A natural right of bequest: the priority of the proprietor. 
 
Locke’s account of a right of inheritance and bequest, I observe, is appropriately 
understood in the context of his patriarchalism. It demonstrates a veritable 
patriarchal view of human society. This may be further discerned in Locke’s 
discussion of a right of bequest. In Locke, I find, the priority lies with the owner of 
property, in delegating inheritance at will. 
Now, Waldron (1988), contrarily, views a right of inheritance and bequest in 
the context of Locke’s theory of original communism. This is also the case in Tully 
(1980). A natural right of inheritance, on this view, is rendered common, that is, a 
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matter of familial right. There is a common right of property, it is understood, such 
that, for Locke, a natural right of inheritance is essentially familial. As such, a 
natural right of inheritance has priority over a right of bequest. 
However, as I gather, such a view overvalues Locke’s theory of original 
communism, at the expense of his conception of the political. 
On Tully’s (1980:134) observation, Locke adopts a non-patriarchal model of 
the family, in proposing a common use right. Locke’s account of inheritance, 
according to Tully (1980:133-5), denies the priority of the father and an individual 
use right. For Tully’s Locke, property is essentially familial, viz. for the good of 
the family. It belongs to members in communion. From a natural and positive duty 
of parents to provide subsistence and comfort to their children, follows a right to 
joint ownership of the possessions of the household, which, in regard to the head 
of the household, “is not his property at all” (Tully 1980:133). 
Waldron (1988:247), likewise, observes in Locke the priority of inheritance 
over bequest. As Waldron interprets Locke, the personal title of the father to 
property is, in fact, defeasible (244). Given partial ownership of the child, the father 
is not fully at liberty to alienate the property, his liberty being restricted by parental 
duty (245). Without the consent of the child, the property (or the part belonging to 
the child), cannot be alienated (245). The child is thus entitled to its share, though 
the exact proportion is ultimately at the discretion of the father (246). If so, the right 
of inheritance has priority over the right of bequest (246-7).317 
Further, Waldron (1988:247-51) continues, given Locke’s assumption of 
original communism, there is no natural right of bequest. Rather, it would be 
considered a mere civil right. The right is protected, that is, by civil law. But on the 
law of nature, it is no more fixed than surplus, which, in Locke (II, 31), justifiably 
 
317 Waldron (1988:246) concludes this as an implication of the argument, rather than from what he 
takes Locke to assert in the First Treatise. 
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reverts to common ownership from an estate of the deceased, unless legally 
prevented. 
Simmons (1992:209n) objects to this reading of Locke as “indefensible.” This 
reading, I do concur, misconstrues Locke’s doctrine of inheritance, in that it views 
original communism as a persistent state in priority of civil ownership. Though 
original communism does in a sense persist, a natural right of bequest is not thereby 
negated. 
Now, Waldron (1988:250) corroborates his reading with some textual 
evidence. As stated in Locke (I, 90), in civil society, absent a claim to inheritance318 
by children or next of kin, property or possessions revert to the community, as 
managed by a public magistrate (ll. 32-4), 
 
but in the State of Nature [these] become again perfectly common, no 
body having a right to Inherit them: nor can any one have a Property in 
them, otherwise then in other things common by Nature […] (ll. 35-8). 
 
Things possessed in the state of nature thus persist in original communism. 
This passage, however, merely denotes a justifiable reversal to common 
ownership, absent a claim to inheritance. It does not negate a natural right of 
bequest. At most, a right of bequest, absent a claim to inheritance, is negated. The 
absence of a claim invokes a natural condition of original communism. Yet the 
presence of a claim neither assumes a civil society nor original communism. A 
claim to property may still obtain within a patriarchal monarchy, that is, a further 
stage of a natural condition. Absent a claim from children or kin, a right of bequest 
is inapplicable, as it relates primarily to proportion of inheritance. But a right of 
bequest is applicable wherever property may be claimed. 
 
318 Or, in Locke’s words, “where no such are to be found, i.e., no Kindred” (ll. 32-3). 
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Absent a claim, possessions revert to common ownership, since, in that case, 
no one has a right to inheritance. Here, everyone has an equal claim to property. 
Accordingly, the estate of the deceased, given the invocation of original 
communism, is not justifiably arbitrated by the proprietor. But, I observe, the estate 
may be justifiably arbitrated by the proprietor in a further natural condition, given 
a structure of paternal proprietary right prior to civil society. If a claimant in that 
state is observed, his proportion — it has not been precluded — may be determined 
by the proprietor. 
Now, we consider, in the foregoing, the justifiability of arbitration, in matters 
of inheritance. But there is in Locke, further, textual evidence of the priority of the 
proprietor. On this evidence, the proprietor may at his prerogative bequeath his 
property to whomever (in violation of his parental duties). In that case, a state of 
original communism, absent a claim to property, is invoked on condition of non-
arbitration by the proprietor. 
On this reading, a right of bequest has priority over a right of inheritance. The 
proprietor, then, may freely bequeath and alienate his property or possessions. 
Children or next of kin have a right prior to the right of others to inherit the property, 
unless the father has chosen to alienate it to some other, in which case conflicting 
claims arise on the estate of the deceased. Also, absent a specific claim to 
inheritance, the possessions of the deceased revert to common ownership, unless 
the proprietor makes prior arrangements and bequeaths his property to some other, 
whose claim to his possessions equals that of any other, if not for said arbitration. 
In evidence of such position, consider Locke’s statement (I, 87) to the effect 
that 
 
[…] if any one had began, and made himself a Property in any particular 
thing […] that thing, that possession, if he dispos’d not otherwise of it 
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by his positive Grant, descended Naturally to his Children, and they had 
a right to succeed to it, and possess it (ll. 12-17). 
 
Note Locke’s caveat: “if he dispos’d not otherwise of it by his positive Grant.” As 
this clause stipulates, the father may intervene by his positive grant, as otherwise 
determined by a natural right of inheritance. Possessions, then, naturally descend 
to the children, unless their father alienates the property to some other; or he 
destroys it.319 His right of bequest, accordingly, is prior to the right of his children 
to inheritance, thus one of free bequest and alienation. 
Simmons (1992:209-10) acknowledges the passage in question invokes the 
potential occurrence of free alienation. Yet, if so, conflicting claims assumedly 
arise as to rightful ownership (210). 
Let us further support this position. 
As Locke (I, 92) makes plain, property, from the right of self-preservation, is 
to the sole benefit and advantage of the proprietor, so that he, if need be, may even 
destroy it. This is stated irrespective of government,320 denoting a use right 
grounded in natural law. 
Now, if he is at liberty to destroy the property, the proprietor, it may be 
inferred, is limited only by the law of self-preservation, in use of the thing (e.g. in 
his right to bequeath and alienate it). But, Locke (I, 92) clarifies, government is for 
the good of the governed, viz. the preservation of right and property, in protecting 
members of society from violence and injury (ll. 5-8). This given, dependents have 
a right to inherit “goods” from their father’s estate, that is, for their own good (I, 
93, ll. 1-5). So, while by natural law, a right to the use of property is limited only 
 
319 On an alternative reading, the father may dispose otherwise of a share of his possessions not 
owed to his children. Locke (I, 87, ll. 12-17), however, specifies “a Property in any particular thing” 
and, again, “that thing, that possession.” 
320 Though, I would argue, this is not argued irrespective of the state, or the political. Consider here 
a proper distinction between the state and government, in Locke. 
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by the law of self-preservation, a right of inheritance, I gather, is protected by civil 
law. In case of conflicting claims, the right of kin is favored. 
Positive law is made conformable to natural law for the public good, as Locke 
(I, 92) lays down. Accordingly, in matters of inheritance, the right of children to 
subsistence and comfort is weighed against the prior right of property, or, a use 
right limited only by the law of self-preservation. The right of bequest, thus, is 
exercised on condition of the fulfillment of parental duty. Yet the relative 
proportion of inheritance, though stipulated by law, is otherwise determined on the 
prejudice of the father (II, 72, ll. 12-17). 
Given this, Locke espouses a natural right of bequest and alienation. In 
Locke, a right of bequest and alienation, from the law of self-preservation, has 
priority over a right of inheritance. 
So, let us posit the following Lockean position. 
A natural right of bequest and alienation obtains, though conflicting claims 
may arise on the property of the deceased in case it has been alienated, wholesale 
or in part, in breach of valid claims of family members thereto. In civil society, 
however, the right of inheritance is further protected, in accordance with the rights 
of children to subsistence and comfort and the correlative duty of parents to provide 
support for their children. Though rights of children to subsistence and comfort also 
applies in a natural condition, paternal right of bequest and alienation overrides the 
former, at the prerogative of the father. But in civil society, paternal prerogative is 
guided by the law of the land, for the good of the governed, viz. in further interest 
of the children. 
To discern Locke’s position, Simmons proposes an interpretation, in response 
to a view in favor common ownership, as we find in Tully (1980), Waldron (1988). 
Simmons (1992:209, 211) proposes a Lockean position of a limited priority 
of the proprietor, that is, on the caveat of a limited priority, in turn, given to the 
rights of children and, contractually, the rights of the wife over paternal prerogative 
328 
  
of bequest. The father, on this interpretation, may dispose of his property as he 
pleases on condition that he provide support for his dependents and honor his 
conjugal duties. 
As Locke (II, 65) ostensibly affirms, 
 
[T]hough a Father may dispose of his own Possessions as he pleases, 
when his Children are out of danger of perishing for want, yet his power 
extends not to the Lives or Goods, which either their own industry, or 
anothers bounty has made theirs […] (ll. 28-31). 
 
Property, thus understood, is not essentially familial. The children have a claim to 
a share of paternal property, yet not to a joint ownership. The right of inheritance, 
if founded on the right to subsistence and comfort, is limited by the selfsame right, 
in that the child has a right to inherit as much as makes reasonable comfort possible 
(Simmons 1992:211). 
Now, in the foregoing, we have proposed a Lockean position of a natural right 
of bequest, where civil law serves to strengthen the status of dependents. 
Accordingly, I wish to qualify Simmons’s interpretation, such that, as now 
conceived, a limited priority of dependents is instituted by civil law, for the public 
good. 
A right of bequest, we may grant, is limited by the fulfillment of parental 
duty, viz. where the duty is not justifiably overridden by a right of alienation, at the 
prerogative of the proprietor. But I now suggest, given the primacy of the right of 
self-preservation and the right of property, natural law stipulates merely the 
favoring of the rights of children and next of kin, in case of conflicting claims. A 
right of bequest, then, remains prior simpliciter to a right of inheritance; yet, in 
regard to parental duty, the dependents’ lot is rectified, in the favoring of their rights 
to the estate of the deceased, in case (post-mortem) those be challenged. The father, 
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acting at his prerogative, has a right to do a temporary wrong, where in alienating 
his property, he endangers his children and dishonors his conjugal duties. The 
wrong, however, is corrected by civil law.321 
A natural right of bequest, I propose, is balanced with a natural right to 
inherit, where full priority of the former yet remains. The father is permitted, on the 
law of self-preservation, to act at will in alienating his property, though, given the 
duty to his children, the act of alienating is deemed wrongful on civil law (after the 
fact), whereas dependents are endangered by lack of subsistence, or their comfort 
is drastically reduced. 
We revisit, then, the condition of parental duty, in consideration of a right of 
bequest and alienation. 
First, the condition of parental duty applies in the context of civil society, 
where a temporary wrong, in case property is forsaken, is legally prevented. The 
“limited” priority of a right of inheritance is referential to the public good. Yet this 
is not so much a limited priority as a limitation of the right (after the fact). 
Second, in a natural condition, a father retains the right of bequest, given the 
safety and the fulfillment of the needs of his children. But now, absent the public 
good, the condition set by parental duty limits not the right but its rightful exercise. 
An unconditional right of bequest is retained, but the condition of parental duty 
determines rightful exercise of the right towards dependents. The proprietor acts 
rightfully towards his children in maintaining the share owed to them, viz. in 
exercising his right of bequest in respect of the duty to his children. Yet, on the law 
of self-preservation, a right of bequest may be exercised in violation of paternal 
 
321 The proposed interpretation, note, presumes the father already has a right, at his prerogative, to 
lessen or remove the otherwise rightful share of his children (if in so doing, he does not endanger 
them). Yet, since dependents not only have a right of subsistence but relative comfort, a lessening 
or a removal of their share, may also be corrected, in some fashion. 
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duty. This ought to be corrected, however, in case of conflicting claims between 
kin and other. 
A right of inheritance, so understood, is a natural political right. The priority 
of a right of bequest is fixed in a patriarchal society. This renders the right not pre-
political but pre-legal. But the right is then consolidated in a legal system. 
The consolidation of a natural right of bequest and inheritance, I find, 
constitutes Locke’s most significant concession to the patriarchal theory. Here, a 
condition of patriarchal society, namely, a right of bequest, is ossified in civil 




Locke, we have observed, espouses a natural right of inheritance and bequest. A 
right of bequest, further, has priority over a right of inheritance, in that the father 
may delegate his property at will. This, however, does not remove paternal duty to 
the children. In Locke, a civil society maintains the priority of a right of bequest. 
Yet in a civil society the right of kin is legally prior to the right of others in case of 
conflicting claims of inheritance. 
 Locke’s doctrine of inheritance and bequest, we find, supports his 
patriarchalism. A civil society retains a patriarchal structure, in re-establishing the 











A Lockean Concept of Sovereignty. 
 
A political naturalist interpretation of Locke’s doctrine, as set forth in his Two 
Treatises, emphasizes his anthropological patriarchalism. This discussion relates to 
Locke’s concessions to the patriarchal theory in respect to pre-civil societies. It 
affords an explanation of the development of human societies towards a formation 
of a civil society. 
A justification of political power, however, is formulated in Locke’s 
account of the original compact. A concept of sovereignty, I observe, may be 
extracted from Locke’s political philosophy. It formulates, moreover, a justification 
of Locke’s commonwealth. I propose a concept of sovereignty can be extracted 
from Locke’s rendition of the formation of government in the original contract. The 
original compact forms a basis of a sovereign commonwealth. 
The separation of governmental powers, as we find in Locke, does not 
indicate an absence of sovereignty. This, on the contrary, demonstrates a Lockean 
concept of sovereignty. Also, for Locke, a theory of sovereignty is consistent with 
a right of resistance exercised by individuals or the people. 
Locke’s sovereign, however, is not a natural person but a political entity 
implied in the original contract. Here, I discern a Lockean concept of sovereignty 
in a political union of original contractors, as distinguished from other sovereign 
contenders, namely, sovereign individuals, the people, and the government (the 
legislative and the executive). 
On this subject, I follow in part Seliger’s reading. As Seliger (1968) 
observes, Locke does not reject the notion of sovereignty “but the notion that 
sovereignty ought to belong to one man and cannot be shared” (327). But Locke, 
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on Seliger’s (1968:326) view, differs from Bodin, Hobbes, and Filmer in 
recommending “moderate sovereignty,” viz. one of separation of powers, checks 
and balances. 
Lockean sovereignty, as I understand, is not moderate, in this sense. In fact, 
I shall accentuate absolutist allowances in Locke’s account of the original compact. 
The separation of powers relates to the power of government. Lockean sovereignty 
is complete relative to the power of the state. 
A concept of Lockean sovereignty provides a political justification of 
political power, viz. prior to a moral or a legal justification. 
A sovereign political union, being original, ultimately justifies political 
power of the union. Individual consent (or a transfer of natural rights to civil society 
in the original contract) expresses this union, after the fact. The state, in Locke’s 
doctrine, is veritably sovereign, in much the same way as stipulated by Jean Bodin, 
save for Locke the sovereign is not a natural person. 
Contra a liberal account of Locke’s political doctrine,322 sovereignty in 
Locke’s Two Treatises, I argue, is principal. Though not nominally frequent in 
Locke’s Second Treatise, a concept of sovereignty is present throughout. Within a 
liberal interpretative framework, the Lockean state is understood as devoid of, if 
not antithetical to, sovereignty. Political power, for Locke, is understood as 
essentially limited. 
Contrarily, the original compact, I contend, manifests a sovereign state, on 













From an historical perspective, Locke’s sovereign may be said to be William III, in 
or from the revolution of 1688. Locke’s objective, in his Two Treatises, as he states 
in “The Preface,” is to make good William III’s title in the consent of the people, 
that is, to legitimate the kingship of William III over England, Ireland, and 
Scotland. 
But Two Treatises was largely written if not a decade earlier, during the 
Exclusion Crisis of 1679-80. Locke’s Two Treatises, then, would not have been 
initially written to justify the revolution (Laslett 1970:47, 51, 55-6, 61). 
Now, against a liberal interpretative framework, I maintain Locke does 
espouse a theory of sovereignty, which is not undermined by Locke’s conception 
of a separation of governmental powers and a right of resistance. Locke’s 
sovereign, however, is not the natural person of the monarch but a political entity 
distinct from individuals, the people, and government. The legitimacy of Locke’s 
commonwealth rests on a political justification. This applies, at the same time, to 
the exercise of a right of resistance against the government. 
Locke’s sovereign, I maintain, is a political union formed in the original 
compact. The union constitutes the sovereign power of the state, providing a 
political justification of political power, including the power of an absolute 
monarch. A political justification, also, renders a transfer of natural rights, in the 
original contract, a posteriori to the formation of a political union. 
 




First, to ascertain a Lockean concept of sovereignty, I distinguish a political entity 
from a legal one. 
Locke, on Franklin’s (1978) historical study, develops the idea of 
constituent authority from George Lawson, whose account attributes sovereign 
power to a political community as a legal entity distinct from parliament (ix-x).323 
Here, Lawson’s idea of the dissolution of government is said to be taken up by 
Locke, in his Second Treatise, where the dissolution of the society is distinguished 
from the dissolution of government (II, 211). 
The natural person of the sovereign, Lawson (1657) lays down, has no right 
to change the fundamental constitution of the society. The people in that case return 
to a state of natural liberty and to a community “which in England is not a 
Parliament, but the fourty Counties” (15). Sovereignty, then, is ultimately ascribed 
to the people (Franklin 1978:ix). 
Franklin (1978:1) states, accordingly, that a right of resistance of the 
political community is, for Locke, solely consistent with sovereignty in a mixed 
constitution. But here, Franklin does not separate a political entity from a legal one. 
In Locke, I attribute a sovereign power to a political entity as distinct from a legal 
one, where the latter is subsumed under the former. A mixed constitution relates to 
the separation of governmental powers. But a government established in the 
original compact may equally assume the form of monarchy, oligarchy, or 
democracy (see II, 132). Also, a right of resistance applies to each form of 
government. 
 
323 A constitutionalist theory of sovereignty, further, operates on the premise of an ancient 
constitution of the common law tradition. “Lawson’s central thought,” Franklin (1978) writes, “was 
that some version of the ancient constitution was the only form of settlement that the English people 
would willingly accept” (59-60). I am not committed here to the idea of an ancient constitution. Nor 
do I claim this is the case in Locke. The attribution of a sovereign power to a political community 
as a legal entity distinct from parliament (government), is our primary concern. See also Pocock’s 
The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (1987). 
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The political is given in the original compact, where a form of government 
is determined. Given a compact, a well-ordered commonwealth is established, 
maintaining public trust on basis of contractual requirements. But public trust, 
accordingly, may be maintained in a monarchy, oligarchy, or a democracy. One 
form of government is not inherently better-ordered than another.324 
Now, in his reading of Locke’s Second Treatise, Green (1986) does separate 
political sovereignty from a question of legality. Political society, in Locke, is 
properly distinguished from the legislative and executive power of government 
(Green 1986:49), given “that Locke distinguishes the act by which political society 
is established from that by which the government, legislative and executive, is 
established” (49). The event of a political entity does not entail legality. Rather, the 
legislative and executive power of government are determinations of a political 
entity, in the form of an original compact (see esp. II, 132, 211). 
Such distinction, I concur, is proper for Locke’s compact. Political 
sovereignty, however, is to be further separated from the power of the people. 
Green (1986) does not distinguish between a political union and the people. For 
Green’s Locke, the people are ultimately sovereign, the power of the people being 
derived from a transfer of individual natural rights to the society. 
However, a political union, established immediately in Locke’s compact, is 
prior to the event of a legal entity. On our proposition, Locke’s sovereign is a 
political entity, not rooted in the people. A political entity, rather, obtains in a union 
of contractors of any number (II, 95). The union is primitive, in justification of 
political power. The people invoke the union, in exercise of their right of resistance, 
derived not from a natural condition but the union. 
 
15.2. The sovereign and the supreme. 
 




In his account of separate powers of government, Locke, within a liberal 
interpretative framework, is said to depart from a concept of sovereignty. I dispute 
this claim, as put forth in (e.g.) Scott (2000), Sagar (2018). 
Now, Locke’s use of the term “sovereignty,” as somewhat rarely applied in 
the Second Treatise, differs in comparison to the First (Cox 1960:108), where 
Locke frequently does apply the term. Use of the term is largely limited to Locke’s 
attack on Filmer in the First Treatise, where the meaning of the term, is one of 
absolute, arbitrary monarchy (108-9). 
Still, in the First Treatise, Locke admits certain features (“marks”) of 
sovereignty, in accordance with Bodin’s theory of sovereignty, upon which 
Filmer’s system relies. Now, sovereignty, for Bodin (1955), is an “absolute and 
perpetual power vested in a commonwealth” (25). As we understand from Bodin 
(1955:25), if power granted to a prince is revocable, princely power is not veritably 
sovereign. Rather, sovereign power, in that case, lies with the one who may revoke 
princely power. It cannot be given to the prince on condition. Princely power is 
conditional only upon divine and natural law (27-8). Otherwise, the law is but the 
command of the sovereign in the exercise of his power (35). 
Non-dependence, for Bodin (1955:28), is the distinguishing mark of the 
sovereign, who is not subject to the commands of any other, “for it is he who makes 
law for the subject, abrogates law already made, and amends obsolete law” (28). 
The law is the expression of the will of the sovereign; and he cannot be subject to 
his own laws (28-9). The sovereign is only subject to, and his power only 
constrained by, natural law (35). 
Concerning the natural person of the monarch, Locke’s consent theory 
diverges from Bodin. While Bodin conceives the sovereign as the natural person of 
the monarch, Locke’s sovereign is a union of original contractors. For Locke, the 
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natural person of the monarch exercises governmental power, whereas state power 
lies in the union. 
Yet a concept of sovereignty, in Locke, shares essential features with 
Bodinian sovereignty. Political power, for Locke (I, 120), is the power to command 
and be obeyed. Also, Locke accepts as sovereign the power of war and peace and 
the power of life and death. These are “marks of sovereignty,” as inter alia325 
stipulated in Bodin’s (1945:172-3) definition of sovereignty. 
The power of life and death, Locke (I, 129) acknowledges, is a “mark of 
sovereignty” (I, 129). Capital punishment, Locke (II, 65) states, lies with the 
magistrate (as opposed to the father). The power to make war and peace326, 
likewise, is a mark of sovereignty, as in political societies only supreme authority 
may wield such power (I, 131).327 
To this extent, Locke affirms Bodin’s understanding of sovereignty. 
Political power, in Locke (I, 129, 131), combines the exercise of capital punishment 
and the power of war and peace (Cox 1960:110). 
Still, in observation of a liberal interpretative framework, Locke’s political 
doctrine is considered antithetical to the very notion of sovereignty. 
Figgis (1914) claims Locke’s objective, in Two Treatises, is to undermine 
the concept of sovereignty. Locke, on Figgis’s (1914) reading, argues “against the 
notion that there is any sovereign power in the state,” launching “an attack directed 
far more against the idea of sovereignty, than against the claims of absolute 
monarchy” (242). Here, Figgis (1914:242) notes, if the legislative, deemed the 
 
325 Bodin (1945) stipulates five powers (“marks”) of sovereignty, viz. (1) creating and defining the 
office of magistrates, (2) proclaiming and annulling laws, (3) declaring war and peace, (4) receiving 
final appeals from magistrates, and, when necessary, (5) wielding the power of life and death (172-
3). For us, the power of war and peace and that of life and death are of primary concern. Compare 
Bodin (1955:43-8). 
326 The power of war and peace is designated by Bodin (1945:172-3) as a “mark of sovereignty.” 
327 Though, in isolation, “this Power in many Cases any one may have without any Politick 
Supremacy” (I, 132, ll. 3-4). 
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supreme authority of the commonwealth, exceeds its mandate, its authority is 
nullified, and the state is dissolved. 
Contra Figgis (1914), not only is a positive idea of sovereignty presented in 
Two Treatises but absolute monarchy, also, is a viable outcome of the original 
compact. Here, I find wanting a proper distinction of state and government. As a 
result, Figgis (1914) misconstrues Locke’s political doctrine. The legislative, acting 
in opposition to the people, is rightly resisted (II, 168). However, a right of 
resistance is not directed against the state but the government in defense of the state, 
namely, the commonwealth. The government, in the case of the legislative acting 
against public trust, is dissolved but not the state. 
A similar view to Figgis’s is expressed in Vaughan (1960). Locke’s Second 
Treatise, Vaughan (1960) maintains, “is, in fact, an assault not only upon the 
sovereignty of Leviathan, but upon the very idea of sovereignty […] against any 
form, even the mildest, that sovereignty can assume” (134). Locke, then, is as much 
opposed to popular sovereignty as to tyranny or oligarchy, on Vaughan’s 
(1960:134) reading. Lockean sovereignty, Vaughan (1960:193) claims, veritably 
resides in the individual. The binding force of the original compact is a mere 
“phantom,” as this restriction is inconsistent with individual consent (194). On the 
contrary, the compact is binding for that very reason. 
Locke fails, Lamprecht (1962) charges, to elucidate sovereignty and 
“nowhere expounded a doctrine of popular sovereignty” (148). In introducing 
separation of powers, Locke seeks to “avoid the problem of sovereignty” (149). 
But, again, this interpretation only applies, if we evaluate Locke’s theory of 
sovereignty within the framework of the separation of governmental powers, 
which, however, extend a concept of sovereignty. 
In this vein, Scott (2000) construes the Lockean state as “a sovereignless 
commonwealth.” As Scott (2000:547) proposes, Locke rejects sovereignty as a 
unifying principle of the state, consisting of several claimants to supreme power, 
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viz. the individual, the people, the legislative, and the executive. In lieu of an 
absolute sovereign, these claimants coexist, rivaling one another, as each, relative 
to the political situation, has a claim to power supreme (552). 
On Scott’s (2000:550) reading, the power of life and death and the power 
of making war and peace are not understood by Locke as “marks of sovereignty.” 
Locke, in fact, rejects the possession of a power of life and death and a power of 
war and peace as signifiers of sovereignty (550). 
But this is a misreading. Locke (I, 131) argues, rather, the pronouncing or 
declaring of war and peace is not a mark of sovereignty, whereas the making of war 
and peace 
 
cannot be made for Politic Societies, but by the Supream Power of such 
Societies; because War and Peace, giving a different Motion to the 
force of such a Politick Body, none can make War or Peace, but that 
which has the direction of the force of the whole Body, and that in 
Politick Societies is only the Supream Power (ll. 10-5). 
 
As Scott (2000:550) admits, Locke does attribute to “supreme power” of a polity 
those powers traditionally ascribed to a sovereign, most notably, the power of life 
and death. But now, Scott (2000) maintains, Locke does not apply the term 
“sovereignty” and “supreme power” interchangeably; these are not synonymous. 
Contrarily, on Seliger’s (1968:326) interpretation, “supreme” is synonymous with 
“sovereign,” in Locke’s usage. 
Cox (1960:109) suggests Locke, in applying the term “supreme power,” 
shifts to a more neutral term, eliminating a connotation of absolute, arbitrary power, 
yet retaining a central idea of sovereignty, viz. an exclusive governmental power 
and right to command and execute the law. Still, we need not claim synonymy in 
demonstrating Locke’s usage of “supreme power” in the context of a sovereign 
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commonwealth. Locke proceeds from an original political union, which, in his 
construction of the original compact, constitutes a state rather than governmental 
power, viz. a sovereign commonwealth. 
Granted, Locke restricts his application of the term “sovereignty” largely to 
his critique of Filmer, in the First Treatise (Scott 2000:548).328 Also, “supreme 
power,” as applied in the Second, relates to the power of government, as may be 
found legitimate by consent. Still, though “supreme power” is understood in 
deference to consent, the absence of Lockean sovereignty has not been 
demonstrated. In fact, original consent, from which governmental power is derived, 
is expressed in political union, given a requirement to act in unison (see II, 99). 
Supreme powers are legitimated on basis of political union. A political requirement 
of unanimity fixes the supreme power of the community and, by extension, of the 
legislative and the executive. 
Further, as Scott (2000:550) acknowledges, Locke’s definition of political 
power stipulates the supremacy of political power. As Locke (II, 3) states, political 
power is a right of (1) making laws with penalties of death for the regulating and 
preserving of property, (2) enforcing those laws, and (3) defending the 
commonwealth from foreign force “and all this only for the Publick Good.” 
But, Scott (2000) stresses, Locke only allows “sovereign” powers to be 
ascribed to “supreme power” in order to establish “a completely different basis for 
that power, one which will limit it and make it reasonable” (550), as manifested by 
the exercise of the powers ascribed to sovereigns (or, supreme power) by “inferior 
magistrates and others” (550). However, Locke (I, 129), again, discusses in this 
context the pronouncing of a sentence of death, as opposed to the establishing of a 
law of capital punishment. The pronouncement, Locke (I, 129) notes, is carried out 
 
328 See also Grant (1987:74-9); Kendall (1965:95); Lamprecht (1962:148). 
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by an inferior magistrate, whereas the power of life and death “is indeed a Mark of 
Sovereignty.” 
The separation of supreme powers signifies not separate claimants to 
sovereign power but extensions of a principle of sovereignty, as rendered in the 
original compact. 
 
15.3. Formation of government. 
 
I distinguish the power of the government from the power of political society. The 
latter is also separated from a legal entity. A political society exercises the power 
of the state, but governmental supreme powers, including the legislative, extend 
state power. The distinction of state and government, in Locke, is effectively one 
of sovereignty and supreme power. 
Here, I object to Simmons’s (1993:61; 6n) understanding of synonymity 
between Locke’s “body politic” (or “civil society”) and a “people.” Further, in his 
discussion of “one Body, one Community” (II, 96), Locke does not refer to a natural 
community (as otherwise conceived in the state of nature) but a nascent state, or 
one body politic as may be established by “any number of men” (II, 95).329 
Locke’s commonwealth is an independent community (II, 133). A civil 
community may be distinguished from a natural community by virtue of its 
independence, namely, its uniform operation, which contractors must be 
understood to accept, in their very covenanting (see II, 99). Independence is 
definitive of a commonwealth, in its adoption of a legal obligation from a political 
 
329 This would be Seliger’s (1968; 1969) contention. But my thesis differs from Seliger’s in 
emphasizing the political over the natural. Simmons (1993), to be sure, does not put forth a like 




requirement to act in unison. A political requirement of unanimity does not imply 
natural cohesion, though it may be inferred.330 
In the original compact, the idea of sovereignty is retained in the form of a 
political requirement of unanimity. It is not the case that sovereignty lies in kingly 
power, or the natural person of the king, but in the independence of a political 
community, as obtains by a requirement of unity. A king, the legislative, or the 
people are supreme by extension of a sovereign union. 
As Locke (II, 157, 212) lays down, the constitution of a legislative, by 
consent of the people, is the original and supreme act of the society, with no inferior 
power to alter it.331 The first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths 
is the establishment of a legislative, grounded upon the first and fundamental 
natural law, viz. the preservation of the society and the public good (II, 134). 
In the formation of government, original contractors by mutual and, by 
extension, majority consent establish an independent legislature, whereupon power 
political is entrusted to governors (II, 132) (See also Simmons 1993:68.) In 
principle, political power so granted and entrusted to government defers to the 
power of original contractors, in whom the power of the people is vested. But this 
very power of the people, referential to original consent, rivals the power of the 
legislative and the executive, in Locke. 
Now, Gough (1973:117-18) distinguishes Lockean legislative sovereignty 
from extralegal sovereignty of the people. Given the latter, legislative sovereignty 
(or, supreme power of the legislative) is not understood to involve a legally 
unlimited and unchallenged power of making law (118). 
Scott (2000:554), however, rejects in Locke the notion of a shared 
sovereignty, given such distinction between legal and political sovereignty. As 
Scott (2000:554) argues, the legislative and the people are relatively “supreme,” 
 
330 We discuss the question of a natural community in 13.2. 
331 In II, 157, Locke uses “original and supreme”; in II, 212, “first and fundamental.” 
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not “sovereign.” Further, there is no common superior between the legislative and 
the people (554). That is, law-makers do not answer to the people via a common 
judge. 
There is apparent textual evidence for such a reading. As Locke (II, 168) 
makes plain, no secular judge stands between the legislative and the executive.332 
In the event of aggression by the legislative or the executive against the people, no 
earthly judge exists between government and the people (II, 168). The people have 
no recourse, then, but to appeal to heaven (ll. 9-10).333 
Further, as emphasized by Scott (2000:548), while the legislative is for 
Locke the supreme power of the commonwealth, the executive “in a very tolerable 
sense may also be called Supreme” (II, 151). Though, as Locke (II, 156) clarifies, 
the executive power (e.g., in dissolving the legislative) does not render the 
executive superior to the legislative. (See also Grant 1987:79.)334 
Granted, the executive power does enjoy relative supremacy (see II, 151, 
156), while no secular judge stands between the supreme powers of the 
commonwealth. Still, the relative supreme power of the executive does not set the 
 
332 Compare II, 240. 
333 Similarly, in his Letter concerning Toleration (1689/2010), Locke maintains no judge on earth 
between a legislator and a people, where, in the case of conflict, God is the only arbiter (34). Scott 
(2000:554) refers to this passage in Locke’s Letter, in support of his argument. According to Scott 
(2000:554), Locke’s doctrine of toleration demonstrates the limits of political power and the absence 
of sovereignty. 
Now, in his Letter, Locke does reject for a civil ruler a mandate to impose religion or to bring 
about the salvation of souls. Such mandate is not decreed from God, “for it nowhere appears that 
God has granted men authority over other men, to compel them to adopt their own religion” (7). On 
the other hand, Locke (1689/2010) accepts ecclesiastical authority, in the case of a theocracy. As 
Locke (1689/2010) states: “If you can show me anywhere a commonwealth based on [a theocratic] 
juridical foundation, I will admit that in that commonwealth ecclesiastical laws should be accepted 
as civil laws, and that all the subjects can and should be barred from foreign worship and alien rites 
by the sword of the ruler” (29). Although, as Locke notes, “there is absolutely no such thing as a 
Christian commonwealth” (29), the state of Israel has the right to forbid “the veneration of another 
Deity,” (29) as would be equivalent to treason. In the case of theocracy, it is accepted by Locke as 
a political requirement that another deity not be worshipped; and citizens of a theocratic state, 
accordingly, are obliged not to worship a nemesis deity. 
334 Compare II, 151. Locke (II, 151) does admit a form of commonwealth wherein the executive and 
the legislative power (in part) are vested in a single person. 
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executive on a par with the legislative. Furthermore, an absence of sovereignty does 
not follow. A case for sovereignty remains, not between supreme powers of the 
commonwealth but in the establishing or joining of the commonwealth, namely, the 
original compact. 
In the beginning of a political society, the majority (from a principle of 
unanimity) naturally holds complete power of the community to establish any form 
of government, viz. democracy, oligarchy, or monarchy (II, 132). In Locke, 
political society thus logically precedes government (Simmons 1993:68; 26n). The 
legislative power, at this moment, is established by the majority. The original 
establishment of a political society, namely, the legislative, is accordingly supreme. 
The people alone, Locke (II, 141) explicates, appoint the form of the 
commonwealth, in setting up a political society proper. The power of the legislative, 
then, is derived from the power of the people, or, the people’s positive voluntary 
grant (II, 141). Yet legislative power is here derived from the power of the people, 
in the event of a formation of a political union of original contractors, viz. by 
extension of the union. 
Also, let us not mistake the power of the legislative for a democratic 
government. Any extension of government by the legislative, will obtain in the 
form of a democracy, oligarchy, or monarchy, as, again, derived from the power of 
original contractors. The majority, in fact, may establish absolute monarchy from 
legislative power (II, 132, 151).335 
The form of government, Locke (II, 132) renders cogent, is determined by 
the placement of supreme power, “which is the Legislative” (ll. 19-21). The 
supreme power of the legislative, put otherwise, manifests in a form of government, 
 
335 Further, as Locke (II, 132) conceives, in a nascent political society, the supreme power might be 
given transitorily to the legislative; and, if so, the power would ultimately revert to the community, 




established by original contractors. A form of government extends the power of the 
legislative, established in political union. Thus, under any form of government, the 
ruling power ought to govern through the legislative, viz. within the framework of 
“declared and received Laws” (II, 137).336 
As Locke (II, 149) expounds, there is but one supreme power in the 
commonwealth, which, under government, is the legislative. The law-making 
power must be supreme, where other powers of the commonwealth are derived 
from, and subordinate to, the legislative (II, 150). Yet the legislative is but a 
fiduciary power, dependent upon public trust and the public good; thus, a supreme 
power ultimately lies in the people to remove or alter the legislative (II, 149). The 
people retain supreme power (II, 149), yet “not as considered under any Form of 
Government, because this Power of the People can never take place till the 
Government be dissolved” (ll. 27-9). This power, however, is perpetually retained, 
in derivation of the union of original contractors, where, in case public trust is 
forfeited, the power devolves to members in position of original contractors,337 who 
may then form a new government, for their safety and security (ll. 10-13). 
Consequently, the legislative, where it has betrayed the public trust and no longer 
can be relied upon to pursue the public good, may be removed or altered by the 
people, whose supreme power is then activated (ll. 4-8). But whilst government 
subsists, the legislative remains supreme (II, 150). 
Thus, the executive, bound by standing, positive law (II, 147), is subordinate 
to the legislative power (II, 152-3).338 But the legislative and executive power of 
the commonwealth defer to original political union, as does the power of the people. 
 
336 Or “established and promulgated Laws” (II, 137, ll. 32-5), viz. “not by extemporary Dictates and 
undetermined Resolutions” (ll. 25-6). 
337 That is, “into the hands of those that gave it” (II, 149, ll. 11-12). 
338 See also Cox (1960:124, 126). Locke (II, 152) makes an exception to this in the case of supreme 
executive power being vested in a single person with a share in the legislative, dependent on his 
consent. This person, effectively, is an absolute monarch, though not in the state of nature towards 




15.4. Dissolution of government. 
 
The legislative, as Green (1986:51) would have it, is the supreme power of Locke’s 
commonwealth. The executive is subordinate to it. But the legislative is ultimately 
subject to the sovereignty of the people (51). As noted, a political entity is properly 
distinguished from a legal entity, in Locke’s rendition of the original contract. Yet 
I object here to the sovereignty of the people. 
Locke’s discussion of the dissolution of government sheds light on this 
issue. 
I observe a distinction of a political and a legal entity in Locke’s discussion 
of the dissolution of government. As Locke (II, 211) states, the dissolution of 
government does not involve the dissolution of political society. In the event of a 
dissolution of government, political society remains (II, 211). That is, if (e.g.) the 
legislative violates public trust, or the executive aims to permanently dissolve the 
legislative in defiance of the public, the society retains the right to resume delegated 
rights (II, 168, 212). (See also Green 1986:51-2; Cox 1960:129.) Political society, 
however, would be dissolved almost exclusively by conquest, but in case it is 
dissolved, government cannot remain (II, 211). As Dunn (1969:181) puts it, only a 
systematic destruction by foreign conquest is likely to dissolve the set of obligations 
individuals have incurred through membership of the commonwealth. 
A political society combines original consent and the power of the people. 
But now a political union, formed in original consent, is to be separated from the 
people. On Green’s (1986:51) reading, however, the people are ultimately 
sovereign. The power of the people remains in the event of a dissolution of 
government, the power being derived from a transfer of individual natural rights in 
the original contract. So, Locke is to separate the dissolution of government from 
the dissolution of political society, given his distinction between the transfer of 
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individual natural rights and the subsequent act by which a newly formed society 
establishes a form of government. 
Now, I do grant the supreme power of the people remains, in the event of a 
dissolution of government, viz. the powers of the legislative and the executive. In 
fact, the power of the people lies beyond the power of the state in a pre-civil 
condition. Thus, upon the dissolution of political union, the people yet remain. 
However, only once the state is established, the people come to possess supreme 
power, distinct from the supreme power of the legislative and the executive. The 
people possess supreme power in virtue of the union. A formation of a community 
from a state of nature establishes one politic society, which constitutes “the 
agreement which every one has with the rest to incorporate, and act as one body, 
and so be one distinct common-wealth” (II, 211). In absence of such agreement, the 
people do not retain supreme power of the commonwealth. A natural community 
of the people may remain, yet without supreme power. Political authority, thus, is 
derived from the union of original contractors, whereby a commonwealth is 
established. 
According to Green (1986:52), resistance is legitimate, for Locke, when it 
is an act of a sovereign people, superseding a government that has fallen short of 
public trust. However, as Green (1986:52) admits, Locke does not apply the term 
“sovereign people,” in Two Treatises. There is but mention of the supreme power 
of the people (see II, 149). 
Given our distinction of sovereign and supreme power, the supreme power 
of the people is not the power of the sovereign, which lies, rather, in the unified 
power of original contractors. Legitimate resistance is an act of the members of the 
commonwealth against the government, in derivation of original political union, 
and in defense of that union. 
The supreme power of the people is not derived from a transfer of individual 
natural rights but an original political union. I distinguish here the sovereign power 
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of original contractors from the supreme power of the people. The former may be 
employed by an individual as much as by the people, given a transgression (or 
failure) of government against its citizens (see II, 168). 
Those living under tyranny find themselves in a natural condition, that is, 
without a legitimate common judge (Simmons 1993:29). Here, members of the 
commonwealth possess a right by “Appeal to Heaven” (II, 168) to resist the 
government, which, for Locke, is under a moral obligation to respect the law of 
nature and to frame its legislation accordingly (Gough 1973:42). But within the 
domain of the state, the umpire defers to the original contract, in making his 
judgement upon the government. 
Should government fail, such that members of the commonwealth no longer 
can rely on its protection339, or their lives are under threat by government force, 
they have a right to resist the government. For where “the Body of the People” — 
or “any single Man”340 — is deprived of the right of self-preservation or is put under 
a power without right and no appeal on earth, the people, or any among them, are 
at liberty to appeal to heaven “whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment” 
(II, 168) and exercise their right of resistance.341 
As is here observed, not only the collective but an individual has a right to 
resist, under appropriate circumstances. But the umpire is not an individual or the 
people. The judgement, rather, is expressed either in the individual or in the people, 
but both defer to the union, i.e., the original contract. 
Further, a right of resistance, exercised by a collective or individuals, is 
directed at the government, not the state. The community does not resist itself. In 
 
339 This is a matter of interpretation, that is, whether non-reliance would justify resistance, or 
government would have to be understood to move to destroy members of the commonwealth. 
340 Here, Locke “at his most anarchistic” (Laslett 1970; 397n) may be said to be an individualist, but 
this is the context of a state of war, viz. between the individual and the government. Lockean 
individuals are unfree in a state of war. 
341 Compare II, 21, where Locke emphasizes a right of resistance per individual judgement. 
349 
  
case a right of resistance be exercised, the objective is not a return to a natural 
condition but a defense of the commonwealth against the government, which has 
acted in violation of public trust. By invocation of the original contract, a right of 
resistance is exercised in opposition to the government established on basis of the 
contract. 
Force applied by the ruler, as Dunn (1969) remarks, does not nullify the 
moral standing of the political community; nor does force cancel the set of 
obligations one has incurred through membership of the commonwealth. Rather, 
force applied by the ruler nullifies the legal status of the ruler (180). Arbitrary force, 
short of conquest, does not undermine the political community, namely, the state, 
but the legal status of the ruler or government. The moral standing of the 
community is fixed in original political union. 
 
15.5. Absolute power. 
 
On our political naturalist interpretation, the absoluteness of power is consistent 
with Locke’s doctrine, as put forth in his Two Treatises. 
I shall claim, given political union holds, absolute monarchy is a viable 
outcome of Locke’s original contract. An absolute monarch, in that case, is not in 
a state of nature towards his subjects but acts within the state. 
As Seliger (1968:244) observes, legislative and executive power, for 
Locke,342 may be exercised by a single entity. Any form of government, from the 
compact, is established by majority consent. This includes an absolutist 
government. The union of the legislative and the executive under one-man rule is 
 
342 See II, 132, 151. 
350 
  
permissible, on the principle of consent. To bar such union overrides the principle 
(244).343 
But, in his analysis of Locke’s absolutist allowances, Seliger (1968:244) 
sets the legislative and the executive on a par. The executive, in Locke, is 
determined by legislative authority, in the formation of government. The power of 
the executive, thus, relies on legislative authority. Absolute monarchy, as any form 
of government, would derive its authority from the legislative. The executive, 
accordingly, is ultimately subordinate to the legislative (II, 147, 150), even though, 
on the assumption of political legitimacy, the former effectively reigns supreme. 
Obedience is claimed not to the commands of the executive in isolation but 
as it refers to the law, in which the power of the executive is vested (Grant 1987:75; 
see also II, 151, 202). Legislative authority has a final claim to obedience in the 
polity, referential to original consent (II, 134, ll. 18-20). Political obligation, then, 
is reduced to obedience to the supreme power of legislative, given legitimacy of the 
law in the consent of the society (II, 134, ll. 18-21), which is the mutual 
(unanimous) consent of the members of the commonwealth to abide by the 
determination of the majority (on a principle of unanimity) on basis of a common 
law. 
Necessary to the law, is the consent of the society (II, 134, ll. 15-16), from 
which the legitimacy of the law is derived (ll. 17-18). The supreme power of the 
legislative and legitimacy of the law are rooted in original consent, whereby 
members of society are mutually bound to obey the law. Thus, only such laws as 
 
343 Given Locke’s (II, 90) rejection of absolute monarchy, Locke’s position here, according to 
Seliger (1968:244), is indicative of inconsistency. True, absolute monarchy, Locke (II, 90) does 
maintain, is inconsistent with civil society and so can be no form of government at all (ll. 1-4). But 
Locke’s rejection of absolute monarchy, on a more charitable interpretation, assumes arbitrariness, 
in referring to Filmer’s construct of absolute monarchy, wherein the monarch is untouched by the 
law. Absolute monarchy, under legislative authority, is otherwise viable in Locke’s commonwealth. 
Compare II, 137, ll. 1-3. 
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enacted by a legislative, established by unanimous consent of original contractors, 
are binding (II, 212, l. 22). 
Absolute power, I concur, is legitimated on the principle of Lockean consent 
(see Seliger 1968:250). As Seliger (1968:245-6) maintains, absolute power is made 
consistent with political power, as exercised in Locke’s commonwealth. Locke (II, 
139, 159) admits the necessity of some absolutist principles in government, given 
the role of prerogative. But for Locke, absolute governmental power, where 
necessary, is not arbitrary (II, 139, ll. 9-10). If kept in check, it is limited to the 
public good, short of arbitrary rule (ll. 10-11). 
Further, arbitrary rule can arise under any form of government (Seliger 
1968:247). This is not particular, in degree or kind, to absolute rule, which, if 
arbitrary, is corrupt and rendered illegitimate (248-50). Accordingly, a right of 
resistance may be invoked under any form of government (262). The boundary of 
absolute rule, as for any other form of government, is drawn by legislative 
authority, provided the legislative does not resort to arbitrary rule, in which case 
authority devolves to the community. Absolute political power is justifiable under 
the law, but rendered arbitrary, where the ruler exerts his own will over the 
populace. So much is recognized by Seliger (1968), but, on his reading, the lines 
are blurred between the legislative and the executive. The proper limits of 
governmental power under an independent legislative, thus, are missed. 
As Grant (1987:75) suggests, the rule of law, or, “That which is by right to 
be obeyed,” may be conceived as the sovereign power, in Locke. Though, as Grant 
(1987:76) admits, Locke does not use the term “sovereignty,” in this regard. 
Moreover, I would distinguish “That which is by right to be obeyed” from “That 
which is to be obeyed” or “That which must be obeyed.” The right to be obeyed344 
constitutes authority by grant. But that which performs the granting of the right, is 
 
344 Political power, for Locke (I, 120), is the right to command and be obeyed. 
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ultimately authoritative. The granting is performed in political union of original 
contractors in the establishment of a government (see II, 132). The rule of law, then, 
is still restricted by original consent. 
Further, the legislative, as distinguished from the rule of law, lacks 
sovereign power, seeing that (1) in upholding a common law, the legislative and 
the executive must be separated (such that legislators and magistrates are subjected 
to the law); and (2) the people retain supreme power to alter the legislative in 
violation of public trust (Grant 1987:75-7). 
The limits of legislative authority are fixed by its legitimating device, 
namely, the mutual consent of original contractors in the setting up of government. 
Now, supreme powers ostensibly defer to the majority. Yet the principle of majority 
consent rests upon a requirement of unanimity, given unanimous consent is found 
wanting on any given issue (II, 99). The supreme power, then, is placed in a form 
of government by the majority from unanimous consent to a formation of a 
legislative, extended in such a form of government as established, if not 
unanimously, on a majoritarian principle. 
Now, the compact is original “in the sense that it specifies the minimal 
conditions under which a legitimate political society originates and may expect to 
continue in being,” where prospective members of the commonwealth must consent 
to its establishment (Cox 1960:114). There is but one compact “which necessarily 
contains an assent to every condition proper to the functioning of political society” 
(115). 
The making of one body politic constitutes the very essence of the original 
compact (Cox 1960:115). In the compact, there is no differentiating between the 
“making” of society and the “making” of the political (115). Still, the political has 
primacy over the social (115). The social is subsumed under the political, the 
product of which it is (115). Still, we need not conclude, as does Cox (1960:116), 
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that society is equivalent to the existence of a political order.345 “Society” 
encompasses the people as well as political union. But a political order, as I would 
understand, merely entails the latter. 
Now, the supreme power of the commonwealth is the legislative (Cox 
1960:123). Legislative authority is singularly supreme, for Locke, while relative 
supremacy may be attributed to the executive, which is and must be subordinate to 
the legislative (Gencer 2010:332). The supremacy of powers implies a difference 
of degree rather than of kind (333). Yet supremacy by degree, in my view, is to be 
explained in deference to a political entity separate from the legislative, given the 
legislative is not a measure of its own authority. 
Locke (II, 152), further, does present a viable exception to the supreme 
power of the legislative, viz. where the executive power and partial legislative 
power is vested in a single person, effectively an absolute monarch, whose consent 
is required for the passing of law. 
Also, concerning the power of the people, Grant (1987:78) rejects popular 
sovereignty in Locke’s construct of the commonwealth. Now, in view of the 
subordination of the powers of the commonwealth, the people do have a right to 
remove or alter the legislative, or the constitution of the government, where public 
trust has been broken (II, 149). But, as Grant (1987:78) notes, the people do not 
hold or exercise in any way political power during the reign of the government, 
having delegated such power to the government, to which obedience therefore is 
owed. The people, then, are not sovereign by reason of a right of resistance (78). 
Popular sovereignty, Resnick (1992:512) maintains, is not understood by 
Locke as incompatible with monarchy but it requires monarchy to be constitutional 
 
345 Locke denies the natural sociability of man, Cox (1960:115) maintains. The state of nature, 
however, is not devoid of the political, as we observe in Locke’s account of the evolution of 




and limited by the legislative. The power of the people, I concur, is compatible with 
absolutist rule. But the people are not sovereign. 
Now, Resnick (1992), in alluding to the limits of political power, refers not 
to state power but the power of government. The placing of a limit on monarchical 
government, ultimately, is exercised by the sovereign power, which is not the 
legislative but original political union. This is not indicative of popular sovereignty 
but the sovereignty of the union of original contractors. 
On Marshall’s (1994:264) rendering, Locke advocates a popular 
revolutionary sovereignty, which potentially would give way to a mixed monarchy. 
Yet, on my reading of Locke, a mixed monarchy obtains within a sovereign 
commonwealth. The power of the people to resist is premised on a concept of 
sovereignty. 
There is, I propose, a reference to sovereign power made in Locke’s 
construct of supreme powers, which extend a sovereign power. Now, for Locke’s 
commonwealth, a distinction of legislative and popular sovereignty, as drawn by 
Gough (1973), is apt. Still, sovereignty lies neither in the legislative nor the people. 
These are, however, extensions of sovereignty, as solidified in the original compact. 
The executive may in practice be understood to rival the legislative for supremacy; 
yet both are extensions of sovereignty, where the power of the executive rests on 
legislative authority. 
Sovereignty is exercised in the placing of supreme power in a form of 
government (see II, 132). This is the act of the sovereign. Yet the sovereign, in 
Locke, is not a natural person. To demonstrate sovereign power, in Locke, we refer 
to his mechanical justification of political power (Laslett 1970:109), in context of 
the original compact. Here, supreme power is placed in the legislative and the 
executive by original contractors, in mutual consent to form a government, in 
response to a requirement of unanimity and obedience to the law, in deference to 
their deed of forming a government. The union of the society consists in the 
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uniformity of will, in the form of the legislative, as established by the community, 
or its majority (II, 212, ll. 13-15). Uniformity, in this sense, is the sovereign will. 
 
15.6. The limits of political power. 
 
The project of this thesis is to locate the sovereign power in Locke’s political 
doctrine. It is my contention, in this project, that a concept of sovereignty is not 
undermined by Locke’s insistence, in his Second Treatise, on the limits of political 
power. In Locke, the limits of political power pertain to governmental (supreme) 
powers, set by a sovereign power. 
The sovereign power, I observe, is the unanimous rule of original 
contractors. 
The supreme power of the commonwealth is but the joint power of every 
member; and therefore, the power of government cannot be exercised arbitrarily 
over the life, liberty, or possession of the members (II, 135). Now, the limits of 
political power, in Locke, extend a political requirement of unanimity. Locke’s 
rendition of a commonwealth (II, 132), given a political requirement of unanimity, 
does not exclude an absolute monarch, whose domain is the executive as well as 
the legislative branch of government. Locke’s monarch, however, reigns on 
condition of unanimous rule. Given this, the law is not reducible to the expression 
of the arbitrary will of the natural person of the monarch. The law remains a 
determination of a constituent sovereign power, namely, a political union. 
A just government, for Locke (II, 142), operates within certain bounds. (See 
also Simmons 1993:204.) But justice, here, is determined by the political. Absolute, 
arbitrary power, in Locke’s usage, is definitive of tyranny (see esp. II, 135-9).346 
Power despotic is unlimited, whereas political (governmental) power, for Locke, is 
 
346 See also II, 23-4, 90, 127, 132, 171-2, 174, 210, 212, 214, 221-2. 
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limited by original consent and, by extension, the rule of law. Political legitimacy, 
relative to the limits of political power, is determined by public trust (II, 136, 221). 
(See also Dunn 1969:162.) 
Further, political power is limited by the law of preservation (II, 135). But 
limitation of political power is determined by original contractors, whose 
preservation and property are at stake. Positive law, if valid and legitimate, cannot 
be enacted contrary to the law of nature (i.e., the preservation of the species). It 
must conform to natural law (II, 135). Yet the scope of the law of preservation is 
narrowed, relative to the interest of original contractors. 
The limits of political authority, Stanton (2011:21) claims, are not 
determined by “the logical requirements of consent” but divine guidelines by the 
requirements of which consent is restricted. But while consent is restricted by 
divine command, unanimous consent, likewise, limits political power in original 
union. Individual consent, then, is expressed in view of political requirements. 
Original contractors possess political power, in their own right (II, 171). But 
the contractors transitorily give up this power to a political society proper, in the 
establishment of a body politic, for the preservation of their life, liberty, and 
property (II, 171). This is mutually agreed upon in the original compact, such that 
the end of a body politic is now its preservation. Given mutual consent, the power 
granted to the society cannot constitute an absolute, arbitrary power. Such power is 
not given by nature and thus cannot be conveyed by compact (II, 172).347 If it were 
to be possessed, such power would contradict the established end of society; and, 
again, it could not be conveyed by compact. Thus, political power is limited by the 
original compact, or, by extension, the power of the people from which it originates 
(II, 171), as it is set to legislate in the aim of the preservation of the community, 
namely, for the public good. 
 
347 This is due to limitation on power by the law of nature. 
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Now, absolute, arbitrary power, governing without settled standing laws, 
cannot consist with the ends of society, established in an original contract, from the 
state of nature (II, 137).348 Given original contractors cannot be supposed to put 
themselves in a worse condition (II, 137), arbitrary rule provides no rationale for a 
departure from the state of nature (only a reason to remain). In the state of nature, 
a natural executive right applies in protection of one’s property. A rationale for 
departure upon the joining of political society introduces to the same end “settled 
standing laws” and “stated rules” (II, 137). 
Still, absolute power may be deemed legitimate, on the rule of law, while 
arbitrary power, relative to the interests of original contractors, is deemed 
illegitimate and more inconvenient than a natural condition (see Grant 1987:72-3). 
Political power is justifiable, barring arbitrariness. 
Contra Sagar (2018:112), absolute power, in Locke, is not by definition 
arbitrary; and Locke sanctions no attack or the killing of an absolute ruler349, whose 
government, on the contrary, is quite possible, on Locke’s rendition of the forms of 
government (see II, 132). 
Also, in Olsthoorn & Apeldoorn (2020), Locke is presented as an anti-
absolutist. Here, a proper distinction between “absolute” and “arbitrary” is missed. 
Absolute power is not ipso facto tyrannical (see II, 151). Arbitrary rule, by 
contrast, is understood by the finality of its judgement and its possession of 
supralegal power of life and death (i.e., of capital punishment), on that judgement. 
Within a common legal framework, the use of absolute force, given the separation 
 
348 As noted prior, absolute monarchy, Locke (II, 90) states, is inconsistent with civil society and so 
can be no form of civil government at all. But here, Locke refers to an absolute monarchy, as 
rendered in Filmer’s system. There is a sense in which, however, an absolute monarchy may be 
constricted within the law, even though the legislative and the executive is vested in a single person 
or body. Absolute rule, in this sense, is not arbitrary, such that the monarch may exert his will, 
irrespective of the law of the land, as in this case established in an original compact. 
349 Here, I do distinguish between an absolute ruler and a tyrant. Sagar (2018) may indeed want to 
refer to the latter, in this regard, but the distinction must, in that case, be re-emphasized.  
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of powers, is justifiable. The arbitrary use of force, however, proceeds outside 
legality, at the mere will of the ruler. For Locke, such use of force is illegitimate, 
as it is not directed towards the preservation of the community. A ruler violates the 
original compact by acting arbitrarily. The power of the ruler is to defer to the 
contract. 
As noted, on Seliger’s (1968:244) account, Locke allows absolute 
monarchy, where the power of the legislative and the executive is held by a single 
person or body. For this, there is indeed strong textual warrant.350 As Locke (II, 
132) renders cogent, the majority, in the formation of government, may put the 
power of making laws into the hands of one man. Further, in a form of 
commonwealth, wherein the executive power and the legislative (in part) is vested 
in a single person, the supreme power of the commonwealth is held by said person 
(II, 151), who, effectively, is an absolute monarch,351 “from whom all inferiour 
Magistrates derive all their several subordinate Powers” (ll. 6-7); and there being 
“no Legislative superiour to him, [and] no Law to be made without his consent” (ll. 
8-10). 
Contra Cox (1960:124), it is not the case that in a well-ordered 
commonwealth (for protection of the people), the executive power and the 
legislative need to be placed in different hands (see II, 143). Now, Locke (I, 143) 
does state that in a well-ordered commonwealth, set up for the public good, the 
 
350 See II, 151, ll. 1-12. Compare II, 132. Now, Seliger (1968:244) deems Locke inconsistent, on 
this point, seeing that Locke (II, 90) renders absolute monarchy illegitimate, or, inconsistent with 
civil society. This, however, is rather uncharitable. As noted prior, Locke may here be understood 
to include arbitrariness, though “arbitrary” happens to be unstated. There is, in that case, no 
inconsistency on Locke’s part. In fact, it is plain, “some men” (II, 90, ll. 1-2) refers to Filmer or 
Filmerists (see Laslett 1970:344n). Compare II, 91-4, where Locke continues a discussion of 
absolute monarchy in a way that is in later sections (II, 151, 168) reserved for absolute, arbitrary 
rule (tyranny). 
351 To be sure, Locke (II, 151) does not call the ruler, in the form of commonwealth in question, an 
“absolute monarch” but, rather, the supreme executor of the law (l. 14). But a commonwealth, so 
described (II, 151), is, presumably, that or some such form of absolute monarchy from original 
consent, as Locke (II, 132) allows. 
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legislative power is put into the hands of diverse persons duly assembled, where 
those lawmakers (out of assembly) are also subject to the law of their own making. 
It might be concluded, on this note, that a well-ordered commonwealth is one in 
which, by definition, the legislative and the executive are in the hands of “diverse 
persons.” This, however, does not follow. Since absolute monarchy is a potential 
outcome of the original compact, where an absolute monarch would answer to the 
people (or, political union), absolute monarchy is no more disorderly than any other 
form of government, in principle. For the very order of the commonwealth relies 
on the unanimity of original contractors, from which the power of the people and 
governmental powers are derived (see II, 132). 
Granted, as Locke (II, 151) clarifies, the supreme executor of the law is not 
wholly in possession of the supreme power, which is that of law-making. Still, the 
executive is “in a very tolerable sense” supreme (II, 151), in that the supreme 
execution of the law is in his jurisdiction. But, while absolute monarchy is a 
possible form of government, political legitimacy is grounded in original consent 
and the rule of law in the form of the legislative. The legislative cannot transfer the 
power of making laws to any other supposed authority (II, 141); and the power of 
making laws is delegated from the people. The supreme executor of the law, thus, 
“has no Will, no Power, but that of the Law” (II, 151, l. 21).352 In the formation of 
absolute monarchy from original consent, Locke’s absolute monarch does not stand 
above the law. Though the law requires his consent, his power is yet exerted within 
the rule of law, given the exception of prerogative and the federative power. 
The supreme executor, accordingly, forfeits his power in violating his oath 
of allegiance; and in that case, he is owed no obedience (II, 151). If he proceeds 
 
352 The absolute monarch is indeed not the sovereign. Rather, sovereign power is properly located 
in unanimous rule (or, the fundamental power of original contractors). Not that Locke’s monarch is 
but a figure head of unanimous rule, but monarchical power is exercised on condition of the 
unanimity of original contractors. 
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according to his own arbitrary will, the executor breaches public trust (II, 222, ll. 
27-30). In the end, members owe no obedience but to the public will of the society 
(ll. 25-6). 
Legislative power, also, is liable to forfeiture. For the legislative to claim 
absolute, arbitrary power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people, is a 
breach of trust laid in its authority (II, 221).353 If it endeavors to exert arbitrary 
power, as in confiscating or destroying private property, the legislative enters a state 
of war with the people; as the people are absolved from obedience to the law (on 
the invocation of a right of resistance) (II, 222). This is a transgression of trust laid 
in legislative authority by the mutual consent of original contractors, viz. the 
fundamental rule of society (II, 222). The legislative, thus, forfeits the power it has 
been granted, whereupon complete power devolves to the people, in their 
reclaiming natural freedom and the right to establish a new legislative (II, 222). 
Locke’s monarch, I propose, exercises the power of a sovereign 
commonwealth, one form of government of which is absolute monarchy. Notably, 
a monarchy elective or hereditary is here conceivable as a form of government (II, 
132). In either case, the monarch is subject to the law, or, in any case, the will of 
the legislative. Legitimate monarchical power is absolute, yet in deference to the 
law. Contra Grant (1987), it is not the case, for Locke, that an absolute monarch 
remains in the state of nature towards his subjects (74) and a king stands above the 
law (79).354 The executive is in possession of extralegal powers (prerogative) (II, 
 
353 Compare II, 168. 
354 To note a caveat, prerogative (i.e., the power of pardon, veto, the calling and dissolving of 
parliament) is, granted, exercised outside the scope of the law, at the discretion of the executive (see 
II, 159). However, special powers of the executive do not render the executive superior to the 
legislative (II, 156, ll. 40-2); and these are not arbitrary but rest on public trust and are exercised 
only for the public weal (II, 156, ll. 33-5). For prerogative is but a permission from the people to the 
ruler to act outside the scope of the law, in the event of urgency or emergency, for the public good 
(II, 158, 164). Thus, an absolute monarch (or, the supreme executor of the law) remains within the 
hierarchical structure of the state, though he does exercise powers at his own discretion. 
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159-68). Yet his powers are largely within the law. A tyrant, however, is in a state 
of war towards the members of the commonwealth (II, 205). 
Towards one another, princes remain in a state of nature (II, 14). But a 
legitimate prince is situated out of a natural condition relative to citizens (see 
Simmons 1993:16). This is also reserved for Locke’s “supreme executor of the 
law,” (II, 151) who wields the executive as well as the legislative power within a 
commonwealth proper. 
Though she distinguishes arbitrary from absolute power, Grant (1987:72-4) 
still proceeds on the interpretation that, for Locke, absolute monarchy in 
inconsistent with civil society “and so can be no Form of Civil Government at all” 
(II, 90, ll. 3-4). But Locke, in relevant sections (II, 90-4), refers to absolute 
monarchy in the Filmerist sense,355 while in later sections (II, 132, 151), Locke 
makes allowances for absolute monarchy, as distinguished from tyranny (absolute, 
arbitrary rule). These allowances, however, do not signify sovereign power per se 
but the exercise of sovereign power, through the medium of the supreme executor. 
Sovereignty is at the level of the commonwealth (state), not government. Supreme 
powers of the government are subject to the sovereign will of original contractors, 
who retain a natural executive right, in case the government moves to destroy (or 
fails to protect) them. 
Now, as Locke (II, 159) stipulates, special powers (prerogative) are left to 
the discretion of the executive. These are, accordingly, applied outside the scope of 
the law. Prerogative is exercised without prescription of, even contrary to, the law 
(II, 160). But the executive is permitted by the people to act on his own accord, for 
 
355 This is supported by Laslett’s (1970:344n) note on “some men” (II, 90, ll. 1-2). In full: “[I]t is 
evident, that Absolute Monarchy, which by some men is counted the only Government in the World, 
is indeed inconsistent with Civil Society, and so can be no Form of Government at all” (ll. 1-4). 
Here, “some men” refers to Filmer and his followers (Laslett 1970:344n), as is also unambiguous, 
in Locke’s statement that, for some men, absolute monarchy is the only form of government. At 
issue, then, is absolute, arbitrary rule. 
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the public good, where the law is silent, or in case it is appropriate to act against 
the letter of the law (II, 164). He advances the public good without a rule (II, 166), 
for the preservation of all members of society, in accordance with the fundamental 
law of nature and government, in urgent and uncertain circumstances (II, 158-9). 
Prerogative, then, does not render the executive superior to the legislative 
(II, 156, ll. 40-2). The executive power is not arbitrary, whereas it rests on public 
trust and is exercised only for the public weal (II, 156, ll. 33-5). The ruler, in that 
case, remains subject to state power, even in the exercise of prerogative. 
By this logic, the use of force against the people, without authority and 
contrary to public trust, introduces a state of war with the people (II, 155). If the 
legislative is dissolved by the executive power, the people affronted have a right to 
exercise their power in reinstating the legislature and removing the power that has 
met them with force (II, 155). 
So, it may now be said, absolutist features remain in the exercise of political 
power, in that it involves special powers of the executive (prerogative), the power 
of life and death, and the power of war and peace (see Grant 1987:78). 
But, Grant (1987:79) notes, sovereign authority, in Locke, cannot be 
inferred from the possession of supreme powers.356 As Locke (I, 132) states, the 
power of war and peace (in isolation) is proof of no other power; for anyone may 
possess such power without any political supremacy. However, in Locke, this 
relates to the supposed sovereign power of those that wield supreme powers. In 
political society, the power is exercised only by the supreme power (I, 131). But 
this is not indicative of the sovereign power of the natural person of the ruler. The 
power of war and peace, as exercised in a political society proper, is a mark of 
sovereignty (I, 131). Sovereign power, ultimately, lies not with the natural person 
 
356 See esp. I, 129, 132. 
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of the ruler but the unanimous rule of original contractors, from which the power 
of war and peace, inter alia, is derived. 
Now, while power political and paternal, in Locke, are contradistinguished 
on basis of a power of life and death peculiar to the former, this is not the case in 
power political and despotic, whereas said power is exercised in each case (see 
Grant 1987:73). But, in Locke’s commonwealth, no natural person is (destined) to 
occupy the throne (II, 13, 90-3, 96-7). (See also Grant 1987:74.) Political power, 
then, is supposedly not exerted at will, viz. by the arbitrary decree of a final judge, 
whose power lies beyond the law (see Grant 1987:78, 80).357 But again, a final 
judge is here assumed to be a natural person. 
The proper limits of political power are fixed in unanimous rule of original 
contractors. The union is a final judge of the legitimacy of political power, the 
illegitimacy of which permits revolution and tyrannicide (see II, 168). But the 
people do not constitute a final judge. The people may not exercise its power until 
the government be dissolved (II, 149). Provided the government stands, the people 
hold no power to act (II, 157). A right of revolution “is only a collective power and 
in no way qualifies the required submission of the individual to the properly 
constituted government” (Cox 1960:122). 
A right of resistance, I observe, constitutes neither the power of the 
individual nor of the people but that of original contractors. It is retained under a 
government, to be exercised by an individual or the people, in case the government 
proceeds to destroy its subjects (II, 168). A power to resist is derived from original 
consent. 
 
357 This I grant, insofar as absolute, arbitrary rule of the natural person of the ruler is at stake. Grant 
(1987), however, does not accommodate Locke’s notion of the supreme executor of the law, where 
the executive and legislative power is vested in a single person, who may be said to be final judge, 
though in deference to the power of the people. (See discussion above, in this section.) Further, the 
sovereign will of original contractors, is not here excluded, qua final judge. 
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In its infancy, government in the form of elective monarchy, Locke (II, 162) 
explains, was almost all prerogative. But due to the accumulation of corruption at 
the end of the Golden Age, the people declared limitations of prerogative, “to be 
exercised for their good” (II, 163). In the advent of a political society proper, the 
natural person of the monarch is dethroned. In the body politic, sovereign power 
now lies in unanimous rule. The original contract marks a shift of sovereign power 
from the natural person of the monarch to original contractors, at which juncture 
the end of government becomes the preservation of property and protection of a 
natural right of inheritance.358 
The renouncing of a natural executive right, upon entering civil society, 
proceeds from the need to avoid the inconveniences of the state of nature, viz. to 
preserve and secure property on “standing rules” (II, 136; 134). The means to secure 
property are the laws of the society (II, 134), established on basis of a trust in 
following declared laws (II, 136). Accordingly, the supreme power (i.e., the 
legislative) is precluded from arbitrary rule of the lives and property of the people 
(II, 135). Issuance of “extemporary arbitrary decrees” is unauthorized; the 
legislative, thus, is bound to operate by “promulgated standing laws” (II, 136).359 
The power given to the legislative by the mutual consent or joint power of 
the people (or, every member of society) can be no more than the latter (II, 135, ll. 
5-9). Political power cannot exceed the power of original contractors, since by 
mutual consent they grant the polity only the power they possess. Legislative 
authority has no more power than what has been granted to it (II, 135, l. 19). The 
power given to and thus possessed by the legislative, is limited to the public good, 
viz. directed towards the preservation of the community (ll. 20-1). However, these 
 
358 As Grant (1987:82) remarks, seeing that the end of government is the preservation of property, 
the supremacy of the law (as the standard of legitimate government) is called into question. 
359 The supreme governmental power cannot confiscate private property, or levy taxes, without 
consent of the proprietor (II, 138, ll. 1-3, 6-7; II, 142), or, the consent of the majority or 
representatives of the majority (II, 140, ll. 4-6). 
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are not the limits of state but governmental powers. The latter are limited by the 
sovereign power of the commonwealth, namely, the unanimous consent of original 
contractors. 
 
15.7. The natural power of the commonwealth. 
 
Lastly, I want to comment on the notion of arbitrariness in Locke’s compact. 
A governmental rule by original consent is not arbitrary towards the 
citizenry. Locke (II, 135) bars the arbitrary rule of original contractors towards one 
another,360 given men in the state of nature have no arbitrary power over one 
another (II, 8). Given unpossessed power cannot be transferred, and one only has 
so much power as nature provides for preservation, no one has an absolute, arbitrary 
power over his own life or the life of any other. Hence, the contractors do not 
mutually possess absolute, arbitrary power over the will or lives of one another (II, 
135). 
But let us now consider the scope of arbitrariness, relative to state power. 
The sovereign body is limited by the law of nature, viz. divine authority. This, I 
find, is its only limitation. The absence of arbitrariness, in terms of a secular account 
of Locke’s political doctrine, relates to government, not state power. 
Locke recognizes two components of the execution of political power, 
namely, the executive and the federative power of the commonwealth (Cox 
1960:123). The executive power is continual, whereas the legislative need not be 
(123). The executive and the federative power are distinct, though in practice these 
are exercised by the same person (I, 131; II, 147-8). (See also Cox 1960:126.) 
Now, original contractors depart from the state of nature with regard to 
fellow prospective members; yet they remain in the state of nature in regard to “the 
 
360 Compare II, 8. 
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rest of Mankind” (II, 145), i.e., foreign states or nations and non-members. (See 
also Simmons 1993:22.) Accordingly, the commonwealth acts for its own 
preservation. It possesses a right to act towards other commonwealths. This is the 
federative power of the commonwealth (Cox 1960:124-5). As each man in the state 
of nature possesses the natural executive right, so the community at large possesses 
a right to preserve itself relative to all persons or bodies outside itself (125).361 
The natural power of the commonwealth is not the executive but the 
federative power (II, 145-7). The federative power is (relative to other political 
societies, foreign and natural persons) natural, placed in the hands of governmental 
agents, yet derived from original contractors, remaining in the state of nature with 
regard to foreigners and the rest of mankind (II, 145-6). (See also Cox 1960:125.) 
This is the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and foreign transactions 
(II, 146). 
Given that the federative power is limited by natural law, restrictions on 
political power ultimately are not set by consent but the authority of the law of 
reason362, in virtue of God’s workmanship. The ground of obligation is natural law. 
Yet in political union, original contractors place themselves under an obligation 
towards themselves, where they agree to being governed. Political consent is still 
revocable “whenever they judge the Cause of sufficient moment” (II, 168). Rational 
requirements of natural law are those of divine authority. 
Now, as Cox (1960:124) notes, the federative power is ministerial and 
likewise subordinate to the legislative (see II, 153). The federative power, though, 
is subordinate to the legislative, insofar as it is ministerial. In the state of nature, the 
federative power may be understood in terms of the preservation of the 
commonwealth, simpliciter. 
 
361 See II, 145-6. 
362 Natural law is the law of reason (I, 101; II, 6, 57, 96). 
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As Cox (1960:124) acknowledges, the body politic constitutes one whole 
community in the state of nature, where the exercise of the federative power is 
almost exclusively concerned with external affairs (126). Foreign policy, 
accordingly, is not based on standing laws (126-7). For the legislative contains no 
authority to lay down laws beyond its jurisdiction (127).363 
The federative power, then, fully extends the power of original political 
union. To bar its arbitrariness within the state of nature (in relation to other 




I have made a case for a Lockean concept of sovereignty. 
Locke espouses a positive theory of the state and, within the domain of the 
state, of government. A positive theory of the state, in Locke’s political doctrine, 
presents an idea of sovereignty, in the absence of the natural person of the 
sovereign. 
Locke’s sovereign is original political union, which renders a posteriori 
individual consent. Political union is implied in the original contract. Political 
authority is derived from the concept of a political union, as formed in the mutual 
consent of original contractors. 
The legitimacy of government as well as a right of resistance, in case of the 
illegitimacy of the government, rest on political union. Members defer to the union, 
in exercising their right of resistance against the government, in defense of their 
state, namely, the commonwealth. 
Absolute monarchy, lastly, is a viable outcome of the original compact, 
equal to that of a democracy or an oligarchy. A right of resistance is not invoked 
 
363 See II, 145, 147, 156-7. 
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by the mere fact of absolute power. While Locke does not sanction the removal or 
the killing of an absolute ruler, Locke does sanction the removal, if not the killing, 































The Limits of Consent. 
 
 
I observe a political justification of political power in Locke’s account of the 
original compact. Locke’s political justification proceeds from a concept of 
sovereignty, in the form of unanimous rule. Lockean consent is ultimately political, 
in its justificatory application. 
Now, lastly, I shall address the scope of morality, in Locke, given his natural 
law theory. But on his theory of natural law, the political, ostensibly, is fixed within 
the bounds of morality. I deny this, however. The political, in the same way as 
morality and reason, is under divine authority.  
Lockean consent is limited by natural law. Under the law of nature, Lockean 
individuals are rendered social moral beings, living at relative peace in a natural 
condition. Original contractors act within the law of nature in forming a 
government, for the protection of their property, yet at the same time in furtherance 
of the species. 
I understand this aspect of Locke’s doctrine as a response to Filmer. But 
Locke’s response does not place his doctrine within political voluntarism. For self-
interest, I find, is not a primary inclination of Lockean individuals but the 
preservation of the species, to preserve God’s workmanship, according to a 
fundamental law of nature. Prospective members of the commonwealth alienate 
their rights not from self-interest but in furtherance of the species. 
In rejecting self-interest, Locke avoids Filmer’s challenge of the revocation 
of consent.364 But Lockean consent, consequently, is rendered political, insofar as 
it applies to justification. 
 
364 See Filmer (A, 285; O, 273-4). 
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To explain, Locke (II, 4) presents a caveat within his natural law theory. As 
stated, in the exercise of natural right, individuals remain naturally free and equal 
“[…] unless the Lord and Master of them all, should by any manifest Declaration 
of his Will set one above another, and confer on him by an evident and clear 
appointment an undoubted Right to Dominion and Sovereignty” (II, 4).365 Here, 
Locke’s caveat evokes the opposing thesis, viz. a derivation of political power, as 
set forth in Filmer’s system, by divine grant. 
For Locke, the caveat does not come to pass. So, free and equal rational 
beings, in giving up their natural rights, place themselves under an obligation in 
thus forming a government. They mutually consent to being governed by their own 
union. Consent, in that case, is not at the prerogative of the individual consenter. It 
is tied to membership. In revoking consent, members secede from the 
commonwealth. 
Here, Locke is no longer vulnerable to Filmer’s challenge of the prerogative 
of the consenter in revoking consent, given natural rights of individuals. As Locke 
(II, 6) renders cogent, human beings are “the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and 
infinitely wise Maker; All the Servants of one Sovereign Master […] being 
furnished with like Faculties, sharing all in one Community of Nature,” (ll. 10-16), 
such that, accordingly, no subordination obtains, where one would be authorized to 
destroy another (ll. 16-17). 
God planted in human beings (as in all other animals) a strong desire for 
self-preservation,366 as a principle of action, whereby human beings are bound to 
preserve themselves so not to let “so curious and wonderful a piece of 
Workmanship” perish “by its own Negligence” (I, 86). Given a strong divinely 
implanted desire for preservation, human beings are instructed by “the voice of 
 
365 Compare I, 67. 
366 This terminology appears to contradict Locke’s denial of innate ideas, in the Essay (1.3). 
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God,” namely, reason, to follow the will of their maker, in pursuing their natural 
inclination (ll. 19-24).367 
Therefore, Locke (I, 86) continues, a right was given onto human beings to 
make use of the lower animals, viz. for the sake of, or as useful and necessary to, 
the preservation of the human species. A use right of the lower animals, then, 
grounds “Man’s Property in the Creatures” (l. 26). This, as Laslett (1970:223n) 
notes, provides an ultimate justification of property. 
But the state of nature is one of liberty, not license (II, 6). It is governed by 
a law of nature, namely, that of reason, obliging everyone (ll. 6-7).368 
Further, one does not have the liberty to destroy oneself (II, 6). The law of 
nature (reason) teaches one ought to do no harm to another in his life, health, liberty, 
or possession, given natural equality. Everyone is thus bound to preserve himself 
as well as the rest of mankind (II, 6). 
As Locke (II, 6) stresses, “when his own Preservation comes not in 
competition,”369 one ought, to the utmost of one’s ability, to preserve the rest of 
humanity. Here, the law of nature is not made to dictate the preservation of each 
over the preservation of all but the preservation of the species over self-interest (see 
Kendall 1965:76-8). The priority of the species is consistent with Locke’s divine 
workmanship argument, whereas the image of God is no one’s in particular. So, 
each has a duty to preserve himself on a presumption of a duty to preserve all. 
 
367 Again, as Laslett (1970:223n) notes, these lines seem to contradict Locke of the Essay (1.3) on 
innate practical principles, although the notion of a divinely implanted desire for self-preservation 
may cohere with the exception Locke (1894) makes for a “desire for happiness” as an “innate 
practical principle” (see Laslett 1970:223n). (We refer here to Fraser’s 1894 edition of Locke’s 
Essay, I, 67.) 
368 See also I, 101; II, 57, 96. 
369 This may be read as to account for supererogatory acts, rather than stipulating the priority of self-
interest. That is, given one need not sacrifice his own life for the general cause, one ought, to the 




Though one, notably, is not required to sacrifice himself in the general interest, that 
is, to preserve humanity in competition with his own preservation. 
The law of nature, Locke (II, 7) states, wills the peace and preservation of 
all mankind, thus barring harm to others. A transgressor of the law of nature, then, 
one may rightfully harm or destroy “for the same reason that he may kill a Wolf or 
a Lyon” (II, 16), that is, not merely in self-defense but for the preservation of the 
species. Individuals who by their violent acts pose a threat to the preservation of 
the species may be rightfully destroyed (II, 16), “for the more effective preservation 
of mankind as a whole” (Simmons 1992:49-50). 
The first and fundamental law of nature, accordingly, is the preservation of 
the human species (II, 16; 135). (See also Kendall 1965:78-9; Simmons 1992:47-
8.) Applied to human society, the law is the preservation of society and, relative to 
the public good, every member of society (II, 134) (See also Gough 1973:22.)370 
Preservation of self, also, is mandated by the law of nature: each ought to preserve 
himself as God’s workmanship.371 A naturally free individual “has not Liberty to 
destroy himself […] but where some nobler use, than its[372] bare Preservation calls 
for it” (II, 6), namely, for “the liberty of man” (II, 22).373 
The duty of self-preservation and the duty to preserve the public good are 
grounded in the principle of the preservation of the species. The principle of 
preservation is not one of self-interest, simpliciter (cf. Simmons 1992:38-9, 47; see 
also Gough 1973:22). Preservation combines a principle of action and a natural 
 
370 As further extended to political society proper or a commonwealth, the fundamental law of the 
commonwealth is the establishment of a legislative (II, 134). 
371 This is a rational requirement on basis of natural law. 
372 “Its,” I gather, refers here to “liberty.” The passage otherwise appears non-sensical. Liberty, then, 
is not preserved at the prerogative of the individual but for the sake of the species, on principle of 
which suicide is forbidden. Locke puts forth his notion of freedom in opposition to Filmer’s, in 
whose system freedom is understood as acting at will. Prior to action, Lockean freedom is fixed 
within the bounds of natural law. Thus, Lockean freedom, barring self-sacrifice, is understood rather 
as acting in and for the general will of the species. 
373 Lockean freedom is “the liberty of man,” (II, 22) while Filmer’s rival notion of freedom is that 
of every man for himself. 
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inclination (I, 86). Self-interest is aligned with the preservation of the species. But 
self-preservation is rationally required in virtue of the preservation of the species 
(see II, 6). 
Individuals are not, on the fundamental law of nature, to preserve only 
themselves but the whole of humanity and therein themselves (cf. Simmons 
1992:48).374 Given the law of the preservation of the species, everyone has an 
invariable duty and likewise a right to preserve himself and others, within the 
commonwealth and in a natural condition (Simmons 1993:67). For Locke, self-
preservation is a right, which is also a duty (Dunn 1980:43). 
Government being a remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature 
(II, 13), freemen seek to preserve their community and property in the form of civil 
society. The executive power of government, at that juncture, is applied for the 
preservation of the community. Absent arbitrary rule, government, for Locke, 
offers better protection. 
But Locke does not explicitly state that God appoints government “to 
restrain the partiality and violence of Men” (II, 13). I take issue with Stanton’s 
(2011:21) reading, to this effect. In the relevant passage, Locke (II, 13) invokes 
rather an objection to his own “strange Doctrine” of a natural executive right of 
natural judges, where contrarily God would be thought to appoint government to 
constrain the use of a right to punish, to avoid “Confusion and Disorder.” In fact, 
Locke would here seem to refer to a Filmerian view of government, for the 
avoidance of anarchy. 
 
374 To fulfill the duty of the preservation of the species, Simmons (1992:38) expounds, individuals 
may judge for themselves to be irrational, in acting against their self-interest (Simmons 1992:38). It 
would rather appear, on Locke’s (esp. I, 86) argument, individuals are irrational in rejecting or 
neglecting the duty of preserving the species and therein their own preservation. The inclination to 
preserve oneself, planted in man by God, is at the same time a principle of action, in following God’s 
will of the preservation of the human species, as His own workmanship. Thus, it remains a rational 
requirement, upon natural law, to preserve the species as well as oneself. 
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The law of preservation, for Locke, explains the formation of government. 
But the justification of the state and government is formulated in Locke’s account 






























This thesis has proposed to isolate a political justification of political power in 
Filmer’s system. A political justification is extracted from Filmer’s de facto theory 
of political power. Filmer’s patriarchal theory, I observe, relies on his de facto 
theory. Further, a de facto political justification culminates in a novel conquest 
theory, based upon possessory right. 
In demonstrating the coherence of Filmer’s system, I have defended the 
tenets of his system, including his patriarchal theory. The concept of a natural 
hierarchy undergirds our defense. On my reading, Filmer’s critics missed or 
devalued this concept, in their attempt at dismantling Filmer’s system. 
Now, my interpretation of Filmer’s doctrine deviates from orthodox Filmer 
scholarship, in that I have rendered positive his critique of consent theory. Anarchy, 
on this account, is not only a breakdown of government but a political situation. 
Filmer describes Israel of the Judges in terms of anarchy, where everyone is his 
own monarch. But on closer inspection, this portrays a political situation, where 
individuals apply their rights as natural judges. 
This conception I have termed “the anarchical principle.” It illuminates, I 
find, Locke’s construct of the original compact. On this ground, I have built my 
case for a similitude in Locke’s and Filmer’s doctrine, within a Bodinian 
sovereignty theory, on basis of which the patriarchal theory is supported. Locke, I 
conclude, also applies a political justification of political power, in his construct of 
the original compact. The difference lies in the person of the sovereign. In Filmer, 
the sovereign is a natural person, whereas in Locke, political union is sovereign, 
given political requirements in the formation of civil society. 
Accordingly, I reject Scott’s (2000) reading, in which Locke is made to 
propose a sovereignless state, with competing claimants to supreme power. As I 
376 
  
discuss, supreme powers of government are extensions of the sovereign power of 
the commonwealth, vested in political union. 
A political voluntarist reading of Locke, as proposed in Simmons (2001), 
fails by Locke’s own standards. Locke proceeds from the state’s monopoly on 
force. A voluntarist reading is at variance with Locke’s political doctrine, in this 
respect. A political naturalist reading incorporates this premise. Also, Locke’s 
account of non-intentional tacit consent is ill accommodated within political 
voluntarism. It is accommodated, however, on our reading. 
Political voluntarism, relatedly, does not satisfy Williams’s (2005) “basic 
legitimation demand.” A Lockean political doctrine does not satisfy Williams’s 
demand on basis of individual consent. To satisfy it, we proceed from political 
requirements of unanimity, referential to Locke’s original compact. 
Further, in his account of the separation of state powers, Locke makes 
absolutist allowances. The formation of Locke’s commonwealth, notably, includes 
absolute monarchy. Here, I object to Sagar’s (2018) understanding of the use of 
“absolute” in Locke, as by definition arbitrary. “Arbitrary” signifies supralegal 
powers of a tyrant. But Locke allows an absolute monarch, whose powers may be 
derived from political union of original contractors. 
Contra Grant (1987), the limits of political power, in Locke, relate but to 
governmental powers. State power remains absolute. It must not, however, act 
arbitrarily in view of the original compact. Still, original contractors are under an 
obligation only to themselves. 
In Locke’s original compact, contractors effectively take possession of a 
political union, in expression of unanimous consent. Political power, ultimately, 
derives from possession of political union. 
Contrary to a liberal Lockean view, Filmer’s system remains coherent. 
Further, Locke, the apparent victor of the historical debate, commits to a Filmerian 
paradigm. To this degree, Filmer was right. 
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On my reading, Locke’s political doctrine is foundationally illiberal. As I 
have stated, Locke’s political doctrine, as represented in his Two Treatises, operates 
on a Filmerian justification of the state. In this context, I believe reasons are 
provided to review the foundations of liberalism. This, I imagine, is a future project, 
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